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The  European  Union's  foreign  policy  continues  to  perplex  scholars  and 
practitioners  alike.  Arguably  the  most  controversial  aspect  of  the  European 
integration  process,  a  single  European  foreign  policy  remains  a  distant  prospect. 
The  Union's  persistent  inability  to  translate  its  economic  weight  into  effective 
political  influence  has  frequently  seen  it  marginalised  on  major  international 
issues,  and  left  searching  for  a  role  in  the  rapidly  changing  post-Cold  War  world. 
Yet  more  than  ever  it  is  expected  to  assume  its  share  of  global  responsibilities  and 
to  take  the  lead  in  developing  a  new  security  order  for  Europe. 
In  the  absence  of  capabilities  to  undertake  foreign  policy  strategies  in  the 
politico-security  sphere,  the  EU  has  relied  instead  on  its  foreign  economic  policy 
to  provide  it  with  the  instruments  to  secure  a  place  for  itself  on  the  world  stage. 
Through  its  long  established  control  of  access  to  lucrative  European  markets  and 
I 
its  substantial  financial  aid  budget,  the  Union  has  acted  as  a  magnetic  force  on  the 
regions  around  it.  With  this  influence  have  come  expectations  of  the  Union  as  a 
benevolent  force  for  economic,  political  and  social  change. 
The  Mediterranean  basin  represents  a  crucial  test  of  the  effectiveness  of 
EU  foreign  policy.  Faced  with  a  region  whose  future  stability  is  inextricably 
linked  to  European  security,  the  Union's  capacity  to  react  to  events  matters  far  less 
than  its  ability  to  undertake  forward  looking  and  genuinely  tranformative  strategic 
action  that  will  make  a  meaningful  and  long-term  contribution  to  security  and 
stability. CONTENTS 
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V Chapter  I 
INTRODUCTION:  EUROPEAN  FOREIGN  POLICY  AND 
STRATEGIC  ACTION 
This  thesis  is  a  study  of  the  development  of  the  European  Union's  external 
Mediterranean  policy  during  the  1990s.  The  period  has  seen  the  EU's  relations 
with  the  majority  of  non-member  states  of  the  Mediterranean  littoral  absorbed  into 
an  innovative  policy  'framework'  -  the  'Euro-Mediterranean  partnership'  (EMP). 
The  EMP  is  based  on  the  negotiation  of  Euro-Mediteffanean  Association 
Agreements,  an  upgraded  form  of  previous  agreements,  and  an  ambitious  and 
innovative  multilateral  political  declaration  and  work  programme.  Over  the  same 
period,  Mediterranean  security  has  become  an  increasingly  salient  issue  for  the 
Union,  testing  both  its  crisis  management  capabilities  and  its  long-term  security 
strategy  for  the  region.  It  is  with  the  latter  in  particular  that  this  thesis  is 
concemed. 
The  central  claim  of  the  thesis  is  that  the  Euro-Mediterranean  Partnership 
demonstrates  the  EU's  capacity  to  undertake  strategic  foreign  policy  action  in  its 
own  right.  This  capacity  is  principally  located  in  the  EU's  first  pillar  (the 
European  Communities),  in  traditionally  been  labelled  'external  economic 
relations'.  1  Active,  as  opposed  to  merely  reactive,  foreign  policy  emanates  from 
the  EC  acting  as  the  'agent'  of  the  European  Union.  2  While  the  Union  has  spent 
much  of  the  1990s  attempting  to  develop  a  stronger  common  foreign  and  security 
policy-making  mechanism,  it  is  the  Union's  'foreign  economic  policy"  that 
consistently  has  the  greatest,  if  not  always  a  highly  visible,  impact  on  the  outside 
world.  3  This  argument  rests  on  the  idea  that  an  inclusive  and  expansive  view  of 
I EU  foreign  policy  should  be  adopted.  Distinguishing  external  economic  relations 
from  foreign  policy  has  become  increasingly  anachronistic  in  an  international 
system  in  which  trade  and  finance  have  become  'high  politics.  '  A  broad  view  of 
EU  Mediterranean  policy  is  required  if  the  policy  -  and  its  significance, 
achievements  and  difficulties  are  to  be  understood. 
A  number  of  secondary  hypotheses  flow  from  this  argument.  First,  we 
should  expect  the  EU's  strategic  action  to  focus  on  so-called  'soft  security'  and 
6soft  power',  implying  the  eschewal  of  a  traditional  politico-military  concerns  in 
favour  of  the  economic,  societal  and  environmental  aspects  of  security.  4  Conflict 
prevention  rather  than  conflict  resolution,  is  the  Union's  main  strength  in  foreign 
policy.  That  is  not  to  suggest  that  politico-military  security  is  irrelevant  for  the 
EU;  the  brutal  wars  in  the  former  Yugoslavia  have  vividly  exposed  its  deficiencies 
in  that  realm.  But  what  matters  most  are  the  EU's  enduring  qualities  as  a 
ficivilian  power',  deploying  resources  that  derive  from  its  status  as  a  regional 
5 
economic  power  to  secure  its  objectives. 
Second,  the  notion  that  economic  policy  instruments  provide  the 
foundation  for  strategic  action  suggests  that  there  ought  to  be  greater  'consistency' 
between  pillars  I  and  JI.  6  In  other  words,  we  should  expect  to  find  economic 
policy  instruments  being  more  effectively  and  systematically  deployed  in  pursuit 
of  the  Union's  political  objectives,  since  that  is  where  its  real  strengths  as  an 
international  actor  lie. 
Third,  the  emphasis  on  pillar  I  and  external  trade  policy  as  the  bases  of 
strategic  action  has  important  implications  for  the  way  strategy  is  formulated  and 
policy  is  made.  The  delegation  Of  Policy  competence  from  the  Member  States  to 
the  Community  in  this  area  is  one  of  the  longest  established  and  most  highly 
developed  features  of  European  integration.  7  We  should  therefore  expect  a 
2 significant  degree  of  supranational  autonomy  in  the  policy  process,  with  the 
Commission  playing  a  key  role  in  shaping  policy  and  negotiating  with  third 
countries  on  behalf  of  the  Union.  By  extension,  we  might  also  anticipate  a 
stronger  sense  of  common  European  interests  in  the  development  of  policy. 
This  introductory  chapter  examines  the  ontology  of  EU  foreign  policy, 
assesses  the  state  of  the  art  in  EU  foreign  policy  studies,  and  sets  out  a  framework 
for  the  analysis  of  strategic  action.  Section  I  explores  the  complex  nature  of  EU 
foreign  policy  and  gives  a  brief  overview  of  the  Union's  competencies  in  that  area. 
In  section  2,  the  theoretical  problems  associated  with  the  study  of  EU  foreign 
policy  are  examined  from  a  variety  of  analytical  perspectives.  Section  3  sets  out  a 
framework  for  the  analysis  of  EU  strategic  action,  arguing  that  particular  attention 
must  be  paid  to  the  policy-making  process  in  order  to  understand  the  transition 
from  strategy  as  plan  into  strategy  as  policy.  It  moves  on  to  outline  the  content  of 
each  chapter  of  the  thesis. 
1.  The  Elusive  Pursuit  of  EU  Foreign  Policy 
Making  sense  of  EU  foreign  policy  is  far  from  straightforward.  As  Christopher 
Hill  argues: 
apart  from  a  very  small  group  of  diplomatic  practitioners  and  specialist 
commentators,  few  Europeans  (let  alone  those  on  the  outside  looking  in) 
have  a  clear  conception  of  the  multiple  layers  and  contradictions  that  go  up 
to  make  what  is  often  called  "European  foreign  PoliCy,,.  8 
A  first  problem  is  the  complex  multi-institutional,  multi-procedural  nature  of  the 
EU  foreign  policy-making  process.  A  bewildering  array  of  treaty  articles, 
European  Court  of  Justice  judgements  and  informal  agreements  among  the 
institutions  and  member  governments  have  shaped  the  EUs  acquispolitique,  the 
totality  of  the  Union's  competencies  and  output  in  the  foreign  Policy  domain. 
3 Institutional  competencies  for  policy-making  and  external  diplomatic  activity  vary 
with  the  issue  in  question  and  the  treaty  articles  associated  with  it.  In  many  cases, 
of  which  EU  Mediterranean  policy  is  a  prime  example,  foreign  policy  strategies 
are  composites  of  measures  that  emanate  from  several  sources  and  are  thus  subject 
to  wide  range  of  decision-making  rules  and  procedures. 
The  diff-usion  of  authority  in  EU  external  policy-making  has  increased  in 
line  with  the  general  transfer  of  policy-making  power  from  Member  State  to 
Community  level.  Since  the  acceleration  of  the  European  integration  process 
sparked  by  the  Single  Market  initiative,  the  externalisation  of  Community  policies 
has  given  most  policy  sectors  an  international  dimension.  9  Trade  negotiations,  for 
instance,  now  routinely  involve  several  Commission  Directorates  General,  as  well 
as  a  multitude  of  national  ministries  and  non-governmental  interests.  In  turn,  the 
external  dimension  of  the  European  integration  process,  most  notably  the  impact 
of  the  Single  Market  initiative,  generates  demands  from  outsiders  for  membership, 
association  agreements,  trade  agreements  and  other  forms  of  formal  relationships 
with  the  Union!  0  To  illustrate  the  point,  the  EU  negotiated  around  25  different 
. 
P--  - 
free  trade  agreements  (FTAs)  in  the  1990s  with  a  range  of  partners,  including 
Russia  and  Mercosur,  as  well  as  Mediteffanean  states.  " 
The  externalisation  of  internal  policy  also  creates  pressure  for  the  Union 
to  'speak  with  one  voice',  since  it  is  directly  to  the  Union  that  demands  are 
addressed.  Yet  the  lack  of  a  clear  institutional  locus  for  external  policy  continues 
to  handicap  the  Union,  exemplified  by  its  Union's  uncertain  status  in  international 
negotiations.  On  numerous  occasions,  third  countries,  and  even  the  Member 
States  themselves,  have  had  to  seek  legal  clarification  of  the  Union9s  powers.  12 
The  EU  had,  for  example,  'no  clear  policy  on  FTAs:  they  were  mostly  negotiated 
by  Commissioners  between  whom  the  world  was  divided  into  regional 
4 responsibilities  ... 
[and  were]  defended  as  a  means  to  strengthen  the  Union's  hand 
in  their  "patch"  of  the  globe.  '  13 
A  second  problem  arises  from  the  existence  of  multiple  'levels'  of 
European  foreign  policy  activity  which  are  enmeshed  with,  and  often  analytically 
inseparable  from,  the  Union's  own  foreign  policy  activities.  The  most  significant 
of  these  remains  the  national  level,  expressed  in  the  foreign  policies  of  the 
Member  States.  Indeed,  EU  external  policies  are  frequently  specifically  designed 
to  complement,  or  be  complemented  by,  national  policies.  Moreover,  although  the 
EU  has  acquired  exclusive  competence  over  many  crucial  areas  of  external 
economic  relations,  the  Member  States  have  stubbornly  resisted  a  significant 
transfer  of  authority  to  the  EU  level  over  the  traditional  politico-security 
component  of  foreign  policy.  Admittedly,  Article  5  of  the  EEC  Treaty  requires 
the  Member  States  to  abstain  from  any  measure  which  could  j  eopardise  the 
attainment  of  the  EU's  objectives.  However,  the  ambiguity  of  the  article  leaves 
much  scope  for  national  foreign  policies  and  national  interests  to  act  as  a 
centrihgal  force  on  the  European  foreign  policy  process. 
At  another  level,  the  EU  has  become  increasingly  dependent  on  outside 
organisations  in  both  the  design  and  implementation  of  its  external  policies. 
Although  the  memberships  of  the  EU  and  these  organisations  may  overlap,  they 
are  rarely  identical.  14  The  dependence  of  the  EU  on  other  organisations  is  ahnost 
total  in  the  cases  of  defence  and  security  policy.  NATO  continues  to  dominate 
European  security  and  has  arguably  become  an  increasingly  significant  player 
15 
since  it  acquired  the  ability  to  act  'out-of-area'.  The  eastern  enlargement 
strategy  of  the  EU,  and  NATO's  own  strategy  for  expansion,  are  inextricably 
linked,  and  it  is  virtually  unthinkable  that  one  can  proceed  without  the  other.  16  In 
similar  fashion,  the  use  of  NGOs  to  implement  EU  funded  projects  ranging  from 
5 support  for  democratisation  to  assistance  for  small  businesses,  has  become 
standard  practice.  Policy  might  originate  in  the  EU,  but  the  implementation  of  it 
is  often  well  outside  its  direct  control.  The  recent  scandal  that  emerged  over  the 
maladministration  of  EU  funds,  including  programmes  in  the  Mediterranean, 
exemplifies  this  control  problem  in  external  policy.  17 
The  classification  of  the  EU's  external  activities  -  has  been  facilitated  by 
its  separation  into  two  (supposedly)  distinct  branches.  18  External  economic 
relations  formed  the  first  branch.  Its  bases  in  the  founding  treaties  were  the 
Common  Commercial  Policy  (Articles  131-5),  relationships  with  the  overseas 
territories  of  the  Member  States  (Articles  3  00-3  10)  and  the  potential  to  accept  new 
members  (Article  237  EEC  Treaty).  19  It  is  primarily  through  these  articles  that  the 
Union  has  been  endowed  with  an  extensive  range  of  external  policy  instruments  in 
pillar  1.  Policy-making  in  this  area  has  a  strong  'supranational'  element,  with 
many  decisions  taken  according  to  the  'Community  method'.  20 
The  literature  on  external  economic  relations  has  tended  to  treat  them  as 
'low  politics',  focusing  either  on  the  economic  implications  of  agreements  for 
relationships  with  third  countries,  or  on  the  effect  the  agreements  have  on  the 
EU's  status  as  an  international  actor.  21  As  Lodge  argues,  however,  'the  Common 
Commercial  Policy's  scope  is  so  wide  that  all  manner  of  other  issues  fall  into  the 
22 
supposedly  "low  political"  competence  of  the  EC.  The  increased  politicisation 
of  trade,  capital  movements  and  money  during  the  1990s  exposes  the  growing 
irrelevance  of  this  distinction. 
European  Political  Cooperation,  later  superseded  by  the  Common  Foreign 
and  Security  Policy  (CFSP),  has  formed  the  second  branch.  Its  creators  saw  EPC 
as  part  of  the  integration  process,  designed  to  foster  coordination  between  the 
national  foreign  policies  of  the  Member  States  and  enable  the  Community  to 
6 collectively  respond  to  the  considerable  external  pressures  that  Western  Europe 
23  faced  at  the  start  of  the  1970s.  The  aim  was  to  empower  the  Community  in  the 
realm  of  'high  politics.  '  However,  EPC  was  deliberately  designed  to  run  parallel 
to,  rather  than  in  conjunction  with,  the  Community's  external  economic  relations, 
and  centred  on  informal  consensus  among  the  foreign  ministries  of  the  member 
states  rather  than  on  the  Community's  institutions.  24 
Despite  being  little  more  than  a  mechanism  for  the  coordination  of 
national  foreign  policies,  EPC  has  attracted  growing  interest  from  the  academic 
community.  The  assumption,  seemingly  corroborated  by  the  gradual  codification 
of  EPC's  procedures,  a  handful  of  high  profile  diplomatic  initiatives,  and  its 
increasing  reliance  on  Community  policy  instruments  and  resources,  was  that  an 
effective  common  foreign  policy  capability  required  a  politico-diplomatic 
dimension;  some  sort  of  collective  capacity  to  deal  with  political,  security  and 
even  military  issues.  Two  decades  of  little  more  than  well-intentioned  political 
declarations  exposed  the  limitations  of  EPC,  but  many  scholars  continued  to 
regard  it  as  the  closest  thing  to  real  foreign  policy  machinery  in  the  EU,  even  if 
what  it  produced  could  hardly  be  described  as  real  foreign  policy.  25 
The  creation  of  the  Common  Foreign  and  Security  Policy  -  the  second  of 
Maastricht's  three  pillars  -  enshrined  the  foreign  policy-external  relations 
dichotomy  in  the  treaties.  Although  the  TEU  (Article  Q  stressed  the  need  for  the 
Commission  and  Council  to  ensure  'horizontal'  consistency  between  the  EU's 
6external  relations,  security,  economic  and  development  policies',  the  treaty  paid 
scant  regard  to  how  bridging  the  divide  between  the  two  pillars  would  actually  be 
achieved.  Nor  did  it  address  the  issue  of  'vertical'  consistency  between  EU 
foreign  policy  and  the  foreign  policies  of  the  individual  Member  States.  26  A 
Declaration  appended  to  the  Treaty  promised  a  review  of  the  procedures  for 
7 consistency,  but  left  the  actual  arrangements  largely  open  ended.  The  suggestion 
prior  to  the  IGCs  that  the  two  branches  might  be  integrated  in  the  single 
institutional  framework  had  been  ruled  out  by  the  sensitivity  of  some  of  the 
Member  States  to  ceding  control  over  one  of  the  key  attributes  of  the  sovereign 
state,  and  by  the  caution  of  the  Commission,  which  was  wary  of  pushing  the 
supranational  cause  too  hard. 
The  final  package  amounted  to  a  codified  version  of  EPC  with  some 
modest  communitarisation  of  procedures,  but  was  talked  up  both  by  EU  policy- 
makers  and  the  European  media  as  heralding  the  dawn  of  a  new  age  in  European 
foreign  PoliCY. 
27  Initially,  the  academic  community  appeared  to  buy  into  the  new 
policy,  albeit  with  critical  reservations  about  its  likely  effectiveness.  The  new 
Title  V  (Article  J.  4)  broached  the  taboo  subject  of  EU  defence  policy  for  the  first 
time,,  tentatively  setting  up  the  WEU  as  the  Union's  defence  arm.  New  decision- 
making  procedures  -  common  positions  and  joint  actions  (Article  J.  2)  -  were 
created  that  potentially  paved  the  way  enable  the  Union  to  take  collective  'action' 
in  addition  to  issuing  political  declarations.  However,  the  CFSP  did  not  equip  the 
Union  with  a  new  set  of  foreign  policy  instruments,  while  decisions  about 
financing  actions  and  the  use  of  pillar  I  external  policy  instrwnents,  were  to  be 
made  on  a  case-specific  basis  rather  than  through  any  set  formula.  In  this  sense, 
the  new  mechanism  singularly  failed  even  to  clarify  the  institutional  division  of 
labour  in  EU  foreign  policy.  28  What  has  been  termed  'ad  hocery'  remained  the 
stmd  practice. 
29 
One  of  the  key  tasks  mandated  to  the  inter-governmental  conferences  that 
produced  the  1997  Amsterdam  Treaty  was  to  'endow  the  Union  with  a  greater 
capacity  for  external  action'.  30  Given  the  ineffectiveness  of  the  CFSP  in  fostering 
agreement  among  the  Member  States,  and  with  eastern  enlargement  looming, 
8 procedural  adaptation  headed  the  wish  list.  31  But  a  leap  forward  in  the 
communitarisation  of  CFSP  decision-making  was  never  a  realistic  prospect.  As 
Bobby  McDonagh,  an  kish  diplomat  involved  in  the  IGC  negotiations  put  it: 
the  simple  fact  is  that,  at  the  present  stage  of  the  Union's  development,  there 
is  a  limit  to  the  extent  to  which  any  Member  State  is  prepared  to  submerge  a 
perceived  important  foreign  policy  interest  within  a  single  European 
position. 
32 
Rather  than  wholesale  reform,  the  1997  Amsterdam  Treaty  made  only 
incremental  changes  to  the  CFSP.  The  Union's  stubborn  adherence  to  unamnuty 
as  the  basis  for  decision-making  was  mitigated  by  provision  for  the  'constructive 
abstention'  of  up  to  a  third  of  the  Member  States  and  a  limited  extension  of  QMV 
to  decisions  that  flow  from  common  strategies  and  those  that  implement  common 
positions  and  joint  actions  (Article  23  (ex  J.  13).  Member  States  retained  the  right 
to  block  decisions  'for  important  and  stated  reasons  of  national  policy',  thus 
preserving  a  defacto  veto  (Article  23.2).  Two  additional  competencies  were 
added  to  Article  J.  2  -  the  definition  of  guidelines  and  the  adoption  of  common 
strategies  -  that  brought  the  Union  into  foreign  policy-making  process  at  an  earlier 
stage  (European  Council).  To  complement  this  enhanced  directional  power,  the 
creation  of  a  Policy  Planning  and  Early  Warning  Unit  (PPEWU)  housed  in  the 
Council  Secretariat  gave  the  Union  a  capacity  for  the  independent  (of  the  Member 
States)  analysis  of  foreign  policy  situations.  The  profile  of  the  Union  abroad  was 
to  be  strengthened  by  the  appointment  of  the  Council's  Secretary  General  as  'High 
Representative'  of  the  CFSP.  Although  these  developments  promoted  further 
'Brusselisation'  of  the  CFSP,  the  Council  was  the  principle  beneficiary  of  change, 
a  situation  which  leaves  the  member  governments  in  control  of  the  CFSp.  33 
By  the  end  of  the  1990s,  it  was  clear  from  experience  that  the  CFSP  had 
not  lived  up  to  its  billing.  34  The  Union  could  point  to  only  a  handful  of 
9 successftil,  high  profile  joint  actions,  among  them  support  for  the  Middle  East 
35 
Peace  Process  and  the  Palestinian  elections.  On  issues  that  ought  to  have 
elicited  a  strong  collective  political  position  from  the  Union,  such  as  the  crises  in 
Algeria  and  the  Balkans,  a  strong  Union  position  was  conspicuous  by  its  absence. 
Like  that  of  its  predecessor,  the  CFSP's  output  was  dominated  by  statements 
rather  than  concrete  action.  Any  bridging  between  pillars  I  and  H  was  driven  by 
the  imperative  of  the  issue  and  the  creativity  of  the  Union,  particularly  the 
opportunism  of  the  Commission,  rather  than  by  procedural  advances  brought  by 
the  TEU  (or  ones  now  in  place  via  the  Amsterdam  treaty). 
Much  of  the  literature  on  EU  foreign  policy  caught  the  CFSP  wave.  Here, 
for  the  first  time,  appeared  to  be  the  bare  bones  of  a  European  security  and 
defence  identity  (ESDI)  and  a  mechanism  for  common  foreign  policy-making  in 
something  approaching  a  constitutionalised  form.  Yet  as  Peterson  and  Sjursen 
argue,  practice  has  shown  the  CFSP  to  be  best  conceived  of  as  a  process  rather 
than  a  policy.  36  The  disappointing  record  of  the  CFSP,  which  with  a  few 
exceptions  has  produced  little  more  than  carefully  worded  and  politically  tentative 
declarations,  suggests  that  finding  a  position  on  which  the  Member  States  can 
actually  agree  -  the  coordination  reflex  -  is  a  more  important  function  than  the 
PoliCY,  S  oUtpUt,. 
37  What  the  CFSP  failed  to  do  was  significantly  change  the  way 
the  Member  States  perceived  foreign  policy.  For  most,  it  remained  a  bastion  of 
sovereignty,  and  any  meaningful  transfer  of  authority  to  the  EU  was  to  be  resisted. 
Nor  could  it  induce  the  political  conditions  under  which  all  the  Member  States 
would  seek  and  subsequently  adhere  to  genuinely  common  foreign  policy 
positions  as  a  matter  of  course.  Indeed,  the  early  years  of  the  CFSP  were  notable 
for  a  resurgence  of  national  interests.  38  Foreign  policy  continued  to  reflect  the 
10 uneasy  tension  between  national  foreign  policy  priorities  and  a  faltering  sense  of  a 
European  interest.  39 
Faced  with  this  institutional  and  procedural  'mixity',  identifying  the  key 
actors  and  influences  involved  in  the  EU"s  foreign  policy  process  is  always 
problematic,  whether  at  the  initiation,  decision  or  implementation  stage.  40 
However,  as  Hill  argues,  'only  by  taking  an  overview  of  all  the  elements  of  what 
we  optimistically  call  "European  foreign  policy"'  can  we  identify  a  pattern  of 
behaviour  and  assess  the  respective  contributions  of  the  various  parts  -  positive 
and  negative'.  41  Recognising  the  merit  of  an  inclusive  definition  of  EU  foreign 
policy  is  also  an  essential  step  to  understanding  the  Union's  overall  impact  in  the 
international  system.  After  all,  whenever  Mediterranean  third  countries  have 
sought  to  deepen  their  relationships  with  the  EU,  it  has  been  the  Union's  trade  and 
aid  policies,  rather  than  its  defence  and  military  capabilities  that  have  really 
mattered. 
2.  Theoretical  Perspectives  on  EU  Foreign  Policy 
Scholars  of  the  European  Union  face  considerable  ontological  and  epistemological 
problems  when  it  comes  to  their  subject  area.  We  are  still  some  way  from 
consensus  on  what  it  is  that  we  are  studying,  let  alone  how  to  study  it.  For  those 
endeavouring  to  theorise  about  EU  foreign  policy,  such  difficulties  are  aggravated 
by  the  multi-level,  multi-institutional  characteristics  of  the  EU's  foreign  policy- 
making  system  described  above,  by  the  obfuscating  and  ambiguous  terminology  in 
which  EU  foreign  policy  is  frequently  couched,  and  by  the  sui  generis  nature  of 
the  Union  itself. 
42 
Not  surprisingly  perhaps,  theoretical  work  on  EU  foreign  policy  has 
always  lagged  some  way  behind  the  burgeoning  theoretical  output  on  other  aspects 
II of  the  European  integration  process.  43  This  theoretical  lacuna  in  European 
foreign  policy  studies  is  compounded  by  the  relatively  small  number  of  detailed 
empirical  case  studies.  Much  of  the  literature  on  the  subject  tends  to  be 
descriptive  or  prescriptive,  concerned  with  making  sense  of  the  procedural 
complexity  of  the  Union's  foreign  policy-maldng  mechanisms  or  offering 
corrective  recipes  for  the  EU's  deficiencies  as  an  international  actor.  This  section 
argues  that  the  building  blocks  of  theory  may  be  present,  but  assembling  them  into 
IQ7-- 
a  comprehensible  theoretical  framework  is  entirely  another  matter.  As 
Christopher  Hill  contends,  'the  experience  of  "European  foreign  policy"  over  the 
last  20  years  or  so  has  been  so  unique  that  the  search  for  one  theory  to  explain  its 
evolution  is  doomed  to  fail....  44 
What,  then,  do  the  major  theoretical  perspectives  on  international  relations 
and  European  integration  have  to  say  about  EU  foreign  policy?  Traditional 
realists  by  and  large  ignore  the  EU  as  an  international  actor  . 
45  Since  it  is  not  a 
state,  it  cannot  by  definition  possess  a  foreign  policy.  Henry  Kissinger's  recent 
tome  on  the  history  of  diplomacy,  for  instance,  barely  mentions  the  diplomatic 
activity  of  the  EU  in  international  politics.  46  For  classical  realists,  the  incessant 
pursuit  of  power,  primarily  through  military  means,  by  states  in  an  anarchic  state 
system  precludes  international  cooperation  other  than  alliance  diplomacy.  47  By 
extension,  the  European  integration  seemed  a  transitory  phenomenon,  destined  to 
disintegrate  in  the  chaotic  post-Cold  War  world.  48 
Neo-realism  (or  structural  realism),  with  its  emphasis  on  systemic  structure 
as  the  major  determinant  of  the  behaviour  of  states,  does  see  the  possibility  of 
cooperation  between  states.  States  may  occasionally  choose  to  cooperate  in  order 
to  avoid  conflict,  whether  military  or  economic,  but  the  anarchic  nature  of  the 
international  system,  in  which  self-reliance  is  essential,  weighs  against  it.  49  In  any 
12 case,  inter-state  bargaining  always  takes  place  with  govemments'  eyes  fiffnly 
fixed  on  the  relative  gains  from  cooperation  and  the  likely  impact  on  the 
distribution  of  power.  "  Through  this  lens,  the  EU  is  viewed  as  a  governmental 
forum  in  which  states  participate  in  order  to  further  their  own  interests  and  power. 
In  a  rare  neo-realist  interpretation  of  EPC,  Alfred  PiJpers  argues  that  'the  major 
policies  and  institutions  of  Europe's  would-be  foreign  policy  are  the  reflection  of 
deliberate  national  preferences  of  the  participating  states.  51 
Neither  realism  nor  neo-realism  are  compatible  with  the  inclusive  image  of 
EU  foreign  policy  presented  above,  based  as  they  are  on  the  assumptions  that 
foreign  policy  is  somehow  the  privileged  domain  of  governmental  elites,  isolated 
. 
r_.  - 
from  domestic  influences,  and  the  exclusive  preserve  of  the  unitary  state.  VAiile 
the  predominantly  inter-governmental  nature  of  EPC  and  the  CFSP  do  lend  some 
credibility  to  the  state-centricity  of  the  two  approaches,  they  cannot  satisfactorily 
account  for  the  institutionalisation  of  foreign  policy  coordination,  however  fragile 
and  limited  it  may  be.  52  Nor  can  they  account  for  the  supranationalisation  of 
national  foreign  economic  policy  in  the  Union.  As  Roy  Ginsberg  argues, 
neorealism: 
Ignores  the  role  of  supranational  institutions  in  crafting  and  facilitating 
compromises  and  in  overseeing  and  managing  daily  processes.  It  also 
ignores  why,  how  and  when  national  interests  converge  and  to  what  extent 
they  are  shaped  by  domestic  and  international  Politics  and  the  ethos  of 
Community  membership.  53 
A  more  sophisticated  version  of  state-centric  analysis  -  liberal 
intergovernmentalism  (LI)  -  also  experiences  difficulties  coming  to  terms  with  the 
expansive  definition  of  EU  foreign  policy.  The  basic  claims  of  this  perspective 
are  that  European  integration  is  driven  by  the  rational,  calculated  choices  of 
governments  to  pool  in  or  delegate  sovereignty  to  international  institutions  in 
response  to  domestic  economic  interests  and  the  need  to  offset  the  negative  effects 
13 of  interdependence.  54  The  decision  to  cooperate  is  made  with  a  clear  idea  of  the 
resultant  costs  and  benefits.  The  creation  of  the  Union's  Common  Commercial 
Policy  (Articles  131-5),  for  instance,  is  explained  as  an  essential  extension  to  the 
55  Member  States'  preference  for  the  liberalisation  of  trade  amongst  themselves. 
Cooperation  in  the  realm  of  traditional  foreign  and  security  policy 
represents  a  bigger  test  for  LI  theory.  Common  foreign  and  security  policy  is  a 
'cnon-socio-economic  collective  good'  whose  costs  and  benefits  are  diffuse  and 
uncertain.  As  Andrew  Moravcsik,  the  leading  proponent  of  this  approach,  argues, 
'the  reasoning  used  to  justify  policies  tends  to  be  symbolic  and  ideological,  rather 
than  calculated  and  concrete.  56  Here,  geopolitical  factors,  concerns  about 
sovereignty  and  the  commitment  of  governments  to  the  European  project  explain 
how  the  EU's  competencies  in  this  field  have  developed. 
Other  variants  of  intergovernmental  institutionalism  offer  similarly 
rationalist,  instrumentalist  interpretations  of  the  EU.  Robert  Keohane  and  Stanley 
Hoffinann.  see  the  EU  as  highly  advanced  form  of  regime,  created  by  European 
governments  for  the  purpose  of  managing  the  increasing  levels  of  interdependence 
between  them.  57  As  the  definition  of  security  expanded  after  the  end  of  the  Cold 
War,  the  increased  importance  of  the  EU  in  managing  trade  and  dealing  with 
issues  such  as  environmental  protection  seemed  to  validate  this  claim.  However, 
intergovernmental.  institutionalists  too  have  comparatively  little  to  say  about  the 
development  of  the  EU  as  a  foreign  policy  actor,  citing  the  weakness  of  its  defence 
and  security  capability  as  evidence  of  both  the  primacy  of  national  interests  and 
58 
the  sui  generis  character  of  the  organisation.  Keohane  and  Hoffmann  concede 
that  in  foreign  economic  policy,  power  has  been  transferred  to  a  central, 
supranational  authority  distinct  from  the  states,  but  see  no  such  prospect  in  the 
14 politico-security  sphere.  59  Moreover,  the  policy  process  itself  is  dominated  by 
govemments. 
Clearly,  the  parameters  of  EU  foreign  policy  are  largely  determined  by  the 
Member  States.  Furthermore,  as  this  thesis  argues,  the  member  governments' 
defence  of  domestic  economic  interests  is  frequently  decisive  at  key  stages  of  the 
policy  process.  However,  intergovernmentalist  theories  suffer  from  a  number  of 
blind  spots.  First,  the  primary  concern  of  these 
intergovemmentalist/institutionalist  theories  is  to  explain  the  major,  formative 
decisions  in  the  history  of  European  integration  rather  than  the  regular  policy 
process.  They  therefore  have  rather  less  utility  as  tools  for  policy  analysis. 
Second,  and  relatedly,  there  is  an  inherent  tendency  in  these  theories  to  overlook 
or  downplay  the  role  of  supranational  agency;  institutions  being  principally 
viewed  as  servants  of  the  member  governments.  60  Third,  in  downplaying  the 
impact  of  geopolitics  and  systemic  change  on  the  bargains  that  states  strike,  LI  in 
particular  excludes  important  external  stimuli  that  clearly  influence  the  type  of 
external  policies  that  the  EU  pursues.  Perceptions  of  a  security  'threat'  from  the 
Mediterranean,  for  instance,  were  a  key  factor  in  determining  the  strategy  that  the 
Union  subsequently  pursued. 
More  promising  variations  on  the  institutionalist  theme  are  to  be  found  in 
'historical'  or  'new'  institutionalist'  theories,  which  emphasise  the  autonomy  of 
6 
supranational  mstitutions.  1  The  chief  merit  of  this  school  of  thought  is  that  it 
distinguishes  distinct  phases  in  the  policy  process.  Governments  may  determine 
the  basis  and  set  the  agenda  for  cooperation,  but  'during  later  phases  of  the 
[policy]  process,  other  actors,  rules  and  EC  procedures  can  exert  their  effects...  '.  62 
External  economic  relations  work  from  a  long-established  script  in  which  the 
supranational  agency  and  entrepreneurship  of  the  Commission  play  a  crucial  role 
15 in  policy  'output'.  The  history  of  EU  Mediterranean  policy  is  one  of  contMiWity, 
with  responsibility  for  negotiating  and  re-negotiating  agreements  with  third 
countries-  the  central  plank  of  policy  -  being  vested  in  pillar  I. 
What  this  brief  distillation  of  theoretical  perspectives  shows  is  that,  to 
varying  degrees,  all  offer  some  insight  into  either  the  nature  or  the  process  of  EU 
foreign  policy.  Intergovemmentalist  approaches  undoubtedly  have  a  stronger 
claim  to  explaining  EPC/CFSP  where  conflicting  foreign  policy  positions  among 
the  Member  States  mean  the  EU  has  frequently  failed  to  produce  a  unified  stance 
on  key  issues.  Supranationalist  approaches  must  figure  in  theoretical  explanations 
of  the  EU's  foreign  economic  policy,  where  governmental  domination  is  checked 
by  the  'Community  method'  of  decision-making.  However,  a  macro-theory  of  EU 
foreign  policy  remains  a  distant  prospect.  If  a  general  theory  is  possible,  it  is 
likely  to  be  built  from  a  synthesis  of  theoretical  perspectives  that  take  into  account 
the  multi-level  character  of  the  EU  foreign  policy-making  system,  the  multiple 
outputs  of  EU  external  policy  and  the  mixture  of  govenunental  and  supranational 
decision-making  procedures  and  policy  instruments  that  comprise  the  Union's 
acquispolitique.  63 
Dissatisfaction  with  what  theory  has  to  offer  has  led  a  number  of  EU 
foreign  policy  analysts  to  seek  instead  to  conceptualise  the  impact  on  and  roles  of 
the  EU  in  the  international  system.  Concepts  such  as  'actorness',  'presence'  and 
'influence'  describe  and  explain  the  functions  and  status  of  the  Union  at  the  global 
or  regional  level,  and  contextualise  its  interaction  with  the  outside  world.  64  The 
common  denominator  running  through  this  work  is  that  the  ambiguous  status  of 
the  EU  as  a  foreign  policy  actor  and  the  complexity  of  its  foreign  policy-making 
system  give  it  variable  presence  or  actor  capability  in  different  'issue  areas'.  65  its 
impact  is  most  tangible  in  the  world  political  economy,  where  its  capacity  for 
16 unified  action  is  greatest.  Conversely,  where  it  lacks  the  capacity  for  unified 
action,  on  military  and  defence  issues  for  example,  its  impact  is  marginal. 
Perhaps  the  most  influential  analysis  of  the  EU's  status  and  performance  as 
an  international  actor  is  Christopher  Hill's  'capabilities-expectations  gap'  thesis. 
Hill  takes  the  argues  that  the  balancing  act  between  the  foreign  policy  'resources' 
at  the  Union's  disposal  -  its  economic  and  financial  power,  its  policy  instruments, 
and  its  cohesiveness  -  and  the  need  to  fulfil  the  growing  list  of  external  demands 
made  of  it  determine  its  effectiveness  as  an  international  actor.  In  EU 
Mediterranean  policy,  the  manifestation  of  the  capabilities-expectations  gap  has 
centred  on  the  issue  of  resource  allocation  issues,  specifically  on  the  level  of 
financial  assistance  and  market  access  for  third  countries.  VAiile  the  Union  has 
increased  the  level  of  resources  it  provides  for  the  Mediterranean,  so  the  Euro- 
Mediterranean  Partnership  has  raised  expectations  about  how  far  the  Union  will 
go  in  offering  an  economic  helping  hand  to  its  poorer  southern  neighbours.  66  Tbe 
'capabilities-expectations  gap'  is  perhaps  most  visible  in  the  Union's  relations 
with  the  United  States  and  Central  and  Eastern  European  countries  67 
, 
but  it  is  an 
important  part  of  the  story  of  EU  Mediterranean  policy,  too.  The  EU's  habit  of 
'talking  up'  its  foreign  policy  may  be  less  acute  now  than  during  the  early  1990s, 
thus  leading  to  a  partial  closing  of  the  gap  between  the  EU's  capabilities  and  the 
outside  world's  expectations  since  then.  68  But  the  gap  remains,  and  it  mitigates 
against  truly  strategic  action  in  EU  external  policy. 
3.  Conceptualising  Strategic  Action 
Policy-makers  and  policy  analysts  may  talk  about  EU  foreign  policy  strategies,  but 
the  actual  meaning  of  strategic  action  is  rarely  considered.  In  basic  terms,  strategy 
can  be  defined  as  'a  plan  of  action  or  policy',  denoting  pro-active,  purposive  rather 
17 than 
reactive  behaviour 
. 
69ThiS  dynaMiC  quality  to  strategic  action  is  summarised 
by  Keohane  and  Hoffinann: 
Strategy  is  essentially  forward  looking:  beginning  where  history  has  left 
them,  actors  seek  to  take  advantage  of  future  trends.  Their  expectations 
shape  their  policies  as  much  as  does  their  actual  situation.  70 
In  turn,  the  notion  of  purposive,  goal  directed  behaviour  implies  a  decision  to 
pursue  more  or  less  specified  objectives,  themselves  a  result  of  the 
identification,  prioritisation  and  articulation  of  interests.  71 
At  first  sight,  the  application  of  this  definition  to  the  EU's  external 
activities  appears  to  be  relatively  straightforward.  The  Union  has  gradually  built 
up  a  hierarchy  of  strategies  towards  individual  third  countries  and  regional 
organisations,  and  developed  distinct  and  consistent  'lines'  on  a  wide  range  of 
external  issues.  The  Yaoundd  and  Lome  conventions,  and  the  so-called  'Global 
Mediterranean  Policy',  were  among  the  first  examples  of  external  strategic 
actions,  designed  to  establish  'frameworks'  for  relations  with  groups  of  third 
countries.  More  recent  high  profile  examples  include  the  Union's  position  in  the 
Uruguay  round  of  the  GATT,  its  Agenda  2000  eastern  accession  strategy  and  the 
'New Transatlantic  Agenda'. 
However,  unpacking  the  concept  of  EU  strategic  action  reveals  two 
significant  analytical  problems.  First,  foreign  policy  analysis  (FPA)  as  an 
academic  discipline  is  inextricably  bound  up  with  the  state  and  with  the  interest- 
driven  behaviour  of  governments.  72  Besides  the  obvious  fact  that  the  EU  is  not  a 
state,  the  lack  of  a  central  government  and  the  prominence  of  the  member 
governments  in  the  policy-making  process  militates  against  using  the  standard  box 
of  analytical  tools.  How,  for  instance,  should  the  analyst  factor  in  the  constant 
interplay  between  institutions,  states  and  interests  that  determines  EU  policy? 
18 Where  does  the  fonnulation  and  execution  of  EU  foreign  policy  strategies  begin 
and  end? 
One  way  around  this  problem  is  to  view  EU  foreign  policy  as  a  system  of 
external  relations.  73  The  system  clearly  has  institutionalised  procedures,  what  Ben 
Soetendorp  describes  as  'decision  regimes',  for  defining  objectives  and  designing 
actions  to  achieve  them.  74  The  creation  of  the  Policy  Planning  and  Early  Warning 
Unit  by  the  Amsterdam  Treaty  was  explicitly  intended  to  improve  the  Union's 
capabilities  in  this  area.  In  the  case  of  the  ENT,  both  the  Commission  and 
individual  Member  States  set  an  agenda  for  strategic  action  in  the  region  and 
proposed  measures  to  execute  it.  Taking  the  system  metaphor  a  step  further,,  the 
system  responds  to  'inputs'  both  from  within  the  Union  (domestic  economic  and 
political  interests,  externalisation)  and  from  its  external  environment  (geo-political 
changes,  specific  demands  from  third  countries).  The  outputs  of  EU  foreign 
policy  feed  back  into  the  system  from  the  results  of  actions,  making  the  whole 
system  dynamic  and  self-sustaining.  While  EU  foreign  policy-making  is  certainly 
not  as  structured  and  tidy  as  the  systems  approach  implies,  it  nevertheless  provides 
a  useful  canvas  on  which  to  paint  a  picture  of  how  strategic  actions  develop. 
The  second  problem  relates  to  the  existence  of  common  European  interests 
as  the  rationale  for  strategic  action.  For  former  Commission  President  Jacques 
Delors,  an  EU  'vision'  for  the  world  and  the  elaboration  of  specific  common 
interests  were  essential  pieces  of  the  integration  jigsaw.  75  But  the  sheer  diversity 
of  the  EU's  membership  means  that  the  opportunities  for  genuine  commonality  or 
even  tight  convergence  of  interests  are  few  and  far  between.  Where  policies  are 
couched  in  terms  of  European  interests,  internal  differences  are  rarely  far  from  the 
surface.  Moreover,  claims  of  a  European  interest  are,  to  a  significant  extent, 
subjective,  based  on  the  perceptions,  understandings  and  also  interests  of  those 
19 making  the  claim.  If  the  EU  is  to  be  used  to  further  the  interests  of  a  Member 
State  or  institution,  then  an  appeal  to  the  general  interest  can  be  an  effective  tactic. 
Again,  however,  this  conceptual  problem  is  rather  less  challenging  than  it 
first  appears  to  be.  A  modem  state's  foreign  policy  interests  can  rarely,  if  ever,  be 
described  as  unified.  The  realist  image  of  the  unitary  state  has  long  since  given 
way  to  pluralist  images  that  stress  the  disaggregated  nature  of  government  and  the 
importance  of  competition  between  competing  interests  in  policy-making.  In  a 
sense,  the  EU's  external  policy-making  system  is  just  a  far  more  complex 
manifestation  of  the  same  phenomenon.  Competition  over  interests  may  be  fiercer 
and  more  protracted  than  is  the  case  at  national  level,  but  the  'bargahiuing  style'  of 
EU  decision-making  allows  for  mediation  between  these  interests.  76  Prior 
agreement  over  what  constitutes  the  EU's  interest  on  particular  issues  is  clearly 
desirable,  but  not  essential,  and  disagreement  over  interests  need  not  be  a  barrier 
to  strategic  action. 
Furthermore,  the  EU  itself  has  gone  some  way  to  narrowing  down  the 
loosely  defined  external  interests  set  out  in  the  treaties.  77  Indeed,  the  1990s  have 
seen  gradual  moves  towards  more  specific  statements  of  what  are  considered  to  be 
the  Union's  fundamental  interests.  After  the  creation  of  the  CFSP,  the  1992 
Lisbon  European  Council  designated  a  number  of  geographical  interest  areas, 
among  them  the  Middle  East  and  Maghreb.  The  Amsterdam  Treaty  (Article  17) 
included  a  reference  to  the  Western  European  Union's  (WEU)  Petersberg  tasks, 
listing  humanitarian  and  rescue  operations,  peacekeeping/peacemaking  and  crisis 
management  as  basic  interests  of  the  Union  in  the  security  and  defence  spheres. 
In  sum,  two  of  the  prerequisites  for  strategic  action  -  the  institutional 
capacity  to  formulate  and  pursue  strategic  objectives  and  the  possession  of  a  set  of 
interests  -  are  present  in  the  Union"  s  external  policy  system.  As  the  Union  has 
20 increased  in  size  and  scope,  so  its  range  of  interests  has  greatly  expanded,  but  so 
too  have  demands  for  it  to  engage  in  long-term  strategic  action,  both  in  the  context 
of  its  evolving  relationship  with  the  former  Soviet  Bloc  countries  and  its 
contribution  to  the  wider  international  economic  and  political  order.  In  many 
respects,,  the  strategic  challenges  facing  the  EU  now  exceed  those  faced  by  all  but 
A.  1- 
- 
die  biggest  states.  Further  improvement  of  its  capacity  to  engage  in  strategic 
behaviour  is  both  likely  and  necessary. 
The  next  analytical  step  is  to  account  for  how  the  Union  moves  from 
strategy-as-plan  to  strategy-as-action.  At  this  stage,  the  policy-making  process 
must  be  the  central  focus,  since  it  is  here  that  a  gap  habitually  appears  between  the 
Union's  rhetoric  and  the  reality  of  its  action.  A  clear  definition  of  interests,  an 
imperative  for  action  and  the  means  to  take  action  do  not  guarantee  that  the 
eventual  Policy  will  be  appropriate.  The  clichd  'economic  giant,  political  pygmy' 
is  testament  to  the  Union's  persistent  inability  to  convert  its  enormous  economic 
weight  into  effective  political  action.  78  Returning  to  the  'system'  metaphor,  we 
must  open  up  the  'black  box'  that  intervenes  between  inputs  and  OutputS. 
79 
The  image  of  EU  policy-making  employed  in  this  thesis  follows  Helen 
Wallace's  lead,  who  argues  that  there  is: 
....  no  single  or  uniform  Community  policy  process.  The  patterns  of  policy- 
making  and  the  roles  of  member  governments  and  Community  institutions 
in  the  policy  process  vary  considerably  from  sector  to  sector  depending  on 
the  extent  of  Community  involvement.  80 
Thus  each  policy  area  has  its  own  logic,  the  mixture  of  institutional  competencies, 
decision-making  formulae  and  constellations  of  actors  involved  that  translate 
proposals  into  policy  outcomeS.  81  Again,  the  complexity  of  the  EU  policy  process 
makes  for  equally  complex  logics.  In  the  Euro-Mediterranean  Partnership 
package,  the  end  product  comprises  a  raft  of  measures,  some  drawn  from  the 
21 Union's  established  range  of  policy  instruments  (Association  Agreements, 
financial  aid,  technical  assistance),  others  tailor-made  for  which  no  established 
logics  exist  (the  Barcelona  process). 
Analytically,  the  implication  of  multiple  logics  is  that  as  much  attention 
must  be  paid  to  institutional  politics  as  to  govenunental  politics.  Where  pillar  I  is 
. 0-  - 
we  locus  for  EU  strategic  action,  the  Commission  exercises  leadership  in  the 
fonnulation  of  strategy,  plays  a  crucial  role  in  negotiating  the  content  of  external 
policy  instruments  and  is  responsible  for  overseeing  the  implementation  of  aid 
programmes  and  the  administration  of  Association  Agreements.  The  European 
Parliament,  though  its  involvement  in  external  policy  is  very  limited,  nevertheless 
performs  an  important  scrutiny  function,  has  budgetary  powers  in  the  allocation  of 
financial  aid  and  must  give  its  assent  to  Association  Agreements  with  third 
countries.  By  the  same  token,  the  member  governments  also  have  considerable 
agenda  setting  power  and  the  'final  say"  over  the  substantive  content  of  policies. 
An  additional  dimension  of  policy-making  is  'politicisation',  the  process 
by  which  issues  become  infused  with  political  significance.  82  For  Michael  Smith, 
it  is  the  politicisation  of  economic  issues  in  the  modem  international  system  that 
has  made  pillar  I  the  core  of  EU  foreign  policy.  83  Its  consequences  are  two  fold. 
First,  the  degree  of  politicisation  of  an  issue  affects  both  strategic  planning  and 
policy  outcomes.  Highly  politicised  issues  may  be  entirely  excluded  from  a 
strategy  if  they  are  deemed  to  have  the  potential  to  hijack  the  broader  objective. 
Govenunents  are  also  apt  to  be  less  favourable  to  making  concessions  on  sensitive 
issues  at  the  decision-making  stage,  fearing  a  domestic  backlash.  Second,  the 
politicisation  of  issues  affects  the  level  at  which  policy  decisions  are  taken.  In 
pillar  I,  for  instance,  many  trade  issues  tend  to  be  treated  as  'technical9,  increasing 
the  Commission's  influence  over  outcomes.  If  trade  issues  subsequently  become 
22 politicised,  the  final  decision  tends  to  shift  upwards  to  mhuisterial  level,  placing 
the  onus  on  governmental  preferences  in  deciding  outcomes.  The  more  general 
point  here  is  that,  while  politicisation  has  undoubtedly  increased  the  significance 
of  external  economic  relations,  it  is  also  a  powerful  constraint  on  supranational 
'-agency'  and  therefore  on  the  EC's  effectiveness  as  the  conduit  for  EU  strategic 
action. 
Much  of  the  thesis  focuses  on  negotiations,  the  dominant  'mode'  of  policy- 
making  in  EU  Mediterranean  policy.  84  The  terms  of  Association  Agreements,  for 
instance,  the  EMP's  main  policy  instrument,  are  largely  detenrnined  by 
negotiations  between  the  Union  and  individual  third  countries  and  by  negotiations 
within  the  Union  that  decide  the  concessions  that  each  third  country  will  be 
offered.  The  multilateral  dimension  of  the  Mediterranean  strategy  is  also  driven 
by  ongoing  negotiations  between  the  participating  governments.  What  confronts 
us  resembles  an  'inside-outside  game',  in  which  negotiations  take  place  at  two 
separate  tables.  85  Inside  the  EU,  the  Member  States  and  institutions  engage  in 
negotiations  to  determine  strategic  objectives,  the  policy  instruments  to  be 
deployed  and  the  Union's  subsequent  position  in  the  policy  process. 
Simultaneous  negotiations  take  place  with  third  countries  to  determine  the  final 
tenns  of  the  policy  package.  The  end  result  -  the  Euro-Mediterranean  Partnership 
-  amounts  to  the  extension  of  a  'negotiated  order'  to  the  Mediterranean  region  . 
86 
Mediterranean  policy  is  a  particularly  good  case  study  of  EU  strategic 
action.  The  Euro-Mediterranean  Partnership  employs  virtually  the  full  range  of 
foreign  policy  tools  available  to  the  Union  and  unequivocally  spans  the  divide 
between  external  economic  relations  and  traditional  politico-security  foreign 
policy.  What  began  as  a  disparate  collection  of  commercial  agreements  has  grown 
into  a  complex  policy  package  embracing  a  vast  range  of  issues  and  sectors.  The 
23 EU's  relations  with  the  Mediterranean  partner  countries  provide  a  crucial  test  of 
both  its  capacity  to  act  as  a  progressive  force  in  the  intemational  order  and  of  its 
ability  to  manage  security  in  a  region  beset  by  conflicts. 
Chapter  2  traces  the  historical  evolution  of  Euro-Mediterranean  relations, 
identifying  the  main  stages  in  the  development  of  Mediterranean  policy.  It  shows 
how  the  politicisation  of  agricultural  trade,  a  key  policy  issue,  began  in  the  first 
round  of  negotiations  between  the  Union  and  the  Mediterranean  third  countries. 
Despite  several  'rounds'  of  renegotiation,,  and  an  attempt  to  create  a  single 
framework  for  relations,  the  first  three  decades  of  Mediterranean  policy  were 
notable  for  the  Union's  persistent  failure  to  address  the  real  concerns  of  the 
partner  countries. 
Chapter  3  examines  the  factors  that  forced  the  EU  to  re-examine  its 
Mediteffanean  policy  at  the  end  of  the  1980s.  With  the  end  of  the  Cold  War, 
Mediterranean  security  suddenly  assumed  new-found  salience  for  the  Union. 
Faced  with  the  rising  popularity  of  radical  Islarn  in  North  Africa,  states  whose 
economic  weakness  and  international  indebtedness  threatened  to  cause  socio- 
economic  breakdown  and  forecasts  a  dramatic  rise  in  illegal  immigration  into 
Europe,  the  Union  was  for  the  first  time  forced  to  consider  the  long-term  effects  of 
its  Mediterranean  policy.  The  resultant  policy  changes  -  the  Redirected 
Mediterranean  Policy  and  the  Euro-Mediterranean  Partnership  -  delivered  an 
impressively  comprehensive  plan  of  action  but  little  genuine  reform  of  Euro- 
Mediterranean  relations. 
Chapter  4  explores  the  multilateral  component  of  the  Union's 
Mediterranean  policy  -  the  Barcelona  process  -  from  its  inception  through  to  the 
early  stages  of  its  implementation.  Sold  as  an  innovative  new  multilateral  forum 
that  would  underpin  future  international  cooperation  in  the  Mediterranean,  the 
24 Barcelona  process  quickly  became  hostage  to  developments  in  the  Middle  East 
Peace  Process,  exposing  the  continuing  weakness  of  the  EU  as  an  international 
political  actor. 
Chapter  5  presents  an  analytical  synthesis  of  the  theory  and  practice  of 
Mediterranean  policy.  By  first  breaking  down  the  EMP  into  distinct  policy  types, 
it  sets  up  a  framework  for  analysis  of  the  politics  that  determined  the  fmal 
outcomes  of  the  policy-making  process.  The  chapter  goes  on  to  examine  key 
decisions  in  the  EMP  in  the  light  of  both  intergovemmentalist  and  institutionalist 
theories. 
Chapter  6  changes  tack,  offering  the  first  of  two  case  studies  of  EU 
diplomacy  in  the  Mediterranean  region,  one  broadly  positive,  the  other  almost 
entirely  negative.  The  Union's  role  in  the  Middle  East  Peace  Process,  which  has 
included  a  successful  CFSP  joint  action  to  assist  the  establish  the  Palestinian 
Authority,  is  a  prime  example  of  how  its  economic  weight  can  successfully  be 
turned  into  political  influence.  It  explores  the  reasons  why  the  Union  and  its 
Member  States  were  able  to  agree  a  collective  position  on  an  issue  that  had  been 
so  divisive  during  the  1970s  and  1980s. 
In  contrast,  chapter  7  offers  a  downbeat  analysis  of  the  Union's  persistent 
failure  to  adopt  a  strong  position  on  the  bloody  conflict  in  Algeria.  Almost  a 
decade  has  passed  since  the  annulment  of  the  legislative  elections  by  the  military 
sparked  a  campaign  of  terrorism  by  the  FIS  in  which  both  sides  are  guilty  of 
terrible  crimes  against  Algerian  citizens.  It  shows  that  what  amounts  to  a  r-non- 
policy'  on  the  crisis  was  a  consequence  of  both  the  weakness  of  the  CFSP  when 
the  member  governments  are  reluctant  to  act,  and  powerful  vested  interests.  In 
both  cases  the  Euro-Mediterranean  Partnership  proved  to  be  of  marginal 
importance. 
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32 Chapter  2 
A  BRIEF  HISTORY  OF  EU  MEDITERRANEAN  POLICY 
The  Euro-Mediterranean  Partnership  cannot  be  explained  without  first 
understanding  the  historical  evolution  of  the  EU's  relations  with  the 
Mediterranean  non-member  countries.  The  Euro-Mediterranean  agreements  were 
essentially  repackaged  versions  of  agreements  negotiated  during  the  early  years  of 
EU  Mediterranean  policy.  Issues  that  were  politicised  in  the  first  rounds  of 
negotiations  have  tended  to  remain  politicised,  leaving  a  'shadow  of  the  past'  in 
which  contemporary  negotiators  and  policy-makers  must  operate.  '  When  policy 
change  did  taken  place,  it  was  through  renegotiation  rather  than  outright 
transformation.  2  The  purpose  of  this  chapter  is  to  trace  the  main  patterns  of 
negotiation  and  associative  diplomacy  that  shaped  and  re-shaped  Mediteffanean 
policy  over  three  decades. 
The  effectiveness  of  Mediterranean  policy  has  tended  to  be  judged  above 
all  by  its  impact  on  trade  between  the  EU  and  the  Mediterranean  third  countries, 
and  disputes  over  the  terms  offered  by  the  Community  became  the  recurring 
feature  of  each  round  of  renegotiations.  The  distributive  outcomes  of  trade 
concessions  resulted  in  immediate,  identifiable  costs  to  be  borne  by  domestic 
producers  within  the  Member  States,  and  a  quantifiable  and  comparable  'deal'  for 
each  associate.  With  clear  internal  and  external  winners  and  losers  from  the 
agreements,  attempts  to  build  a  comprehensive  strategy  for  the  region  were 
consistently  subordinated  to  the  defence  of  domestic  interests  by  individual 
Member  States,  as  well  as  to  the  increasing  limitations  on  concessionary 
diplomacy  that  stemmed  from  the  externalisation  of  the  CAP  and  other 
33 Community  policies.  3  The  history  of  Mediterranean  policy,  as  this  chapter  sets 
out  to  demonstrate,,  is  one  of  an  absence  of  effective  strategic  action  on  the  part  of 
the  EU. 
Section  I  outlines  the  fonnative  phase  of  the  EU's  relations  with  the 
Mediterranean  partners  and  the  main  determinants  of  the  Community's  choice  of 
policy  instruments.  Section  2  evaluates  the  first  major  policy  development  in  the 
1970s  -  the  Global  Mediterranean  Policy  (GMP)  -  examining  the  politics  behind 
the  Community's  first  serious  attempt  to  develop  a  strategy  for  the  region.  Section 
3  assesses  how  the  Community  adapted  its  Mediterranean  policy  after  the 
accession  of  Greece,  Portugal  and  Spain  during  the  1980s.  It  argues  that  this  third 
phase  of  Mediteffanean  policy  was  more  concerned  with  managing  the  impact  of 
accession  on  EU  policies  and  satisfying  the  interests  of  the  Member  States  than 
with  making  the  adjustments  needed  to  offset  the  negative  impact  of  enlargement 
on  third  countries. 
1.  A  Slow  Start:  The  Treaty  of  Rome  and  the  Patchwork  of  Associates 
The  Treaty  of  Rome  (195  7)  contained  no  formal  foreign  policy  provisions  and 
offered  little  stimulus  for  the  definition  and  pursuit  of  common  external  interests 
and  objectives.  The  Community  was  equipped  with  a  limited  range  of  explicit 
powers,  scattered  throughout  the  founding  treaties,  to  develop  relations  with  the 
outside  world.  However,  there  were  considerable  uncertainties  about  the 
distribution  of  competencies  between  the  institutions  and  Member  States.  On  the 
one  hand,  key  features  of  external  policy  that  were  to  emerge  later  -  including 
development  policy  and  cooperation  on  politico-security  matters  -  remained  the 
responsibility  of  the  Member  States.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Community  had 
responsibility  for  the  regulation  of  external  trade  through  the  common  commercial 
34 policy  (Article  133)  harnessed  to  a  Common  External  Tariff,  the  right  to  conclude 
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treaties,  and  the  power  to  manage  the  externalities  of  internal  policies.  It  was  left 
to  political  and  economic  exigencies,  and  the  judgements  of  the  ECJ,  to 
incrementally  define  the  parameters  of  Community  external  policy. 
The  Community  had  several  motives  for  seeking  to  draw  the 
Mediterranean  third  countries  towards  it  during  the  1960s.  The  first  of  these  was 
the  strategic  importance  of  the  Mediterranean  region  to  the  Western  camp  in  the 
context  of  the  Cold  War.  For  Habib  Ben  Yahia,  a  former  Tunisian  foreign 
minister,  'the  north's  interest  in  the  southern  shore  has  always  been  about 
security.  5  Attention  focused  on  the  north  east  Mediterranean;  the  Maghreb  was 
seen  more  as  a  problem  for  the  French  than  a  military  problem  for  the  West,  but 
both  regions  were  sufficiently  close  to  the  Community  to  pose  serious  security 
problems  were  they  to  become  hostile  to  the  west.  6 
Commercial  ties  between  the  Six  and  the  Mediterranean  non-members 
linked  to  traditional  imperial  trading  patterns  were  a  second  motive  for  a 
Community  Mediterranean  policy.  In  1960,  the  Mediterranean  non-member 
countries  as  a  group  (including  Portugal  and  Spain)  absorbed  over  15  per  cent  of 
Community  exports.  In  turr4  over  60  per  cent  of  the  exports  of  Mediterranean 
third  countries  exports  went  to  the  Community.  The  Maghreb  countries  were 
major  suppliers  of  primary  products  to  the  Six,  including  petroleum  from  Algeria 
and  Libya  and  phosphates  from  Morocco.  Agricultural  exports  to  the  Community 
were  a  vital  source  of  export  revenues  for  Morocco  and  Tunisia.  On  the  EC  side, 
the  Member  States,  particularly  France  and  Italy,  exported  manufactured  and 
capital  goods  to  the  Mediterranean  countries. 
The  prime  mover  on  Mediterranean  policy  was  France,  which  dominated 
Community  trade  in  the  region.  In  the  early  1960s  it  accounted  for  40  per  cent  of 
35 exports  to  the  Maghreb  and  received  around  45  per  cent  of  Maghrebi  imports  to 
the  Community,  and  benefited  from  a  strong  commercial  presence  in  the  region 
through  a  mixture  of  private  and  public  investment.  '  Having  carefully  nurtured  its 
sources  of  primary  goods,  De  Gaulle's  government  clearly  sought  to  protect  them 
when  responsibility  for  commercial  policy  shifted  to  the  EEC.  Moreover,  rapid 
economic  growth  in  the  1960s  meant  a  growing  demand  for  North  African  labour 
in  France.  Taking  these  economic  factors  together,  it  was  clear  that  initially, 
policy  would  be  driven  by  Paris. 
Lacking  the  instruments  to  pursue  a  comprehensive  policy  strategy  in  the 
region,  the  Community's  relations  with  Mediterranean  third  countries  instead 
evolved  in  what  Stanley  Henig  accurately  described  as  'a  doctrinal  vacuum'. 
Since  the  Treaty  of  Rome  gave  only  vague  directions  as  to  how  relations  with  the 
Mediterranean  third  countries  should  evolve,  it  was  relatively  easy  for  the 
Community  to  avoid  making  substantive  commitments.  9  As  govenunents  lined  up 
to  establish  formal  relations  with  the  Community,  it  responded  with  a  mixture  of 
association  agreements  with  Greece,  Malta  and  Turkey,  special  preferential 
commercial  arrangements  for  France's  former  colonies  in  North  Africa,  and  a 
series  of  commercial  accords  with  the  remainder  of  the  Mediterranean  non- 
member  countries.  The  result  was  a  'pyramid'  of  agreements  based  on 
differentiated  commercial  and  political  privileges.  '  0  The  choice  of  one  form  of 
agreement  over  another  and  the  emergence  of  a  hierarchy  of  more  and  less 
favoured  third  countries  reflected  the  political  priorities  of  the  Member  States  and, 
albeit  in  a  limited  and  disparate  way,  the  identification  and  pursuit  of  Community 
interests  in  the  region. 
The  most  advanced  policy  instrument  was  full  association,  based  on  Article 
310.  The  provisions  of  Article  310  left  open  the  goals,  form  and  content  of 
36 agreements,  stating  only  that  association  should  involve  'reciProcal  rights  and 
obligations,  common  action  and  special  procedures'.  In  theory,  association  was 
therefore  flexible  enough  to  accommodate  both  the  demands  of  third  countries  and 
the  numerous  limitations  imposed  by  the  political  and  economic  situation  inside 
the  Community,  although  finding  a  mutually  acceptable  balance  was  usually 
difficult.  12  Association  agreements,  and  variants  of  them,  were  to  become  the 
instrument  of  choice  in  Mediterranean  policy. 
The  precise  terms  of  association  were  a  function  of  the  strategic  and 
commercial  importance  of  the  associate  to  the  Community,  and,  arguably,  to  its 
cultural  compatibility  with  Western  Europe.  At  best,  association  was  a  'stepping 
13 
stone  to  full  membership;  at  worst,  a  poor  relation  to  membership'.  Greece  and 
Turkey  concluded  Association  Agreements  in  1962  and  1963  respectively,  as  the 
Community  made  a  transparent  attempt  to  prevent  the  two  countries  from  falling 
into  the  hands  of  the  communist  bloc.  14  Both  the  agreements,  of  unlimited 
duration,  were  to  lead  to  full  customs  unions  over  transitional  periods  of  between 
12  and  22  years,  and  both  states  had  their  eligibility  for  membership  recognised.  15 
But  Greece  was  offered  a  clear  timetable  for  membership  and  considerably  more 
generous  commercial  terms  -  including  higher  import  quotas  -  than  those  offered 
to  Turkey.  The  Community  was  also  studiously  imprecise  about  the  timing  and 
end-state  of  Turkey-EC  integration.  With  its  self-professed  European  vocation, 
small  population  and  relatively  small  economy,  Greek  accession  was  both  a  more 
attractive  and  a  less  problematic  proposition.  16 
The  second  kind  of  association,  based  on  Articles  182-7  of  the  Treaty,  was 
designed  to  safeguard  the  'special'  relationships  of  the  Member  States  with  their 
dependencies,  principally  the  Francophone  African  countries.  17  These  provisions 
gave  rise  to  the  1963  Yaounde  Convention  which  gave  former  colonies  duty  and 
37 quota  free  access  to  the  Community"  s  markets  for  a  range  of  exports,  and  financial 
aid  worth  800  Million  ECUs.  However,  although  the  Article  182  provisions  were 
dressed  up  in  the  rhetoric  of  economic  development,  their  main  purposes  were  to 
protect  imports  of  cheap  primary  products  and  maintain  the  privileged  position  of 
colonial  imports  in  home  markets.  18  For  non-members,  preferential  trading 
affangements  offset  the  economic  cost  to  them  of  the  Community's  customs 
union.  19  The  chief  advocate  of  Article  182  was  France,  which  made  special 
arrangements  for  its  overseas  territories  a  condition  of  its  decision  to  sign  the 
Treaty  of  Rome.  20  As  Gobe  argues,  'she  [France]  developed  the  idea  of  Euro- 
Africa,  which  allowed  her  to  implement  towards  the  old  colonies  a  policy  she 
could  not  work  out  herself  '21  The  multilateralisation  of  colonial  economic 
relations  spread  the  costs  of  continuing  to  support  the  territories  -  through 
Europeanising  reduced  tariffs  on  imports  -  among  the  six. 
The  third  policy  instrument  for  the  Mediterranean,  earmarked  for  the 
independent  countries  of  the  franc  area,  was  economic  association.  Although  it 
was  based  on  Article  3  10,  this  fonn  of  association  did  not  include  financial  aid, 
technical  assistance  and  provisions  for  the  free  movement  of  workers.  In  effect,  it 
was  a  half-way  house  between  a  simple  trade  agreement  and  full  association, 
lacking  the  political  dimension  of  the  latter.  Having  conceded  to  French  pressure 
to  include  Article  182  in  the  Treaty  of  Rome,  the  other  Member  States  were  more 
circumspect  about  granting  similarly  special  status  to  the  Mediterranean  non- 
member  states.  22  The  message  was  clear:  for  various  reasons,  these  states  were  of 
secondary  importance  to  the  Community  and  would  have  to  wait  for  their  status  to 
be  upgraded. 
From  the  outset,  the  member  states  were  in  a  strong  position  to  determine 
the  form,  content  and  terms  of  associations.  The  decision-making  procedure  for 
38 Article  3  10  gave  the  Council  of  Ministers  the  right  of  approbation  with  respect  to 
the  Commission's  negotiating  mandate,  required  unanimity  in  the  Council  to 
conclude  agreements,  and  ratification  of  agreements  by  national  parliaments.  23 
Furthermore,  associations  usually  covered  several  subjects  outside  the 
Community's  remit,  requiring  'mixed'  agreements  in  which  both  the  Community 
and  the  Member  States  participated  as  legal  parties.  24  Even  where  Community 
possessed  exclusive  competence  to  conclude  agreements  (Article  133),  defacto 
use  of  unanimity  to  approve  the  Commission's  negotiating  mandates,  and  the 
oversight  function  of  the  Council,  enabled  the  Member  States  to  keep  the 
Commission  on  a  tight  rein. 
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Morocco  and  Tunisia  were  the  first  Mediterranean  states  to  take  up  the 
offer  of  economic  association,  opening  negotiations  with  the  Community  in  1965. 
However,  they  quickly  ran  into  opposition  from  Italy,  which  embarked  on  'three 
year  long  filibuster'  in  defence  of  its  agricultural  industry.  26  Southern  Italian 
agriculture,  particularly  its  citrus  fruit  industry,  was  in  a  weak  position  in  the  mid 
1960s  and  faced  direct  competition  from  Moroccan  and  Tunisian  imports  of  so- 
called  'Mediterranean  products.  27  Concessions  in  this  sector  were  therefore  a 
highly  sensitive  issue  for  the  Italian  government.  Crucially,  France  -  the  chief  ally 
of  the  Maghreb  states  within  the  Community  -  chose  1965  to  walk  out  of  the 
Council.  Much  of  the  Council's  business  was  suspended,  and  with  its  relatively 
low  status  on  the  EEC's  hierarchy  of  priorities,  Morocco  and  Tunisia  found 
themselves  sidelined  during  1965  and  1966.  When  the  talks  resumed  at  the  end  of 
1966,  lengthy  internal  negotiations  were  required  to  find  a  compromise 
satisfactory  to  the  Italian  government.  A  combination  of  compensatory  measures 
for  Italian  farmers  and  intensive  diplomacy  by  DGI  officials  and  the  Maghrebi 
ambassadors  finally  persuaded  Italy  to  accept  the  agreements.  28 
39 Internal  negotiations  were  also  necessary  to  reconcile  differences  in  the 
foreign  policy  orientations  of  certain  Member  States  towards  Israel  and  the 
Maghreb.  Following  the  1967  Arab-Israeli  conflict,  the  Netherlands,  backed  by 
Germany,  linked  the  continuation  of  the  association  negotiations  to  their  demand 
for  a  similar  deal  for  Israel.  France,  continued  to  press  the  case  for  the  Maghreb. 
The  Dutch  government  blocked  the  conclusion  of  the  Maghreb  associations  in  the 
Council,  insisting  that  a  mandate  should  also  be  prepared  for  a  full  association 
agreement  with  Israel  . 
29A  compromise  formula,  brokered  by  the  Commission 
and  the  Maghrebi  ambassadors,  led  to  the  removal  of  the  non-commercial  parts  of 
the  agreement.  In  the  end,  a  partial,  temporary  agreement  was  deemed  preferable 
to  no  agreement  at  all. 
Underlying  the  Member  States'  hesitancy  over  the  Association 
Agreements  were  more  fundamental  differences  over  the  Community's  approach 
to  economic  development  policy.  In  the  protectionist  camp,  France  advocated  a 
regionalist  approach  to  EC  external  relations,  favouring  privileged  treatment  for  a 
restricted  group  of  third  countries  which  in  turn  safeguarded  French  commercial 
interests.  30  The  Netherlands  and  West  Gennany,  by  contrast,  argued  for  a  'single 
international  cooperative  movement  in  line  with  the  liberalising  agenda  of  the 
GATT.  01  The  Federal  Republic  adopted  a  global  view  of  the  Community's 
development  policy  befitting  its  lack  of  colonial  ties  and  the  relative  lack  of 
competition  to  its  own  agricultural  sector  from  imports  of  Mediterranean 
products.  32  Subsequent  enlargements  of  the  Community  would  accentuate  and 
polarise  these  divergent  ideological  approaches. 
Protectionists  and  regionalists  undoubtedly  held  sway  in  the  first  phase  of 
Mediterranean  policy.  The  conclusion  of  preferential  trading  agreements 
provoked  criticism  from  both  non-associates  and  the  USA.  Non-associates 
40 claimed  that  preferential  terms  of  trade  for  associates  discriminated  against  their 
exporters.  The  USA  had  sought  the  dismantling  of  imperial  preferences  since  the 
end  of  World  War  2.33  But  the  Community  stood  fmn  and  sought  waivers  where 
the  agreements  contravened  GATT  principles.  34 
On  the  external  front,  the  Community"  s  key  task  was  to  obtain  the 
ap  roval  of  Morocco  and  Tunisia  to  a  deal  that  fell  short  of  their  expectations. 
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Despite  having  resorted  to  the  lowest-common  denominator  to  win  the  assent  of 
all  the  Member  States  to  the  accords,  the  Community  could  not  ignore  the  fact  that 
it  had  invited  the  two  states  to  apply  for  full  association.  The  solution  was  a 
clause  in  the  agreements  stating  that  they: 
appear  clearly  as  a  first  step  towards  more  global  accords  to  be  concluded 
later...  do  not  preclude  the  maintenance  of  preferential  commercial  relations 
with  France  ...  and  are  able  to  be  rapidly  implemented.  35 
It  is  important,  however,  not  to  over-state  either  the  politicisation  of  key 
issues  in  this  first  round  of  agreements,  or  indeed  the  political  importance  of 
Mediterranean  policy  in  general.  In  a  detailed  study  of  the  Maghreb  negotiations, 
Glenda  Rosenthal  found  'little  solid  evidence  of  the  effective  exercise  of  public 
opinion  and  interest  group  pressures  in  the  negotiation  of  the  Maghreb 
treaties  .... 
Primarily,  the  conclusion  of  the  Maghreb  agreements  was  a  strictly 
EEC-Maghreb  affair  and  involved  almost  no  external  pressures.  36  In  the  overall 
scheme  of  the  European  integration,  Mediterranean  policy  was  a  low  priority  at 
this  stage. 
The  end  product  of  the  Community's  first  phase  of  associative  diplomacy 
in  the  Mediterranean  resembled  a  'patchwork'  rather  than  a  coherent  network.  As 
Eberhard  Rhein  argues: 
The  Community  handled  the  association  relationship  as  if  it  were  a  formal, 
rather  superficial  international  agreement.  It  did  not  really  care  what  was 
41 going  on  behind  the  scenes,  what  economic  and  social  policies  were  being 
pursued.  37 
Nevertheless,  the  agreements  sparked  a  'chain  reaction'  among  other 
Mediterranean  countries  which  sought  to  enter  into  new  agreements,  or  upgrade 
38 
their  existing  relationships,  with  the  Community.  As  the  list  of  demandeurs 
grew,  the  Community  was  forced  to  rethink  its  approach. 
2.  From  Patchwork  to  Framework:  The  Global  Mediterranean  poliCY39 
If  the  Community's  approach  to  the  Mediterranean  was  piecemeal  in  the  early 
years,  the  1970s  saw  the  first  serious  attempt  to  formulate  a  strategy  for  the  region. 
It  occurred  during  a  period  when  the  Community  was  making  serious  efforts  to 
establish  its  credentials  as  an  international  actor.  The  1969  Hague  Summit  saw 
EC  member  governments  agreeing  to  improve  the  coordination  of  their  individual 
foreign  policies,  which  galvanised  foreign  ministers  into  more  serious 
consideration  of  the  Community's  common  external  interests.  In  1970,  the  launch 
of  European  Political  Cooperation  gave  rise  to  the  first  inter-governniental 
meetings  at  which  the  member  states  set  out  to  identify  the  Community's  political 
interests  and  prepare  the  ground  for  future  foreign  policy  positions.  At  the  1972 
Paris  Summit,  the  Member  States  duly  resolved  to  ensure  'an  overall  and  balanced 
handling'  of  the  Community's  relations  with  the  Mediterranean  third  countries, 
and  instructed  the  Commission  to  look  again  at  the  Association  Agreements.  40 
The  Commission  responded  by  submitting  proposals  to  the  Council  for  a 
new  policy  framework  -  the  Global  Mediterranean  Policy  (GMP)  -  centring  on 
new  'cooperation  agreements'  that  covered  financial,  technical  and  social  matters 
and  the  expansion  of  the  geographical  scope  of  the  associative  network.  41  The 
long-tenn  objective  was  the  creation  of  a  Mediterranean  free-trade  area.  42  To 
42 increase  competition  in  the  region  and  boost  exports,  France  proposed  that  the 
associates  should  open  up  their  markets  to  Community  exports.  However,  the 
Commission  argued  that  the  free-circulation  of  goods  alone  would  not  promote 
development  in  the  region,  and  that  the  GMP  should  also  include  provisions  on 
capital  movements,  technology  transfers,  technical  cooperation,  labour  and 
enviromnental  and  financial  cooperation.  43 
External  events  Played  a  much  more  prominent  part  in  politicising 
Mediterranean  policy  during  this  period  than  had  previously  been  the  case.  First, 
unity  among  the  developing  countries,  expressed  in  demands  by  the  G77  for  a  new 
and  more  benevolent  international  economic  order,  put  the  Community's  relations 
with  developing  countries  under  the  spotlight.  44  For  third  countries  subject  to 
Article  182  of  the  Treaty,  the  Community  responded  with  the  Lome  convention  in 
1975.  In  turn,  greater  equity  was  demanded  between  the  level  of  commercial 
privileges  granted  to  the  African  associates  and  those  offered  to  the  Community's 
other  partners. 
45 
Second,  the  1973  Arab-Israeli  war  and  subsequent  Arab  oil  embargo 
compelled  the  Community  to  look  at  the  political  dimension  of  its  Mediterranean 
policy.  Although  these  events  occurred  after  the  launch  of  the  GMP,  the  OPEC 
embargo  exposed  the  vulnerability  of  the  Community's  energy  supplies  and 
demanded  rapid  diplomatic  action  from  the  Member  States.  Their  response  -  the 
Euro-Arab  Dialogue  -  was  the  first  explicitly  political  fonn  of  association  . 
41  It 
established  a  forum  in  which  discussions  would  take  place  between  the 
Community  and  the  Arab  League  at  Ministerial  as  well  as  civil-servant  level  on 
issues  ranging  from  the  status  of  the  PLO  and  Israeli  foreign  policy  to  cultural, 
social  and  technological  collaboration.  Even  if  the  'Dialogue'  was  essentially  an 
example  of  gesture  politics,  it  nevertheless  signalled  that  the  Community 
43 recognised  the  increasing  political  salience  of  good  relations  with  Mediterranean 
non-member  states. 
The  Arab-Israeli  conflict  presented  the  Community  with  a  problem  of  a 
different  order.  The  Community's  commitment  to  negotiate  agreements  with  any 
Mediterranean  country  that  applied  left  it  with  a  political  balancing  act  between  its 
policies  towards  the  Arab  states  and  its  relationship  with  Israel.  Condemnation  of 
Israel's  occupation  of  Gaza  and  the  West  Bank  by  the  Member  States  in  EPC 
clashed  with  the  ongoing  discussion  of  a  new  cooperation  agreement  with  the 
Community.  The  lack  of  obvious  linkage  between  the  Community's  criticism  of 
Israel's  policies  and  its  'routine'  external  economic  relations  with  Israel 
exemplified  the  inherent  inconsistency  of  Community  foreign  policy-making. 
Indeed,  there  is  little  to  suggest  that  the  possibility  of  halting  the  negotiations  with 
Israel  was  even  broached. 
Internally,  several  factors  paved  the  way  for  a  more  comprehensive 
Mediterranean  strategy.  First,  the  Commission's  growing  assertiveness  and  self- 
confidence  on  external  policy  matters  saw  it  take  a  more  prominent  role  in  setting 
the  agenda  on  Mediterranean  policy.  It  attempted  to  sell  to  the  Member  States  the 
idea  that  the  economic  development  of  the  Mediteffanean  -  the  long  term  goal  of 
the  GMP  -  was  'a  natural  extension  of  European  integration'.  47  In  doing  so,  the 
Commission  stood  to  have  its  own  powers  as  policy  initiator  and  negotiator 
augmented,  since  the  GMP  called  for  Community  level  action  in  new  policy 
areas.  48  The  pay  off  for  the  Community  would  be  improved  coordination  of 
policy,  and  a  greater  sense  of  direction,  in  the  areas  covered  by  the  cooperation 
agreements. 
Second,  the  early  1970s  witnessed  a  subtle  but  significant  shift  in  French 
foreign  policy.  De  Gaulle's  resignation  precipitated  the  gradual  reform  of 
44 France's  relations  with  its  former  colonies  in  North  Africa,  although  it  continued 
to  claim  special  responsibility  for  the  region.  As  far  as  Community  Policy  was 
concerned,  France  adopted  a  more  favourable  attitude  to  the  multilateralisation  of 
its  own  economic  and  political  relations  with  Mediterranean  third  countries  while 
seeking  to  retain  its  status  as  a  policy  leader.  49  Conditional  acceptance  by 
Pompidou's  government  of  the  principle  of  a  regional  free-trade  zone,  for 
instance,  removed  a  significant  obstacle  to  the  re-negotiation  of  trading 
preferences. 
Third,  the  1973  enlargement  of  the  Community  necessitated  adjustments  to 
the  existing  association  agreements  and,  perhaps  more  importantly,  tilted  the 
ideological  scales  towards  the  northern  liberalisers.  Adaptation  measures  were 
attached  to  each  agreement  in  order  to  extend  the  Mediterranean  preference 
system  to  Denmark,  Ireland  and  the  UK  . 
50  Despite  being  dressed  up  as  'technical' 
negotiations  by  the  Commission,  a  number  of  Mediterranean  associates  used  the 
talks  to  express  their  dissatisfaction  with  the  terms  of  their  agreements. 
Community  imports  of  Moroccan  oranges,  for  instance,  had  fallen  by  8%  between 
1970  and  1972,  provoking  complaints  of  protectionism  from  Moroccan  diplomats 
in  Brussels.  51  When  Algeria  began  talks  with  the  Community  in  September  1973, 
it  raised  similar  concerns  about  the  level  of  market  access  for  its  oil  and  wine 
exports.  Non-associates  argued  that  the  implementation  of  preferential  trade 
provisions  by  the  new  Member  States  would  adversely  affect  their  trade  with  those 
countries.  This  problem  further  strengthened  the  case  for  a  uniform  association 
system  in  the  region. 
The  accession  of  Demnark,  the  UK  and  Ireland  brought  three  states  into 
the  Community  which  faced  no  significant  competition  from  Mediteffanean 
imports  and  had  comparatively  fewer  direct  interests  in  Mediterranean  policy  than 
45 France  and  Italy.  52  As  Tovias  argues,  'they  did  not  share  the  Commission's  desire 
to  create  a  sphere  of  influence  there,  even  questioning  at  times  the  need  for  a 
Mediterranean  policy  at  all.  953  Moreover,  West  Gennany  found  in  the  UK  a 
powerful  ally  for  its  campaign  to  open  up  the  Community's  markets  to 
Mediterranean  imports  and  allow  the  Mediterranean  associates  to  safeguard 
domestic  producers  by  retaining  tariffs  on  imports  from  the  Community.  As  a 
result,  the  progression  of  the  GMP  proposals  through  the  Council  was  impeded  by 
an  increasingly  bitter  dispute  between  free-traders  and  protectionists.  54 
By  June  1973,  the  Council  had  draft  negotiating  mandates  for  the 
cooperation  agreements.  The  principal  commitments  of  the  GMP  were  are  shown 
in  table  1.1: 
Table  1.1  Main  commitments  of  the  GMP 
I  "L. 
ii)  Improved  access  to  the  C( 
'without  endangering  the  leg 
time  of  year. 
agreement.  This  bilateral  a 
eement  in  financial  protocols  attached  to  each 
would  be  supplemented  by  loans  and  grants  from 
A  cursory  glance  suggests  that  the  GMP  fulfilled  many  of  the  Community's 
promises.  The  agreements  included  provisions  for  cooperation  in  a  variety  of 
46 fields,  including  the  environment,  industry,  investment  and  science.  On  the 
particularly  sensitive  subject  of  labour  policy,  existing  bilateral  arrangements  on 
the  treatment  and  status  of  Maghrebi  workers  in  the  Community  were 
supplemented  by  a  new  agreement  on  non-discrimination  and  the  equal  treatment 
of  workers.  56  Pension  rights  were  to  be  made  transferable  between  EC  countries, 
and  remittances  of  pensions  and  other  payments  to  countries  of  origin  were  to  be 
allowed.  The  creation  of  the  Cooperation  Councils  gave  the  agreements  an 
institutional  structure  to  facilitate  ongoing  political  exchanges  between  the 
Community  and  associates  and  to  deal  with  implementation  problems  when  they 
arose. 
The  enhanced  scope  of  the  agreements  also  met  some  of  the  Community's 
1". 
key  strategic  objectives.  Most  notably,  the  provisions  for  cooperation  in  the 
energy  sector  aimed  to  'foster  participation  by  Community  fmns  in  programmes 
for  the  exploration  production  and  processing  of  energy  resources  and  to  ensure 
that  long  ten'n  contracts  for  the  delivery  of  petroleum  products  are  properly 
performed.  '  57  For  the  more  economically  advanced  Mediterranean  states,  the 
GMP  undoubtedly  drew  them  closer  to  the  Community.  To  varying  degrees, 
Greece,  Portugal  and  Spain,  as  well  as  Malta  and  Turkey,  had  their  European 
vocations  confim-led. 
58 
However,  beneath  the  surface,  the  deep-rooted  asymmetry  of  Euro- 
Mediterranean  relations  was  barely  addressed.  The  idea  of  free-trade  foundered 
in  the  face  of  irreconcilable  differences  among  the  Member  States  about  the 
Community's  balance  between  preferential  treatment  and  liberalisation.  France, 
supported  by  Belgium,  Italy  and  the  Commission,  favoured  an  '-active  policy'  (as 
opposed  to  a  laissez-faire  policy)  and  viewed  reciprocity  as  a  tough  but  necessary 
choice.  59  The  UK  and  West  Germany  favoured  across  the  board  liberalisation. 
47 The  eventual  compromise  upheld  the  principle  of  reciprocity,  but  allowed 
differentiation  among  the  Mediterranean  associates  on  a  case-by-case  basis, 
removing  any  suggestion  of  uniformity  in  the  GMP. 
Concessions  on  agricultural  trade  again  required  protracted  internal 
negotiations  before  an  offer  could  be  made  to  the  third  countries.  The  Italian 
government,  for  instance,  mounted  a  campaign  in  the  Council  for  additional 
protection  for  its  Producers  before  it  would  accept  any  new  concessions  to  the 
Maghreb  states.  In  the  absence  of  progress,  the  Community  had  to  resort  to 
temporary  agreements,  since  the  first  generation  of  accords  expired  in  1974.  A 
second  round  of  talks  was  held  in  October  and  November  1974,  but  the 
Community's  revised  offer  on  agricultural  trade  received  a  lukewarm  response.  60 
Existing  arrangements  were  extended  as  the  talks  laboriously  progressed  through 
the  minutiae  of  concessions  on  citrus  fruits,  olive  oil,  tomato  concentrates  and 
wine.  The  introduction  of  the  CAP  had  only  served  to  increase  the  politicisation 
of  agriculture  and  the  Community  had  to  negotiate  from  a  position  even  less 
flexible  than  had  been  the  case  in  the  1960s. 
Momentum  was  finally  injected  into  the  negotiating  process  in  April  1975 
when  the  Council  agreed  a  series  of  so-called  'market  organisation  measures'  for 
the  most  contentious  sectors,  which  subsequently  freed  the  Commission  to  re- 
commence  negotiations.  61  The  new  measures  were  essentially  defensive, 
installing  safeguard  measures  against  imports  of  the  so-called  'sensitive' 
products.  62  Tariff  concessions  ranged  from  30-100%  and  covered  86-89%  of 
agricultural  exports,  an  average  tariff  reduction  of  30-40%  for  Tunisian  and 
Morocco  imports  over  the  1969  accords.  63  But  new  quantitative  restrictions  were 
also  applied  to  wines,  tinned  sardines,  potatoes,  oranges  and  tomatoes.  Taken 
48 collectively,  these  products  ranked  among  the  most  valuable  exports  for  the 
Mediterranean  non-member  countries. 
Beyond  agricultural  trade,  quantitative  import  ceilings  were  introduced  on 
refined  petroleum  products  above  which  punitive  duties  would  apply.  The 
Community  was  anxious  to  guarantee  uninterrupted  supplies  of  oil  and  gas,  but 
less  keen  to  encourage  the  development  of  potentially  competitive  indigenous 
processing  industries  in  the  associate  countries.  Trade  in  textiles,  a  sector  in 
which  Morocco  Egypt  and  Tunisia  had  a  clear  comparative  advantage  over 
Community  manufacturers,  was  totally  excluded  from  the  agreements  and  subject 
to  voluntary  export  restraints.  64  Effective  lobbying  by  European  textile 
manufacturers  and  the  already  stiff  competition  faced  by  the  industry  from 
external  sources  ruled  out  any  possibility  of  preferential  treatment  for  textile 
imports. 
The  new  agreements  were  undoubtedly  more  comprehensive  than  the 
earlier  trade  agreements,  but  the  underlying  pattern  of  the  EC's  relations  with  the 
Mediterranean  non-members  remained:  qualified  and  limited  assistance,  with 
Member  States  insisting  on  derogations  and  protective  measures  where  the 
interests  of  domestic  producers  were  threatened  . 
65  From  the  associates'  point  of 
view,  the  agreements  largely  failed  to  take  into  account  the  commercial,  cultural 
and  historical  specificities  of  their  relationships  with  the  Community.  66  Put 
simply,  the  accords  merely  perpetuated  economic  dependence.  67 
49 TABLE  1.2  The  Mediterranean  Network  After  the  GMT 
Country  Date  of  Agreement 
_Type 
of  Agreement 
Greece  November  1962  Association 
Turkey  September  1963  Association 
Morocco  March  1969 
April  1976 
Commercial 
Cooperation 
Tunisia  March  1969 
April  1976 
Commercial 
Cooperation 
Yugoslavia  April  1970  Trade 
Malta  December  1970  Association 
Cyprus  December  1972  Association 
Israel  March  1964 
May  1975 
Trade 
Free  trade  and  cooperation* 
Algeria  April  1976  Cooperation 
Egypt  December  1972 
January  1977 
Association 
Cooperation 
Jordan  January  1977  Cooperation 
Syria  January  1977  Cooperation 
Lebanon  May  1965 
May  1976 
Trade 
Cooperation 
*  Israel's  advanced  state  of  economic  development  compared  to  the  other  Mediterranean 
associates  put  it  on  a  different  footing  with  the  Community.  Moves  towards  free  trade  between  the 
two  began  in  1964,  and  accelerated  with  the  free-trade  agreement  of  1975. 
Source:  Khader,  B.  (1997)  Le  Partenariat  Euro-Miditerraneen  apr&  la  Conference  de 
Barcelone,  Paris:  L'Harmattan,  p.  3  1. 
Roy  Ginsberg  describes  the  GMP  as  'the  first  successful  attempt  by  the  EC 
at  a  self  styled  foreign  policy'.  68  Eberhard  Rhein,  a  fonner  Director  General  in  the 
Commission's  DGI,  sees  it  as  the  'first  example  of  a  coherent  piece  of 
Community  foreign  poliCy., 
69  However,  while  the  GMP  undoubtedly  brought  a 
sense  of  structure  to  the  Community's  relations  with  the  Mediterranean  associates, 
it  failed  to  change  either  the  bilateral  basis  of  the  policy  or  the  underlying 
asymmetry  of  economic  relations.  The  limited  scope  of  the  GMP  is  thrown  into 
sharp  relief  when  compared  to  the  1963  Yaounde  and  1975  Lome  Conventions 
between  the  Community  and  the  Member  States'  former  colonies,  which  created 
an  elaborate  system  of  market  access,  a  development  fund  of  I  billion  ECUs 
50 (Lom6)  and  an  institutional  structure  that  included  a  consultative  assembly  and  a 
council  of  ministers.  As  the  Community  contemplated  enlarging  to  the  south,  the 
inadequacies  of  the  GMP  became  apparent. 
3.  Southern  Enlargement:  Managing  Internal  Change 
The  accession  of  Greece,  Portugal  and  Spain  to  the  Community  marked  a  distinct 
phase  of  Mediterranean  policy  in  its  own  right.  On  the  economic  front,  southern 
enlargement  had  major  implications  for  the  Community"s  internal  market  in 
Mediterranean-type  agricultural  products.  With  significant  overlap  between  the 
production  structures  of  the  three  new  member  states  and  those  of  the 
Mediterranean  non-members,  the  potential  and  actual  trade  diversion  effects  of 
enlargement  represented  a  further  challenge  to  the  developmental  objectives  of  the 
GMP.  On  the  political  front,  enlargement  absorbed  three  states  into  the 
Community  with  an  extensive  range  of  commercial  and  political  interests  in  the 
region.  The  inception  of  this  Mediterranean  lobby  also  promised  to  even  up  the 
balance  of  power  between  northern  and  southern  Member  States. 
The  economies  of  many  of  the  Mediterranean  associates  were  in  a  parlous 
state  by  the  turn  of  the  decade.  Rapid  economic  growth  in  the  early-mid  1970s 
was  followed  by  stagnation  and  rising  external  debt  as  import  substitution 
strategies  and  indigenous  economic  development  policies  faltered.  By  1979,  the 
aggregate  trade  deficit  of  the  Mediterranean  third  countries  with  the  EC  stood  at  9 
billion  ECUs  compared  with  4  billion  ECUs  in  1973 
. 
70  Notwithstanding 
exogenous  factors  -  the  global  oil  price  shocks,  commodity  price  collapses  and 
global  recession,  the  cooperation  agreements  had  manifestly  failed  to  ameliorate 
economic  conditions  in  the  non-member  countries.. 
51 Even  before  enlargement,  the  margin  of  preference  for  the  Mediterranean 
associates  in  relation  to  those  states  with  no  preferential  trade  deal  from  the 
Community  had  fallen  by  a  third  as  a  result  of  global  tariff  reductions  in  the 
Kennedy  Round  of  the  GATT.  71  Import  volumes  of  tomatoes,  Morocco's  most 
important  agricultural  export,  fell  every  year  between  1978  and  1983,  provoking 
protests  from  the  Moroccan  delegation  in  Brussels  that  subsidised  Community 
production  was  putting  its  farmers  out  of  business.  72  Heinz  was  forced  to  close  a 
tomato  concentrates  factory  in  Morocco  as  the  Community's  defensive  'market 
73 
orgarasation  measures'  took  effect.  Employment  opportunities  for  migrant 
workers  were  also  hit  by  the  recession,  which  diminished  income  from  migrant 
workers'  remittances. 
74 
The  Community  entered  the  1980s  apparently  ill  prepared  for  the  effect 
southern  enlargement  would  have  on  the  GMP.  Not  until  1979  was  a  detailed 
study  of  its  impact  on  the  GMP  produced  . 
75The  key  finding  of  the  report  was  that 
the  Community's  self-sufficiency  ratio  in  most  Mediterranean  agricultural 
76 
products  would  rise  from  between  80-90%  to  a  situation  of  surplus.  Spanish 
accession  alone  was  projected  to  raise  Community  vegetable  production  by  25%, 
fresh  fruit  by  48%  and  olive  oil  by  59%,  threatening  to  displace  Maghrebi  imports 
of  these  products.  77  Morocco  and  Tunisia  stood  to  lose  the  most.  The  Tunisian 
agricultural  sector,  for  instance,  was  heavily  dependent  on  exports  of  olive  oil 
(50%  of  its  total  agricultural  exports)  but  the  entry  of  Greece  and  Spain  threatened 
to  devastate  the  industry.  78  The  report  also  predicted  that  Cyprus,  Malta,  Israel 
and  Turkey  would  suffer  net  falls  in  their  trade  with  the  EC.  79 
The  associates  demanded  the  renegotiation  of  certain  clauses  in  the 
cooperation  agreements  that  would  increase  import  quotas  in  order  to  offset  the 
displacement  effects  of  free  access  to  the  Community  market  for  Portuguese  and 
52 Spanish  goods  . 
80  France,  still  committed  to  preserving  its  special  import  regime 
for  cheap  Moroccan  and  Tunisian  agricultural  exports  to  the  Community,  offered 
strong  support  for  revising  the  agreements  so  as  to  offset  the  trade  displacement 
effects  of  enlargement  . 
81  The  Commission  tried  to  deal  with  the  protocols  as  a 
technical  issue  in  order  to  depoliticise  any  trade  concessions  and  give  itself  the 
maximum  possible  flexibility  to  put  an  acceptable  package  together.  The 
proposed  deal  was  based  on  two  measures.  First,  in  the  event  of  changes  in 
community  agricultural  production,  the  Community  undertook  to  proportionately 
- 
J. 
adjust  market  access  for  the  associates.  Import  volumes  would  therefore  rise  and 
fall  with  trends  in  internal  production.  At  the  same  time,  the  Community  pledged 
Community  assistance  to  reduce  the  associates  growing  dependency  on  food 
imports,  another  consequence  of  the  failure  of  economic  self-reliance  strategies. 
Second,  the  Community  aimed  to  reduce  customs  duties  and  tariffs  in  a  number  of 
particularly  sensitive  sectors  such  as  processed  foodstuffs,  petrochemicals  and 
textiles. 
Yet  again,  however,  the  major  battles  over  the  terms  of  the  protocols  on 
agricultural  trade  were  fought  in  the  Council  as  Member  States'  interests  collided. 
As  Crouzatier  argues,  'enlargement...  brought  home  to  the  northern  partners  the 
specific  difficulties  of  the  Mediterranean  economy,,  and  accentuated  internal 
discord  within  the  Community  over  the  correct  policy  to  pursue  for  the  region.  '  82 
The  Iberian  member  states  quickly  situated  themselves  in  the  protectionist  camp. 
Spain,  backed  by  Italy,  put  pressure  on  the  Council  to  withhold  its  approval  of  the 
Commission's  negotiating  mandate  until  after  the  entry  of  the  Iberians  into  the 
Community.  This  ad-hoc  alliance  ensured  that  the  Mediterranean  Member  States 
as  a  group  would  carry  extra  weight  to  block  additional  trade  concessions  in  the 
post-accession  period. 
53 The  negotiations  resulted  in  a  compromise  between  the  Spanish 
government  and  the  Commission  that  restricted  future  imports  of  Mediterranean 
agricultural  products  to  'traditional  exports',  thus  reducing  the  associates'  scope 
for  product  diversification  and  limiting  the  potential  for  new  competition  with 
European  producers.  83  Quotas  were  calculated  based  on  1980-84  levels,  a  period 
of  severe  drought  in  the  Maghreb  and  therefore  a  atypically  low  production  period. 
On  a  more  positive  note,,  customs  duties  were  gradually  reduced  over  a  transitional 
period  of  10  years  from  1986  in  parallel  with  the  transitional  period  for  Portugal 
and  Spain.  Mandates  for  the  Commission  to  negotiate  protocols  to  the  existing 
cooperation  and  accords  were  agreed  by  the  Council  in  November  1985.84  Greek, 
Portuguese  and  Spanish  tariffs  on  many  products  were  phased  out  incrementally, 
and  removed  altogether  by  1996.  The  CAP's  reference  price  system  for 
Mediterranean  products,  a  measure  which  discriminated  against  lower  priced 
imports,  was  also  to  be  abolished  by  1996.  However,  the  reference  price  was 
simply  replaced  by  a  countervailing  charge  on  exports  above  quota  limits.  This 
combination  of  factors  prompted  an  angry  reaction  from  Rabat  and  Tunis  and 
85  demands  for  compensation  in  the  form  of  fmancial  aid.  Extra  funds  were 
provided  in  the  fourth  financial  protocols  (1987-1991,  see  Appendix  2),  but  the 
total  increase  of  20  per  cent  for  the  whole  region  failed  to  appease  the  associates. 
The  economies  of  the  Mediterranean  associates  continued  to  weaken 
through  the  1980s.  Falling  export  revenues  failed  to  deliver  sufficient  import 
coverage  rates,  trade  deficits  rose  and  external  indebtedness  grew  exponentially, 
leading  to  increased  pressure  for  unpopular  reforms  demanded  by  the  JW.  86 
Perhaps  the  most  visible  sign  of  the  growing  dissatisfaction  of  the  Mediterranean 
countries  with  their  treatment  by  the  EC  was  Morocco"  s  application  for 
Community  membership,  made  in  July  1987.87  The  failure  of  the  GMP  and  the 
54 apparent  inability  of  the  Community  to  reform  its  Mediterranean  policy  provoked 
88  Rabat  into  what  was  more  a  sign  of  frustration  than  a  serious  attempt  to  join.  By 
the  end  of  the  decade,  the  case  for  wholesale  policy  reform  was  strong. 
Conclusions 
What  this  brief  history  of  Mediterranean  policy  shows  is  the  centrality  of  pillar  I  in 
the  development  of  Euro-Mediterranean  relations.  From  the  outset,  the  foundation 
for  the  policy  was  the  management  of  trade  relations  with  Mediterranean  third 
countries.  To  the  extent  that  objectives  existed,  they  were  initially  driven  by  the 
commercial  interests  of  the  Member  States  and,  in  the  cases  of  Greece  and  Turkey, 
by  Cold  War  strategic  considerations.  When  the  first  set  of  agreements  were 
absorbed  into  the  GMP,  the  Union's  ambitious  rhetoric  far  exceeded  the  reality  of 
the  deal  it  offered  the  Mediterranean  non-member  countries. 
It  is  difficult  to  avoid  the  conclusion  that  the  advancement  of  economic 
development  in  the  Mediterranean  was  simply  not  a  high  priority  for  the 
Community,  and  that  it  was  content  to  preserve  the  overall  balance  of  its  trade 
relations  with  the  non-member  states.  Treaties,  whether  in  the  form  of  narrow 
associations  or  broader  cooperation  agreements,  tended  to  preserve  the  'North- 
South'  character  of  relations  between  the  Community  and  the  Mediterranean  non- 
members,  preserving  the  economic  status  quo  left  by  colonialism.  This  tendency 
prompted  some  commentators  to  conclude  that  the  relationship  had  'neo-colonial' 
qualities  . 
89  Furthermore,  the  first  generation  of  Association  Agreements  hardly 
justify  the  label  'Mediterranean  policy',  accomplishing  little  more  than  the 
codification  of  existing  terms  of  trade.  The  relatively  weak  bargaining  power  of 
the  Mediterranean  third  countries  left  them  with  little  choice  other  than  to  accept 
what  the  Community  offered. 
55 The  reasons  for  this  conservatism  lay  in  the  defensive  attitude  adopted  by 
the  southern  Member  States,  who  clearly  dominated  the  initial  development  of 
Mediterranean  policy  instruments.  Of  the  key  issues  at  stake,  agriculture  was 
repeatedly  the  most  contentious,  politicised  from  the  outset  by  the  Italian 
government.  Recurring  arguments  about  agricultural  trade  revealed  reflected  the 
similarity  of  the  production  structures  of  the  southern  Member  Mediterranean 
Member  States  and  the  non-members.  The  Community  was  faced  with  conflict  of 
interests  between  the  need  to  safeguard  the  interests  of  European  producers  and 
the  accepted  view  that  market  access  for  non-member  countries  had  to  be 
improved.  It  was  a  conflict  that  the  Community  never  managed  to  fully  resolve. 
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61 Chapter  3 
OLD  WINE  IN  NEW  BOTTLES?  THE  REDIRECTED 
MEDITERRANEAN  POLICY  AND  THE  EURO-MEDITERRANEAN 
AGREEMENTS 
The  end  of  the  1980s  saw  a  clearer  strategic  direction  begin  to  emerge  in  EU 
Mediterranean  policy.  Opinion  among  key  actors  within  the  EU,  and  in  Western 
Europe  more  generally,  converged  around  the  view  that  the  Mediterranean  region 
posed  immediate  and  longer-term  security  problems  for  Europe.  The  policy 
changes  that  resulted  were  initially  low  key  but  were  rapidly  followed  by  a  more 
extensive  repackaging  exercise  that  led  to  the  Euro-Mediterranean  partnership 
(EMP)  and  a  third  generation  of  bilateral  agreements  (the  Euro-Mediterranean 
Agreements).  The  Union's  impressive  sounding  objective  was  to  turn  the 
Mediterranean  into  an  area  of  'peace,  stability  and  prosperity.  " 
This  chapter  charts  the  rise  of  Mediterranean  policy  up  the  EU's  foreign 
policy  agenda.  Section  one  argues  that  the  major  stimuli  for  change  were  external, 
a  combination  of  the  weak  economic,  political  and  social  situations  of  the 
Mediterranean  non-members  and  the  increased  salience  of  Mediterranean  security 
in  the  aftermath  of  the  Cold  War.  Section  2  assesses  the  Redirected 
Mediterranean  Policy  (RMP),  the  ineffectual  outcome  of  the  Union's  first  attempt 
to  repackage  its  relationship  with  the  Mediterranean  third  countries.  2  Section  3 
discusses  the  origins  of  the  Euro-Mediterranean  Partnership  and  the  rationale  that 
lay  behind  it.  The  final  section  examines  the  negotiation  and  content  of  the  Euro- 
Mediterranean  agreements,  the  principal  policy  instrument  attached  to  the  new 
Mediterranean  strategy.  3 
62 1.  The  Changing  Definition  of  Mediterranean  Security 
The  sudden  geo-political  transformation  of  Europe  in  1989  had  a  profound  impact 
on  both  the  EU's  external  environment  and  its  internal  order.  Its  instinctive 
reaction  was  to  turn  to  its  eastern  boundary  and  begin  considering  ways  to  bring 
back  the  CEECs  into  the  European  fold.  4  Although  the  Union  initially  failed  to 
come  up  with  a  coherent  eastern  strategy,  it  did  take  the  lead  in  starting  the 
process  of  economic  and  political  transition  in  the  region.  At  the  same  time, 
5  however,  awareness  was  growing  of  the  vulnerability  of  the  EU's  southern  flank. 
With  the  uneasy  balancing  effect  of  US-Soviet  competition  in  the  region  removed, 
the  challenges  and  complexities  of  Mediterranean  security  became  increasingly 
apparent.  In  this  dramatically  different  geo-strategic  context,  the  Union  was 
expected  to  assume  a  much  bigger  share  of  the  responsibility  for  security  in  its 
own  back  yard.  6 
For  Mediterranean  third  countries,  the  end  of  the  Cold  War  reinforced  their 
sense  of  marginalisation  in  the  international  economic  and  political  order. 
Fearing,  that  they  would  be  overlooked  in  East-West  rapprochement,  a  number  of 
the  poorer  Mediterranean  countries  warned  of  instability  and  future  conflicts  if  the 
widening  prosperity  gap  between  North  and  South  was  not  addressed.  7  States 
already  under  severe  economic  strain  were  faced  with  the  prospect  of  being 
crowded  out  in  the  allocation  of  aid,  investment  and  other  developmental 
resources  to  Central  and  Eastern  Europe.  The  message  to  Western  Europe  was 
simple  but  powerful:  benign  neglect  of  Mediterranean  security  was  no  longer 
sustainable. 
At  the  root  of  the  Mediterranean  security  challenge  was  a  constellation  of 
interrelated  economic,  political  and  social  factors.  By  1989,  the  economic 
positions  of  several  Mediterranean  associates  had  deteriorated  to  the  point  of 
63 crisis.  External  debts  rose  throughout  the  decade  on  the  back  of  dramatic  falls  in 
oil  revenues,  the  global  collapse  of  commodity  prices  and  the  failure  of  domestic 
economic  policieS.  8  In  1989,  the  total  external  debt  of  the  Maghreb  states  stood  at 
41  billion  ECUs,  while  that  of  the  Mashreq  countries  stood  at  53  billion  ECUs, 
figures  that  represented  between  18  and  40  per  cent  of  GNP.  9  For  Algeria,  debt 
repayments  amounted  to  70  per  cent  of  export  receipts;  for  Morocco  45  per  cent. 
Table  3.1  Debt  Statistics  for  the  Mediterranean  Associates 
Country  1980 
Debt/GNP 
1989 
Debt/GNP 
1980 
Debt/Exports*, 
1989 
Debt/ExPorts* 
N 
Maghreb  47.2  74.9  150.1  237.9 
Ma  52.0  102.7  110.0  229.3 
Cyprus  25.0  47.0  49.0  82.0 
Malta  8.8  20.7  9.1  24.3 
Turkey  34.3  53.8  332.9  189.8 
Earnings  from  exports  of  goods  and  services. 
No  figures  quoted  for  Israel.  Debt  stood  at  19  billion  ECUs  in  1989. 
Sources:  World  Debt  Tables,  World  Bank,  1996;  Ayari,  C.  (1992)  Enjeux  Miditerraneens:  Pour 
Une  Coopiration  Euro-Arabe,  Paris:  CNRS,  p.  199. 
The  Mediterranean  debt  crisis  had  a  number  of  implications  for  EU  policy. 
First,  violent  mass  demonstrations  in  Algeria,  Morocco  and  Tunisia  during  1987 
and  1988,  a  reaction  to  austerity  measures  imposed  by  the  IMF,  served  as  an 
uncomfortable  reminder  of  the  fragility  of  the  democratisation  and  liberalisation 
processes  underway  in  the  region.  10  This  tangible  demonstration  of  the  link 
between  economic  and  political  stability  forced  the  Union  to  consider  the 
effectiveness  of  its  support  for  moves  towards  pluralism.  Second,  EU  Member 
States  and  private  banks  in  Western  Europe  were  collectively  the  biggest  creditors 
of  Mediterranean  third  countries,  accounting  for  50  per  cent  of  the  region's  total 
debt.  11  A  case  therefore  existed  for  improved  coordination  among  European 
64 creditors,  and  the  EU  was  one  possible  option.  Italy,  for  instance,  argued  that  a 
Mediterranean  financial  institution  should  be  established  to  channel  macro- 
12 
economic  assistance  to  third  countries. 
The  Union's  trade  policy  in  the  Mediterranean  was  an  obvious  target  for 
criticism.  Despite  the  Association  and  Cooperation  agreements,  trade  with  the  EU 
had  failed  to  act  as  the  motor  for  economic  growth  in  most  of  the  associate 
countries.  The  non-members'  share  of  total  Community  imports  declined  from  II 
per  cent  in  1980  to  8.2  per  cent  by  1988  as  trade  with  the  Asia  gained  ground.  As 
table  3.2  shows,  the  EU's  trade  surplus  with  the  Mediterranean  non-members 
decreased  only  marginally  -  from  3.2  billion  ECUs  in  1980  to  2.8  billion  ECUs  in 
1989.  As  European  economies  slipped  into  recession  in  1990,  a  further 
contraction  of  trade  was  expected,  and  the  old  issue  of  improving  market  access 
assumed  even  greater  significance. 
Table  3.2  Trade  with  the  EU  (Million  ECUs)  (1980-1989) 
Country  Imports  1980  Imports  1989  Exports  1980  Exports  1989, 
Algeria  4435  5848  5093  4715 
Cyprus  269  524  601  1438 
Egypt  2385  2441  3397  3764 
Israel  1660  3197  17191  5101 
Jordan  21  102  760  905 
Lebanon  45  101  1139  829 
Libya*  7478  6304  4530  2911 
Malta  253  568  503  1064 
Morocco  1356  2674  1764  3226 
Syria  969  775  1400  780 
Tunisia  1380  1980  1684  2531 
Turkey 
- 
1053  5536  1917  5609 
ITOTALS  1  21304  1  300501  24507  _  32873 
*  Libya,  though  not  an  associate,  is  included  because  of  the  sizeable  volume  of  its  trade  with  the 
Community.  No  figures  available  for  trade  with  the  Palestinian  territories. 
Source:  Data  extrapolated  from  Eurostat,  various  publications. 
65 The  stagnation  of  Euro-Mediterranean  trade  was  exacerbated  by  the  finther 
erosion  of  the  Community's  preferential  external  trading  system  through 
liberalisation  measures  agreed  in  the  Uruguay  Round  of  the  GATT.  As  Regnault 
puts  it,  'when  we  prefer  the  whole  world,  we  no  longer  prefer  anyone.  "  13 
Projections  from  the  Uruguay  Round  suggested  that  Mediterranean  third  countries 
stood  to  lose  5  10  million  ECUs  worth  of  trade  once  the  Round  was  completed.  14 
Coupled  with  the  rigours  of  domestic  liberalisation  programmes,  the  pace  of 
global  economic  change  was  outstripping  the  capacity  of  Mediterranean 
governments  to  implement  the  reforms  it  necessitated.  They  looked  to  the  EU  for 
targeted  assistance,  including  help  with  economic  restructuring,  small  business 
and  fmancial  market  development,  and  the  modernisation  of  production 
facilities.  15  Conversely,  if  the  Union  was  to  protect  its  dominant  economic 
position  in  the  area,  some  sort  of  'deepened  regionalism'  seemed  to  be  the  most 
appropnate  method  of  binding  Mediterranean  countries  to  it.  16 
The  consequences  of  the  Single  Market  project  also  had  to  be  factored  into 
the  Mediterranean  economic  equation.  For  the  Community's  Mediterranean 
trading  partners,  the  potential  trade  creation  benefits  of  the  1992  project  were 
likely  to  be  outweighed  by  its  diversionary  effects  on  trade  and  investment.  17 
Moreover,  studies  suggested  that  any  expansion  of  imports  resulting  from  the 
single  market  initiative  would  centre  on  manufactured  goods  rather  than  primary 
commodities.  '  18  There  was  widespread  concern  that  the  single  market  project 
would  generate  new  import  barriers,  lead  to  a  further  diminution  of  the 
preferential  market  access  regime,  create  disincentives  to  already  slow  rates  of 
inward  FDI,  and  lead  to  the  imposition  of  tighter  and  more  strictly  policed  rules  of 
19 
ongin.  The  Union  thus  felt  it  necessary  to  give  assurances  that  they  would  not  be 
marginalised.  Commissioner  Abel  Matutes,  who  took  on  the  Mediterranean 
66 policy  brief  during  1989,  claimed  that:  'we  have  a  vital  interest  in  being  open  to 
imports  and  being  able  to  export  to  the  rest  of  the  world.  The  risks  of  the 
Community  being  closed  to  the  rest  of  the  world  when  it  completes  the  single 
market  in  1992  are  non-existent.  920  Nevertheless,  the  possibility  of  an  economic 
'fortress  Europe'  was  viewed  with  some  apprehension.  21 
It  was  the  potential  political  and  social  fallout  of  economic  failure  that 
raised  fears  of  a  future  security  'threat'  from  the  Mediterranean.  Since  the  1960s, 
economic  growth  had  lagged  far  behind  rapid  population  expansion  in  the 
Maghreb,  Mashreq  and  Turkey,  resulting  in  a  significant  drop  in  per  capita  GDP 
from  1974-1  990.22  With  economies  (and  governments)  unable  to  generate 
sufficient  employment  to  keep  up  with  the  demand  for  work  from  burgeoning 
young  populations,  pressure  built  up  behind  a  number  of  safety  valves,  of  which 
migration  and  the  possible  overthrow  of  western-friendly  incumbent  governments 
had  the  most  far  reaching  implications.  23  As  a  former  Moroccan  ambassador  to 
the  UK  put  it,  'If  we  want  to  keep  people  in  our  country,  we  have  to  find  a  way  to 
give  them  jobs.  24  Empirical  analyses  identified  the  potential  for  a  large-scale 
expansion  of  immigration,  particularly  from  the  Maghreb  and  South  East 
Europe. 
25 
A  more  immediate  concern  for  the  EU,  and  for  Mediterranean 
governments  themselves,  was  the  growing  appeal  of  political  Islam  across  the 
region.  France,  for  instance,  identified  the  rise  of  Islarn  as  one  of  its  key  foreign 
policy  challenges  of  the  1990S.  26  The  burgeoning  number  of  young  unemployed 
people  were  increasingly  turning  to  Islamic  social  movements  and  political  parties 
with  their  roots  in  rapidly  expanding  urban  poor.  The  paring  back  of  traditionally 
patemalistic  states  and  disillusiomnent  with  the  lost  ideals  of  the  post- 
independence  period  provided  fertile  ground  for  radical  alternatives. 
67 The  Union's  response  to  Islamisation  had  to  be  carefully  measured.  On 
A-  - 
Ene  one  hand,  sizeable  populations  of  Muslims  in  Belgium,  France,  Germany  and 
the  UK  made  relations  with  the  Islamic  world  as  much  an  internal  issue  as  an 
external  one.  27  Considerable  latent  hostility  existed  towards  a  'West'  which 
proclaimed  its  support  for  democratisation  while  at  the  same  time  using  its 
influence  to  try  and  prevent  Islamic  parties  coming  to  power.  On  the  other  hand, 
discredited  regimes  in  North  Africa  and  the  Middle  East  often  enjoyed  overt 
support,  or  at  least  tacit  approval,  from  EU  Member  States  and  the  West  in 
general,  which  were  anxious  to  safeguard  their  commercial  and  political  interests 
in  those  countries.  Furthermore,  as  Cold  War  armoury  started  to  be  dispersed  in 
the  former  Soviet  Union,  it  was  feared  that  Islamic  governments  and  groups 
hostile  to  the  West  might  illicitly  acquire  chemical,  biological  or nuclear  weapons. 
Anti-govemment  violence  might  easily  spill  over  into  Western  Europe,  with 
Islamic  activists  exploiting  links  between  groups  from  both  sides  of  the 
Mediteffanean. 
This  combination  of  destabilising  economic  and  political  factors  in  the 
Mediterranean  pointed  to  the  need  for  a  multi-dimensional,  holistic  approach  to 
regional  security,  in  line  with  a  broader  trend,  evident  in  the  security  studies 
community,  towards  re-defining  the  concept  of  security  itself.  28  Policies  would 
have  to  begin  to  encompass,  inter  alia,  cultural,  economic,  environmental  and 
social  issues  -  reflecting  the  interdependency  of  the  factors  influencing  modem 
29 
security.  For  instance,  economic  underdevelopment  and  poverty  were  likely  to 
provoke  social  problems  which  in  turn  threatened  the  stability  of  weak  states.  30 
Weak,  insecure  states  were  more  inclined  to  resort  to  violence  in  the  face  of 
perceived  or  real  threats,  and  therefore  a  challenge  to  peaceful  international  order. 
At  the  institutional  level,  this  shift  of  emphasis  from  traditional  politico-military 
68 security  towards  'soft  security'  implied  a  more  prominent  role  for  organisations 
with  very  broad  remits,  such  as  the  EU,  the  OSCE  and  the  United  Nations,  and  a 
general  increase  in  international  cooperation. 
The  Mediterranean  of  the  late  1980s  appeared  to  be  an  ideal  test  for  this 
new  thinking.  From  the  point  of  view  of  the  EU  and  its  Member  States,  the  socio- 
economic  signals  emanating  from  the  region  were  providing  a  stream  of  largely 
negative  policy  feedback,  creating  a  strong  imperative  for  policy  change.  31  But 
the  policy  discourse  that  developed  around  the  Mediterranean  security  problem 
tended  to  be  long  on  rhetoric  and  short  on  substance.  Terminology  like  'co- 
development',  'cooperation'  and  'dialogue'  abounded  without  any  clear  sense  of 
how  such  concepts  might  be  operationalised.  In  the  end,  events  dictated  the  pace 
ofchange. 
2.  The  Redirected  Mediterranean  Policy:  Rhetoric  and  Reality 
As  a  self-proclaimed  progressive  force  in  the  international  order,  the  EU  seemed 
well-placed  to  lead  the  development  of  innovative  security  policy  in  Europe.  The 
diminishing  relevance  of  traditional  balance  of  power  politics  and  military 
capability  after  1989  brought  renewed  interest  in  the  notion  of  the  Union  as  a 
benevolent  'civilian  superpower',  contributing  its  largesse  and  its  functional 
expertise  to  the  construction  of  a  new  model  of  international  relations  in  which 
economic  success  would  be  of  paramount  importance.  Narrowing  the  massive  gap 
in  prosperity  between  the  northern  and  southern  shores  of  the  Mediterranean  was 
essential.  In  1990,  per  capita  GDP  in  the  EU  stood  at  16500  ECUs,  while  in  the 
Maghreb  and  Mashreq  countries  it  stood  at  less  than  1500  ECUs.  32  However,  the 
extent  to  which  the  Union  was  capable  of  performing  this  role  as  benefactor  again 
69 hinged  on  the  ability  of  the  Member  States  to  set  aside  short  term  political 
expediency  for  long-tenn  change. 
With  a  former  Spanish  MP  -  Abel  Matutes  -  in  charge  of  EU- 
Mediterranean  relations,  the  subsequent  re-evaluation  of  Mediterranean  policy 
was  very  much  Commission-led.  33  Matutes  initial  task  was  to  convince  the 
Member  States  that  Europe's  security  was  inseparable  from  the  prosperity  and 
stability  of  the  wider  Mediterranean  region.  34  Exploratory  proposals  for  an 
upgraded  policy  were  presented  to  the  heads  of  government  at  the  Strasbourg 
summit  in  1989.  The  paper  acknowledged  the  poor  economic  performance  of  the 
majority  of  Mediterranean  associates  and  highlighted  their  failure  to  meet  the 
demand  for  jobs  as  a  major  threat  to  social  stability.  35  The  deteriorating  quality  of 
the  Mediterranean  enviromnent,  growing  food  shortages  and  chronic  balance  of 
payments  deficits  were  also  identified  as  problems  that  Mediterranean  had  to 
address. 
36 
The  European  Parliament  and  the  Economic  and  Social  Committee  (ESC) 
joined  in  the  debate  in  late  1989,  calling  for  'joint  economic  development', 
'institutionalised  economic  integration'  and  more  effective  management  and 
distribution  of  EU  financial  resources.  37  The  ESC  was  especially  critical,  taking 
the  Member  States  to  task  for  'protectionist  practices'  and  arguing  that  the  most 
damage  had  been  done  by  'the  inherent  limits  and  contradictions  of  the 
Community's  general  Mediterranean  strategy,  and  by  outstanding  problems  within 
the  Community  itself  938  It  singled  out  the  failure  of  the  Member  States  to  open 
up  their  agricultural  markets,  pointing  out  that  those  governments  with  the  most 
interest  in  Mediterranean  security  also  tended  to  be  the  most  protectionist.  39 
The  Matutes  document  came  before  the  Council  at  an  opportune  time. 
Spain  and  France  held  the  Council  gavel  in  1989,  while  Italy  took  over  in  the 
70 second  half  of  1990,  giving  the  EU"s  agenda  a  distinctly  Mediterranean  flavour. 
As  De  Vasconcelos  argues,  the  region  had  become  a  "common  foreign  policy 
priority'  for  France,  Italy  and  Spain,  whose  foreign  mhuistries  had  established  a 
mechanism  for  regular  consultations  between  political  directors.  40  In  1989,  Italian 
Foreign  Minister  Gianni  de  Michelis  demanded  a  wholesale  rebalancing  in  the 
distribution  of  EC  resources  to  the  Central  and  Eastern  European  countries  and  the 
south,  arguing  that  the  EC  should  'combine  its  aid  policy  to  Eastern  and  to 
Mediterranean  countries,  with  each  member  country  dedicating  0.25  per  cent  of  its 
GNP  to  these  two  areas.  Al  In  1990,  Spanish  Foreign  Minister  Femdndez  Ordofi-ez 
called  for  a  new  regional  security  system,  arguing  that  it  should  be  based  on 
economic  development  and  inter-cultural  dialogue.  Together,  this  Mediterranean 
lobby  ensure  that  the  Commission's  proposals  were  not  lost  in  the  EU's  crowded 
agenda  at  this  time. 
The  outcome  of  Matutes'  policy  review  was  the  Redirected  Mediterranean 
Policy  (RMP),  a  mixture  of  promises  to  improve  the  terms  of  the  bilateral 
agreements,  additional  funding  and  new  financial  instruments  (See  Figure  3.1).  42 
71 Figure  3.1  Main  Commitments  of  the  Redirected  Mediterranean  Policy 
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The  decision  to  supplement  the  bilateral  financial  protocols  with  a  new 
budget  line  for  regional  integration  projects  served  a  number  of  purposes.  First, 
the  low  level  of  trade  between  the  Mediterranean  associates  themselves  was 
widely  regarded  as  an  impediment  to  economic  growth  and  the  liberalisation 
process.  44  By  offering  financial  incentives,  the  Union  sought  to  kick-start  cross- 
border  economic  activity.  From  its  own  point  of  view,  a  more  favourable  intra- 
regional  trading  enviroment  would  help  cement  the  positions  of  European 
companies  in  the  associates'  markets  and  facilitate  European  investments  in  the 
growing  network  of  transnational  energy  projects  in  the  Western  Mediterranean. 
Second,  regional  political  integration,  a  predicted  spin-off  from  economic 
integration,  was  seen  as  a  positive  development  in  the  security  context.  As 
Regelsberger  argues,  'such  developments  are  judged  as  stabilising  factors  in  world 
72 politics,  particularly  where  such  trends  are  accompanied  by  internal  political 
reforms  in  third  countries  centred  on  democratic  values.  45  In  1989,  the  five 
Maghreb  states  had  launched  their  own  regional  organisation  -  the  Arab  Maghreb 
Union  -  modelled  on  the  EU  with  joint  decision  making  bodies  and  an  agenda  for 
functional  cooperation  on  a  wide  range  of  issues.  46  Although  the  Union  provided 
no  direct  financial  assistance  to  the  fledgling  organisation,  the  regional  integration 
funds  were  intended  to  help  buttress  cross-border  activity  in  the  Maghreb.  47 
Third,  with  the  third  financial  protocols  up  for  re-negotiation  and 
substantial  claims  on  the  EC  budget  from  Central  and  Eastern  Europe,  the 
Commission  had  to  make  a  watertight  case  in  the  Council  to  secure  extra  money 
for  the  Mediterranean.  That  the  RMP  earmarked  financial  aid  for  internal 
economic  reforms  persuaded  sceptical  northern  Member  States,  particularly 
Germany,  to  endorse  the  package,  albeit  with  a  35  per  cent  cut  in  the  figure 
48 
originally  requested  . 
However,  the  new  financial  instrument  also  had  a  number  of  limitations. 
The  allocation  of  the  funding  was  to  be  decided  on  a  project  by  project  basis, 
rather  than  as  part  of  a  pre-determined  programme.  Not  only  did  this  procedure 
slow  the  approval  of  the  projects  by  the  Commission,  it  also  subjected  projects  to 
the  vagaries  of  decision-making  in  many  of  the  Mediterranean  associates' 
bureaucracies.  The  take  up  rate  of  EC  funding  proved  to  be  a  persistent  problem 
for  the  Commission,  with  funds  rarely  being  fully  committed  . 
49  Finally, 
promoting  cooperation  between  Mediterranean  NGOs  -  the  civil  society 
dimension  of  the  RMP  -  relied  on  projects  bypassing  governments  who  were 
traditionally  suspicious  of  political  activities  outside  the  control  of  the  state. 
The  Commission's  suggestion  that  debt  policy  should  be  coordinated  by 
the  EU  fell  on  deaf  ears.  50  Member  States  were  reluctant  to  stray  from  the 
73 prevailing  order  dominated  by  the  multilateral  financial  institutions  and  collective 
management  among  the  biggest  creditor  states  in  the  G7/GIO.  Despite  gestures  by 
a  number  of  Member  States  to  unilaterally  reduce  the  debt  servicing  burden  for 
Mediterranean  countries,  the  Council  chose  to  link  any  assistance  with  debt 
servicing  to  the  implementation  of  structural  adjustment  programmes  and 
economic  reforms  imposed  by  the  Bretton  Woods  institutions.  The  segment  of  aid 
designated  for  structural  adjustment  and  macro-economic  reforms  was  made 
conditional  upon  adherence  to  IMF  programmes.  The  Union's  only  concession 
over  this  issue  was  its  offer  to  link  projects  to  'sectors  particularly  affected  by 
structural  adjustment  9.51 
On  the  trade  front,  the  RMP  inevitably  ran  into  obstacles  in  the  Council. 
Looming  recession  in  Western  Europe  made  the  southern  Member  States 
particularly  sensitive  to  the  suggestion  of  increased  competition.  Access  for 
agricultural  produce  was  only  marginally  improved  by  an  agreement  to  bring 
forward  by  three  years  the  tariff  reductions  promised  after  the  end  of  Portugal  and 
Spain's  transitional  periods.  Morocco's  Ambassador  to  the  EU  delivered  a  strong 
rebuke  to  Brussels,  deploring  the  'timidity'  of  the  Council's  decisions.  52 
Relaxation  of  the  Union's  textile  import  regime,  another  key  sector  for 
Mediterranean  third  countries,  was  forced  on  it  by  the  Uruguay  Round  of  the 
GATT  rather  than  by  any  altruistic  intentions.  A  Council  decision  of  December 
1990  to  eliminate  quantitative  limits  on  textile  imports  simply  pre-empted  the 
abolition  of  the  Multi-Fibre  Agreement.  53 
In  hindsight,  the  RMP  did  little  more  than  act  as  a  legitimating  device  for 
increased  aid  to  the  Mediterranean.  As  a  strategy,  it  was  afflicted  with  the  same 
faults  that  imPaired  the  GMP:  the  gap  between  the  Commission's  policy 
prescriptions  and  what  the  Member  States  would  sanction,  the  ineffectiveness  of 
74 policy  in  addressing  the  structural  asymmetry  of  Euro-Mediterranean  economic 
relations,  and  the  reliance  on  existing  policy  instruments  that  were  clearly  failing 
to  stimulate  trade.  But  the  RMP  at  least  ensured  that  Mediterranean  policy  stayed 
on  the  EU's  external  relations  agenda  during  the  1990s,  at  a  time  when  it  was 
preoccupied  with  its  own  internal  development  and  with  the  rapidly  evolving 
situation  in  eastern  Europe.  In  a  very  limited  way,  the  regional  integration 
element  also  demonstrated  a  practical  application  by  the  EU  of  the  concept  of  'soft 
security'.  This  regionalisation  of  Mediterranean  policy  was  to  provide  the 
foundations  for  the  Euro-Mediterranean  Partnership. 
3.  The  Euro-Mediterranean  Partnership 
The  turning  point  in  the  development  of  the  Union's  Mediterranean  strategy  came 
with  the  1991  Gulf  War,  which  left  'a  gaping  hole  between  the  North  and  South' 
and  put  the  limitations  of  the  RMP,  and  the  Union's  powerlessness  in  the  politico- 
security  sphere,  into  sharp  relief.  54  The  economic,  political  and  socio-cultural 
disruption  caused  by  the  conflict  lent  new  urgency  to  the  search  for  cooperative 
security  structures  in  the  region,  something  on  which  the  EU  was  expected  to  take 
55 
the  lead. 
However,  as  Christopher  Piening  argues,  'the  Gulf  crisis  was  of  the  sort 
that  the  EU  was  least  able  to  deal  with',  demanding  a  rapid  political  response  to 
Iraq's  invasion  of  Kuwait  as  well  as  a  nuanced  position  that  took  into  account  the 
politico-cultural  sensitivities  of  Euro-Arab  relations.  56  Anti-war  and  anti-west 
demonstrations  throughout  the  Arab  world  and  in  European  capitals  alarmed 
European  governments,  who  feared  a  backlash  against  their  commercial  interests 
in  the  region  and  hostility  from  Muslim  citizens  in  Europe.  57  The  burning  of 
French  flags  during  protests  in  Rabat  had  a  particularly  profound  psychological 
75 effect,  prompting  some  commentators  asking  whether  France  had  finally  'lost  the 
Maghreb.  '  58  One  French  deputj  even  called  for  a  'Marshall  Plan  for  the 
Mediterranean'.  59  The  Union's  failure  to  project  a  unified  political  position  on  the 
conflict  and  to  take  into  account  the  cultural  implications  of  European 
involvement  in  the  US-led  coalition  undoubtedly  damaged  its  credibility  in  the 
eyes  of  the  Arab  world,  and  made  the  RMP  appear  largely  irrelevant.  60 
Only  in  the  aftermath  of  the  Gulf  conflict  did  the  Union's  external 
relations  machinery  grind  into  gear.  The  immediate  challenge  was  to  'desensitise' 
relations  with  the  Arab  countries,  a  task  entrusted  to  the  Troika  (Italy, 
Luxembourg,  The  Netherlands)  which  embarked  on  a  conciliatory  tour  of  the 
region.  61  The  Ministers  involved  noted  'real  bitterness'  from  the  Arab  states  and 
returned  to  Brussels  with  requests  for  substantial  financial  assistance  to  offset  the 
loss  of  trade  that  resulted  the  conflict.  62  However,  the  Union  had  already 
contributed  1.5  billion  ECUs  in  balance  of  payments  support  to  the  'front  line' 
states  in  the  conflict  in  August  1990,  and  the  only  additional  assistance  it  was 
prepared  to  offer  was  loan  capital  of  250  million  ECUs  to  Israel  and  the 
Palestinian  Territories  to  help  rebuild  communications  and  other  infrastructural. 
networks.  63  The  overriding  impression  left  by  the  Union's  behaviour  during  this 
period  was  of  an  irresolute  organisation,  unsure  of  how  best  to  contribute  to  the 
restoration  of  order  in  the  region. 
In  the  absence  of  an  EU  initiative,  it  was  left  to  the  big  three  southern  EU 
Member  States  -  France,  Italy  Spain  and  Italy  -  to  explore  other  avenues  for 
regional  cooperation.  By  far  the  most  ambitious  of  these  was  a  Spanish/Italian 
proposal  for  a  Conference  on  Security  and  Cooperation  in  the  Mediterranean 
(CSCM),  unveiled  at  a  CSCE  summit  in  Palma  during  September  1990.  The  idea 
appeared  to  have  timeliness  in  its  favour.  Modelled  on  the  Helsinki  agreement, 
76 the  CSCM  was  to  have  the  same  wide-ranging  remit  as  the  CSCE,  bringing 
together  Mediterranean  Arab  states,  Gulf  states  and  EU  Member  States.  64  Spain 
and  Italy  saw  the  CSCM  primarily  as  a  conflict  prevention  mechanism  and  as  a 
vehicle  for  multilateral  'dialogue'  between  the  Islamic  world  and  the  West. 
However,  the  USA,  which  was  left  off  the  list  of  prospective  CSCM  members, 
dismissed  the  initiative,  viewing  it  as  a  thinly  veiled  attempt  by  the  Europeans  to 
replace  it  as  the  lynchpin  of  international  security  in  the  region  . 
65  By  mid-  1992, 
the  proposal  had  quietly  dropped  off  the  CSCE  agenda,  replaced  instead  by  a 
vague  sounding  offer  to  'exchange  infonnation'  with  Mediterranean  states.  66 
An  alternative  route  was  taken  by  France,  which  favoured  a  less  ambitious 
sub-regional  approach  centred  on  the  Western  Mediterranean.  In  December  1990, 
it  launched  an  initiative  to  instigate  political  dialogue  between  five  northern 
Mediterranean  states  and  the  five  states  of  the  AMU.  The  '5+5'  process  was 
formally  launched  at  a  conference  of  Foreign  Ministers  in  Rome.  The  agreement 
provided  for  annual  meetings  between  foreign  ministers,  and  established  several 
working  groups  to  cover  issues  such  as  development,  food  self-sufficiency  and 
enviromnental  issues.  As  was  the  case  with  the  CSCM,  the  5+5  dialogue  quickly 
foundered  when  differences  surfaced  among  the  participating  states.  67  The 
European  states  refused  to  sit  at  the  same  table  as  Libya,  which  had  recently  been 
officially  condemned  by  the  EU  for  refusing  to  release  the  suspects  in  the 
Lockerbie  bombing  for  trial.  Its  death  knell  was  sounded  by  the  military  coup  in 
Algeria  in  January  1992. 
The  failure  of  these  attempts  to  create  new  regional  intergovernmental 
forums  re-focused  attention  on  EU  Mediteffanean  policy.  At  the  start  of  1992, 
Spain  was  given  the  task  of  producing  a  report  on  how  relations  between  the 
68 
Union  and  the  Maghreb  states  could  be  improved 
.  Working  closely  with 
77 Commissioner  Matutes,  the  Gonzalez  government  suggested  a  'partnership'  with 
the  Maghreb  states  that  would  include  a  free-trade  area  and  an  extensive  agenda 
for  cooperation  on  everything  from  the  common  management  of  natural  resources 
and  energy  to  supplies  of  food.  The  paper  also  called  for  the  institutionalisation  of 
meetings  between  the  Union  and  the  Arab  Maghreb  Union  at  both  the 
governmental  and  parliamentary  levels.  69  The  tone  of  the  report  was  strongly  neo- 
liberal,  arguing  that  free-trade,  increased  private  investment  and  macro-economic 
reform  were  the  most  effective  route  to  socio-economic  development  and 
modernisation,  and  that  the  Association  Agreements  and  EU  financial  aid  should 
be  used  in  support  of  these  objectives  . 
70  On  the  basis  of  the  Spanish  paper,  the 
Commission  was  tasked  with  preparing  firm  proposals  for  action. 
This  latest  round  of  reform  of  Mediterranean  policy  benefited  from 
political  momentum  injected  by  the  creation  of  the  CFSP.  One  effect  of  the  CFSP 
had  been  to  galvanise  the  member  governments,  into  more  thorough  consideration 
of  their  common  foreign  policy  interests,  and  the  post-Gulf  war  Mediterranean 
was  widely  regarded  as  a  priority  area  for  common  foreign  policy  actions.  A 
report  on  the  CFSP  presented  at  the  1992  Lisbon  European  Council  divided  the 
Mediterranean  into  two  geographical  areas  for  strategic  actions  in  favour  of 
economic  development,  security  and  stability:  the  Maghreb  and  the  Middle  East.  71 
While  the  definition  of  these  common  interests  was  imprecise,  the  Lisbon  text 
nevertheless  listed  the  broad  objectives  that  the  Union  should  pursue.  For  EU- 
Maghreb  relations,  the  heads  of  goverment  called  for  'upgraded  partnership'  and 
an  eclectic  'constructive  dialogue'  covering  immigration,  drug  trafficking,  Islamic 
fundamentalism,  population  growth  and  terrorism.  It  was  a  direct  endorsement  of 
the  joint  Commission-  Spanish  proposals  and  for  the  Commission's  exploratory 
communication  on  the  subject  presented  at  the  SUMMit. 
72  For  the  Middle  East,  the 
78 text  called  for  the  Union's  'full  involvement'  in  the  Peace  Process  and  for  efforts 
to  persuade  Israel  to  change  its  policy  in  the  Palestinian  territories.  The  Lisbon 
European  Council  effectively  laid  the  foundations  for  the  Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership. 
The  transition  to  the  CFSP  also  had  a  positive  impact  on  the  institutional 
balance  in  Mediterranean  policy.  As  Forster  and  Wallace  put  it,  'for  the  European 
Commission  external  relations  and  foreign  policy  had  now  become  one  of  its  most 
important  fields  of  operation.  73  VAiile  its  considerable  powers  in  the  external 
economic  relations  sphere  had  been  carefully  nurtured  by  the  Commission,  Article 
J.  8  (Title  V,  Maastricht  Treaty)  gave  the  Commission  a  right  to  submit  proposals 
to  the  Council  on  CFSP  matters.  To  try  to  make  the  most  of  its  new  powers,  the 
Commission  re-structured  itself.  Directorate  General  IB  was  given  responsibility 
for  the  Southern  Mediterranean  and  the  Middle  East,  while  DG  IA  acquired  a 
CFSP  directorate.  The  Commission  duly  benefited  by  virtue  of  its  permanency  in 
both  the  EC  and  CFSP  structures,  a  division  of  labour  that  promised  to  improve 
the  coherence  of  EU  strategic  action  by  starting  to  bridge  the  divide  between 
pillars  I  and  II. 
Consistent  with  the  Lisbon  text,  the  Commission  initially  continued  to 
focus  on  the  Maghreb.  74  By  the  end  of  1992,  several  months  of  exchanges 
between  the  Commission  and  the  Moroccan  and  Tunisian  governments  had 
established  the  need  for  new  agreements  with  the  EU  based  on  three  distinct  lines 
of  action.  First,  both  sides  agreed  to  further  renegotiation  of  the  temis  of  trade  in 
the  agreements,  with  Morocco  and  Tunisia  pressing  for  full  free-trade  in  all 
sectors.  75  Second,  provisions  would  be  included  in  each  agreement  covering 
rights  of  establishment,  rules  on  the  movement  of  services  and  capital,  technical 
cooperation  and  the  possibility  ofjoint  research  and  development  projects.  Third, 
79 the  new  agreements  would  include  provisions  for  'social  cooperation',  essentially 
ministerial  dialogue  on  issues  such  as  migration  and  living  and  working 
conditions  for  Maghrebi  citizens  in  the  EU.  At  a  meeting  of  EU  foreign  ministers 
in  December  1992,  the  Commission's  recommendations  were  given  the  green 
light  by  the  Member  States,  and  work  began  on  mandates  for  the  Commission  to 
begin  negotiations. 
However,  in  view  of  the  rapidly  evolving  Peace  Process  in  the  Middle 
East,  DG  IB  saw  the  partnership  as  a  means  to  stimulate  'post-conflict'  economic 
cooperation  between  the  Arabs  and  Israelis.  76  There  was  also  a  sense  among  the 
other  Mediterranean  third  countries  that  too  much  of  the  EU's  attention  was  being 
devoted  to  the  Maghreb.  At  a  meeting  of  the  EU-Egypt  Cooperation  Council  in 
July  1992,  an  Egyptian  official  had  urged  the  Union  to  'embrace  the 
Mediterranean  region  as  a  single  entity'.  77  When  it  appeared  during  1993  that 
Israel  and  the  PLO  might  be  on  the  verge  of  permanent  peace,,  the  partnership 
proposals  were  duly  extended  to  embrace  the  Machrek  and  take  in  the  Union's 
relationships  with  Cyprus,  Malta  and  Turkey.  78  By  1994,  the  EU's  relationships 
with  the  Mediterranean  non-member  countries  had  been  subsumed  under  a  single 
policy  framework:  the  Euro-Mediterranean  Partnership.  79 
The  basis  of  the  upgraded  agreements  -  the  main  po  icy  instrument 
attached  to  the  new  strategy  -  was  the  gradual  liberalisation  of  trade  over  a 
transitional  period  of  up  to  12  years  . 
80  Some  sectors  -  most  notably  trade  in 
services  -  were  excluded,  and  the  Council  ruled  out  the  unconditional 
liberalisation  of  agricultural  trade,  although  the  Union  promised  to  review  the 
market  situation  for  Mediterranean  agricultural  products  by  the  end  of  the  I  990s 
81 
after  strong  political  pressure  from  the  Maghrebi  governments.  Nevertheless, 
the  scope  of  the  agreements  was  far  wider  than  previous  agreements,  and 
80 incorporated  the  vast  majority  of  the  proposals  made  by  the  joint  Commission- 
Spanish  paper.  82  All  the  new  agreements  were  to  include  provisions  for 
cooperation  on  issues  such  as  energy  policy,  crime  and  immigration.  Formalised 
political  dialogue,  superseding  the  system  of  Cooperation  Councils  and 
Committees  gave  the  agreements  a  stronger  institutional  structure.  Regular 
dialogue  would  take  place  at  levels  ranging  from  Ministerial  to  senior  foreign 
office  officials. 
The  precise  provisions  of  the  trade  component  of  the  Euro-Mediterranean 
agreements  varied  from  one  partner  country  to  another  but  contained  certain 
common  features,  set  out  in  Figure  3.2: 
Figure  3.2  Common  Provisions  of  the  Euro-Mediterranean  Agreements 
e  The  extension  of  trade  preferences  based  (  the  pre-existing  arrangements 
end  more  limited  preferences  to 
after  1  January  2000. 
The  Euro-Mediterranean  agreements  were  essential  to  the  long-term 
success  of  the  EMP.  The  economic  centrepiece  of  the  EU's  Mediterranean 
strategy  -a  free-trade  area  -  implied  the  complete  removal  of  barriers  to  trade 
across  all  sectors.  For  the  majority  of  the  Mediterranean  partners,  their 
81 commitment  to  the  EMP  turned  on  them  seeing  tangible  economic  benefits  well 
before  the  2010  deadline  for  the  completion  of  the  FTA.  Free-trade  was  a  high 
stake  game  for  states  which  had  few  resources  at  their  disposal  to  alleviate  the 
negative  effects  of  increased  competition  on  domestic  producers.  In  the  event,  the 
Union  was  to  prove  disappointingly  defensive. 
4.  Negotiating  the  Euro-Mediterranean  Agreements 
When  negotiations  opened  -  initially  with  Tunisia  and  Morocco  in  1994  -  it 
quickly  became  clear  that  the  Member  States'  would  yet  again  hold  sway  over  the 
final  terms  of  the  agreements.  The  Council  attached  footnotes  to  each  of  the 
Commission's  negotiating  mandates  stipulating  that  traditional  trade  flows  should 
be  the  guiding  principle  and  the  upper  limit  of  trade  concessions.  83  In  addition  to 
keeping  to  these  targets,  the  Commission  was  'asked  to  avoid  proposing  additional 
concessions  which  could  worsen  the  situation  of  the  EU  market  for  sensitive 
products.  '  84  A  sense  of  dija  vu  pervaded  the  atmosphere  in  which  negotiators 
were  operating. 
Full  liberalisation  of  trade  in  industrial  products  posed  few  problems  for 
negotiators.  The  Mediterranean  partner  countries  accepted  that  their  markets 
would  have  to  be  fully  opened  to  European  manufactured  goods,  while  the 
85 
Member  States  saw  little  danger  of  competition  from  full  liberalisation.  But  the 
Union's  firm  line  on  traditional  trade  flows  in  agriculture  left  little  scope  for 
increases,  even  where  the  partners  demonstrated  that  they  had  the  production 
capacity  to  take  up  their  full  quotas.  86  Having  been  promised  free-trade,  the 
Mediterranean  partners'  demands  were  generally  far  in  excess  of  existing  import 
quota  levels.  Egypt's  wish-list  (in  the  early  stages  of  its  negotiations)  exemplified 
82 the  gulf  between  the  demands  of  the  partners  and  the  offers  the  Union  was 
prepared  to  make. 
Figure  3.3  EU-Egypt  Negotiating  Positions 
Product  EU  offer  (tonnes  per  annum)  Egypt's  request  (tonnes  per 
annum) 
Potatoes  220,000  450,000 
Oranges  1,000  3009000  (170,000)* 
Cut  flowers  500  30,000  (10,000)** 
Rice  32,000  200,000 
Egypt's  average  annual  exports  of  citrus  fruits  amounted  to  13000  tonnes. 
**  Egyptian  negotiators  were  prepared  to  accept  parity  with  Morocco  for  cut  flower  imports  (5000 
tonnes) 
Figures  in  brackets  show  the  reduction  in  demands  over  the  course  of  two  years. 
Source:  Unofficial  document  obtained  from  Embassy  of  partner  country. 
Even  allowing  for  'over-asking  and  under  offering',  standard  bargaining 
techniques,  negotiating  with  such  apparently  irreconcilable  demands  on  the  table 
pointed  to  lengthy,  hard-fought  and  highly  political  bargaining.  87 
The  Commission  consequently  found  itself  in  a  difficult,  though  familiar, 
position  in  the  negotiations  as  the  pivot  between  the  Member  States  and  the  third 
countries.  Switching  between  parallel  negotiations  -  internally  with  the  Member 
States,  externally  with  the  partner  countries  -  the  Commission  had  to  ensure  that  it 
could  sell  concessions  and  measures  included  in  the  agreements  to  the  Council 
while  at  the  same  time  maximising  concessions  from  the  member  governments. 
At  the  heart  of  the  internal  negotiating  process  was  an  ever-present  tension 
between  the  Commission  and  the  Member  States.  A  Commission  official 
described  the  Commission-Council  relationship  in  these  simplified  terms: 
The  Commission  informs  constantly  the  Council  on  the  negotiating  process. 
When  the  Commission  considers  that  the  negotiations  are  over,  the 
Commission  goes  to  the  Council  and  says  that  "ten  per  Cent  of  the  mandate 
is  not  fulfilled  because  our  partners  didn't  accept  this  and  this".  The 
83 Council  says  "try  and  try  again",  and  the  Commission  says  "fliat's  all,  now 
you  decide.  48 
Despite  being  the  Union's  sole  negotiator  in  the  process,  the  Commission 
consistently  found  its  hands  tied  by  the  Council 
. 
89As  was  the  case  in  previous 
rounds  of  negotiations,  it  proved  unable  to  contain  the  talks  at  a  'technical  level', 
where  diplomats  from  the  agriculture,  foreign  and  trade  ministries  of  the  partner 
countries  travelled  to  Brussels  to  decide  on  quota  levels  for  individual  products  in 
the  agreements.  Instead,  discussions  over  the  most  sensitive  products  for  both  the 
Member  States  and  the  partner  countries  repeatedly  became  politicised  to  such  a 
degree  that  the  direct  intervention  of  heads  of  government  was  sometimes 
required.  During  the  negotiations  with  Egypt  in  1998,  for  instance,  Commission 
President  Jacques  Santer  met  with  President  Hosni  Mubarak  in  an  attempt  to  find 
a  solution  to  disputes  over  oranges,  rice,  cut  flowers,  rules  of  origin  and  the  thorny 
question  of  a  clause  in  the  agreement  requiring  Egypt  to  readmit  citizens  who  had 
tried  to  enter  the  EU  illegally.  90  Santer's  statement  that  'we  will  not  let  a  few 
oranges  stop  the  negotiations'  had  a  hollow  ring  to  it.  91 
On  occasions,  however,  the  Commission  was  prepared  to  push  its 
autonomy  to  the  limit  in  order  to  secure  what  it  judged  to  be  an  effective  deal. 
When  it  offered  the  Morocco  an  increase  in  its  import  quota  for  tomato  paste  that 
exceeded  the  figure  stipulated  in  the  negotiating  mandate,  it  was  publicly  rebuked 
by  the  Portuguese  government  for  tending  to  'negotiate  free-wheel  and  to 
substitute  itself  in  the  role  of  political  organs  that  represent  sovereign  states".  92  On 
another  occasion,  it  was  criticised  for  having  negotiated,  without  the  approval  of 
COREPER,  a  revision  clause  in  the  agreement  with  Jordan  that  allowed  for  re- 
negotiation  of  quotas  within  three  years  of  the  ageement  entering  into  force.  93  At 
times,  the  Commission  appeared  to  be  faced  with  a  no-win  situation.  On  one 
84 occasion,  for  instance,  COREPER  rejected  a  request  from  the  hish  Council 
Presidency  for  it  to  intervene  during  the  negotiations  with  Egypt  on  the  grounds 
that  the  Commission  alone  should  be  acting  on  behalf  of  the  Union. 
As  far  as  the  Member  States  were  concerned,  the  negotiations  saw  them 
divide  into  a  northern,  liberalising  tendency  and  the  protectionist,  producer- 
oriented  southern  camp.  As  a  Commission  negotiator  complained,  the  'Northern 
Member  States  couldn't  care  less  about  this  ....  they  are  frustrated.  994  TMs 
sentiment  was  echoed  by  a  Scandinavian  diplomat: 
We  have  tried  quite  hard  to  make  things  as  liberal  as  possible.  But  it  is  an 
uphill  struggle.  In  the  EU,  it  is  a  producers  market  -  their  interests  are 
valued  much  more  highly  than  consumers'  interests.  I'm  not  sure  how 
Sweden  can  influence  this  in  the  best  way.  We're  almost  seen  as  a 
marginalised,  extremist  country  when  it  comes  to  free  trade.  95 
The  likely  impact  of  this  division  had  been  flagged  by  the  EU's  Economic  and 
Social  Committee  well  before  the  negotiations  began.  Its  argument  was  a 
prescient  one: 
Until  these  two  positions  are  superseded  by  new  thinking  which  combines 
trade  policy  with  economic  and  financial  policy,  as  part  of  a  joint 
development  policy  -  of  mutual,  Euro-Mediterranean  interest  -  the  only 
common  ground  will  remain  the  purely  negative  position  of  not 
strengthening  Community  Mediterranean  policy,  leaving  the  bulk  of 
cooperation  work  in  the  Mediterranean  Basin  to  the  Member  States.  96 
Yet  the  Euro-Mediterranean  agreements  were  also  notable  for  a  marked 
escalation  in  the  politicisation  of  concessions  on  products  even  for  the  northern 
group.  Govenunents  that  had  not  previously  had  cause  to  block  negotiations 
suddenly  found  themselves  under  pressure  to  safeguard  domestic  interests  over 
apparently  small  quota  increases.  The  dispute  over  cut  flowers  in  the  Moroccan 
agreement  was  a  case  in  point.  Germany  and  the  Netherlands  questioned  the 
Commission's  offer  of  on  cut  flowers  (5000  tonnes  per  annum),  arguing  that  the  it 
had  exceeded  its  mandate.  97  The  Germans'  claim  that  the  tonnage  offered  would 
85 harm  their  domestic  industry  is  was  a  puzzling  one,  given  its  strong  preference  for 
trade  liberalisation.  Under  the  agreement,  Germany  would  only  receive  700 
tonnes  of  flowers  per  annum  with  a  market  value  I  million  ECU,  a  tiny  percentage 
of  its  total  production.  The  Netherlands  adopted  a  similar  line.  As  a  Dutch 
negotiator  put  it,  the  dilemma  was: 
not  about  competition,  it  [was]  a  matter  of  fairness.  We  are  producers  but 
also  traders  in  cut  flowers  via  Amsterdam.  There  [was]  discussion  and 
debate  in  the  Netherlands  on  what  we  do  in  this  case.  Trade  is  bigger  than 
production,  but  the  point  is  that  it  is  a  traditional  industry.  You  can't  retrain 
flower  growers  overnight.  98 
A  measure  of  Dutch  sensitivities  on  this  issue  was  their  decision  to  negotiate  with 
the  Moroccan  government  themselves.  99 
Several  diplomats  explained  their  governments'  opposition  to  higher 
import  quota  concessions  in  terms  of  their  potential  cumulative  effect.  100 
According  to  a  Portuguese  diplomat: 
The  problem  was  the  market  situation  for  the  Council  ...  There  is  always  a 
tendency  for  the  Mediterranean  partners  to  feel  that  we  minimise  their 
demands  when  Commission  proposals  get  to  the  Council  table.  But 
Ministers  always  think  in  terms  of  global  concessions,  and  of  overlap  into 
the  ACP,  It  is  very  difficult  to  explain  that  there  is  a  tie  between  the 
problems.  101 
A  Commission  official  offered  a  similar  analysis,  acknowledging  the  limitations 
imposed  by  the  CAP:  'I  would  say  that  although  our  position  is  more  restricted 
than  it  should  be,  the  fact  is  that  the  future  is  not  in  a  major  expansion  of 
avicultural  exports.  ' 
102 
They  key  problem  facing  the  Member  States,  and  a  major  reason  for  their 
obstructive  behaviour  in  the  negotiations,  was  the  need  to  return  to  their  respective 
capitals  with  deals  that  would  be  ratified  by  national  parliaments.  With  the  EU's 
agricultural  markets  already  over-saturated  with  European  products,  it  was 
politically  inexpedient  for  governments  to  be  seen  to  be  signing  up  to  agreements, 
86 in  the  name  of  EU  Mediterranean  policy,  whose  net  effect  would  be  to  increase 
competition.  Farm  lobbies  were  extremely  powerful  domestic  constituencies  in 
the  southern  Member  States,  using  formal  channels  to  national  ministries  as  well 
as  blockades  and  demonstrations  to  exert  pressure  on  their  governments.  In  at 
least  two  cases  -  the  negotiations  with  Morocco  and  Tunisia  -  protests  by  farmers 
which  included  the  destruction  of  imported  produce  led  to  discussions  temporarily 
being  halted. 
103 
'Resolving  these  internal  disputes  at  the  EU  level  tended  to  be  a  last  minute 
affair,  calling  for  both  political  creativity  and  flexibility  on  the  Union's  part.  In 
the  negotiations  with  Morocco  and  Tunisia,  the  French  and  Spanish  Council 
Presidencies  used  their  position  in  the  chair  to  put  additional  political  pressure  on 
governments  to  conclude  the  accords.  Spanish  Foreign  Minister  Javier  Solana,  for 
instance,  repeatedly  stressed  that  the  value  of  the  trade  concessions  at  stake 
amounted  to  only  20  million  ECUs.  104  French  ministers  showed  considerable 
solidarity  with  the  Spanish,  regularly  criticising  any  sign  of  intransigence  on  the 
part  of  the  other  Member  States. 
105 
Use  of  issue-linkage  and  side  payments  also  helped  pave  the  way  for 
agreements  to  be  concluded.  The  Guterres  socialist  government  in  Portugal  had 
just  taken  office  when  it  found  itself  facing  increased  imports  of  Moroccan  tomato 
concentrates  and  canned  sardines;  products  which  form  the  dominant  share  of  the 
Portuguese  food  processing  industry.  106  Fanners  and  fishennen  were  the 
traditional  constituents  of  the  opposition  parties.  Anticipating  hostility  at  home  to 
the  Morocco  agreement  and  the  possibility  of  an  embarrassing  row  as  it  passed 
through  the  parliament,  the  government  rounded  on  the  Commission.  The 
Portuguese  government  blocked  negotiations  until  the  Commission  promised 
extra  funding  (from  the  EU's  Structural  Funds)  to  modernise  the  canning  industry 
87 and  new  controls  on  the  marketing  of  Moroccan  imports.  107  Such  face-saving 
compromises  were  a  typical  feature  of  the  negotiations. 
Despite  the  'partnership'  label  on  the  new  Mediterranean  policy,  the 
Mediterranean  third  countries  were  little  more  than  bit  players  in  the  negotiations. 
Only  Morocco,  which  possessed  the  bargaining  chip  of  access  to  its  lucrative 
fishing  grounds,  was  able  to  hold  out  for  additional  concessions  and  extra  funding 
P--  -  from  the  EU,  securing  financial  compensation  for  its  fishing  fleets  in  return  for 
improved  access  for  its  tomatoes.  Others,  such  as  Egypt,  bemoaned  the  Union's 
inflexibility  but  stuck  to  their  demands.  As  an  Egyptian  diplomat  put  it: 
Come  2010,  our  markets  will  be  open  100  per  cent  for  European  industrial 
products  and  what  we  are  asking  for  is  equal  treatment  in  agriculture.  We 
are  being  practical  and  realistic.  We  know  that  there  are  big  problems  in  the 
CAP.  We  said  ok,  we  will  not  ask  for  equal  treatment  at  this  point.  At  least 
at  this  point  we  would  like  to  increase  our  exports  to  the  EU  and  have  some 
privileges.  108 
By  1999,  Euro-Mediterranean  agreements  had  only  been  formally 
concluded  with  Morocco,  the  Palestinian  Authority  and  Tunisia.  The  Union  was 
forced  to  admit  that  the  completion  date  for  the  free-trade  area  would  be  pushed 
back  five  years  to  2015.109  Even  that  looked  optimistic.  Most  intractable  of  all 
were  the  negotiations  with  Egypt,  which  stalled  in  1996  over  the  quota  offered  on 
potatoes  and  failed  to  move  for  over  a  year.  A  corollary  of  Egypt's  refusal  to 
concede  on  its  demands  was  a  halt  to  negotiations  with  Syria  and  Lebanon.  Both 
refused  to  resume  bargaining  until  it  became  clear  what  Egypt  would  be 
offered.  "  0  At  the  time  of  writing,  the  Mediterranean  free-trade  area,  the  centre- 
piece  of  the  new  Mediterranean  policy,  is  a  distant  prospect. 
88 Figure  3.4  Status  of  Negotiations  with  Partner  Countries,  January  1999 
Mediterranean  Partner  Negotiations  Open  Agreement  Signed  Entry  into  force 
Morocco 
'1993 
February  1996 
Tunisia  1993  July  1995  March  1998 
Jordan  1996  November  1997 
Egypt  1996  Negotiations  Ongoing  - 
Palestinian  Authority  1996  February  1997  July  1997 
Algeria  1997  Negotiations  Ongoing  - 
Lebanon  1997  Negotiations  Ongoing 
Syria 
-  6-  1998  Negotiations  Ongoing 
Source:  European  Commission,  DG  IB  (1998)  Progress  offegotiations  on  Euro-Mediterranean 
Association  Agreements,  April,  ((http:  //www.  euromed.  net/)) 
Conclusions 
To  a  considerable  extent,  the  Euro-Mediterranean  Partnership  was  simply  'old 
wine  in  new  bottles'.  The  basic  structure  of  Euro-Mediterranean  relations  was 
retained,  with  cooperation  across  an  extensive  range  of  functional  issues  being 
built  into  a  modified  form  of  Association  Agreement.  While  there  was  a  clearer 
definition  of  the  Union's  strategic  objectives  in  the  region,  neither  the  Redirected 
Mediterranean  Policy  nor  the  Partnership  seriously  addressed  the  'big'  questions: 
the  inherent  asymmetry  in  trade  relations  and  the  debt  crisis.  Under  pressure  to 
respond  expeditiously  and  effectively  to  events  in  the  Gulf  and  the  re-launch  of 
the  Middle  East  Peace  Process,  the  partnership  strategy  was  above  all  an 
ambitious  declaration  of  intent  that  the  Union  would  engage  with  the  partner 
countries  on  a  much  more  systematic  basis. 
Beyond  the  partnership  rhetoric,  however,  the  Union  once  again  proved 
stubbornly  protectionist  on  the  issues  that  really  mattered  to  the  partner  countries. 
As  a  Swedish  diplomat  put  it,  it  is  sad  to  see  how  much  political  mileage  there  is 
out  of  I  tonne  of  cut  flowers.  But  [EU]  politics  works  like  that  -  very  short- 
89 sighted.  ""  A  corollary  of  the  EUs  protectionism  is  that  the  Euro-Mediterranean 
agreements  are  likely  to  have  a  minimal  impact  on  the  economies  of  the  C7- 
Mediteffanean  partners,  thus  undennining  a  central  plank  of  the  Union"  s  'soft 
security'  strategy.  The  Commission  inevitably  found  itself  caught  between  its  role 
as  a  servant  of  the  Member  States,  its  responsibility  for  regulating  EU  markets, 
and  the  need  to  reach  deals  with  the  Mediterranean  partner  countries  that 
represented  a  quantitative  improvement  in  access  for  their  imports. 
However,  the  outcome  of  the  negotiations  of  the  Euro-Mediterranean 
agreements  was  not  entirely  negative.  Assuming  that  the  preferred  outcome  for 
many  producers  within  the  EU  would  have  been  the  status  quo  or  even  a 
contraction  of  imports  from  the  partner  countries,  then  the  fact  that 
concessions  were  made  might  be  regarded  as  a  small  sign  of  progress.  Moreover, 
the  Mediterranean  states  were  hardly  alone  in  finding  the  EU  a  tough  and 
defensive  negotiator.  The  1990s  saw  the  EU  embroiled  in  protracted  rows  over 
the  agricultural  trade  in  the  Uruguay  Round  of  the  GATT.  Its  'Europe 
Agreements'  with  the  Central  and  Eastern  European  countries  were  notable  for  the 
numerous  protocols  and  annexes  attached  to  the  accords  that  allowed  for  trade 
barriers  to  be  re-imposed  if  EU  producers  faced  unacceptable  competitive  pressure 
.  C-- 
from  imports.  In  the  final  analysis,  the  EU  had  at  least  put  in  place  a  framework 
for  action  and  begun  the  slow  process  of  policy  reform. 
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96 Chapter  4 
THE  BARCELONA  PROCESS:  FOREIGN  POLICY  BY 
MULTILATERAL  MEANS? 
If  the  Euro-Mediterranean  agreements  represented  'more  of  the  same',  then  the 
Barcelona  conference  marked  a  genuine  break  with  the  past.  This  innovative, 
multilateral  dimension  of  the  Euro-Mediterranean  Partnership,  based  on  a 
comprehensive  Declaration  and  Work  Programme,  secured  the  approval  of  27 
governments  and  spawned  a  rolling  programme  of  functional  cooperation  among 
both  governments  and  non-governmental  actors  across  an  extensive  range  of  policy 
sectors.  '  Politically,  the  Declaration  laid  the  foundations  for  a  regional  diplomatic 
network  to  deal  with  highly  sensitive  subjects  such  as  arms  control,  democratic 
reforms  and  human  rights  in  a  fonnat  that  resembled  the  Organisation  for  Security 
and  Cooperation  in  Europe.  The  participation  of  Israel,  Lebanon,  the  Palestinian 
Authority,  and  Syria  on  an  equal  basis  gave  the  Barcelona  process  a  unique  status 
in  the  region  as  the  only  forum  where  these  traditional  enemies  would  routinely  sit 
at  the  same  table. 
This  chapter  assesses  the  Barcelona  process  as  part  of  the  EU's 
Mediterranean  strategy  and  considers  its  broader  implications  for  EU  foreign 
policy.  Section  one  examines  the  rationale  behind  the  EU's  decision  to  convene 
the  conference.  Section  two  analyses  the  preparation  of  the  Conference,  arguing 
that  navigation  by  the  French  and  Spanish  Council  Presidencies  during  1995  was 
instrumental  in  producing  mutually  acceptable  texts  that  also  met  the  Union's 
own  policy  objectives.  The  third  section  focuses  on  the  context  of  the  Barcelona 
Declaration  and  the  progress  made  in  the  early  stages  of  its  implementation. 
97 Section  four  shows  how  the  institutional  and  procedural  modalities  of  the 
Barcelona  process  have  boosted,  albeit  modestly,  the  EU's  foreign  policy 
capabilities. 
1.  The  Road  to  the  Barcelona  Conference 
The  seeds  of  the  Barcelona  process  germinated  in  the  vacant  ground  left  by  the 
aborted  CSCM  and  '5+5'  projects.  The  attempt  to  create  the  two  regional  forums 
had  demonstrated  the  high  level  of  support  around  the  Mediterranean  for  multi- 
dimensional  functional  cooperation  underpinned  by  strong  institutional 
architecture.  The  keyword  was  'interdependence',  the  recognition  that  common 
Mediterranean  problems  ranging  from  crime  to  environmental  pollution  should 
be  managed  at  regional  level.  There  seemed  no  reason  why  the  success  of  the 
OSCE  should  not  be  miffored  in  some  form  in  the  Mediteffanean.  The 
arguments  of  Guido  de  Marco,  Malta's  Foreign  Minister  and  a  leading 
protagonist  of  multilateralism,  were  typical: 
We  cannot  close  an  eye  to  regional  flash  points  that  must  be  contained  and 
possibly  diffused,  if  our  own  security  is  not  to  be  put  in  jeopardy  ....  we 
should  all  try  to  create  the  facilities  to  involve  all  the  parties  concerned  in  a 
2  dialogue. 
De  Marco's  assumption,  shared  in  particular  by  Italian  foreign  minister  Gianni 
de  Michelis  and  Spain's  Fernando  Ordon-ez,,  was  that  regular  ministerial 
'dialogue'  -  simply  getting  as  many  governments  as  possible  together  at  the  same 
table  -  would  be  an  essential  element  in  long-term  conflict  prevention.  Such 
dialogue  gave  the  political  impetus  to  inter-govemmental  cooperation  on  a  broad 
range  of  common  Mediterranean  problems.  3 
The  failure  to  take  off  of  many  of  these  initiatives  left  the  way  open  for 
the  EU  to  launch  its  own  multilateral  forum,  a  challenge  initially  taken  up  by  the 
98 Commission.  Consistent  with  its  own  long-established  advocacy  of  enhanced 
regional  organisation,  the  Commission's  1992  proposals  for  a  Euro-Maghreb 
partnership  called  for  the  bilateral  track  of  the  EU's  new  Mediterranean  strategy 
to  be  complemented  by  dialogue  on  'all  matters  of  common  interest'  between  the 
EC  and  Algeria,  Morocco  and  Tunisia.  4  By  1993,  the  Community  had 
participated  constructively  in  the  multilateral  track  of  the  Middle  East  Peace 
Process  for  several  years,  following  the  1991  Madrid  Conference.  DG  IB  became 
convinced  that  the  EMP  should  be  extended  to  Israel  and  the  Mashreq  countries.  ' 
Such  a  move  would  provide  another  channel  for  the  normalisation  of 
governmental  relations  between  the  Arabs  and  Israelis,  as  well  as  providing  the 
basis  for  region-wide  strategic  action.  In  a  follow-up  communication  to  the 
Council,  the  Commission  argued  that  multi-sectoral,  functional  cooperation 
between  govenunents  and  private  actors  was  essential  to  the  consolidation  of  the 
Peace  Process  in  the  long-term,  and  mentioned  the  possibility  of  establishing 
4 joint  institutions. 
96 
The  idea  of  convening  a  conference  was  first  openly  mooted  at  the  Corfu 
Summit  in  June  1994  after  Spain  offered  to  host  the  event  at  the  end  of  its 
Council  Presidency  in  1995.7  However,  the  real  watershed  for  the  Barcelona 
process  was  the  Essen  Summit  in  December  1994.  Regardless  of  the  underlying 
strength  of  their  commitment  to  it,  the  heads  of  government  gave  unanimously 
endorsed  the  Commission's  strategy  in  what  amounted  to  affmnation  that  the 
EMP  was  a  foreign  policy  interest  of  all  the  Member  States.  8 
However,  the  agreement  to  hold  the  conference  fonned  part  of  a  inter- 
governmental  package  deal  in  which  the  Mediterranean  Member  States  accepted 
that  eastern  enlargement  of  the  EU  had  to  be  the  Union's  number  one  priority  in 
exchange  for  a  clear  signal  that  the  Union  would  make  a  significant  gesture 
99 towards  the  south.  9  With  Germany  about  to  assume  the  Presidency  and  shift  the 
EU's  attention  back  towards  the  East,  it  took  a  combination  of  political  pressure 
from  the  Commission  and  Spain,  and  the  intervention  of  German  Chancellor 
Helmut  Kohl,  to  find  a  satisfactory  compromise  in  Essen. 
Alongside  the  Commission,  the  prime  movers  in  the  upgrading  of  EU 
Mediterranean  policy  were  France,  Italy  and  Spain,  the  big  three  southern 
Member  States.  The  precise  extent  to  which  the  three  governments,  actually 
collaborated  over  the  EMP  is  unclear,  but  there  was  sufficient  convergence 
between  their  positions  on  regional  security  and  the  EU's  role  in  it  to  generate  the 
necessary  political  momentwn  behind  the  EMP.  10  According  to  a  Spanish 
foreign  ministry  official: 
There  was  no  institutional  coordination  on  Mediterranean  issues,  no  contact 
group  .... 
but  events  in  the  EU  provoked  cooperation  among  France,  Italy  and 
Spain.  11 
In  a  similar  vein,  a  Portuguese  official  described  the  relationship  between  the 
Mediterranean  Member  States  as  'intuitive',  relying  more  on  their  'proximity  of 
interests'  than  any  deliberate  effort  to  adopt  joint  positions.  12 
The  most  active  member  of  this  informal  Mediterranean  caucus  was 
Spain,  which  had  frequently  been  at  the  forefront  of  moves  to  multilateralise 
Mediterranean  security.  Indeed,  since  its  accession  to  the  Community,  the 
Spanish  govenunent  had  increasingly  sought  to  'Europeanise'  its  foreign 
policy. 
13  The  centrality  of  aid  and  trade  in  post-Cold  War  security  strategies 
persuaded  the  government  that  delegating  responsibility  to  the  EU  for  such  a 
crucial  of  its  foreign  EU  was  both  necessary  and  practical.  14  From  1989 
onwards,  the  Gonzalez  government  conspicuously  committed  itself  to  the  CSCE, 
rather  than  NATO,  as  the  most  appropriate  European  and  Mediterranean  security 
orgamsation.  15  When  it  became  clear  that  the  Ordofiez-De  Michelis  sponsored 
100 CSCM  project  was  destined  to  fail,  Spain  turned  its  attention  to  promoting  EU 
policy.  Its  subsequent  offer  to  host  the  conference  was  the  culmination  of  several 
years  of  quiet  yet  effective  Spanish  diplomacy  in  the  region  and  confirmation  of 
its  increasing  importance  as  an  international  power  in  the  Mediterranean.  16 
In  the  context  of  the  EU's  Mediterranean  strategy,  a  multilateral 
conference  served  a  number  of  purposes.  First,  it  offered  the  EU  a  high  profile 
platform  from  which  to  'sell'  the  EMP  to  the  partners  and  to  the  wider  world.  It 
was  the  kind  of  grand  political  gesture  called  for  by  Jacques  Delors,  who  argued 
that  the  Union  needed  to  send  'powerful  messages  to  its  neighbours'  in  the  east 
and  south.  17  Second,  given  the  economic  disruption  likely  to  arise  from  the  Euro- 
Med  free-trade  initiative,  the  conference  also  amounted  to  a  form  of  political 
compensation.  It  would  create  a  fagade  of  diplomatic  equality  and  elevated 
political  status  for  the  partners  vis-a-vis  the  EU,  at  least  in  the  short  term.  Third, 
it  was  also  expected  that  the  conference  would  help  kick  start  the  negotiation  of 
the  Euro-Mediterranean  agreements  with  Morocco  and  Tunisia,  which  stalled 
during  1994.  The  assumption  was  that  all  parties  would  want  to  conclude  the 
negotiations  before  the  event  as  a  sign  that  the  EMP  was  making  tangible 
progyess. 
18 
However,  even  leaving  aside  its  utility  as  a  political  signal,  the  conference 
also  presented  the  EU  with  an  opportunity  to  set  out  the  principles  of  the  ENT  in 
a  multilateral  framework  that  was  expected  to  generate  foreign  policy  actions  in 
its  own  right.  As  a  Spanish  diplomat  put  it,  'the  Barcelona  conference  was  the 
way  to  maintain  a  long-term  relationship  with  the  Mediterranean  countries  and  to 
give  attention  to  very  specific  issues.  '19  The  multilateralisation  of  Mediterranean 
policy  would  equip  the  EU  with  an  additional  foreign  policy  tool,  designed  to 
facilitate  the  'boundary  management'  objectives  of  its  Mediterranean  policy  by 
101 drawing  together  the  various  functional  cooperation  Programmes  under  a  single 
heading.  20  Given  the  anticipated  Participation  of  the  vast  majority  of  the 
Mediterranean  littoral  states,  the  conference  would  be  a  step  forward  in  the 
Union 
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s  attempt  to  construct  a  regional  identity  to  underpin  the  EMP. 
That  said,  the  significance  of  the  conference  initiative  can  be  exaggerated. 
As  a  German  official  commented,  the  Member  States  had  agreed  to  hold  the 
event  'without  an  idea  as  to  what  it  should  initiate',  although  it  was  clear  that  the 
conference  was  not  intended  to  produce  a  legally  binding  international  treaty.  21 
The  Commission's  initial  communication  on  the  subject  was  instructive,  being 
long  on  rhetoric  and  short  on  substance: 
The  conference  should  reach  agreement  on  a  series  of  economic  and 
political  guidelines  for  Euro-Mediterranean  policy  into  the  next  century, 
which  could  be  set  out  in  a  new  Charter.....  The  Conference  should  thereby 
contribute  to  creating  a  larger  awareness,  among  political  and  business 
leaders  throughout  the  world  of  the  Mediterranean  being  ready  to  embark  on 
a  courageous  j  ourney  which  will  progressively  transform  it  into  a  region  of 
stability  and  peace,  rapid  economic  development,  social  change  and,  last  but 
not  least,  political  pluralism.  22 
2.  Negotiating  the  Barcelona  Conference 
From  the  outset,  the  Barcelona  conference  was,  as  Esther  Barbe  argues,  a 
6genuinely  European  project.  23  The  decision  to  hold  the  conference  was  the 
EU's  alone,  and  was  effectively  presented  to  the  partners  as  afait  accompli.  As 
the  agenda  setting  phase  of  the  conference  was  to  show,  it  also  turned  into  a 
conspicuously  governmental  project,  shaped  by  the  foreign  policy  interests  and  of 
the  participating  governments.  In  procedural  terms,  the  EU's  preparations  for  the 
conference  were  conducted  along  the  lines  of  a  CFSP  action,  with  the  Troika 
undertaking  the  bulk  of  the  diplomatic  legwork.  The  adoption  of  this  format 
102 resulted  from  the  anticipated  inclusion  of  pillar  II  and  pillar  III  issues  in  the 
Declaration,  subject  to  inter-governmental.  decision  making  within  the  EU. 
Work  on  the  Barcelona  Declaration  commenced  under  the  French  Council 
Presidency  at  the  start  of  1995.24  The  Balladur  government  made  Mediterranean 
policy  a  central  plank  of  its  six  month  programme  for  the  EU,  setting  out  to 
impose  its  own  vision  of  the  EMP  on  the  conference.  According  to  a  Council 
Secretariat  official,  the  French  'worked  very  much  on  their  own'  in  the  early 
stages.  25  Exploratory  discussions  took  place  in  the  relevant  Council  working- 
groups  with  the  tabling  of  a  large  number  offiches  submitted  by  individual 
French  ministries.  This  French  bid  to  influence  the  implementation  of  the 
Barcelona  process  met  with  a  lukewarm  response  from  the  other  Member  States, 
who  regarded  its  proposals  as  too  detailed  and  too  ambitious  to  be  practical.  26 
The  Commission  spent  the  period  after  Essen  working  on  its  own 
proposals  to  implement  the  EMP.  Its  ensuing  communication  to  the  Council, 
timed  to  coincide  with  the  Member  States'  first  formal  discussion  of  the  draft 
Declaration,  reinforced  its  case  for  extra  funding.  27  The  document  incorporated  a 
breakdown  of  prospective  spending  commitments,  an  analysis  of  the  EMP's 
strategic  aims  and  objectives,  and  guidelines  for  EU  follow-up  actions  in  each 
policy  area.  Such  thoroughness  was  intended  to  reassure  sceptical  northern 
Member  States,  particularly  Germany,  that  the  distribution  of  EU  funds  would  be 
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tightly  controlled  and  strategically  targeted.  At  the  same  time,  the  Commission 
argued  that  the  proposals  'could  serve  as  a  useful  basis  for  the  Barcelona 
Conference',  in  a  ploy  by  Commissioner  Marm'  to  counter  the  Council's 
domination  of  the  exercise. 
On  April  10  1995,  a  discussion  document  setting  out  the  initial  position  of 
the  Union  was  put  to  the  General  Affairs  Council.  According  to  Alain  Juppe,  the 
103 report  was  prepared  'by  the  Council,  and  more  precisely  by  Coreper'  implying  a 
collective  effort  by  the  Member  States.  29  According  to  the  Council  Secretariat, 
much  of  the  paper  was  in  fact  drafted  by  the  French  foreign  ministry.  30 
Nevertheless,  along  with  the  Commission's  Communication,,  the  report  was 
approved  by  EU  Foreign  Ministers  and  served  as  the  basis  for  consultations 
between  the  Troika  and  the  Mediterranean  partners,  the  first  time  the  latter  had 
been  approached  for  their  input. 
The  feedback  from  the  twelve  partners  was  broadly  positive,  although 
there  were  general  concerns  about  the  overall  direction  of  the  EMP  and  some 
very  specific  concerns  about  the  Conference  itself  For  several  non-member 
governments,  multilateralism  threatened  to  water  down  their  'special'  bilateral 
relationships  with  the  EU  and  with  individual  Member  States.  A  North  African 
diplomat  argued: 
You  cannot  come  up  with  a  policy  devised  in  Brussels  and  say  this  will 
apply  all  the  way  to  Egypt  or  Israel.  You  cannot  simply  think  of  any  policy 
that  would  be  fit  for  all  these  countries  and  serve  all  their  interests  at  the 
same  time,  and  not  be  detrimental  to  a  major  extent  to  one  group  or 
another.  31 
A  Mashreqi  official  complained  that: 
There  was  no  prior  consultation  between  the  EU  and  the  Mediterranean 
states  on  what  were  the  real  needs....  The  concept  of  specificity  is  important. 
No  structure  can  be  adapted  to  countries  with  very  different  cultural 
heritages  and  social  cleavages.  32 
The  point  here  is  that  the  geographical  expansion  of  EU  Mediterranean  was  not 
wholeheartedly  endorsed  by  the  Mediterranean  partners,  who  viewed  it  as  an 
artificial  construction  which  failed  to  take  into  account  the  diversity  of  the 
region's  economies  and  political  systems. 
Concern  was  also  expressed  about  the  EU's  over-emphasis  on  the 
politico-security  dimension  of  the  EMP,  and  a  corresponding  under-emphasis 
104 of  socio-cultural  cooperation.  The  Maghreb  countries,  for  instance,  pointed  out 
that  issues  such  as  the  status  of  migrant  workers  in  the  Union  had  been  left  out 
of  the  draft  document.  On  the  sensitive  issues  of  democratisation  and  human 
rights,  the  partners  voiced  reservations  about  the  perceived  imposition  of 
European  cultural  nonns  and  the  possibility  of  political  conditions  being 
applied  to  EU  aid. 
Specific  concerns  focused  on  two  issues.  First,  the  partner  countries 
highlighted  the  Union's  indecision  over  the  level  of  financial  aid  attached  to  the 
EMP.  A  protracted  row  over  the  budget  in  the  run  up  to  the  Cannes  Summit 
(June  1995)  threatened  to  leave  the  EMP  without  the  financial  resources  to 
support  it.  Second,  Lebanon  and  Syria  would  not  commit  themselves  to 
attending  the  conference,  a  result  of  their  refusal  to  take  part  in  any 
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international  meeting  alongside  Israel.  The  prospect  of  their  absence 
jeopardised  one  of  the  EMP's  basic  purposes:  fully  inclusive  regional 
integration. 
By  the  end  of  the  French  Presidency  in  June,  an  essentially  unaltered 
framework  document  had  been  adopted  by  the  Foreign  Ministers,  which 
incorporated  the  results  of  the  troika's  consultations  with  the  partners.  34  One 
notable  change  was  the  addition  of  a  passage  stating  that  the  Euro-Mediterranean 
agreements  would  'safeguard  the  specificity'  of  the  partners'  bilateral  relations 
with  the  Union.  35  The  Cannes  Summit  (June  1995)  subsequently  approved  the 
document,  whose  mainlines  were: 
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1)  A  political  and  security  chapter,  comprising,  inter  alia,  measures  designe 
It  is  worth  noting  that  this  early  draft  of  the  Barcelona  Declaration  closely 
followed  the  broad  guidelines  proposed  by  the  Commission  in  1994.37  The 
Cannes  Summit  also  saw  the  resolution  of  the  budget  problem,  with  the  Member 
States  agreeing  to  increase  aid  to  4.7  billion  ECUs,  matched  by  an  almost 
identical  amount  in  ElB  grants  and  loans. 
At  the  start  of  the  Spanish  Presidency,  the  first  fortnal  draft  of  the  Joint 
Declaration  -  essentially  a  summary  of  the  EU's  own  position  -  was  prepared  by 
the  Council  Secretariat.  38  The  contents  of  this  paper  were  trimmed  back  by  the 
Council  Secretariat  in  order  to  'a  manageable  summary'  and  subsequently 
forwarded  to  the  Spaniards.  39  When  discussion  resumed  in  September  1995,  the 
Spanish  government  had  'put  back  a  lot  of  what  had  been  left  OUt., 
40  They  felt 
that  drafting  the  paper  was  'the  responsibility  of  the  Presidency'  and  that  'the 
Secretariat's  role  should  be  limited.  94  1  The  re-drafted  paper  was  much  closer  to 
the  Cannes  document  than  the  Secretariat's  summary,  underlining  the  ultimate 
control  by  govermuents  of  the  preparatory  phase. 
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between  France  and  Spain.  42  At  issue  was  the  balance  between  the  three  chapters 
of  the  Declaration.  Having  successfully  co-sponsored  the  Stability  Pact  for 
Central  and  Eastern  Europe,  Balladur's  government  regarded  a  similar  initiative 
for  the  Mediterranean  as  a  means  to  boost  the  Union's  profile  in  the  Middle  East 
by  promoting  it  as  an  alternative  interlocutor  to  the  USA.  43  French  diplomats 
sought  to  put  the  Political  and  Security  chapter  on  the  'front  page",  proposing  that 
a  Mediterranean  stability  pact  should  be  the  centrepiece  of  the  political  and 
security  partnership.  44 
However,  the  Spanish  govemment  felt  that  no  single  chapter  should 
dominate,  and  that  any  attempt  to  establish  new  codes  of  conduct  for 
international  relations  in  the  Mediterranean  region  could  interfere  with  the 
Middle  East  Peace  Process.  45  Asserting  its  own  credentials  as  'honest  broker', 
Spain  took  a  more  guarded  position  on  the  EU's  involvement  in  the  Middle  East 
Peace  Process,  believing  that  step-by-step  confidence  building  and  careful, 
relatively  neutral  diplomacy  would  produce  better  results  in  the  long  run  than  a 
high  profile  political  initiative.  As  the  Declaration  passed  through  the  Council's 
working  groups  again,  Spanish  representatives  persuaded  their  counterparts  to 
heed  Commissioner  Man'n's  warning  that  the  Barcelona  process  should  be  kept 
distinct  from  the  Peace  Process.  46 
Closer  to  the  Conference  itself,  several  problems  surfaced  which  again 
exposed  the  lack  of  unity  among  the  EU  Member  States.  The  first  concerned  a 
request  by  eight  Arab-Mediterranean  countries,  led  by  Algeria,  to  allow  Libya  to 
attend  . 
47  The  exclusion  of  Libya  from  the  EMP  left  a  gaping  geo-political  hole  in 
the  regional  construction.  Moreover,  as  a  major  supplier  of  oil  to  Italy,  and  a 
perceived  security  'threat',  Libya's  presence  in  Barcelona  could  only  benefit  the 
107 EMP.  Spanish  Foreign  Minister  Javier  Solana  hinted  that  Libya  might  be 
allowed  to  participate,  stating  that  'it  has  not  been  ruled  out  that  observers  may 
be  attending  in  one  form  or  another.  A8  However,  Commissioner  Manin  was 
unsympathetic,  arguing  that  Libya  had  not  entered  into  'contractual  relations' 
with  the  EU,  an  unwritten  prerequisite  of  participation.  49  Moreover,  in  view  of 
A-  - 
the  continuing  impasse  over  the  Lockerbie  and  UTA  bombings,  the  prospect  of 
British  and  French  foreign  ministers  sitting  alongside  Libyan  leaders  was  always 
50 
unlikely.  In  the  end,  the  problem  was  resolved  when  Colonel  Gadhaffi's 
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retracted  his  government's  request  to  attend. 
A  second  problem  concerned  requests  by  the  Arab  League,  Russia  and  the 
USA  to  attend  the  conference  as  official  observers.  The  traditional  security 
interests  of  the  superpowers  in  Mediterranean,  and  the  involvement  of  Egypt, 
Israel,  Jordan  and  Syria  in  the  EMP,  elevated  the  status  of  the  event.  France  and 
Spain  were  especially  guarded  about  the  USA's  presence.  As  a  French  foreign 
ministry  spokesperson  put  it,  'the  Barcelona  Conference  is  only  for  Europeans 
and  Mediterraneans,  and  the  USA  is  neither.  52  In  the  Spanish  press,  the  USA 
stood  accused  of  trying  to  'get  in  by  the  back  door.  '  53  Ultimately,  the  EU  stuck  to 
its  guns  over  the  exclusivity  of  Barcelona,  and  the  'outsiders'  were  only  invited 
to  observe  the  opening  plenary  session. 
A  host  of  problems  arose  with  the  text  of  the  Declaration  during  the 
month  before  the  conference,  forcing  several  re-drafts  of  the  document.  In 
particular,  the  wording  of  the  Political  and  Security  chapter  drew  strong 
objections  from  a  number  of  Middle  Eastern  countries.  Syria,  backed  by  the 
Palestinians,  questioned  sections  on  self-determination  and  the  fight  against 
terrorism,  arguing  that  armed  conflicts  over  occupied  territories  should  not  be 
defined  as  terrorism,  but  as  'legitimate  struggles'.  54  Egypt,  along  with  Syria,  also 
108 attempted  to  use  the  Barcelona  Declaration  to  force  Israel  to  sign  up  to  the 
nuclear  non-proliferation  treaty.  55 
Decisions  about  the  institutional  format  for  implementing  the  Barcelona 
process  started  taken  in  October  1995,  after  lengthy  arguments  in  Coreper  about 
how  the  EU  itself  should  be  represented.  A  'Senior  Officials  Committee' 
comprising  Ambassadors  and  other  high-ranking  foreign  ministry  personnel  was 
established  to  oversee  the  political  and  security  partnership.  In  an  attempt  to 
preserve  the  sanctity  of  the  Union's  institutional  procedures,  Belgium  and 
Luxembourg  argued  that  only  the  Troika  should  represent  the  Union.  56  France, 
however,  concerned  that  its  input  into  the  Barcelona  process  would  be 
diminished  after  it  left  the  Troika,  argued  for  the  full  participation  of  all  the 
Member  States.  The  eventual  compromise  stipulated  that  the  Troika  would 
represent  the  Union,  but  that  the  other  Member  States  could  attend  meetings  and 
intervene  if  the  chair  permitted  it.  57 
The  other  two  chapters  were  to  be  overseen  by  the  'Euro-Med 
Committee'  in  which  the  Member  States  were  represented  only  by  the  Troika. 
The  Commission,  as  well  as  all  twelve  partners,  were  represented  in  both 
Committees.  For  the  Commission,  these  formulae  confumed  its  position  as 
manager  of  the  Barcelona  process.  Only  as  the  implementation  process  get 
underway  did  the  political  and  practical  implications  of  this  institutional 
architecture  become  clear. 
3.  The  Barcelona  Process 
It  was  hard  to  avoid  being  swept  along  by  the  tide  of  euphoria  generated  by  the 
Barcelona  conference.  Pictures  of  Israeli,  Lebanese,  Palestinian  and  Syrian 
representatives  standing  together  in  the  Catalan  sunshine  captured  the  very 
109 essence  of  the  so-called  'Barcelona  spirit'.  One  commentator  likened  it  to  the 
1955  Messina  conference.  58  As  Bichara  Khader  observes,  'those  who  dared  to 
express  scepticism  about  the  project  of  "partnership"  were  described  as 
"Cassandras"'.  59  The  diplomatic  momentum  started  by  the  conference  initially 
seemed  to  be  sustained  when  the  Council  Presidency  passed  to  Italy.  Detailed 
schedules  for  follow-up  meetings  covering  much  of  the  Work  Programme  were 
drawn  up  by  the  Italians,  under  the  energetic  chairmanship  of  Ambassador 
Antonio  Badini. 
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However,  the  euphoria  proved  short-lived  as  the  limitations  of  the  process 
and  the  highly  sensitive  nature  of  much  of  its  subject  matter  became  clear. 
Crucially,  the  Middle  East  Peace  Process  broke  down  early  in  1997,  effectively 
ending  the  rapprochement  between  the  Arabs  and  Israelis.  Expectations  that  the 
participants  would  set  aside  political  differences  in  the  interest  of  functional 
cooperation  proved  optimistic  as  the  policy  output  of  the  EMP  dwindled. 
Progress  became  little  more  than  a  matter  of  ensuring  that  the  partners  continued 
to  come  to  the  negotiating  table.  The  second  and  third  ministerial  meetings  in 
Malta  (April  1997)  and  Palermo  (June  1998),  beset  by  arguments  between  the 
Israelis  and  Palestinians,  produced  little  more  than  a  balance  sheet  of  the  EMP. 
This  section  offers  a  chapter-by-chapter  assessment  of  the  Barcelona  process. 
Political  and  Security  Chapter 
The  language  of  the  political  and  security  chapter  was  ambitious,  committing  the 
signatories  to  'establishing  a  common  area  of  peace  and  stability'  and  to 
upholding  principles  of  human  rights  and  fundamental  freedoms,  self- 
determination,,  and  territorial  integrity.  Drawing  on  principles  from  the  CSCE, 
LN  and  other  international  agreements,  the  Political  and  Security  Chapter  was 
110 intended  to  subject  Mediterranean  security  to  internationally,  though  not 
universally,  accepted  standards  and  rules  of  inter-state  conduct.  The  signatories 
agreed  to  promote  confidence  and  security  building  measures,  to  ensure  the  non- 
proliferation  of  nuclear  weapons  and  to  cooperate  in  the  fight  against  terrorism. 
An  undertaking  was  also  made  to  examine  the  possibility  of  a  stability  pact, 
though  it  was  expressly  identified  in  the  text  as  a  long-term  goal. 
Notwithstanding  the  ambiguity  of  terms  like  'Peace'  and  'stability'  as 
policy  objectives,  the  substance  of  the  Political  and  Security  Partnership  clearly 
touched  raw  nerves.  Both  the  Israeli  and  Syrian  delegations  reiterated  their 
objections  to  its  contents  at  post-Conference  press  briefings 
. 
61  Beyondthe 
semantic  arguments,,  issues  such  as  terrorism,  self-determination  and  territorial 
integrity  were  at  the  heart  of  conflicts  in  the  region  at  both  the  inter-state  and 
intra-state  levels.  Without  any  legal  basis  for  the  Declaration,  there  was  little 
sense  of  how  the  first  chapter  would  generate  policy  actions.  As  a  Commission 
official  conceded: 
We  don't  know  how  we  are  going  to  proceed.  Do  we  start  big  discussions 
on  human  rights  in  the  Mediterranean?  I  don't  know.  62 
A  stark  contrast  materialised  between  the  maximalist  rhetoric  of  the  Declaration 
and  the  minimal  measures  proposed  during  the  follow-up  process. 
The  fate  of  the  stability  pact  initiative  exemplified  the  contrasting 
preferences  of  the  signatories  on  politico-security  issues,  as  well  as  the  difficulty 
of  making  the  transition  from  dialogue  to  action.  During  the  conference,  France 
and  Malta  -  the  co-sponsors  of  the  stability  pact  -  pressed  for  it  to  be  adopted  as  a 
priority  measure  in  the  follow-up  to  Barcelona.  63  However,  France's 
counterparts  in  the  EU  were  rather  less  enthusiastic.  Most  preferred  a  cautious, 
incremental  approach,  fearing  that  formal  multilateral  commitments  over  security 
III might  rebound  on  the  Union  given  the  unravelling  of  the  Oslo  peace  accords.  64 
Despite  the  direct  intervention  of  President  Jacques  Chirac's  office,  the  French 
were  forced  to  lower  their  sights,  conceding  that  the  charter  should  simply  be 
4  something  to  help  relations  between  all  the  Mediterranean  countries.  965  At  the 
Malta  summit,  the  participants  agreed  to  put  their  work  on  the  pact  on  the  back 
burner,  to  be  resumed  'when  political  circumstances  allow[ed].  966 
The  stalling  effect  of  political  developments  in  the  Middle  East  masked  a 
more  fundamental  reason  for  the  lack  of  headway  in  the  first  chapter.  The  lack  of 
appetite  for  new  formal  security  arrangements  was  symptomatic  of  the  EU's 
uneasiness  about  its  identity  in  the  politico-security  sphere.  Critics  of  the 
Barcelona  process  singled  out  the  failure  of  the  EU  to  its  channel  its  input  into 
the  first  chapter  through  the  CFSp.  67  The  European  Parliament,  for  instance, 
argued  that  the  political  and  security  chapter  affected  the  security  of  the  Union  as 
a  whole,  and  that  any  initiatives  taken  should  therefore  be  treated  as  CFSP 
actions.  68  It  was  a  familiar  claim:  the  EU  stood  a  much  better  chance  of 
achieving  its  objectives  if  it  spoke  with  a  single  voice.  However,  even  in  the 
unlikely  event  of  Member  States  unanimously  agreeing  specific  common 
positions  or  joint  actions  on  Mediterranean  security  measures,  the  EU  possessed 
no  independent  defence/military  capability  to  back  such  measures  up. 
Mediterranean  security  experts  concurred  on  the  essential  role  of  'outsiders'  - 
principally  the  USA,  but  also  increasingly  NATO  -  in  the  region  . 
69  Bearing  in 
mind  the  deeply  entrenched  differences  between  the  member  governments  over 
the  EU-NATO-WEU  triangle,  and  the  presence  of  the  neutral  EU  Member 
States,  the  Barcelona  process  appeared  ill-suited  to  pro-active,  'hard'  security 
policy-making. 
112 From  the  point  of  view  of  the  Arab  participants,  the  idea  of  a  security 
4pact"  was  an  unwelcome  reminder  of  European  colonialism  in  the  Middle  East, 
1  70 
stirring  memories  oe  notorious  Baghdad  pact.  They  also  doubted  its 
relevance  in  the  absence  of  progress  in  the  Middle  East  Peace  Process,  seen  as 
the  major  barrier  to  regional  integration.  An  Egyptian  official  expressed  the  Arab 
position  thus: 
We  believe  that  it  is  premature  at  this  time  to  talk  about  a  stability  pact. 
How  can  you  talk  about  a  stability  pact  when  conflicts  are  still  rampant  in 
the  Mediterranean?  71 
For  most  of  the  partners,  the  stability  pact  was  also  further  evidence  of  the 
European  side's  excessive  emphasis  on  the  security  strand  in  the  EMP,  to  the 
detriment  of  the  economic  and  human  chapters.  72  A  Maghrebi  diplomat  called 
for 
A  greater  balance  between  the  three  pillars.  Of  course,  there  are  problems 
which  occupy  Southern  Europe 
...  terrorism...  drugs,  but  the  security  aspect 
shouldn't  dominate.  73 
Almost  by  default,  the  leitmotif  of  the  first  chapter  became  low-level 
confidence-building,  a  generic  label  for  any  action  that  increased  the  regularity 
and  transparency  of  inter-governmental  contact  on  security  matters.  Work  in  the 
Senior  Officials  Committee  was  divided  into  six  sectors:  strengthening  of 
democracy,  preventive  diplomacy,  confidence  and  security  building  measures, 
disarmament  and  organised  crime.  Gradually,  a  list  of  operational  measures  was 
assembled,  funded  and  coordinated  by  the  EU.  They  included: 
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None  of  these  measures  could  be  described  as  ground-breaking,  but  they 
did  serve  a  useful  function  by  creating  a  network  of  security  experts  comprising 
of  academics,  diplomats,  and  even  military  personnel.  75  Frequent  conferences, 
seminars,  training  sessions  and  the  exchange  of  information  on  a  variety  of 
security-related  subjects,  if  nothing  else,  built  confidence  and  promoted 
awareness  of  the  EMP  among  an  influential  group  of  actors.  At  the  same  time, 
though,  there  was  a  sense  that  the  network  was  merely  covering  old  ground, 
albeit  in  a  more  systematic  way.  A  member  of  Euromesco  suggested  that: 
Euromesco  is  preparing  many  studies  on  topics  already  known.  In  a  way, 
the  EU  is  just  spending  money  to  duplicate  research  that  has  been  done  1000 
times.  76 
For  the  participating  govenu-nents,  the  chief  merit  of  the  political  and 
security  chapter  was  that  it  offered  them  a  low-visibility  talking  shop.  The 
114 ie----  liarity  bred  by  the  process  was  important,  since  it  allowed  dialogue  to  ami 
continue  even  when  a  number  Of  Participants  were  refusing  to  meet  each  other 
outside.  As  Spencer  argues, 
the  utility  of  CBMs  is  perceived  to  derive  from  their  gradual  creation  of  an 
atmosphere  of  mutual  trust,  transparency  and  predictability  -  in  slow  and 
incremental  steps,  if  need  be  -  in  order  to  provide  alternatives  to 
confrontation  and  conflict  where  differences  between  states  recur  or  have 
been  enflamed,  or  where  new  points  of  contention  have  arisen.  77 
In  view  of  the  Barcelona  Declaration"  s  commitment  to  non-interference  with 
existing  conflict  resolution  initiatives,,  expectations  of  what  the  first  chapter 
might  accomplish  inevitably  had  to  be  lowered. 
The  Economic  and  Financial  Partnership 
The  economic  and  financial  chapter  was  the  centrepiece  of  the  Barcelona  process, 
and  the  'engine'  of  the  EMP,  committing  the  signatories  to  establishing  one  of 
the  world's  largest  free  trade  zones  by  2010;  a  potential  market  of  800  million 
people.  The  measures  set  out  in  the  Barcelona  Work  Programme  were  designed 
to  complement  the  Euro-Mediterranean  agreements  by  stimulating  regional 
economic  integration,  inward  investment  and  infrastructural  development,  and  by 
setting  out  guidelines  for  the  management  of  common  resources  (environment, 
water).  As  one  official  put  it,  'Barcelona  [was]  a  launching  pad.  It  provide[d] 
the  value-added  at  the  multilateral  level  to  support  the  bilateral.  -)78 
As  an  integral  component  of  the  EU's  long-term  strategy,  the  second 
chapter  laid  down  the  methodology  by  which  a  framework  of  economic 
governance  would  be  extended  to  the  region,  and  underscored  the  neo-liberal 
orthodoxy  inherent  in  the  EMP  . 
79  The  Work  Programme  earmarked  the 
harmonisation  of  import/export  procedures,  rules  and  standards  as  the  priority  for 
115 the  implementation  process.  Provisions  relating  to  the  extension  of  existing  co- 
operation  in  fields  such  as  energy,  rural  development,,  technology  transfer, 
technical  assistance  for  business  co-operation  and  investment  were  all  directed 
towards  readying  the  partners  for  the  shock  of  a  rapid  transition  to  free  trade. 
Laced  with  a  heavy  dose  of  the  EU's  own  self-  interest,  the  second 
chapter  was  premised  on  a  highly  selective  externalisation  of  the  EU's  single 
market  model  utilising  a  methodology  already  employed  in  the  Union's  eastern 
enlargement  strategy.  The  Work  Programme  added-up  to  a  wish-list  of  issues  on 
which  the  Union's  objectives  could  best  be  met  through  multilateral  action.  For 
instance,  the  rapidly  expanding  presence  of  European  investors  in  North  Africa's 
gas  industry  would  clearly  benefit  from  the  extra  protection  afforded  by 
international  agreements.  At  a  relatively  low  cost  to  the  Union  -  grants  and  EIB 
loans,  more  'dialogue',  the  exchange  of  technical  expertise  -  it  could  'buy' 
security  of  supply  and  a  more  conducive  economic  climate  for  investors. 
For  the  Mediterranean  partners,  the  economic  and  financial  partnership 
was  the  main  attraction  of  the  Barcelona  process,  promising  further 
improvements  in  their  access  to  the  EU's  markets,  increased  financial  aid  and  the 
EU's  assistance  and  expertise  in  restructuring  their  economies.  Governments 
willingly  bought  the  economists'  argument  that  a  multilateral  economic 
relationship  with  the  EU  would  'lock-in'  the  credibility  of  domestic  reform 
programmes,  enabling  them  to  reap  the  benefits  of  the  free-trade  initiative 
. 
80  A 
Mashreqi  official's  view  was  typical: 
Our  national  industry  will  suffer  very  much  from  the  FTA.  We  have  a  very 
strong  lobby  against  this  agreement.  Can  you  imagine  competing  with  the 
giants  in  Europe?  But  we  know  there's  no  other  way  to  liberalise.  81 
In  reality,  however,  the  peripheral  role  of  the  Mediterranean  partners  in 
the  preparation  phase,  coupled  with  their  relatively  weak  bargaining  power  vis-a- 
116 vis  the  EU,  left  them  little  alternative  other  than  to  accept  what  was  a  flawed 
package  from  their  point  of  view.  Most  criticisms  from  the  partners  were 
targeted  at  areas  left  out  of  the  Declaration  and  Work  Programme,  and  at  the  use 
of  bilateral  negotiations  to  set  the  terms  of  the  free  trade  area,  a  method  that 
enabled  the  EU  to  deal  with  each  partner  individually  and  rule  out  any  possibility 
of  collective  bargaining.  82  Capital  and  goods  would  move  increasingly  freely 
throughout  the  region,  labour  would  not.  The  Declaration  made  a  brief  reference 
to  the  liberalisation  of  trade  in  services,  but  no  provisions  for  it  were  included  in 
the  Work  Programme.  83  On  foreign  investment,  regarded  as  a  crucial 
determinant  of  the  EMP's  success,  the  Work  Programme  included  only  an 
unsubstantial  pledge  to  'help  create  a  climate  favourable  to  the  removal  of 
obstacles  to  investment,  by  giving  greater  though  to  the  defmition  of  such 
obstacles.  ' 
84 
The  inconsistencies  and  paradoxes  of  the  Barcelona  process  did  not  take 
long  to  surface.  Three  problems  raised  questions  about  the  credibility  of  the 
Union's  strategy.  First,  the  Declaration  made  only  a  vague  reference  to  the  debt 
problem,  stating  that: 
The  partners  acknowledge  the  difficulties  that  the  question  of  debt  can 
create  ...  They  agree,  in  view  of  the  importance  of  their  relations  to  continue 
the  dialogue  in  order  to  achieve  progress  in  the  competent  fora. 
By  implication,  the  debt  issue  would  continue  to  be  handled  by  individual 
Member  States  in  the  London  and  Paris  clubs,  forums  better  known  for  their 
cautious  conservatism  than  their  forward  thinking.  An  Algerian  commentator 
summed  up  the  partners'  feelings  on  the  subject:  'Can  a  partnership,  in  the  equal 
benefit  of  both  parties,  be  built  between  a  "heavy"  creditor  and  his  debtor?  85 
Second,  the  EU's  defensive  stance  in  the  bilateral  negotiations  with  the 
individual  partners  sharply  contrasted  with  the  expansive  language  on  free-trade 
117 in  the  Barcelona  process.  Xavier  Prats,  Commissioner  Marin"s  cabinet 
spokesman  on  the  Mediterranean,  put  the  issue  bluntly:  'the  EU  is  selfish,  but 
then  so  is  everyone.  The  question  is,  who  gets  the  better  deal?  -)86  only  Morocco 
and  Tunisia  concluded  their  Euro-Mediterranean  agreements  before  the 
Barcelona  Conference,  leading  to  a  growing  sense  of  the  bilateral  and  multilateral 
tracks  being  out  of  synch.  At  the  same  time  as  the  trade  and  industry  ministers 
were  meeting  around  the  Mediterranean  to  discuss  cooperation  on  industial  and 
investment  policies,  so  agriculture  ministers  were  engaged  in  protracted  battles 
over  orange,,  potato  and  rice  quotas. 
A  third  problem  arose  out  from  the  Member  States'  wrangling  over  the 
'MEDA'  financial  regulation.  Having  already  fought  a  very  public  battle  over  the 
Mediterranean  financial  aid  budget  at  the  Cannes  Summit,  the  Member  States 
then  proceeded  to  spend  months  engaged  in  disputes  about  the  decision-making 
procedures  attached  to  it.  87  In  November  1995,  progress  of  the  MEDA 
DI 
Ivegulation  through  Council  stalled,  according  to  one  participant,  'because  of  a 
theological  dispute  between  the  UK  and  the  other  15  over  the  voting  mechanism 
used  to  suspend  ftmding  in  the  event  of  a  human  rights  problem.  88  The  UK 
demanded  unanimity  in  Council  on  a  Commission  proposal  to  suspend  funding, 
while  the  14  favoured  qualified  majority  voting.  Occurring  in  the  same  month  as 
the  Barcelona  Conference,  it  was  hardly  an  encouraging  signal  for  the  partners. 
Following  a  compromise  that  postponed  a  decision  until  1997,  a  ftirther  dispute 
arose  when  Greece,  along  with  the  European  Parliament,  raised  objections  to  the 
89 
application  of  MEDA  to  Turkey.  Meanwhile,  the  disbursement  of  the  funds 
was  blocked. 
As  in  the  first  chapter,  the  implementation  of  the  economic  and  financial. 
chapter  started  with  meetings  to  agree  'common  sectoral  principles  as  the  basis 
118 for  the  alignment  of  policies  in  the  sectors  concerned.  '90  Follow-up  conferences 
were  organised  in  a  bewildering  range  of  sectors,,  many  of  which  simply  led  to 
finiher  meetings.  (See  Appendix  2). 
As  was  the  case  with  the  first  chapter,  the  principal  benefit  of  the  second 
chapter  was  its  construction  of  networks  of  actors  -  principally  businesses  and 
consultancies  -  from  all  the  partner  countries.  Getting  private  business  interests 
on  board  was  essential  to  the  free-trade  initiative.  The  Mediterranean  region 
accounted  for  only  two  per  cent  of  total  overseas  investment  by  EU  businesses, 
limiting  the  assumed  stabilising  effect  of  economic  integration.  Much  of  the 
work  undertaken  after  Barcelona  therefore  focused  on  increasing  incentives  for 
capital  investment.  Investors  guides,  funded  by  the  Commission,  were  compiled 
for  each  of  the  partners.  Networks  of  chambers  of  commerce  and  economic 
institutes  were  mandated  to  improve  the  flow  of  business  information  and 
increase  awareness  of  investment  opportunities.  MEDA  funds  were  provided  for 
European  consultancies  to  advise  small  and  medium-sized  enterprises  in  the 
partner  countries,  and  to  oversee  the  implementation  ofjoint  projects  between 
EU  and  third  country  businesses.  While  there  were  some  problems  starting  up 
business  development  projects  in  partner  countries  with  underdeveloped 
investment  regimes,  the  emergence  of  an  ethos  ofjoint  participation  was 
nevertheless  a  sign  of  progress. 
The  Social,  Cultural  and  Human  Affairs  Chapter 
The  third  chapter  of  the  Barcelona  Declaration  was  intended  to  integrate  'civil 
society'  into  the  process  and  instigate  'cultural  dialogue'  and  'exchanges  at 
human,  scientific  and  technological  level.  '  The  range  of  subjects  covered  in  the 
Declaration  and  Work  Programme  was  impressive,  identifying  numerous  new 
119 avenues  of  cooperation  in  areas  such  as  education,  human  health,  democratic 
practices,  migration,  terrorism,  drug  trafficking,  international  crime,  corruption 
and  racism.  Such  issues  were  an  essential  element  in  the  new  thinking  on 
secun 
On  the  face  of  it,  the  incorporation  of  a  socio-cultural  dimension  in  the 
EMP  was  a  laudable  objective,  and  one  lacking  in  previous  incarnations  of  EU 
Mediterranean  policy.  At  the  same  time,  however,  it  was  fraught  with 
difficulties,  opening  up  the  EU  to  accusations  of  neo-colonialism  and  of  a 
6continued  proclivity  for  imposing  its  cultural  and  social  values  on  the 
developing  world.  '91  Moreover,  as  Colas  argues,  'the  invocation  of  civil  society 
at  inter-governmental.  conferences  like  the  one  held  at  Barcelona  has  been  mainly 
rhetorical.  -)92  The  Work  Programme  struck  an  uneasy  balance  between 
progressive  language  on  cultural  and  social  issues,  and  tough  passages  on  crime, 
drug  trafficking,  migration  and  terrorism  that  were  arguably  the  Union's  real 
pnon  les. 
The  biggest  shortcoming  of  the  third  chapter  was  its  failure  to  recognise 
that  civil  society  needed  to  be  given  a  free  rein  by  governments  if  the  principles 
of  the  Declaration  were  to  be  implemented.  Given  the  authoritarian  nature  of 
governments  in  a  number  of  the  Mediterranean  partner  countries,  the  latitude  of 
action  for  non-govermnental  organisations  was  invariably  narrow.  Cooption  of 
certain  approved  organisations  and  social  movements,  and  suppression  of 
opposition,  was  the  norm  in  the  Maghreb.  Thus,  social  movements  and  NGOs 
which  bought  into  the  agenda  set  by  states  were  actually  limiting  the  possibilities 
of  extending  transnational  links  among  civil  societies  operating  on  both  shores  of 
the  Mediterranean.  93  Perhaps  the  best  example  of  the  inherent  paradoxes  in  the 
third  chapter  arose  during  preparations  for  the  Helsinki  Ministerial  Conference  on 
120 the  Environment  in  November  1997.  Several  Arab-Mediterranean  governments 
demanded  that  NGOs  originating  from  their  states  should  receive  official 
accreditation  before  being  allowed  to  participate.  94  As  one  official  argued,  we 
have  to  find  a  place  for  NGOs,  but  in  most  of  these  countries  NGOs  represent  the 
opposition. 
05 
The  principal  benefits  of  the  third  chapter  were  arguably  felt  outside  the 
Barcelona  process  itself.  On  the  fringes  of  the  Conference,  a  Euro-Med  Civil 
Forum  was  established,  organised  and  funded  by  the  Catalun-ya's  Communidad 
Autonoma,  the  European  Commission,  the  EU's  Economic  and  Social 
Committee,  the  Spanish  Foreign  Ministry  and  UNESCO.  Around  1200 
representatives  from  700  social  bodies  participated  in  the  first  forum  which 
discussed  issues  ranging  from  cooperation  between  SMEs  to  religious  dialogue 
and  inter-cultural  exchanges.  Less  visible,  though  potentially  more  politically 
significant,  was  the  'Alternative  Mediterranean  Conference'  attended  by  2000 
delegates  from  300  associations  including  anti-racist  movements,  trade  unions 
and  NGOs.  It  challenged  the  state-led  nature  of  the  Barcelona  process,  singling 
out  the  dominance  of  trade  liberalisation  and  the  involvement  in  the  process  of 
authoritarian  governments.  96 
By  the  time  of  the  Malta  summit,  the  number  of  initiatives  underway  in 
the  third  chapter  had  mushroomed.  At  the  second  meeting  of  the  Euro-Med 
Forum  one  participant  summarised  progress  thus: 
Many  events,  fora,  workshops  and  new  networks  have  cropped  up  all  over 
the  Mediterranean.  The  difficulty  of  drawing  up  a  report  of  activities  and 
initiatives  is  evident  and  discriminatory.  At  the  time  of  the  Malta  meeting, 
We  are  unfortunately  unable  to  establish  a  complete  inventory  of  all  the 
activities  and  their  development.  97 
121 The  fact  that  appraising  the  third  chapter  was  so  difficult  suggests  that  at  least 
one  of  the  aims  of  the  exercise  -  to  stimulate  de-centralised  cooperation  between 
non-govemmental  actors  was  well  underway. 
4.  The  Impact  of  the  Barcelona  Process  on  EU  Foreign  Policy 
For  Eberhard  Rhein,  the  Euro-Mediterranean  partnership  'underscored  the 
ambition  of  the  EU  to  speak  for  the  whole  of  Europe.  '  98  Certainly,  the  Barcelona 
process  was  dominated  from  start  to  finish  by  the  Union  at  both  the  agenda 
setting  and  implementation  phases.  As  Rhein  goes  on  to  argue,  'those  countries 
still  staying  outside  the  EU  have  hardly  any  other  option  but  to  follow,  at  least 
implicitly,  the  lines  decided  by  the  EU.  '99  The  close  adherence  by  the  Member 
States  to  the  Commission's  1994  proposals  on  the  EMP  demonstrated  the  high 
degree  of  commitment  to  the  European  Union  as  the  most  appropriate  level  at 
which  to  pursue  a  proactive  Mediterranean  policy.  That  their  political  investment 
in  the  Mediterranean  was  backed  by  a  substantial  financial  commitment  further 
strengthened  the  strategic  coherence  of  the  EMP. 
As  far  as  the  EMP's  impact  on  EU  foreign  policy  was  concerned,  the 
principal  gains  were  derived  from  the  institutional  architecture  attached  to  the 
Barcelona  process.  For  instance,  one  of  the  main  concerns  of  the  Mediterranean 
EU  Presidencies  responsible  for  drafting  the  Barcelona  agenda  was  the  fact  that 
the  chairmanship  of  the  two  implementation  committees  would  pass  successively 
to  smaller,  non-Mediterranean  Member  States.  The  assumption  was  that  for  the 
small  Presidencies,  sustaining  the  momentum  generated  by  France,  Spain  and 
Italy  would  be  a  problem.  100  Yet  there  was  no  evidence  to  suggest  that  the 
subsequent  Irish  and  Dutch  Presidencies  allowed  the  process  to  slow  down.  The 
two  ensured  a  full  schedule  of  meetings  and  managed  to  hold  the  process  together 
122 when  the  ailing  Middle  East  Peace  Process  threatened  to  blow  it  apart.  The 
impressive  performance  of  the  Irish  and  Dutch  owed  much  to  the  skilful 
diplomacy  of  their  respective  foreign  ministries.  However,  it  must  also  be 
attributed  to  an  effective  balance  having  been  struck  between  the  roles  of  the 
Council  and  Commission. 
The  Commission  was  arguably  the  major  beneficiary  from  the  Barcelona 
process.  DGIB  was  granted  responsibility  for  coordinating  the  follow-up  process 
in  all  three  chapters,  alongside  the  Council  Presidency.  From  the  outset,  the 
Commission  used  its  power  judiciously,  deliberately  proposing  several  actions  in 
the  first  chapter  which  required  funds  from  the  MEDA  budget.  In  doing  so,  it 
exploited  a  backdoor  route  to  circumventing  the  arbitrary  distinction  made 
between  pillars  I  and  II  of  the  Maastricht  treaty.  Politico-security  policy  was 
being  made,  funded  and  administered  by  the  Community,  rather  than  by  purely 
inter-governmental  agreements  among  the  Member  States. 
The  willingness  of  the  Member  States  to  accept  this  formula  resulted, 
firstly,  from  the  interdependent  nature  of  the  various  elements  in  the  Barcelona 
programme.  Put  simply,  the  Member  States  had  no  other  option.  Secondly, 
separating  the  political  from  the  economic  had  become  increasingly  impractical 
in  the  context  of  the  EU.  Articles  J.  5  and  J.  9,  Title  V  of  the  Treaty  on  European 
Union  provided  for  the  participation  of  the  Commission  in  matters  relating  to  the 
CFSP,  and  included  the  possibility  of  policy  initiation  in  certain  circumstances. 
The  Commission  was  part  of  the  EU's  delegation  to  the  Senior  Officials 
Committee.  All  could  agree  that  the  ability  of  it  and  the  Council  Secretariat  to 
ensure  effective  co-ordination  between  first  and  second  pillar  matters  was  crucial 
to  the  programme's  success. 
123 The  multilateral  nature  of  the  Barcelona  process  made  Mediterranean 
security  a  joint  undertaking.  Essentially  a  rolling  political  dialogue,  the  EU's 
objectives  for  Mediterranean  security  could  be  pursued  in  an  environment  where 
agreements  would  be  reached  among  27  governments.  One  effect  of  this 
inclusive  approach  was  to  remove  some  of  the  potential  for  antagonism  which 
tended  to  hamper  unilateral  political  action  by  the  EU.  In  this  sense,  the 
Barcelona  process  has  also  perhaps  given  the  EU  the  capacity  for  proactive 
security  policy-making  by  another  means.  More  generally,  the  innovative 
an  roach  to  decision-making  in  the  Barcelona  process,  and  in  particular  the  Up 
Member  States'  willingness  to  accept  the  new  arrangements  in  the  interests  of  a 
coherent  strategy,  may  significantly  improve  the  EU's  capabilities  in  the  sphere 
of  foreign  policy. 
Conclusions 
The  EU's  new  Mediterranean  policy  may  fairly  be  described  as  'nothing  but  a 
political  deal  with  Europe  offering  its  advice,  its  moral  presence,  its  vast  political 
and  economic  experience  and,  of  course,  sizeable  financial  cooperation  to  those 
determined  to  tackle  their  problems  effectively.  '101  Perhaps  the  most  telling 
observation  about  the  Barcelona  process  is  that  it  concerns  'the  management, 
rather  than  the  transformation,  of  [EU-Mediterranean]  relations.  '  102  Excessive 
expectations  about  the  Barcelona  process  are  probably  unwise,  especially  given 
persistmg  impasse  between  the  Arabs  and  Israelis.  But  the  idea  behind  it  - 
functional  cooperation  -  is  a  realistic  and  arguably  laudable  one.  The  gradual 
extension  of  a  negotiated  order  in  the  Mediterranean,  beginning  with  the 
establishment  of  cooperative  networks  and  moving  towards  multilateral 
agreements  is  undoubtedly  laying  the  foundations  for  future  regional  integration, 
124 something  all  the  participants  recognise  as  a  necessary  and  positive  development. 
Whether  or  not  political  'spillover'  -  the  creation  of  a  culture  of  regional 
cooperation  at  all  levels  of  government  -  follows  remains  to  be  seen. 
Much  depends  on  the  maintenance  of  momentum  by  the  EU  and  on  the 
commitment  of  all  sides  to  make  the  follow-up  process  effective.  In  this  respect, 
whether  or  not  the  Mediterranean  retains  its  current  salience  for  the  Member 
States  will  be  crucial,  since  the  effectiveness  of  this  multilateral  track  of  the 
Union's  strategy  is  unlikely  to  become  clear  until  well  into  the  next  millennium. 
With  eastern  enlargement  looming,  there  is  a  danger  that  the  Barcelona  process 
may  fade  into  the  background  as  the  Union's  financial  and  political  resources  are 
diverted  to  the  task  of  integrating  the  CEECs. 
Although  still  far  from  being  the  finished  article,  the  Barcelona  process 
has  given  EU  Mediterranean  policy  a  much  clearer  structure  and  coverage  of  a  far 
wider  range  of  issues  than  had  previously  been  the  case.  Moreover,  there  is  now 
a  clearer  strategic  direction  to  the  policy,  with  a  specific  final  objective,  a  free 
trade  area,  and  a  more  or  less  precise  target  date  for  achieving  it.  If  the 
Europeans  can  rise  to  the  challenge  they  have  set  themselves  and  undertake 
genuine  trade  liberalisation,  then  the  Barcelona  process  may  prove  to  be  a  useful 
supporting  framework. 
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130 Chapter  5 
THE  POLITICS  OF  MEDITERRANEAN  POLICY:  THEORY  AND 
PRACTICE 
This  chapter  attempts  to  conceptually  'unpack'  EU  Mediterranean  policy, 
employing  different  theoretical  perspectives  to  explain  the  policy  process  that  took 
the  EMP  from  a  plan  of  action  to  substantive  policy  outputs.  Section  I  considers 
the  characteristics  of  the  EMP  as  policy  area,  comparing  it  with  eastern 
enlargement  and  setting  it  in  the  wider  context  of  Euro-Mediterranean  relations. 
Adapting  Theodore  Lowi's  classic  taxonomy  of  policy  types,  it  takes  up  the 
argument  that  every  policy  area  should  first  be  categorised  before  having  theory 
applied  to  it.  '  It  breaks  down  the  EMP  into  four  more  or  less  discrete  categories: 
distributive,  redistributive,  constituent  and  regulatory.  Each  category  is  subject  to 
different  'logics'  or  dynamics  that  govern.  how  decisions  are  made  and  to  specific 
patterns  of  bargaining  and  negotiation.  The  relative  influence  of  actors  involved 
in  the  policy-making  process,  both  governmental  and  supranational,  also  varies 
with  the  policy  t)Te.  2 
This  argument  that  'policy  matters'  is  linked  in  section  2  to  an  analysis  of 
3  the  impact  of  intergovernmental  Politics  on  the  EMP.  It  contends  that  the  EMP 
was  not  simply  a  product  of  the  self-interested  behaviour  of  the  Member  States, 
and  that  negotiating  outcomes  on  specific  issues  were  not  effectively  pre- 
determined  by  the  preferences  and  power  of  govermnents,  as  intergovernmentalist 
theories  tend  to  assume.  4  While  Member  States'  economic  interests  were 
certainly  decisive  at  given  points,  policy  also  developed  in  ways  which  cannot  be 
understood  by  looking  at  govermnental  Preferences  in  isolation.  Ideas,  geo- 
131 politics  and  ideology,  factors  that  are  not  easily  accounted  for  by  rational  choice, 
interest-based  theories,  must  also  figure  in  an  explanation  of  the  EMP. 
Section  3  engages  with  the  institutionalist  claim  that  institutions  have  a 
significant  role  in  determining  policy  outcomes,  and  have  policy  'preferences'  in 
5 
their  own  right.  The  parts  played  by  the  EU's  institutions  in  the  EMP  varied 
according  to  their  formal,  treaty-bound  competencies,  to  the  negotiating  and 
decision  making  procedures  that  applied  on  given  issues,  and  to  the  unique 
features  of  the  Barcelona  process.  The  focus  here  is  on  the  roles  of  the 
Commission,  the  Council  Presidency  and  Secretariat  and  the  European  Parliament 
in  the  policy  process. 
1.  Conceptualising  the  EMP 
What  are  the  salient  features  of  the  EU's  Mediterranean  strategy  for  the  way 
policy  subsequently  developed?  The  first  feature  is  a  self-evident  one: 
Mediterranean  policy  is  unequivocally  external  policy.  With  the  exceptions  of 
Cyprus  and  Malta  (and  arguably  Turkey),  the  Mediterranean  partners  are  not 
eligible  for  membership  of  the  Union,  and  are  not  being  prepared  for  future 
membership.  The  range  of  instruments  available  is  therefore  restricted  to 
(accession  substitutes',  limiting  the  potential  for  genuinely  innovative  policy.  6 
The  'templates'  of  accession  substitutes  and  the  rules  governing  their  use  are 
deeply  entrenched  in  the  EU's  acquis  politique,  set  down  in  the  treaty  articles 
which  stipulate  the  legal  bases  and  decision-making  procedures  for  negotiating 
with  third  countries.  Trade  and  Association  Agreements  have  become  the  Union's 
modus  operandi  in  external  economic  relations,  leading  to  what  Paul  Pierson 
labels  '-accumulated  policy  constraints.  "  7  Admittedly,  there  is  still  sufficient 
flexibility  in  the  EU's  external  policy  system  to  allow  for  innovation  dic 
132 Barcelona  process  is  an  obvious  example  -  and  for  these  standard  policy 
instruments  to  be  incrementally  modified  -  exemplified  by  the  change  from  Trade 
and  Cooperation  agreements  to  Euro-Mediterranean  Agreements.  But  the  history 
of  EU  external  relations  has  been  consistently  conservative  and  defensive  of  the 
status  quo.  Mediterranean  policy  is,  to  a  considerable  extent,  'path  dependent. 
To  understand  the  significance  of  using  '-accession  substitutes'  as  the  basis 
for  policy,  it  is  worth  briefly  comparing  the  EU's  relations  with  the  CEECs  and 
the  Mediterranean  non-members.  Both  regions  are  of  fundamental  geo-political 
importance  to  the  EU.  Both  represented  key  tests  for  EU  foreign  policy  in  the 
early  1990s.  However,  the  Union's  relationships  with  the  CEECs  quickly  became 
an  internal  issue  when  the  Union  decided  to  offer  the  Visegyad  four  membership.  9 
Accession  presents  the  Union  with  a  policy  challenge  of  a  fundamentally  higher 
order  than  association.  As  Friis  observes,  the  accession  process  forces  the 
Member  States  'to  embark  on  a  major  internal  renegotiation'  with  long-term 
implications  for  the  Union's  existence.  10  Enlargement  is  also  highly  politicised, 
provoking  often  bitter  and  protracted  debate  among  the  Member  States  about  how 
the  financial  burden  of  integrating  economies  in  transition  should  be  shared.  The 
economic  and  political  costs  and  benefits  associated  with  enlargement  in  terms  of 
its  impact  on  individual  economic  sectors,  EU  policies  and  the  Member  States 
themselves  are  usually  more  or  less  precisely  established  before  accession  actually 
takes  place,  providing  a  clear  indication  of  who  stands  to  gain  and  who  stands  to 
lose  from  the  process. 
By  contrast,  the  EU's  Mediterranean  strategy  required  comparatively 
minor  internal  adjustments  and  little  substantive  renegotiation  of  the  existing 
tenns  of  EU-MNC  relations.  Since  trade  with  the  Mediterranean  partners  had 
long  been  regulated  by  the  EU,  the  potential  costs  of  any  proposed  changes  to 
133 import  quotas  were  readily  available  prior  to  negotiations.  That  is  not  to  say  that 
Mediterranean  policy  was  apolitical.  Specific  issues  such  as  agricultural  import 
quotas,  the  MEDA  budget  and  the  immigration  clauses  in  the  Euro-Mediterranean 
agreements  were  highly  politicised.  But  the  point  here  is  that  the  EU's 
Mediterranean  strategy  was  largely  concerned  with  reorganising  the  management 
of  relations  with  the  partner  countries.  Eastern  enlargement  aims  to 
-transform 
the 
candidates  in  the  short-run,  and  has  huge  transformative  implications  for  both  the 
EU's  policies  and  its  institutions. 
A  second  feature  of  the  Mediterranean  strategy  was  its  focus  on  long-tenn 
change,  which  had  a  number  of  implications  for  policy  development.  The 
emphasis  was  on  addressing  a  problem  -  Mediterranean  security  -  which  all  the 
Member  States  accepted,  to  varying  degrees,  as  a  common  problem.  "  Bargaining 
between  the  Member  States  over  the  Union's  strategic  objectives  in  the 
Mediteffanean,  though  certainly  relevant,  was  not  decisive  in  the  early  stages  of 
the  EMP.  12  Defining  a  'Mediteffanean  strategy'  was  the  Commission's 
responsibility,  backed  by  the  agenda-setting  advocacy  of  the  southern  Member 
States.  13 
This  distinction  between  problem  solving  and  bargaining  in  the  EU  policy 
14 
process,  originally  identified  by  Fritz  Scharpf,  is  an  important  one.  Problem 
solving  involves  a  search  for  the  most  efficient  and  effective  solution  to  a  common 
problem.  Rather  than  simply  trying  to  minimise  costs  to  themselves  and  protect 
national  interests,  characteristics  of  a  bargaining  approach,  Member  States  assess 
the  'common  utility'  of  policy.  15  While  there  is  scant  evidence  that  the  Member 
States  carefully  calculated  the  utility  of  pursuing  the  EMP,  they  undoubtedly  saw 
long-term  benefits  in  it.  Where  bargaining  did  periodically  play  a  decisive  part  in 
134 shaping  the  EMP  was  in  the  negotiation  of  specific  Policy  measures  (see  Section 
2). 
A  third  feature  of  the  EMP  is  that  it  represents  only  one  level  in  an 
expanding  network  of  regional  and  sub-regional  governance,  which  includes 
organisations  such  as  the  Arab  Maghreb  Union,  the  Middle  East  and  North  Africa 
economic  summits,  nascent  economic  integration  projects  in  the  Middle  East,  and 
a  host  of  NGOs  dedicated  to  functional  cooperation  in  areas  such  as 
envirom,  nental  protection  of  the  Mediterranean  sea.  16  To  this  list  must  be  added 
the  multilateral  financial  institutions  -  the  IMF  and  World  Bank  -  and  creditor 
groups  such  as  the  Paris  Club  which  virtually  control  socio-economic 
development  strategies  in  many  of  the  partner  countries. 
The  most  important  of  the  alternative  channels  remains  bilateral  relations 
between  EU  Member  States  and  the  partner  countries.  In  policy  areas  where 
neither  the  EU  nor  the  EMP  are  mandated  to  act,  or  where  concurrent 
competencies  operate,  member  governments  retain  4  privileged  bilateral  rights'  to 
pursue  their  own  commercial  and  political  objectives  and  deploy  their  own  set  of 
policy  instruments.  17  When  Algeria  opened  up  its  natural  gas  industry  to  foreign 
investors,  the  southern  EU  govenunents  were  swift  to  put  together  attractive 
credit  packages  to  support  the  investment  activities  of  national  companies.  The 
Italian  government's  decision  to  sign  a  'friendship'  accord  with  Libya  in  July 
1998,  part  of  a  subtle  campaign  to  bring  that  notable  absentee  into  the  Euro- 
Mediterranean  fold,  potentially  set  it  against  the  UK,  France  and  the  official  EU 
line.  18  The  point  here  is  that,  regardless  of  the  existence  of  the  EMP,  traditional, 
inter-state  diplomacy  and  national  foreign  policies  continue  to  exercise 
considerable  influence  over  international  relations  in  the  region.  19  In  signing  up  to 
135 the  EMP,  the  Member  States  were  not  transferring  new  foreign  Policy  powers  to 
the  EU. 
To  summarise,  the  EMP  did  not  herald  sweeping  changes  to  the  EUIs 
internal  order.  Although  the  strategy  promised  greater  depth  in  the  Union's 
economic  and  political  relations  with  the  partner  countries,  it  simply  did  not 
irrevocably  affect  the  Union's  future.  Seen  in  the  broader  context  of  international 
order  in  the  region,  it  was  only  one  channel  for  Euro-Mediterranean  cooperation, 
and  only  one  vehicle  to  promote  soft  security.  We  would  therefore  expec  the 
Mediterranean  strategy  to  have  been  agreed  without  a  great  deal  of  political 
controversy,  implying  a  strong  role  for  the  Commission  and  weaker  role  for 
governmental  interests  in  policy  development.  That  the  EU  had  agreed  on  how  to 
approach  the  Mediterranean  security  problem,  mattered  far  less  than  the  deal  it 
was  ultimately  prepared  to  offer  the  partner  countries. 
Understanding  how  flesh  was  put  on  the  bones  of  the  Mediterranean 
strategy  requires  analysis  of  the  policy  types  that  comprised  the  EMP  package,  and 
specifically  to  the  negotiating  processes  associated  with  each  of  these  types. 
While  the  'path  dependency'  of  the  Euro-Mediterranean  agreements  limited  the 
potential  for  terms  of  trade  to  be  changed  by  hard  bargaining,  negotiations  within 
the  EU  and  between  the  EU  and  individual  partner  countries  nevertheless 
determined  outcomes  on  all  the  key  issues.  Likewise,  the  funds  available  for  the 
MEDA  budget  were  largely  pre-determined  by  previous  budgetary  agreements,  but 
the  precise  figure  was  set  by  negotiation.  The  Barcelona  Declaration  was  almost 
entirely  the  product  of  intergovenunental  negotiations. 
As  Likke  Friis  argues,  'any  issue  area  negotiations  can  probably  [italics  in 
onginal]  only  be  understood  by  conceptualising  the  various  issue  area  logics 
which  are  at  play.  20  The  notion  of  multiple  logics  is  an  especially  apposite  one  in 
136 the  context  of  the  EMP  since  each  of  its  components  was  subject  to  distinct 
negotiation  and  decision-making  procedures.  The  Euro-Mediterranean 
agreements  were  negotiated  on  the  basis  of  Articles  3  00  and  3  10  of  the  EU  Treaty, 
giving  the  Commission  responsibility  for  conducting  the  negotiations,  the  Council 
the  duty  to  conclude  the  agreement  by  unanimous  endorsement  of  the  Member 
States  and  the  Parliament  the  right  to  be  consulted  during  the  negotiations  and  to 
give  its  assent.  A  different  logic  operated  for  the  Barcelona  process,  the  content 
of  which  was  prepared  by  the  Member  States  in  collaboration  with  the 
Commission  and  the  partner  countries.  The  negotiating  process  was  a  mixture  of 
standard  agenda  setting  by  the  Union's  Council  Presidency,  ad  hoc  consultations 
between  the  participating  governments,  and  the  drafting  of  a  series  of  documents 
leading  to  the  Barcelona  Declaration  and  Work  Programme.  After  the  Barcelona 
conference,  the  process  switched  to  a  typical  multilateral  format,  permitting  any 
participant  to  propose  measures,  and  requiring  unanimous  agreement  for  measures 
to  be  implemented.  The  MEDA  budget  also  had  its  own  distinct  logic,  with  the 
Commission  proposing  projects,  the  Member  States  giving  their  approval  in  a 
regulatory  committee,  and  the  allocation  of  funds  being  open  to  competitive 
tendering  among  private  organisations. 
One  way  of  making  sense  of  these  multiple  logics  is  to  break  down  the 
EMP  into  Theodore  Lowi's  four-fold  taxonomy  of  policy  types:  distributive,  re- 
distributive,  constituent  and  regulatory.  21  The  essence  of  Lowi's  argument  is  that 
'policies  determine  politics'.  22  Each  type  is  subject  to  different  decision-making 
procedures,  involves  different  constellations  of  actors  in  the  policy-making 
process  and  has  type-specific  costs  and  benefits  associated  with  it.  23  A  corollary 
of  this  differentiation  is  that  the  degree  of  politicisation  varies  according  to  the 
policy  category  and  to  the  individual  issue  at  stake.  Many  aspects  of  distributive 
137 policy,  for  instance,  may  well  be  treated  as  'technical'  issues  at  the  bureaucratic 
level  (by  the  Commission)  while  redistributive  issues  tend  to  be  resolved  at  the 
political  level  (Council).  24 
That  said,  predicting  how  politicised  a  particular  issue  will  be,  and  the 
likely  outcome  of  negotiations,  is  an  uncertain  business.  As  William  Wallace 
argues: 
The  art  of  policy-making  is  partly  a  matter  of  correctly  assessing  the 
broadness  or  narrowness,  the  political  sensitivity  or  technical  complexity,  of 
successive  issues.  The  definition  of  and  redefinition  of  issues  is  thus  a 
subjective  process,  with  plenty  of  room  for  political  intervention  and 
redirection.  25 
The  Union  had  considerable  experience  of  negotiating  with  the  partner  countries, 
and  many  of  the  issues  at  stake  in  the  EMP  were  familiar  from  previous 
negotiating  rounds,  but  neither  side  entered  into  the  substantive  stage  of  the  EMP 
with  a  clear  idea  of  the  specific  problems  that  would  arise.  Twenty  seven 
governments  were  involved,  with  an  attendantly  diverse  range  of  demands, 
expectations  and  interests.  Negotiations  extended  to  fluid  issues  such  as  the 
changing  market  situation  within  the  Union,  assessments  of  the  individual 
financial  needs  of  each  partner  country  and  the  identification  of  the  priorities  for 
cooperation.  Moreover,  negotiators  effectively  operated  at  three  levels,  searching 
for  agreements  that  satisfied  domestic  interests,  were  mutually  acceptable  to  the 
EU  and  to  the  partner  countries  and  fulfilled  the  objectives  of  the  partnership 
strategy.  26  Much,  therefore,  remained  to  be  settled  in  the  normal  course  of 
intergovermnental  and  institutional  politicking. 
Distributive  politics  in  the  Euro-Mediterranean  Partnership  centred  on 
sharing  the  costs  of  renegotiating  trade  concessions  in  the  association  agreements, 
in  allocating  MEDA  funds  to  the  partner  countries,  and  apportioning  public 
4  goods'  such  as  technical  assistance.  Two  factors  militated  against  politicisation 
138 of  the  distributive  dimension  of  the  EMP.  First,  trade  concessions  in  the  Euro- 
Mediterranean  agreements  were  to  be  negotiated  against  the  background  of 
patterns  of  imports  and  exports,  a  constraint  accepted  by  the  Commission, 
Member  States  and  partner  countries.  Second,  there  was  no  suggestion  that  the 
existing  apportiomnent  of  financial  resources  aniong  the  partner  countries  would 
change. 
Nevertheless,  it  was  easy  to  predict  that  several  distributive  issues  would 
prove  highly  disputatious.  Even  a  cursory  glance  at  the  history  of  EU 
Mediterranean  policy  would  point  to  problems  over  agricultural  import  quotas. 
Given  the  diversity  of  the  partner  states"  trade  with  the  Union,  the  range  of 
contentious  issues  inevitably  varied  from  negotiation  to  negotiation.  Each  partner 
govenunent  had  certain  products  for  which  they  sought  substantial  new 
concessions  from  the  Union.  Similarly,  certain  products  also  presented  particular 
difficulties  for  individual  Member  States.  Finding  solutions  to  the  more 
politicised  distributive  issues  was  largely  dependent  on  what  the  Union  was 
prepared  to  offer.  In  other  words,  outcomes  were  determined  by  internal  needs  not 
external  demands. 
The  redistributive  politics  of  the  EMP  revolved  around  the  question  of 
how  the  additional  funding  eannarked  for  the  Mediterranean  would  affect  other 
priorities  for  the  Union's  external  spending,  principally  the  European 
Development  Fund  (EDF)  and  aid  to  the  CEECs.  This  dimension  of  policy 
revolved  to  an  even  greater  extent  around  negotiations  within  the  EU.  The  partner 
governments  might  have  pressed  for  increased  aid,  but  the  decision  over  resource 
allocation  was  the  EU's  alone.  Although  Mediterranean  policy  briefly  became 
highly  politicised  in  the  run  up  to  the  1995  Cannes  Summit,  once  the  funding 
decision  was  taken,  redistributive  politics  slipped  into  the  background. 
139 The  constituent  (or  constitutive)  aspect  of  the  EMP  emerged  in  the 
institutional  architecture  created  to  serve  the  Barcelona  process.  Constitutive 
politics  refers  to  a  situation  'whereby  the  Member  States  [in  the  EMP's  case,  the 
27  participants]  adopt  a  series  of  decision  rules,  and  in  some  cases  create  new 
institutions,  for  subsequent  policy-making.  27  The  EMP  was  internally 
constitutive  in  that  new  institutional  structures  and  procedures,  such  as  the  Euro- 
Mediterranean  Committee,  the  Senior  Officials  Committee  and  the  MEDA  budget 
line,  had  to  be  devised.  The  EMP  was  externally  constitutive  in  that  it  gave  rise  to 
the  Barcelona  Declaration  and  spawned  a  plethora  of  new  multilateral  forums. 
Given  the  consensual  multilateralism  of  the  Barcelona  process,  it  might  be 
expected  that  the  partners  would  have  been  more  closely  in  designing  the  EMP's 
institutional  architecture.  However,  the  EU  patently  had  the  upper  hand  in 
devising  the  Barcelona  framework  and  European  initiatives  dominated  the  agenda 
of  the  follow-up  process. 
28 
The  regulatory  dimension  of  the  EMP  -  Lowi's  fourth  policy  type  - 
manifested  itself  in  the  legislative  changes  forced  on  the  Mediterranean  partners 
by  the  need  to  adapt  their  import  and  export  regimes  to  the  requirements  of  Euro- 
Mediterranean  agreements  (customs  duties,  tariff  systems)  and  by  administrative 
changes  agreed  in  the  context  of  the  Barcelona  process.  As  the  Commission's 
dispute  with  Israel  during  1998  over  the  abuse  of  rules  of  origin  showed,  this 
aspect  of  Mediterranean  policy  could  occasionally  become  highly  politicised. 
However,  such  examples  were  rare,  since  many  of  the  partners  were  already  in  the 
process  of  implementing  comprehensive  economic  reforms  as  part  of  INff 
structural  adjustment  programmes  and  moving  towards  trade  liberalisation  in  the 
context  of  the  GATT  agreements.  29 
140 Pigeon-holing  the  components  of  the  EMP  into  these  discrete  categories 
does  not  cover  every  angle  of  the  POlicY-making  process.  Several  decisions, 
including  NEDA,  could  be  placed  in  more  than  one  category,  and  there  was 
always  a  strong  element  of  subjectivity  in  the  way  issues  were  def  30  ined. 
Furthermore,  the  renegotiated  aspects  of  the  ENT  unzipped  old  issues  and  created 
the  potential  for  their  politicisation  or  re-politicisation.  But  it  does  offer  a  neat 
framework  for  policy  analysis.  The  next  task  is  to  integrate  intergovernmental  and 
institutional  politics. 
2.  Governments,  Interests  and  the  Policy  Process 
The  preferences  (interests)  that  Member  States  advanced  and  defended  in  the 
Mediterranean  policy  process  clearly  mattered.  There  was  patently  demand, 
chiefly  expressed  by  the  southern  EU  Member  States,  for  'more'  Mediterranean 
policy.  France,  Italy,  Spain  and  Greece  could  each  legitimately  claim  to  have  real 
and  wide-ranging,  if  not  vital,  domestic  interests  in  the  elaboration  of  a  more 
comprehensive  EU  policy.  All  the  Member  States  had  a  commercial  presence  of 
some  sort  in  the  partner  countries'  markets.  Even  those  states  without  obvious 
security  interests  in  the  Mediterranean  were  persuaded  that  policy  change  was  in 
the  Union's  general  interest.  In  narrower  terms,  governmental  preferences  were 
undeniably  critical  in  the  final  stages  of  negotiations  on  the  Euro-Mediterranean 
agreements  and  in  the  MEDA  budget  decision. 
At  first  sight,  the  most  appropriate  theoretical  tools  for  understanding  the 
relationship  between  governmental  preferences,  negotiation  and  outcomes  in  the 
formulation  and  negotiation  of  the  EMP  are  to  be  found  in  interest-based  analyses. 
A  strong  case  exists  for  the  utilisation  of  theories  that  capture  the  interplay 
between  domestic  interests  and  the  behaviour  of  governments  in  the  EU  policy- 
141 making  process.  31  Diplomats  and  politicians  not  only  bargain  with  each  other, 
they  must  also  ensure  that  any  agreement  reached  is  acceptable  to  their  domestic 
constituencies.  An  especially  relevant  example  of  this  interactive  process  was  the 
negotiation  of  Morocco's  Euro-Mediterranean  agreement,  during  which  the 
French,  Portuguese  and  Spanish  governments  faced  vociferous  lobbying  and 
protests  from  farmers  and  other  producers  at  home  over  concessions  on  tornatoes,, 
sardines  and  oranges.  Simultaneously  they  faced  pressure  from  the  Commission, 
other  Member  States  and  the  Moroccan  government  to  reach  an  acceptable 
agreement. 
Arguably  the  most  complete  and  compelling  theoretical  tool  on  offer  is 
Andrew  Moravcsik's  'liberal-intergovemmentalism',  which  explains  European 
integration  as  the  product  of  preference-based  negotiations  between  govermnents. 
32  Moravcsik's  central  claim  is  that  the  EU's  'grand  bargains'  -  treaty  negotiations 
-  and  resultant  policies  such  as  the  CAP,  EMU  and  the  single  market  -  proceed  in 
a  causal  sequence  that  sees  governments  rationally  formulating  preferences  based 
primarily  on  dominant  domestic  economic  interests,  bargaining  with  other  EU 
governments  to  secure  the  benefits  of  policy  cooperation,  then  pooling  or 
delegating  sovereignty  in  the  EU  in  order  to  'lock  in'  commitments  to 
cooper  ion. 
33 
Through  this  intergovernmentalist  lens,  the  EMP  might  be  explained  as  the 
product  of  the  Member  States  need  to  cooperate  in  order  to  maximise  the 
commercial  advantages  of  producers  in  Mediterranean  markets  and  to  improve  the 
34 
management  of  economic  relationships  with  the  partner  countries.  Qualified 
trade  liberalisation  in  the  Euro-Mediterranean  agreements  undoubtedly  served  the 
interests  of  EU  manufacturers  and  suppliers  of  capital  goods.  The  exclusion  of 
agricultural  trade  from  the  free-trade  initiative  also  fits  Moravcsik's  analysis:  'The 
142 greater  the  competitiveness  of  third  country  producers,  the  greater  the  pressure  for 
external  protection.  05  Furthermore,  much  of  the  work  in  the  second  chapter  of 
the  Barcelona  process  was  intended  to  create  an  economic  environment  more 
amenable  to  trade  and  investment,  with  European  businesses  being  the  principal 
beneficiaries. 
Yet  an  intergovernmentalist  approach  goes  only  part  of  the  way  to 
accounting  for  the  development  of  the  EMP.  First,  as  section  I  showed,  the  EMP 
cannot  be  regarded  as  the  result  of  a  grand  bargain  or  history-making  decision. 
Intergovemmentalist  theory  in  general  tends  to  be  concerned  with  explaining  the 
motives  for  inter-state  cooperation  and  the  establishment  of  international 
institutions  rather  than  with  the  policy  analysis.  Mediterranean  policy  'existed' 
well  before  the  EMP,  the  Union's  primary  aims  being  effective  modification  and 
re-packaging  rather  than  dramatic  reform.  There  is  therefore  little  to  indicate  that 
the  development  of  the  EMP  followed  the  neat  sequence  described  above. 
Second,  rational  choice  theories,  of  which  liberal  intergovernmentalism  is 
one,  are  ill-suited  to  explaining  a  policy  in  which  ideas,  rhetoric  and  symbolism 
often  appeared  to  matter  as  much,  if  not  more,  than  concrete  interests.  36  Asked  to 
explain  his  government's  interests  in  relation  to  the  EMP,  this  diplomat's  response 
was  typical: 
It  is  a  good  thing  to  aim  at  a  stable  situation  in  the  partner  countries,  a  big 
advantage  to  have  a  stable  socio-economic  and  political  environment.  So 
partnership  is  important.  The  Mediterranean  could  threaten  the  EU.  37 
It  is  hard  to  conceive  of  governments  rationally  configuring  their  preferences 
towards  the  kind  of  abstract  strategic  objectives  that  underpin  the  EMP.  Regional 
peace,  stability  and  prosperity  are  not  the  stuff  of  orderly,  systematic  governmental 
responses  to  domestic  interests. 
143 Third,  the  prominence  of  'security'  as  a  rationale  for  the  EMP  points 
towards  a  rather  more  substantive  role  for  geopolitical  factors  than  Moravcsik 
appears  to  favour.  His  argument  is  that  only  where  the  costs  and  benefits  of 
cooperation  are  'uncertain,  balanced 
,  or  weak'  do  'security  externalities'  really 
count.  38  Security  interests  might  be  cited  as  motives  ex  post,  but  they  are  almost 
always  secondary  to  commercial  interests.  39  Granted,  definitions  of  the  Union's 
geo-strategic  interests  in  the  Mediterranean  tended  to  be  ambiguous,  but  the  rise  in 
illegal  immigration  into  southern  Europe  in  the  early  1990s,  and  the  violence  in 
Algeria  that  spilled  over  into  France  during  1995,  were  very real  security 
problems.  The  point  is  not  that  Moravcsik  dismisses  security  externalities. 
Rather,  it  is  that  his  definition  of  how  geopolitics  and  security  influence 
governmental  choices  is  perhaps  too  narrow,  rooted  in  Cold  War  thinking  on  the 
subjects. 
Fourth,  an  intergovernmentalist  approach  manifestly  fails  to  capture  the 
complexity,  fluidity  and  plurality  of  the  process  of  negotiating  a  multi-faceted 
policy  package  like  the  EMP.  As  the  negotiation  of  the  Euro-Mediterranean 
agreements  and  implementation  of  the  Barcelona  process  showed,  the 
Commission  possessed  significant  capacity  for  autonomous  action  in  its  own  right 
(see  Section  3).  Other  EU  institutions  also  played  important  roles  in  the  policy 
process.  Add  to  the  equation  the  interests  of  the  12  partner  governments  and  the 
excessive  parsimony  of  the  kind  of  systematic  game  theoretic  analysis  on  which 
intergovenunentalist  theory  is  predicated  is  exposed. 
How  should  governmental  preferences  be  factored  into  an  explanation  of 
the  EMP?  Clearly,  in  a  manner  that  acknowledges  that  the  weight  of  preferences 
vanes  with  the  salience  of  the  issue  at  stake,  with  the  policy  type,  with  the 
decision-making  procedures  that  apply  and  with  the  wider  context  in  which  each 
144 decision  is  made.  The  remainder  of  this  section  examines  the  broader  cleavages 
in  the  Member  States  preferences  towards  the  EMP,  and  assesses  the  impact  of 
these  preferences  based  on  selected  evidence  from  the  Euro-Mediterranean 
agreement  negotiations  and  the  MEDA  budget  decision. 
A  key  cleavage  in  intergovermnental  bargaining  over  the  EMP  was  an 
outgrowth  of  the  'trade  versus  aid'  debate,  a  traditional  fault-line  in  the  Union's 
external  trade  policy.  40  As  a  German  diplomat  explained: 
This  discussion  took  place  in  the  preparations  for  Barcelona.  We,  as  others, 
the  UK,  the  Netherlands,  the  Scandinavians,  took  the  view  that  more 
influence  should  be  given  to  the  framework  for  private  investment  and  less 
to  public  assistance.  41 
The  'trade  versus  aid'  debate  set  those  Member  States  with  a  liberal,  laissez-faire 
prescription  for  economic  development  in  the  Mediterranean  region  against  a 
group  favouring  a  strategy  that  balanced  trade  liberalisation  with  a  substantial  aid 
component.  The  issue  roughly  divided  the  Member  States  across  an  east-west 
axis.  Northern  Member  States  (Denmark,  Germany,  the  UK,  Sweden  and  the 
Benelux  states)  firmly  positioned  themselves  in  the  free-traders  camp,  while 
France,  Spain  and  Italy  tended  to  press  for  higher  levels  of  aid  and  the 
maintenance  of  preferential  trading  arrangements. 
The  reasons  for  this  division  appear  self-evident.  Southern  Member  States 
had  more  intense  economic  and  security  interests  in  the  region  than  their  northern, 
non-Mediterranean  counterparts.  It  was,  therefore,  a  matter  of  self-interest  for 
them  to  persuade  their  counterparts  to  increase  the  EU's  budget  for  the  region  in 
order  to  supplement  (and  in  arguably  substitute  for)  their  own  'investment'  in 
regional  security,  in  the  form  of  bilateral  aid  programmes  and  national 
defence/security  policies.  Consistent  with  this  division,  France  and  Spain  were 
145 the  prime  movers  in  pressing  for  a  comprehensive  and  generous  EU 
Mediteffanean  policy. 
Returning  briefly  to  intergovernmentalist  theory,  the  southern  group  might 
reasonably  have  been  expected  to  'go  the  extra  mile'  on  trade  concessions,  since 
A.  1- 
- 
uacy  clearly  stood  to  lose  the  most  if  satisfactory  agreements  were  not  reached 
with  the  partner  countries.  However,  the  Mediterranean  Member  States  were 
caught  between  two  stools  on  this  issue.  On  the  one  hand,  France,  Italy  and  Spain 
expended  much  diplomatic  effort  during  their  respective  Council  Presidencies 
pushing  the  Union  and  the  partners  towards  agreement.  On  the  other  hand, 
domestic  interests  in  those  countries  were  openly  antagonistic  towards  Maghrebi 
importers,  restricting  their  respective  governments'  room  for  manoeuvre  in  the 
Council. 
Here,  liberal  intergovernmentalism  predicts  'side  payments'  in  the  form  of 
financial  compensation  and  other  support  for  domestic  producers  adversely 
affected  by  the  EMP,  and  the  trading  off  of  issues  in  package  deals  to  balance 
losses  with  gains.  The  financial  aid  awarded  to  Portugal's  sardine  canning 
industry  as  compensation  for  concessions  on  Morocco's  sardine  import  quota  is  a 
good  example  of  a  financial  side-payment.  Similarly,  Morocco's  successful  ploy 
of  linking  its  demands  on  tomato  iMPort  quotas  to  the  renegotiation  of  a  fishing 
agreement  with  the  EU,  of  which  Spanish  fishermen  were  the  main  beneficiaries, 
provides  a  clear  example  of  issue  linkage. 
By  contrast,  the  preferences  of  the  northern  Member  States  on  import 
concessions  ought  to  have  been  both  more  disposed  to  liberalisation  and  less 
intense  than  those  of  their  southern  counterparts.  Yet  both  German  and  Dutch 
negotiators  came  under  similarly  concerted  pressure  from  domestic  producers 
(flower-growers)  to  stand  their  ground  on  quotas.  As  a  Dutch  diplomat  observed: 
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agriculture,  we  are  also  protectionist.  The  Ministries  of  Economy  and 
Finance,  they  are  all  for  trade.  The  Ministry,  they  say  "no",  not  one  cut 
flower  we  can  have.  In  the  end  though,  trade  is  always  better  than  aid.  42 
This  ever  present  tension  between  ideological  orientation  and  domestic 
political  expediency  lies  at  the  heart  of  the  often  schizophrenic  character  of  EU 
trade  PoliCY. 
43  It  also  appears  to  confirm  a  basic  assumption  of  Moravcsik's 
A-  - 
theory:  that  governments  will  favour  agreements  whose  net  effect  is  to  boost 
exports  except  where  politically  powerful,  non-competitive  producers  stand  to 
lose.  44  The  broader  pattern  of  negotiation  in  the  EMP  -  liberalisation  on  non- 
sensitive  issues,  continued  protection  on  sensitive  issues  -  also  appears  to 
coffoborate  this  assumption. 
Nevertheless,  there  were  instances  of  govenunental.  concessions  on 
politicised  issues  without  obvious  side-payments  and  issue  linkage.  The  reason 
offered  by  a  German  official  for  his  government's  eventual  decision  to 
compromise  over  cut  flowers  suggests  ideological  motives: 
We  conceded  more  than  we  intended  on  cut  flowers.  As  usually  in  the  final 
phase  of  negotiations,  in  the  end  it  is  excluded  for  us  to  block  negotiations 
with  any  country.  It  is  about  our  positive  attitude  to  European  integration. 
In  the  end,  at  least  on  this  issue  we  got  agreement.  45 
In  similar  vein,  a  British  official  argued: 
We  do  have  agricultural  interests  as  well,  but  Malcom  Rifkind  made  it  clear 
during  the  negotiations  with  Egypt  and  we  are  making  it  clear  with  Jordan 
that  the  development  of  trade  and  the  Euro-Mediterranean  Partnership  must 
be  the  priority.  46 
The  point  here  is  that  the  Union"s  long-term  strategic  objectives,  the  'greater 
good'  of  European  integration  and  the  imperative  of  concluding  the  agreements 
often  outweighed  very  intense  domestic  pressures. 
A  secondq  broad  cleavage  divided  the  Member  States  into  two  camps 
according  to  their  preference  for  deepening  the  EU's  relationship  with  Central  and 
147 Eastern  Europe  or  the  Mediterranean,  a  division  which  at  times  harmed  the 
internal  cohesion  of  the  COMMUnity.  47  Again,  however,  competition  for  resources 
between  east  and  south  was  not  a  zero-sum  game,  and  membership  of  either 
4camp'  was  not  exclusive.  France,  under  Edouard  Balladur's  premiership,  sought 
to  be  an  influential  player  in  both  directions,  sponsoring  the  EU's  stability  pact 
initiative  in  Central  and  Eastern  Europe,  while  at  the  same  time  calling  for  the 
Union  to  devote  more  resources  to  the  Mediterranean.  Germany  is  a  major  trading 
partner  of  the  Mediterranean  partners,,  particularly  Algeria  and  Egypt,  and  is  also 
one  of  the  top  three  aid  donors  to  the  region  among  the  Member  States.  The  fact 
that  preferences  on  this  issue  were  mutable  was  to  play  a  crucial  part  in  bargaining 
on  the  MEDA  budget. 
The  MEDA  budget  -a  product  of  distributive,  redistributive  and 
constitutive  decisions  -  was  'fought  over  tooth  and  nail'  by  the  Member  States.  48 
The  decision  was  made  against  a  background  of  several  constraints  that  actually 
reduced  the  leverage  of  the  member  governments.  First,  any  changes  in  funding 
had  to  comply  with  the  EU"s  total  projected  budget  agreed  at  the  Edinburgh 
European  Council  in  1992  (for  the  period  1993-9).  Second,  the  Mediterranean 
faced  stiff  competition  for  funds  from  other  regions,  including  the  Central  and 
Eastern  European  countries  and  Latin  America.  Third,  the  responsibility  for 
deciding  how  much  of  the  budget  to  bid  for  lay  with  the  Commission.  Fourth,  the 
Mediterranean  was  not  the  EU's  number  one  external  budgetary  priority  at  that 
time.  A  row  over  increased  contributions  to  the  European  Development  Fund  for 
the  Lomd  countries  topped  the  agenda,  followed  by  pre-accession  measures  for  the 
CEECs. 
The  key  players  in  the  MEDA  deal  were  the  Commission,  France, 
Gennany  and  Spain.  Both  the  French  and  Spanish  governments  supported 
148 Commissioner  Manuel  Marin's  proposal  of  5.5  billion  ECUs,  although  the 
Spanish  expressed  concern  that  budgetary  provisions  for  Latin  America  should  not 
be  adversely  affected  by  any  increase.  49  The  Gennan  government,  by  contrast, 
argued  that,  since  most  of  the  Mediterranean  partners  were  not  potential  members 
of  the  EU,  the  existing  balance  in  the  distribution  of  resources,  skewed  in  favour 
of  the  CEECs,  should  be  preserved.  50  Its  was  an  unequivocal  attempt  to  maximise 
the  budgetary  allocation  for  its  own  back  yard.  Meanwhile,  Finance  Minister 
Theo  Waigel  was  pressuring  Chancellor  Kohl  to  negotiate  a  reduction  in 
Gennany's  overall  contribution  to  the  EU  budget.  51  COREPER  proved  unable  to 
find  a  solution,  leaving  ministers  to  thrash  out  a  deal  at  the  Luxembourg  General 
Affairs  Council  and  subsequently  at  the  Cannes  European  Council  in  June  1995.52 
The  final  deal  in  Cannes  reduced  the  Commission's  indicative  figure  to  4.7 
billion  ECUs  (1995-1999).  A  proportionate  reduction  from  7.1  billion  ECUs  to 
6.7  billion  ECUs  was  agreed  in  the  financial  provision  for  the  CEECs.  Both 
regions  lost  out  as  a  result  of  a  compromise  negotiated  between  the  French, 
German  and  Spanish  governments  which  increased  contributions  to  the  European 
Development  Fund  for  Lome  at  the  expense  of  other  areas.  53  However,  vigorous 
diplomacy  by  the  Spanish  delegation  at  Cannes  convinced  their  German 
colleagues  to  accept  that  the  original  ratio  of  funds  proposed  by  the  Commission 
for  the  East  and  South  should  be  retained.  54 
Up  to  a  point,  the  : ftmction  of  govenunental  preferences  in  the  EMP  does 
confonn  to  intergovemmentalist  theory.  Negotiators  from  the  Member  States 
clearly  had  to  reconcile  domestic  interests  with  the  need  to  reach  agreement  with 
the  partner  countries.  Preferences  varied  according  to  the  issue  on  the  table  and  to 
its  salience  to  governments,  with  predictably  hard  bargaining  over  agricultural 
quotas  and  finances.  Outcomes  on  the  most  politicised  issues  were  decided  at  a 
149 political  level,  involving  compromises  and  trade-offs.  But  intergovernmentalist 
theory  can  offer  only  a  snapshot  of  the  policy  process,  explaiming  specific  decision 
points  at  which  governmental  preferences  were  necessarily  crucial.  Agreements 
with  third  countries  have  to  be  concluded  by  the  Member  States  in  the  Council 
(Article  300),  while  decisions  about  allocating  funds  from  the  EU  budget  also 
primarily  rest  with  the  Member  States.  To  fully  capture  the  dynamic  nature  of  the 
policy  process,  institutional  politics  cannot  be  ignored. 
3.  EU  Institutions  and  the  Euro-Mediterranean  Partnership 
The  influence  of  the  EU's  institutions  in  policy-making  is  a  matter  for  vigorous 
theoretical  debate.  Broadly  speaking,  intergovernmentalists  see  only  marginal 
influence  for  the  institutions,  whose  primary  function  is  to  act  as  guarantors  for 
agreements  between  states.  55  Even  in  daily  decision-making,  the  activities  of  the 
Commission,  Parliament  and  the  European  Court  of  Justice  are  argued  to  'stem 
primarily  from  the  desire  to  lock-in  credible  national  commitments.  56 
Institutionalists  argue  that  institutions  are  political  actors  in  their  own  right, 
capable  of  exercising  supranational  autonomy  in  policy-making  and  pursuing 
their  own  preferences.  57  This  section  explores  the  notion  that  'institutions  matter', 
assessing  the  parts  played  by  the  Commission,  European  Parliament  and  two  of 
the  Council's  multiple  institutions  -  the  Presidency  and  Council  Secretariat  -  in  the 
EMP. 
The  Commission 
The  Commission  was  heavily  involved  in  all  aspects  of  the  EMP,  from  the 
ideational  stage  right  through  to  its  implementation.  In  new  institutionalist  terms, 
it  developed  an  'endogenous  institutional  impetus  for  policy  change  that 
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exceed[ed]  mere  institutional  mediation'.  As  the  institutional  memory  bank  of 
EU  Mediterranean  policy,  it  was  in  a  strong  position  to  push  for  policy  change. 
As  the  EU's  negotiator  on  the  Euro-Mediterranean  agreements,  its  creativity  in 
finding  mutually  acceptable  deals  was  essential.  Its  responsibility  for  coordinating 
the  three  chapters  of  the  Barcelona  Declaration  made  it  the  institutional  engine  of 
the  Barcelona  process. 
The  Commission's  agenda  setting  role  in  EU  policy-making  is  now  well- 
established  in  the  literature,  although  studies  tend  to  limit  themselves  to  EU 
internal  policies.  59  The  institution  has  proved  adept  at  maximising  both  its  own 
competencies  and  those  of  the  EU,,  habitually  pushing  for  'more  Europe.  60  Its 
formal  right  of  initiation  (Article  211),  and  the  freedom  it  has  to  stimulate  policy 
development  in  the  EU's  institutional  structure,  have  made  it  an  essential  source 
of  policy  ideas  and  policy  change. 
In  the  case  of  Mediterranean  policy,  DGlB  had  little  difficulty  getting  the 
backing  of  the  Member  States  for  the  partnership  strategy.  The  Mediterranean  was 
already  high  on  the  EU's  foreign  policy  agenda,  having  been  put  there  by  the 
French,  Italian  and  Spanish  governments,  and  by  the  Union's  own  policy  review 
process.  What  the  Commission  did  was  simply  react  to  the  already  'informed 
demand'  for  policy  change.  61  The  challenge  facing  the  Commission  was  to 
convince  the  Member  States  that  the  status  quo  in  Euro-Mediterranean  economic 
relations  was  unacceptable  and  that  existing  financial  resources  for  the  region  did 
not  match  the  scale  of  the  problems  to  be  addressed. 
In  previous  generations  of  Mediterranean  policy,  the  Commission  had 
enjoyed  only  limited  success  in  translating  its  proposals  into  action.  Even  where  it 
possessed  exclusive  competence  to  negotiate  for  the  Community  on  the 
Association  Agreements,  its  room  for  manoeuvre  on  concessions  had  usually  been 
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Member  States.  The  EMP  proposals  showed  that  some  of  the  lessons  of  the  past 
had  been  learned.  Its  1995  paper,  for  instance,  excluded  agricultural  trade  from 
the  proposals  for  a  free-trade  area.  62  Although  the  Commission  was  fully 
cognisant  of  the  economic  significance  of  agricultural  trade  liberalisation  to  the 
Mediterranean  partners,  protecting  EU  farmers'  markets  and  preserving  the 
integrity  of  the  CAP  system  were  judged  to  be  higher  priorities.  63  Furthermore, 
rather  than  placing  an  emphasis  on  the  need  for  new  trade  concessions  from  the 
Union,  the  partnership  paper  shifted  the  onus  of  responsibility  for  reform  to  the 
Mediterranean  third  countries  themselves.  In  doing  so,  the  Commission 
developed  a  strategy  that  could  be  sold  to  member  governments  of  all  ideological 
persuasions;  there  was  something  in  it  for  everyone.  Free-traders  could  point  to 
the  self-help  elements,  while  the  interventionists  could  point  to  the  call  for  a  more 
focused  and  comprehensive  programme  of  assistance. 
What  EU  scholars  have  labelled  'conceptual  innovation'  and  'purposeful 
opportunism'  were  also  evident  in  the  Commission's  proposals.  64  By  reasoning 
that  an  integrated,  'multidimensional'  strategy  -  encompassing  'linked  actions  in 
the  economic,  social  and  political  spheres'  -  was  required,  the  Commission 
changed  the  basis  of  EU  Mediterranean  policy  from  a  simple  framework  for 
managing  trade  and  channelling  aid  to  a  more  comprehensive  policy  framework 
which  offered  a  detailed  programme  identifying  the  areas  in  which  cooperative 
projects  should  be  established  with  the  partner  countries.  65  In  doing  so,  it  staked  a 
strong  claim  to  expand  its  own  competencies.  On  everything  from  support  for 
Private  sector  development  to  'democratisation'  projects,  DG  IB  would  be 
responsible  for  selecting  projects,  allocating  funds  and  overseeing  their 
iMplementation. 
152 How,  then,  did  the  Commission  fare  in  seeing  through  its  proposals?  Its 
most  important  task  was  to  persuade  the  Member  States  to  accept  its  proposal  for 
a  doubling  of  the  aid  budget  for  the  Mediterranean.  By  preparing  a  thorough  case 
for  the  increase  based  on  its  informational  resources,  it  gave  the  member 
governments  little  cause  to  question  the  logic  of  its  figures.  A  Commission 
official  described  the  process  thus: 
We  did  various  calculations  based  on  what  countries  had  absorbed  out  of  the 
financial  Protocols,  World  Bank  analyses  of  their  needs  for  the  future  and 
comparison  of  US  and  World  Bank  aid  ....  also  on  how  much  headroom  there 
was  on  chapter  4  of  the  [Edinburgh]  financial  perspective.  66 
Linking  its  plans  to  the  activities  of  the  multilateral  financial  institutions  reassured 
the  more  sceptical  Member  States  such  as  Germany  and  the  UK  that  the  Union 
would  not  simply  be  pouring  money  into  an  empty  hole.  67 
That  said,  Commissioner  Manuel  Manfn  had  first  to  convince  his 
counterparts  in  the  Commission  that  the  proposed  level  of  funding  was 
apPropriate.  He  initially  requested  6.3  billion  ECUs,  but  was  faced  down  by 
Commissioners  Hans  Van  den  Broek,  responsible  for  the  CEECs,  and  Erkki 
Liikanen,  responsible  for  the  EU  budget.  68  Even  so,  Man'n  eventually  'got  a  lot 
more  money  than  he  expected  and  the  Commission's  political  commitment  to  the 
partnership'  when  his  colleagues  unanimously  approved  a  figure  of  5.5  billion 
ECUs  to  be  put  to  the  CoUnCil.  69  This  figure  represented  70%  of  the  ainount 
awarded  to  the  CEECs,  and  would  represent  a  considerable  step  towards  the 
rebalancing  of  resources  sought  by  the  southern  Member  States  and  Marin. 
Yet  despite  the  Commission's  strong  case,  the  member  goverrunents  still 
reduced  the  MEDA  budget  by  1.6  billion  ECUs.  Criticised  as  derisory  by  several 
of  the  Mediterranean  partners,  the  Cannes  deal  called  into  question  the  seriousness 
of  the  Union's  commitment  to  economic  development  in  the  region  . 
70  Indeed,  a 
153 more  substantial  reduction  might  even  have  j  eopardised  the  entire  EMP  project.  71 
Here,  the  limits  on  the  power  of  the  Commission  to  secure  its  preferences  on 
redistributive  issues  was  exposed.  Even  with  the  backing  of  France,  Italy  and 
Spain,  the  final  outcome  was  beyond  its  control. 
Distributive  issues  proved  equally  vexatious  for  the  Commission,  with 
disputes  over  trade  concessions  regularly  being  taken  out  of  its  control  and  pushed 
up  to  the  political  level.  The  Euro-Mediterranean  agreements  saw  the 
Commission's  negotiating  flexibility  more  restricted  than  ever  by  its  mandates 
from  the  Council.  A  Commission  negotiator  summed  up  the  problem  thus: 
We  had  little  margin  for  negotiation  on  agriculture  because  of  the  traditional 
flows  line.  By  playing  with  the  schedules,  we  sometimes  can  take  more 
favourable  years  as  the  basis  to  calculate  traditional  flows.  But  the  ministers 
don't  see  the  concessions  in  a  broader  context.  They  ask  for  a  free  trade  area 
as  a  precursor  for  south-south  trade  and  then  fail  to  conclude  an  agreement 
because  no  one  can  agree  whether  we  should  accept  18000  or  30000 
tonnes. 
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Only  where  non-contentious  issues,  such  as  dismantling  tariffs  on  industrial 
products,  were  at  stake  was  the  Commission  able  to  conduct  the  negotiations  as 
'technical'  issues,  consulting  the  Council  only  on  an  infonnal  basis  when  it 
proposed  concessions  that  exceeded  traditional  trade 
floWS.  73  That  all  but  the 
negotiations  with  Tunisia  were  stalled  for  long  periods  attested  to  the 
restraining  effect  of  politicisation  on  the  Commission's  power  to  offer  the 
partners  significantly  improved  access  to  the  EU's  market. 
On  the  face  of  it,  the  constitutive  aspects  of  the  Barcelona  process  were 
more  positive  from  the  Commission's  point  of  view.  As  coordinator  of  the 
Barcelona  process,  DG  IB  was  guaranteed  a  major  initiating  role  across  the  three 
chapters  and  defacto  control  of  its  implementation.  Although  it  relied  to  a  great 
extent  on  the  'Barcelona  spirit'  to  keep  the  process  moving,  its  status  as  the  only 
EU  representative  on  the  two  main  steenng  committees  gave  it  a  comparative 
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interests. 
The  MEDA  Regulation  also  represented  a  qualified  success  for  the 
Commission,  since  the  region-wide,  multi-annual  basis  of  the  instrument 
increased  capacity  to  link  the  objectives  of  the  Mediterranean  strategy  with  the 
financial  aid  programme.  74  However,  the  Member  States  put  in  place  a  number  of 
safeguards  that  kept  the  Commission  on  a  fairly  tight  rein.  In  line  with  the  general 
trend  in  comitology  during  the  1990s,  Article  II  of  the  MEDA  regulation  made 
the  Commission's  proposals  for  projects  subject  to  a  3A  (regulatory  committee) 
which  requires  a  qualified  majority  vote  in  the  Council  for  approval,  rather  than  a 
2A  (management  committee)  in  the  draft  regulation,  which  requires  the  Council  to 
muster  a  qualified  majority  to  overturn  Commission  proposalS.  75  In  the 
Commission's  draft  regulation,  it  had  argued  for  the  latter  procedure  to  apply.  76 
This  institutional  configuration  ensured  that  the  national  governments  closely 
monitored  both  the  technical  side  of  the  proposed  projects  and  their  political 
context. 
To  summarise,  most  of  the  Commission's  key  demands  on  the  EMP  were 
met  by  the  Member  States  at  the  formative  stage  with  few  questions  raised  about 
the  objectives  and  content  of  the  strategy.  The  Commission  was  assisted  in  this 
respect  by  the  functional  basis  of  its  strategy  and  the  absence  of  obviously  high 
costs  to  the  Member  States,  which  helped  keep  politicisation  to  a  minimum. 
Nevertheless,  the  nature  of  the  EU  policy  process  gives  govenunents  'another  bite 
at  the  cherry'  when  it  comes  to  taking  decisions  on  distributive  and  redistributive 
issues.  The  Commission's  line  agricultural  trade  concessions,  on  which  it  closely 
adhered  to  the  Council's  negotiating  mandate,  and  its  'softly  softly'  approach  to 
proposing  measures  in  the  Barcelona  process,  were  indicative  of  its  wariness  about 
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between  the  Commission  and  the  States  that  limits  the  Union's  CaPacity  for  truly 
forward-thinking,  transfonnative  strategic  actions. 
The  European  Parliament 
It  is  difficult  to  point  to  any  clear  instance  of  the  European  Parliament  directly 
influencing  the  development  of  Mediterranean  policy  during  the  1990s.  This 
unstartling  finding  simply  reflects  the  continued  weakness  of  the  EP  in  policy 
initiation  and  its  limited  range  of  powers  in  foreign-policy  making.  Given  its  lack 
of  influence  in  foreign  policy,  the  Parliament  could  afford  to  back  the 
Commission's  call  for  more  far-  reaching  policy  reform,  its  resolutions 
emphasising  the  'extension  of  regional  cooperation'  and  the  need  for  genuinely 
'binding  decisions'  in  the  fields  of  security,  economic  cooperation,  human  rights, 
democracy  and  social  development.  77 
Still,  the  EP  was  able  to  make  a  mark  on  the  EMP.  Its  input  derived  both 
P--  -  from  the  powers  ascribed  to  it  in  EU  Treaties  and  its  informal  position  in  the  EU's 
institutional  framework.  First,  its  power  of  assent  on  agreements  concluded 
between  the  EU  and  third  countries  (Article  300)  endowed  it  with  a  dejure  veto. 
Second,  its  right  to  question  the  Commission  and  the  Council  enabled  it  to  raise 
awkward  questions  about  issues  that  it  felt  the  EMP  was  failing  to  address.  Third, 
as  the  democratic  arm  of  the  Union,  the  EP  naturally  gravitated  towards  the  socio- 
cultural  aspects  of  the  Barcelona  programme  where  it  took  the  lead  on  a  number  of 
uutiatives. 
When  entire  agreements  were  not  at  stake,  the  EP  exercised  its  power  of 
assent  much  more  freely,  employing  a  combination  of  delayed  votes  and  outright 
rejection  to  impose  its  preferences.  Several  times  during  the  1980s  the  Parliament 
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Mediterranean  third  countries.  In  1987,  it  delayed  its  vote  on  an  additional 
protocol  to  Turkey's  association  agreement  for  over  a  year  in  protests  at  the 
treatment  of  the  state's  treatment  of  its  Kurdish  population.  In  the  same  year  it 
temporarily  blocked  three  protocols  to  the  EU-Israel  association  agreement  over 
the  obstruction  of  Palestinian  exports  from  the  occupied  territories.  Similarly 
defiant  gestures  were  made  in  1992,  when  the  Parliament  refused  to  approve  the 
fourth  financial  protocols  with  Morocco  and  Syria  over  the  human  rights  situation 
in  the  two  countries.  By  the  time  the  Barcelona  process  began,  the  EP  had 
acquired  a  reputation  among  the  Mediterranean  partners  for  the  politicisation  of 
issues  that  they  preferred  to  keep  off  the  table  in  their  negotiations  with  the  EU. 
As  a  Turkish  official  lamented,  'if  there's  not  Greece,  there's  the  European 
Parliament.  ' 
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The  EP  has  never  withheld  its  assent  to  a  full  Association  or  Cooperation 
agreement  with  a  Mediterranean  third  country.  It  has  relied  instead  on  the  threat 
of  non-ratification  as  a  means  to  highlight  its  concerns  and  extract  concessions 
P--  -  from  govemments.  Even  that  tactic  has  been  judiciously  used.  The  Euro- 
Mediterranean  agreements  with  Morocco,  Tunisia,  and  the  interim  agreement  with 
the  Palestinian  Authority,  all  safely  passed  through  the  EP,  and  it  seems  highly 
unlikely  that  ratification  of  agreements  currently  being  negotiated  with  other  the 
Mediterranean  partners  will  be  any  more  problematic.  79Non-ratification  is  a 
rather  blunt  instrument  and  the  Parliament  has  judged  it,  in  the  EMP  context,  to  be 
counter-productive.  This  statement  on  the  agreement  with  Morocco  illustrates  the 
point: 
'Where  improvements  need  to  be  made,  experience  shows  that  this  better 
achieved  through  ffiendly  dialogue  than  verbal  assault.  '80 
157 Since  the  EU's  strategy  assumes  that  socio-cultural  transformation, 
democratisation  and  improvements  in  the  human  rights  situation  in  the  region  will 
follow  economic  development,  blocking  the  measures  intended  to  foster  the  latter 
was  justifiably  deemed  to  be  self-defeating. 
However,  there  was  one  notable  exception  that  demonstrates  where  the 
Parliament's  strengths  lie.  During  the  ratification  process  of  the  Customs  Union 
agreement  with  Turkey  in  1995,  the  EP  engaged  in  an  extraordinarily  high  profile 
campaign  to  force  action  from  the  Turkish  government  on  human  rights, 
particularly  over  its  treatment  of  the  country's  Kurdish  population.  In  the  nine 
months  between  the  EU-Turkish  Association  Council's  decision  to  go  ahead  with 
the  Customs  Union  and  the  EP's  vote,  20  per  cent  of  the  EP's  members  undertook 
missions  to  Turkey  to  secure  guarantees  from  the  Ciller  government  on  a  number 
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of  human  rights  issues.  Over  the  same  period,  parliamentarians  were  subjected 
to  intense  pressure  from,  among  others,  the  USA,  EU  member  governments,  EU 
and  Turkish  businesses  and  the  UN  to  give  their  assent.  Pauline  Green,  leader  of 
the  Socialist  group  in  the  Parliament,  complained  of  'excessive  and 
counterproductive  pressure.  '  82 
The  Parliament  finally  approved  the  agreement  in  December  1995  with  a 
majority  of  2:  1.83  Despite  failing  to  carry  through  its  threat  to  withhold  its  assent, 
it  could  legitimately  claim  to  have  achieved  its  ob  ectives.  The  Turkish  j 
government  was  forced  to  remove  a  series  of  'anti-terrorist'  clauses  from  the 
constitution  and  to  release  several  political  prisoners  associated  with  the  Kurdish 
cause.  The  whole  episode  served  to  establish  the  EP  as  the  human  rights 
watchdog  of  the  EMP,  a  role  certain  to  gain  in  significance  as  the  Barcelona 
process  developed. 
158 The  introduction  of  MEDA  represented  a  retrogressive  step  as  far  as  the 
Parliament's  input  into  the  aid  dimension  of  Mediterranean  policy  was  concerned. 
Whereas  the  bilateral  financial  protocols  were  subject  to  Article  300,  requiring  the 
EP  to  approve  the  budget  for  each  individual  partner  country,  the  MEDA 
regulation  entitled  the  Parliament  only  to  be  'kept  regularly  informed'  of  the 
programme's  implementation.  84  Out  of  22  amendments  to  the  Regulation  tabled 
by  the  EP,  the  Commission  accepted  only  6  outright,  and  5  with  modifications.  85 
Amendments  designed  to  increase  the  reporting  requirements  on  allocations  to 
individual  projects,  to  increase  the  regularity  with  which  the  Commission  had  to 
report  to  the  Parliament,  and  to  give  it  the  right  to  demand  a  suspension  of  aid  in 
the  event  of  human  rights  violations  all  failed  to  find  their  way  into  the 
Regulation.  Its  call  for  an  inter-institutional  agreement  on  the  MEDA  budget  also 
went  unheeded. 
Given  no  say  in  the  individual  projects  to  be  funded  by  MEDA,  the 
Parliament  threatened  to  block  future  budgetary  appropriations  unless  money  was 
explicitly  set  aside  for  'civil  society'  projects.  86  It  received  some  nominal 
compensation  when  the  Commission  and  Council  met  its  demand  for  a  separate 
budget  line  to  promote  the  activities  of  non-governmental  organisations  in  the 
region.  87  The  new  budget  line  -  MEDA  Democracy  -  was  initially  allocated  just 
10  million  ECUs,  transferred  out  of  the  MEDA  budget.  88 
The  Parliament's  powers  of  questioning  and  debate  took  on  more 
significance  than  usual  in  view  of  the  disappointing  outcome  on  the  constitutive 
elements  of  the  EMP.  According  to  procedural  convention,  the  Par  iament 
debates  commercial  agreements  with  the  Commission  and  Council  before 
negotiations  commence,  and  is  kept  informed  by  both  institutions  of  progress 
which  includes  the  possibility  of  receiving  confidential  briefings  about  the 
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negotiating  mandates.  In  practice,  the  application  of  this  convention  in  the  END 
meant  that  the  EP's  potential  reaction  had  to  be  taken  into  account  prior  to  the 
opening  of  negotiations  on  the  Euro-Mediterranean  agreements.  Conscious  of  the 
potential  difficulty  of  securing  the  EP's  ratification  of  the  Euro-Med  agreement 
with  Algeria,  the  Commission  delayed  the  formal  start  of  negotiations  with 
Algeria  until  the  election  of  Liamine  Zeroual  in  1995  gave  the  regime  some 
semblance  of  democratic  legitimacy, 
The  Parliament's  propensity  for  making  life  awkward  for  the  Commission 
ensured  that  DG  IB  exceeded  the  formal  requirement  to  keep  the  Parliament 
informed  during  the  negotiations.  In  an  appearance  before  MEPs  during  the 
ratification  of  the  Moroccan  accord,  for  instance,  Commissioner  Marm'  promised 
to  deliver  an  annual  assessment  of  Morocco's  action  on  human  rights  in  the 
context  of  the  agreement.  90  Similar  undertakings  were  given  for  the  agreements 
with  the  other  Mediterranean  partners.  Through  suasion  rather  than  outright 
sanction,  the  Parliament  thus  ensured  that  its  agenda  was  taken  into  account  in  the 
EMP.  91 
Another  of  the  Parliament's  functions  in  the  EMP  stemmed  from  its  own 
entrepreneurial  creativity.  When  the  Union  established  new  relationships  with  the 
CEECs  in  the  early  1990s,  the  Parliament  rapidly  moved  to  reinforce  its  links  with 
national  parliaments  in  each  country.  The  democratic  void  left  in  the  Barcelona 
Declaration  prompted  it  to  launch  its  own  initiatives  to  stimulate  similar 
parliamentary  participation  in  the  EMP  and  to  give  some  semblance  of 
representative  legitimacy  to  the  third  chapter,  which  was  conspicuously  failing  to 
engage  'civil  society'  in  the  process.  A  civil  servant  in  the  Parliament's  Division 
for  relations  with  parliamentary  assemblies  was  designated  to  establish  contacts 
with  parliaments  in  the  partner  states  and  organise  a  standing  forum.  92 
160 Three  years  after  Barcelona,  though,  the  results  of  the  niuitiative  were 
modest.  Several  political  groups  within  the  EP,  most  notably  the  European 
People's  Party,  questioned  the  need  for  yet  another  forum  when  Parliamentary 
delegations  already  paid  regular  visits  to  the  parliaments  of  the  partner  countries. 
The  same  groups  expressed  concern  about  funding  such  an  initiative  when  the 
Parliament  was  under  fire  over  its  administrative  expenditure.  93  The  idea  of  an 
inter-parliamentary  forum  also  ran  into  opposition  from  Germany  and  the  Benelux 
countries,  which  were  averse  to  the  creation  of  an  institution  for  which  additional 
funding  might  be  necessary.  94  Their  priority  lay  in  developing  similar  such 
relationships  in  the  CEECs.  The  partner  countries  expected  a  well  organised 
institution  with  its  own  secretariat  and  a  measure  of  political  influence  over  the 
EMP,  and  were  inevitably  disappointed  with  the  outcome.  95 
In  sum,  there  was  little  in  the  EMP  to  increase  the  EP's  influence  in  EU 
Mediterranean  policy.  But  as  long  as  the  Commission  considered  the  views  of 
the  Parliament  and  provided  it  with  a  steady  supply  of  detailed  infonnation  on 
which  to  base  its  resolutions,  it  stood  a  reasonable  chance  of  having  its  concerns 
heard  and  addressed.  Faced  with  a  process  dominated  by  27  governments,,  its 
most  effective  tactic  was  to  raise  the  kind  of  awkward  questions,  especially  on 
human  rights,  that  the  same  governments  deliberately  avoided. 
The  Council 
The  Council's  primary  function  in  the  EMP  was  as  the  venue  for 
intergovenu-nental  bargaining  between  the  Member  States.  Meetings  of  the  two 
Barcelona  coordinating  committees  took  place  in  the  Council,  while  COREPER 
and  the  various  Mediterranean-related  Council  working  groups  met  regularly  to 
discuss  issues  ranging  from  the  Euro-Med  agreements  to  the  Middle  East  Peace 
161 Process.  96  However,  in  their  own  right,  both  the  Presidency  and  the  Council 
Secretariat  made  significant  contributions  to  the  policy  process  and  to  the 
management  of  the  Barcelona  process. 
The  Presidency 
It  is  no  coincidence  that  1995  was  the  EU's  'year  of  the  Mediteffanean.  '  The 
successive  Council  Presidencies  of  France,  Spain  and  Italy  from  January  1995  to 
June  1996  were  guaranteed  to  keep  the  EMP  moving.  As  managers  of  the 
Council's  business,  it  is  standard  practice,  particularly  for  the  bigger  Member 
States,  to  'impose  a  particular  topic"  on  the  EU  during  their  terms  in  office.  97  The 
EMP  was  high  on  the  Council's  agenda  throughout  the  period  leading  up  to  the 
Barcelona  Conference. 
Perhaps  the  best  illustration  of  the  political  importance  of  the  Presidency 
arose  in  the  debate  over  the  Union's  representation  on  the  Barcelona  coordinating 
committees.  The  Troika  represented  the  Member  States  on  both  committees  and 
enjoyed  a  defacto  right  of  initiative  alongside  the  Commission.  Once  it  left  the 
Troika  at  the  start  of  1996,  France  saw  itself  being  marginalised  in  the  follow-up 
process  and  sought  to  change  the  formula  for  the  Union's  representation  on  the 
Committees  to  allow  all  the  Member  States  to  participate  in  meetings.  98 
However,  the  Irish  Presidency  ruled  out  any  revision  of  the  procedures,  fearing  the 
setting  of  a  precedent  that  might  further  complicate  the  Union's  representation  in 
international  negotiations. 
"  Instead,  an  infonnal  practice  was  introduced  that 
allowed  Member  States  not  represented  on  the  troika  to  address  meetings  through 
the  Presidency.  '  00 
The  composition  of  the  Troika  was  also  a  salient  factor  sustaining  the 
momentum  of  the  Barcelona  process.  French,  German  and  Spanish  officials  all 
162 expressed  concern  that  the  initial  collective  enthusiasm  for  the  process  might  be 
lost  as  the  Presidency  passed  to  Italy,  absorbed  by  another  round  of  national 
elections  during  the  first  half  of  1996,  then  to  a  succession  of  smaller,  non- 
Mediterranean  Member  States  with  inevitably  fewer  civil  servants  dedicated  to  the 
task.  101  Initially,  such  fears  proved  groundless.  Indeed,  a  Commission  official 
complained  that  the  Italians  had  organised  'too  many  meetings.  '  102  The 
Presidencies  of  Ireland,  Luxembourg  and  the  Netherlands  were  also  judged 
satisfactory.  All  three  were  keen  to  avoid  accusations  that  they  were  any  less 
capable  of  dealing  with  the  EMP  than  the  southern  Member  States.  103 
That  said,  as  the  German  Presidency  of  1999  approached,  the 
Mediterranean  lobby  felt  it  necessary  to  step  up  its  campaign  to  keep  the  Union 
focused  on  the  region.  French  officials,  for  instance,  met  with  British  and  German 
colleagues  during  1997  to  'press  for  the  Mediterranean'  and  worked  closely  with 
Italian  officials  to  keep  the  issue  of  Turkey's  status  at  the  forefront.  104  The 
decision  to  hold  'Barcelona  IIF  during  the  German  Presidency  was  welcomed,  but 
was  tempered  by  concern  that  the  Union's  next  major  review  of  its  budget  would 
take  place  in  the  same  period.  With  Eastern.  enlargement  approaching,  the 
southern  Member  States  sought  guarantees  that  the  budget  for  the  region  would 
not  be  reduced. 
The  apparent  seamlessness  of  the  transition  to  the  implementation  phase 
was  a  product  of  three  primary  factors.  First,  the  follow-up  phase  benefited  from 
the  groundwork  laid  by  the  French  and  Spanish  Presidencies  which,  along  with  the 
Commission  carefully  identified  the  priorities  for  implementation  and  drew  up  an 
indicative  schedule  of  events.  105  The  incoming  presidencies  -  Italy,  Ireland  in  the 
second  half  of  1996  and  Luxembourg  in  the  second  half  of  1997  -  merely  had  to 
take  the  baton.  Second,  the  Commission  came  into  its  own  as  both  coordinator 
163 and  initiator,  presenting  the  Member  States  with  ideas  for  measures  at  the  first 
meetings  of  the  Euro-Mediterranean  Committee  and  the  Senior  Officials 
Committee  in  March  1996.  Third,  the  routine,  technocratic  nature  of  much  of  the 
follow-up  programme  left  little  room  for  any  government  to  raise  political 
objections  to  measures  on  the  agenda. 
When  the  breakdown  of  the  Middle  East  Peace  Process  caused  the 
implementation  of  the  Barcelona  process  to  stall  in  mid-  1996,  the  Presidency 
found  itself  performing  the  role  of  political  mediator  between  the  partner 
countries.  This  role  obliged  the  Presidency  to  resolve  disputes  and  defuse 
diplomatic  stand-offs  among  the  participants.  During  its  hectic  six  month  tenure 
in  1997,  the  Dutch  Presidency  persuaded  Arafat  and  Levy  to  sit  down  for  bilateral 
talks  at  the  Malta  Conference  and  oversaw  talks  between  the  Greek  and  Turkish 
government  over  sovereignty  in  the  Aegean.  That  it  was  left  to  the  Presidency  to 
perform  this  crucial  function  was  indicative  of  the  limits  to  the  Commission's 
political  role  in  the  Barcelona  process.  Low  politics  and  functional  cooperation 
were  left  to  DGIB.  High  politics  remained  the  preserve  of  the  governments. 
The  Council  Secretariat 
The  Secretariat's  primary  task  is  to  provide  'administrative  backup'  to  the 
working  groups,  Coreper  and  the  Council  itself  106  However,  it  is  actually  more 
than  just  a  facilitator  of  the  Council's  business,  and  frequently  acts  as  a  broker  of 
compromise  and  agreement  among  the  Member  States.  In  the  EMP,  it  played  a 
key  role  in  drafting  the  Barcelona  Declaration  and  in  preparing  texts  on  the 
Union's  position  in  follow-up  meetings.  The  importance  of  the  Working  Groups 
and  the  Ministerial  Committees  in  the  implementation  of  Barcelona  Declaration 
164 made  the  Secretariat,  as  the  coordinator  of  their  activities,  an  indispensable  part  of 
the  process. 
The  Secretariat's  main  assets  in  the  EMP  were  its  expertise,  its  neutrality 
and  the  regularity  of  its  contacts  with  the  permanent  representations  and  national 
officials.  107  The  handful  of  staff  assigned  to  the  Mediterranean  acted,  like  their 
counterparts  in  the  Commission,  as  an  institutional  memory  bank  for  the  policy 
area.  Having  responsibility  for  keeping  records  of  the  Euro-Med  Committee  and 
Senior  Officials  Committee  meetings  -  Secretariat  officials  sat  on  both  -  made 
these  officials  an  essential  source  of  information  for  member  governments  and 
particularly  for  the  Council  Presidencies  when  they  took  over.  Their  awareness  of 
the  political  sensitivities  of  both  the  Member  States  and  many  of  the  partner 
countries  also  made  equipped  them  to  judge  what  the  participants  in  the  Barcelona 
process  would  be  prepared  to  accept.  Its  neutrality  made  the  Secretariat  an 
important  middleman  between  the  participants  and  the  Presidency.  As  a 
Secretariat  official  explained: 
We  are  approached  by  states  who  don't  want  to  go  to  the  Presidency 
directly.  They  want  to  filter  through  the  Secretariat  who  subtly  assesses 
their  difficulties  and  tries  to  provide  a  solution.  108 
This  practice  allowed  govenunents  to  test  the  water  before  putting  an  initiative  to 
the  Council  or  to  the  follow-up  committees,  an  advantage  in  the  exploratory 
atmosphere  of  the  EMP. 
The  degree  of  influence  possessed  by  the  Secretariat  waxed  and  waned 
with  changes  in  the  Council  Presidency.  When  smaller  states  -  such  as  Ireland 
and  Luxembourg  -  were  in  the  chair,  it  tended  to  be  more  influential,  a 
consequence  of  the  considerable  organisational  and  political  resources  demanded 
by  the  EMP.  Preparing  texts  on  issues  such  as  the  Middle  East  Peace  Process  and 
165 Mediterranean  security  cooperation  required  a  level  of  expertise  and  experience 
not  always  available  to  Member  States  with  small  foreign  mi*m  modest  istries  and 
diplomatic  resources.  During  these  periods,  the  Secretariat  became  an  ally  of  the 
Presidency,  helping  smaller  states  'prove  that  they  can  run  [EU  business] 
efficiently  and  well  even  in  areas  without  strong  interest.  "09  Conversely,  the 
drafting  of  texts  and  the  planning  of  Council  activity  tended  to  be  concentrated 
more  in  national  capitals  when  the  larger  Member  States  held  the  Presidency. 
The  role  of  the  Council  in  the  EMP  should  be  seen  as  both  complementary 
and  supplementary  to  that  of  the  Commission.  Individual  Member  States  used  the 
Presidency  to  keep  Mediterranean  policy  at  the  top  of  the  EU's  foreign  policy 
agenda  during  1995.  Emphasis  then  shifted  to  the  Presidency  as  co-coordinator 
alongside  the  Commission,  with  the  former  arranging  schedules  of  follow-up 
meetings  and  the  latter  undertaking  the  technical  leg  work.  When  political 
problems  arose,  Presidential  mediation  came  into  its  own.  The  Council 
Secretariat  essentially  provided  continuity  between  Presidencies  and  assistance  to 
the  smaller  Member  States.  Neither  body  in  any  sense  gained  new  competencies 
ýe_  - 
trom  the  EMP,  but  both  were  an  integral  part  of  its  institutional  architecture. 
Conclusions 
Only  when  the  EMP  is  set  alongside  a  core  policy  such  as  eastern  enlargement 
does  its  comparatively  low  political  salience  become  apparent.  The  Union's 
Mediterranean  strategy  was  chiefly  concerned  with  improving  the  management  of  4-1.1 
existing  relationships  with  the  partner  countries  over  the  longer  term  rather  than 
embarking  on  the  kind  of  grand  renegotiation  and  reformation  demanded  by 
accession.  As  a  result,  the  politics  of  agreeing  the  strategy  were  never  likely  to 
provoke  the  in-fighting  among  the  EU's  institutions  and  Member  States  that 
166 frequently  accompanies  the  Union's  'histOrY-making'  decisions.  Problem  solving, 
as  opposed  to  bargaining,  characterised  the  passage  of  the  EMP  from  proposed 
strategy  to  concrete  policy. 
Conceptualising  the  EMP  along  the  lines  of  Lowi's  taxonomy  suggests  that 
this  low  level  of  politicisation  was  also  a  feature  of  decision-making  on  the 
individual  policy  components  of  the  EMP.  Only  the  distributive  decisions  to 
which  clearly  identifiable  costs  were  attached  -  the  MEDA  budget  and  import 
quota  concessions  -  became  significantly  politicised.  Even  then,  politicisation  was 
infrequent,  partly  as  a  consequence  of  the  restrictions  imposed  on  the  Union  by  its 
limited  financial  resources,  and  partly  as  a  consequence  of  the  'path  dependency' 
of  Mediterranean  policy  instruments  which  left  little  scope  for  flexibility  on  the 
Union's  part. 
Intergovernmental  politics  clearly  mattered  at  key  stages  in  the  negotiation 
of  the  EMP.  A  central  claim  of  intergovemmentalist  theories  -  that  domestic 
interests  determine  governmental  preferences  and  the  behaviour  of  goverranents  in 
international  negotiations  -  was  certainly  borne  out  by  the  hard  bargaining  over 
trade  concessions.  Furthermore,  differing  preferences  among  the  Member  States 
on  issues  such  as  trade-aid  and  the  uneasy  peace  on  the  east  versus  south  debate 
were  never  far  from  the  surface,  evidenced  by  the  deal  struck  in  Cannes. 
But  the  EMP  cannot  be  explained  by  intergovernmentalist  theory  alone. 
First,  the  undoubted  importance  of  geo-politics  and  security  as  underlying 
rationales  for  the  Union's  Mediterranean  strategy  are  not  easily  accounted  for  by 
theories  that  are  predicated  on  the  rational  calculation  of  economic  self-interest  by 
governments.  Converging  perceptions  among  the  Member  States  that 
Mediterranean  security  presented  a  challenge  to  the  whole  of  Western  Europe 
demonstrated  a  collective  impetus  for  increased  policy  responsibilities  to  be 
167 delegated  to  the  EU  and  for  the  EU  to  be  utilised  as  the  linchpin  of  a  multilateral 
framework  for  Euro-Mediterranean  relations. 
The  institutional  politics  of  the  EMP  provide  a  good  indication  of  how  far 
Mediteffanean  policy  has  been  'Europeanised'.  Policy  change  was  led  by  the 
Commission  which  both  defined  the  Union's  strategic  objectives  and  prescribed 
solutions.  Its  persuasive  case  for  the  partnership  strategy  went  largely  unopposed, 
and  many  of  its  preferences,  at  least  on  the  appropriate  framework  for  policy,  were 
willingly  accepted  by  the  Member  States.  When  governmental  preferences 
reasserted  themselves  over  substantive  distributive,  redistributive  and  constituent 
political  issues,  the  limits  of  the  Commission's  autonomy  became  clear.  The 
Parliament  remains  a  bit  player  in  EU  foreign  policy,  denied  any  meaningful  role 
in  the  design  of  strategic  actions,  and  caught  between  its  power  to  obstruct  the 
conclusion  of  agreements  and  the  danger  of  damaging  the  Union's  relations  with 
third  countries.  The  Council  remains  at  the  sharp  end  of  the  policy  process,  with 
its  multiple  institutions  empowered  to  determine  the  Union's  foreign  policy 
priorities  and  to  dictate  policy  outcomes. 
It  is  testament  to  the  EU's  maturing  as  an  international  political  actor  that  a 
comprehensive  foreign  policy  strategy  like  the  EMP  is  formulated  at  the 
supranational  level,  producing  action  based  on  'the  institutional  assets  and 
international.  agency  of  the  EC.  '110  Mediterranean  policy  is  no  longer  merely  a 
disparate  collection  of  external  relationships.  The  Union  has  defined  a  coherent 
set  of  objectives  in  response  to  identifiable  European  interests,  some  clearly 
collective,  others  reflecting  the  specific  preferences  of  the  Mediterranean  Member 
States.  However,  implementation  of  strategic  action,  and  therefore  its 
effectiveness,  still  tends  to  be  subjected  to  the  perennial  tension  between  the 
Commission's  broader,  long-term  objectives  and  the  short  term  political  interests 
168 of  the  Member  States.  That  the  collective  interest  is  habitually  overridden  by 
strong  national  interests  shows  how  far  the  EU  has  to  go  as  a  foreign  policy  actor. 
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176 Chapter  6 
INFLUENCE  WITHOUT  POWER:  THE  EU  AND  THE  MIDDLE  EAST 
PEACE  PROCESS 
'The  Europeans  will  be  unable  to  achieve  anything  in  the  Middle  East  in  a  million 
years'.  Hemy  Kissinger  (1974)1 
'The  US  has  power  but  Europe  has  influence'.  Miguel  Moratinos  (1997)2 
The  EU's  role  in  the  Arab-Israeli  conflict  has  long  been  a  benchmark  of  its  status 
as  an  international  political  actor.  Yet  in  an  area  of  vital  strategic  interest  to  the 
Union,  it  has  often  struggled  to  make  its  impact  felt.  A  combination  of  a  lack  of 
cohesion  among  the  Member  States  on  the  issue  and  the  more  general  weakness  of 
EU  foreign  policy  have  left  it  playing  second  and  third  fiddle  to  the  US  and  other 
mediators.  Over  time,  though,  the  kind  of  scepticism  exemplified  by  Kissinger's 
dismissal  of  European  ambitions  has  gradually  given  way  to  grudging  acceptance 
that  the  Union  has  an  important  contribution  to  make  to  Arab-Israeli  bridge- 
building.  The  EU  has  carved  out  distinct  roles  for  itself  as  the  major  financial 
underwriter  of  the  Peace  Process  and  as  an  'honest  broker'  in  diplomatic  efforts  to 
bring  the  protagonists  together.  This  chapter  attempts  to  explain  how  and  why  the 
Union's  input  into  the  Peace  Process  has  changed,  and  assesses  the  utility  of  the 
Euro-Mediterranean  partnership  in  strengthening  its  position  in  the  region. 
Section  I  begins  with  an  historical  overview  of  EU  policy  on  the  Arab- 
Israeli  conflict,  charting  the  Union's  attempts  to  establish  a  credible  position, 
independent  from  that  of  the  USA.  The  second  section  briefly  examines 
177 European  reactions  to  the  remarkable  series  of  events  precipitated  by  the  1990 
Gulf  War  and  the  subsequent  US-sponsored  Madrid  conference  between  Israel  and 
the  Palestinians.  At  that  juncture,  the  EU  missed,  or  was  denied,  an  opportunity  to 
assume  a  central  role  in  the  Peace  Process.  Section  3  focuses  on  the  period  after 
the  introduction  of  the  CFSP  and  the  realisation  on  the  part  of  the  EU  that  its 
strength  lay  in  low-profile  diplomacy  rather  than  high-profile  political  initiatives. 
Section  4  shows  how  the  fortunes  of  the  Barcelona  process  ebbed  and  flowed  with 
developments  in  the  Middle  East,  and  goes  on  to  examine  how  the  Euro- 
Mediterranean  agreements  gave  the  Union  new  political  leverage  in  the  Peace 
Process. 
1.  Bifurcation  and  Fragmentation:  EPC  and  the  Arab-Israeli  Conflict 
The  Six-Day  war  (1967)  was  an  inauspicious  start  in  the  context  of  the  foreign 
policy  ambitions  of  the  European  Community.  The  six  EC  member  governments 
found  themselves  torn  between  their  loyalties  to  either  the  Arab  or  Israeli  side,  and 
were  pressured  to  come  up  with  a  collective  political  response.  3  Such  was  the 
polarisation  of  attitudes,  however,  that  the  crisis  was  barely  discussed  at  the  Rome 
Summit  on  the  eve  of  the  war.  The  aftermath  of  the  conflict  saw  the  individual 
European  governments  go  their  separate  ways.  France,  under  De  Gaulle, 
maintained  its  traditionally  pro-Arab  stance.  Germany  assumed  a  neutral  position 
but  in  fact  backed  the  Israelis.  Italian  opinion  was  somewhat  divided,  although  a 
majority  of  its  political  elite  backed  Israel.  The  Netherlands  took  the  strongest 
pro-Israeli  position,  condemning  the  belligerence  of  the  Arab  states  and  the 
support  of  the  USSR  for  the  Arab  countries.  Belgium  and  Luxembourg  sought  a 
solution  through  the  UN  and  NATO.  Admittedly,  all  the  Member  States  endorsed 
UN  Resolution  242,  though  this  later  proved  to  be  a  poisoned  chalice  since  it 
178 associated  the  Community  with  the  lack  of  recognition  of  Palestinlian  aspirations 
for  statehood.  4  Not  until  the  1969  Hague  Summit  and  the  launch  of  European 
Political  Cooperation  (EPC)  did  the  Community  begin  to  develop  the  institutional 
machinery  for  collective  diplomacy.  The  Arab-Israeli  conflict  was  to  become  one 
of  the  first  preoccupations  of  the  Community's  new  foreign  policy  mechanism. 
On  the  face  of  it,  the  introduction  of  the  EPC  mechanism  exerted  a  positive 
influence  on  the  Community's  ability  to  project  a  common  front  on  the  Middle 
East.  The  early  1970s  witnessed  the  gradual  convergence  of  the  Member  States' 
foreign  policies  towards  a  common  position.  Under  strong  pressure  from 
Pompidou's  government,  the  other  five  Member  States  were  persuaded  to  align 
themselves  with  the  French  line  on  the  conflict,  which,  itself  was  sympathetic  to 
the  Arab  cause.  A  joint  paper  -  the  Schumann  document  -  was  approved  by 
Community  foreign  ministers  in  May  197  1.  The  paper  adhered  to  Resolution  242 
and  therefore  did  little  to  distinguish  the  Community's  policy  on  the  situation  in 
the  Middle  East.  But  as  Greilsammer  and  Weiler  argue,  'their  purpose  at  that 
stage  was  not  to  formulate  an  active  or  reactive  foreign  policy  goal  but  rather  to 
flex  their  [the  EC's]  new  muscles  in  the  EPC  framework.  95  That  said,  the 
Schumann  document  had  one  notable  external  consequence.  It  sent  a  signal  to  the 
Israeli  government  that  previously  staunch  European  allies,  most  notably  the 
Dutch,  were  prepared,  albeit  reluctantly,  to  harden  their  line  in  order  to  promote 
Community  policy.  As  a  consequence,  Israel  would  henceforth  adopt  an 
increasingly  hostile  stance  towards  independent  European  initiatives. 
These  early  experiments  with  EPC  set  a  pattern  that  prevailed  throughout 
the  following  two  decades  of  European  initiatives  on  the  Middle  East:  periods  of 
lowest  common  denominator  concertation  were  followed  by  fragmentation  as 
national  foreign  policies  diverged  from  the  agreed  line.  The  Community's 
179 reaction  to  the  1973  Yom  Kippur  war  was  a  case  in  point.  Internal  wrangling  in 
the  immediate  aftermath  of  the  war  ruled  Out  any  immediate  response.  It  took 
OPEC's  fourfold  hike  in  oil  prices,  a  direct  threat  to  a  vital  European  interest 
(supplies  of  cheap  oil),  to  spur  the  Member  States  into  action.  In  particular,  the 
UK,  which  had  previously  adopted  a  strongly  pro-Israeli  posture,  saw  the 
commercial  imperative  of  a  more  pro-Arab  line  and  fell  into  line  with  the  loose 
consensus  in  EPC.  The  result  -  the  joint  declaration  of  6  November  1973  -  was 
significant  in  two  respects.  First,  it  referred  to  the  'legitimate  rights  of  the 
Palestinians',  a  phrase  absent  in  Resolution  242  and  a  formulation  favoured  by  the 
Arab  states.  Second,  it  called  for  external  guarantees  of  any  settlement  of  the 
conflict,  a  measure  strongly  opposed  by  the  Israelis.  The  Declaration  was  well 
received  by  the  Arab  side,  which  in  turn  allowed  the  Community  to  establish  the 
Euro-Arab  political  dialogue,  designed  to  placate  Arab  oil  producers  and  remove 
future  threats  to  oil  supplies. 
The  Community's  involvement  in  the  Peace  Process  had  little  obvious 
effect  on  its  growing  network  of  relationships  with  the  Mediterranean  non- 
member  countries.  Despite  the  souring  of  the  Community's  political  relations 
with  Israel,  a  free-trade,  financial  and  technical  cooperation  agreement  was  signed 
in  1975.  Similarly,  the  Community  concluded  agreements  with  most  Arab- 
Mediterranean  countries  without  any  apparent  linkage  between  the  negotiation  of 
the  agreements  and  its  position  on  the  Arab-Israeli  conflict.  This  decoupling  was 
perhaps  a  logical  outcome  of  the  institutional  and  procedural  distinction  between 
the  EC  method  and  EPC.  The  use  of  foreign  economic  policy  instruments  to 
influence  the  Arabs  and  Israelis  was  to  come  later. 
After  tentatively  setting  its  stall  on  the  question  of  Palestinian  rights,  the 
Community  gradually  made  resolving  the  status  of  the  Palestintian  people  the 
180 central  plank  of  its  approach.  Three  factors  motivated  this  shift.  First,  an 
increasingly  anti-American  French  government  was  determined  to  set  the 
Community  apart  from  the  USA.  Second,  given  the  Community's  heavy 
dependence  on  Arab  oil,  an  Arab-friendly  policy  was  an  astute  political  move. 
Tbird,  a  pro-Arab  position  was  also  seen  as  a  way  to  sharpen  the  profile  of  EPC. 
Significantly,  the  Community  allowed  the  PLO,  regarded  by  the  Israelis  and  the 
USA  as  a  pariah  organisation,  to  participate  in  the  Euro-Arab  dialogue  as  part  of  a 
joint  Arab  delegation.  6  By  the  time  of  the  1977  London  European  Council 
meeting,  the  positions  of  the  Member  States  had  sufficiently  converged  to  permit  a 
more  substantive  definition  of  Palestinian  rights.  The  London  Declaration  stated 
that: 
the  Nine  have  affirmed  their  belief  that  a  solution  to  the  conflict  in  the 
Middle  East  will  be  possible  only  if  the  legitimate  right  of  the  Palestinian 
people  to  give  effective  expression  to  its  national  identity  is  translated  into 
fact,  which  would  take  into  account  the  need  for  a  homeland  for  the 
Palestinian  people.  7 
Had  the  Camp  David  peace  negotiations  not  started  soon  after  the  London 
Declaration,  the  Community's  initiative  might  have  had  a  bigger  impact.  In  the 
event,  the  USA,  Egypt  and  Israel  pursued  their  own  triangular  diplomacy,  at  odds 
with  European  demands  for  a  comprehensive  settlement  involving  all  the  relevant 
parties.  The  Community  welcomed  Sadat's  overtures  to  Israel,  but  reiterated  its 
demand  that  a  settlement  should  be  all-inclusive.  This  insistence,  coupled  with 
what  was  perceived  as  an  increasingly  pro-Arab  European  line,  relegated  the 
Community  to  the  status  of  a  bit  player  in  the  Peace  Process. 
French  diplomacy  played  a  key  role  in  defining  the  Community's  position. 
President  Giscard  d'Estaing  enjoyed  similar  success  to  his  predecessor  Pompidou 
in  translating  the  French  preference  for  independent  'European'  initiatives  into 
8 
action  in  EPC.  Tliat  successive  French  governments  were  able  to  take  a  lead  on 
181 the  Middle  East  was  both  a  reflection  of  a  traditional  desire  for  greater 
Community  independence  from  the  USA,  and  their  propensity  to  view  France  as  a 
global  diplomatic  power.  What  brought  the  pro-Israeli  Member  States,  primarily 
Germany  and  the  Netherlands,  on  board  was  less  clear.  Dominique  MoYsi,  for 
instance,  argues  that  a  combination  of  a  lack  of  attention  on  the  part  of  the  Carter 
administration  to  the  Palestinian  problem,  and  the  ability  of  EPC  to  paper  over 
cracks  among  the  Member  States  was  crucial  in  encouraging  the  Community  to 
launch  its  own  initiative.  9  In  addition,  pro-Israeli  Member  governments  were 
forced  to  reconsider  their  foreign  policy  orientations  in  order  to  protect  their 
commercial  interests  in  the  Arab  countries.  In  short,  both  internal  and  external 
circumstances  created  the  right  environment  for  the  Community  to  plough  its  own 
furrow. 
The  1980  Venice  European  Council  was  hailed  as  the  crowning  glory  of 
EPC's  engagement  in  the  Middle  East  Peace  Process.  Any  lingering  ambiguity 
. 
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from  the  1977  Declaration  was  removed  as  the  Community  unequivocally  aligned 
itself  with  the  Palestinian  cause.  The  Venice  Declaration  stated  the  Community's 
belief  that  the  Palestinian  problem  was  'not  simply  one  of  refugees'  and  that  the 
Palestinian  people  should  be  pennitted  to  'exercise  fully  their  right  to  self- 
detennination.  "O  Although  it  stopped  short  of  officially  recognising  the  PLO,  at 
France's  insistence  the  text  also  called  for  Arafat's  organisation  to  be  'associated 
with  the  negotiations'.  '  1  As  far  as  implementing  this  new  'policy'  was  concerned, 
the  Declaration  provided  for  consultation  with  'all  the  parties  concerned'.  12 
Predictably,  the  Venice  Declaration  enraged  Menachem  Begin's  hardline 
Likud  government,  which  described  it  as  'totalitarian  blackmail'  and  likened  it  to 
a  'Munich  surrender'.  13  The  attitude  of  the  Carter  administration  was  more 
moderate,  a  testament  both  to  the  conciliatory  diplomacy  of  the  I  ian  oreign 
182 Minister  and  Council  President  Emilio  Colombo,  who  travelled  to  Washington 
prior  to  the  Venice  Meeting.  14  The  extent  to  which  the  Community  was  prepared 
to  distance  itself  from  the  US  was  tempered  by  reluctance  to  offend  its  main 
supplier  of  security.  Promises  were  therefore  made  in  advance  of  the  Venice 
summit  that  the  Camp  David  negotiations  would  not  be  prejudiced  by  the 
Declaration. 
At  the  time,  EPC  appeared  to  have  secured  the  assent  of  the  Member 
States  to  a  common  decision  of  international  magnitude.  For  example,  the  British 
Prime  Minister  Thatcher  claimed  that  the  Declaration  'showed  that  they  [the 
15  Member  States]  had  a  part  to  play  on  the  international  scene'.  What  exactly  this 
part  was  to  be  was  more  problematic.  Clearly,  the  Community  had  neither  the 
credibility  with  the  protagonists  (the  PLO  rejected  the  Venice  Declaration  as 
insufficient),  nor  the  diplomatic  power  to  become  an  alternative  mediator.  If  it  set 
out  to  amend  Resolution  242,  it  risked  further  alienating  Israel  and  a  possible  veto 
from  the  USA  in  the  UN  Security  Council.  The  Community's  self-styled  'role',  if 
any,  seemed  simply  to  be  to  bring  together  the  most  important  parties  in  the 
conflict  -  the  Israelis  and  Palestinians  -  for  direct  talks. 
For  a  while,  the  implementation  of  the  Venice  initiative  proceeded 
according  to  plan,  helped  by  the  absence  of  new  US  initiatives  during  the  1980 
election  campaign.  Commission  President  Gaston  Thom  was  despatched  to  the 
Middle  East  to  establish  contacts  with  both  sides  and  gauge  reactions  to  the 
Declaration.  While  Thom  failed  to  win  over  the  Israelis,  the  European 
mtervention  received  support  from  many  of  the  Arab  states.  In  the  UN,  the  voti  g 
behaviour  of  the  Member  States  showed  a  strong  adherence  to  the  principles  of  the 
Declaration  and  to  the  agreed  Community  line.  Addressing  the  General 
Assembly,  Thom  drew  on  the  support  of  the  Arab  governments  in  claiming  that 
183 6only  a  comprehensive  settlement  [one  directly  involving  the  Palestinians]  can 
bring  about  a  just  and  lasting  peace  in  the  Middle  East. 
However,  as  external  events  evolved  and  internal  dissent  resurfaced,  the 
EC's  solidarity  began  to  crumble.  No  agreement  could  be  reached  in  EPC  on  a 
series  of  position  papers  prepared  by  national  foreign  ministries  on  different 
aspects  of  the  Peace  Process,  and  they  were  referred  to  only  obliquely  at  the  1980 
Luxembourg  European  Council.  Four  target  areas  were  eventually  identified  -  the 
withdrawal  of  occupying  forces,  self-determination,  general  security  in  the  Middle 
East  and  the  status  of  Jerusalem.  The  Dutch  Council  Presidency  (January-June 
198  1),  charged  with  the  task  of  exploring  the  Community's  new  ideas  with  the 
Arabs  and  Israelis,  maintained  a  low  profile  on  the  Middle  East.  16  The  Dutch 
government,  still  sensitive  to  Israeli  concerns,  carried  out  consultations  with 
governments  in  the  Middle  East,  but  made  little  attempt  to  promote  the 
Community's  approach. 
The  inter-governmental  nature  of  EPC  decision-making,  which  carried  no 
legal  obligations,  made  deviation  from  the  Community  line  a  relatively 
straightforward  political  option.  Following  Reagan's  1980  election  victory,  the 
British  government  called  into  question  any  immediate  European  follow-up  action 
on  the  Peace  Process.  It  did  so  partly  to  appease  the  new  Republican 
administration,  but  also  out  of  concern  that  the  Community  was  ill-prepared  for 
the  political  repercussions  of  its  initiative.  17  The  coming  to  power  of  the  strongly 
pro-Palestinian  Papandreou  government  marked  the  start  of  a  hardline  Greek 
foreign  policy  that  rejected  any  Community  association  with  Camp  David  and  led 
to  confrontations  with  its  EC  counterparts-'  8  Externally,  Begin's  re-election  in 
Israel  and  the  growing  opposition  of  the  Reagan  administration  to  European 
interference  in  the  Peace  Process  deterred  fixther  EPC  action. 
184 The  1982  Israeli  invasion  of  Lebanon  was  a  golden  OPPortunity  for  the 
Community  to  re-assert  itself  in  the  Middle  East.  The  Community  had  come 
under  increased  criticism  for  its  lack  of  collective  condemnation  of  the  expansion 
of  Israeli  settlements  and  repression  of  Palestinians  in  the  occupied  territories. 
When  an  EPC  statement  was  finally  made,  it  was  again  dismissed  by  the  Begin 
government.  However,  Israel's  incursion  into  Lebanon  drew  an  angry  and  rapid 
response  from  Europe.  A  veiled  threat  was  made  in  the  EPC  statement  (9  June 
1982)  warning  of  'future  action'  if  Israeli  troops  were  not  withdrawn. 
This  period  was  notable  for  the  use  of  Community  policy  instruments  (aid, 
financial  protocols,  trade  rules)  to  make  a  political  point  (condemnation  of  Israel's 
action  in  Lebanon).  The  first  concrete  action  was  an  embargo  on  arms  sales  to 
Israel.  19  The  embargo  was  followed  by  the  European  Parliament's  decision  to 
withhold  for  several  months  its  approval  of  the  second  EEC-Israel  financial 
protocol  in  protest  at  Begin's  actions.  At  the  same  time,  the  Community  provided 
funds  for  the  international  humanitarian  aid  effort  in  Lebanon,  and  began  a  short 
time  later  to  channel  aid  to  the  Palestinian  territories. 
What  conclusions  can  be  drawn  about  the  early  phase  of  the  EC's 
involvement  in  the  Middle  East  Peace  Process?  First,  the  Community  never 
received  much  more  than  lukewarm  responses  to  its  initiatives  from  the  key 
players  in  the  conflict.  From  the  inception  of  EPC,  it  failed  to  assert  a  sufficiently 
distant  position  from  the  US  to  win  the  full  confidence  of  the  Arab  side,  and 
crucially  of  the  PLO.  Relations  with  Israel  only  deteriorated  after  EPC  was 
created.  Even  if  Begin's  evocation  of  World  War  Two  was  harsh,  both  the  Israelis 
and  the  Arabs  had  suffered  the  pernicious  effects  of  colonial  European  politics, 
most  damagingly  in  the  artificial  and  discriminatory  division  of  territories. 
perceptions  of  European  diplomacy  were  inevitably  coloured  by  the  past.  20 
185 Second,  although  EPC  undoubtedly  helped  foster  foreign  policy  concertation,  the 
mechanism  was  better  suited  to  'the  coordination  of  national  actions  rather  than 
the  expression  of  a  common  position'.  21  There  was  a  considerable  gap  between  the 
strong  tone  of  EPC  Declarations  and  their  half-hearted  implementation. 
2.  A  Second  Chance?  The  Gulf  War  and  the  Resurrection  of  the  Peace 
Process 
The  1990  Gulf  War  altered  the  political  landscape  in  the  Middle  East  and  brought 
a  renewed  sense  of  urgency  to  the  search  for  a  solution  to  the  Arab-Israeli  conflict. 
European  calls  for  a  comprehensive  solution  to  the  conflict  assumed  new 
resonance  in  view  of  the  involvement  of  so  many  of  the  region's  states  in  the  Gulf 
22 
crisis.  Yet  the  Union  emerged  from  the  Gulf  War  with  a  tarnished  reputation 
among  the  Arab  countries.  The  obvious  divisions  among  the  Member  States  over 
their  contributions  to  the  military  operation  had  again  exposed  the  Union's 
weaknesses  as  an  international  power  and  reinforced  the  sense  of  its  dependence 
on  the  USA  in  international  crises.  For  the  Arab  states,  the  Union's  involvement 
in  what  was  perceived  as  an  American  war  confirmed  its  unreliability  as  a 
counterweight  to  the  US.  23  In  particular,  France's  role  in  the  coalition  was  viewed 
as  tantamount  to  treason  by  its  sizeable  population  of  Arab  immigrants,  provoking 
mass  demonstrations  in  Paris. 
24 
However,  the  EU  still  had  grounds  to  expect  that  its  growing  economic  and 
political  weight,  further  enhanced  by  moves  towards  the  completion  of  the  Single 
Market,  would  enable  it  to  stake  a  credible  claim  for  a  more  significant  role  in  the 
Peace  Process.  As  Leon  Hadar  suggests,  'the  Gulf  crisis  showed  President  Bush 
that  the  US  needed  European  support  and,  perhaps  more  importantly,  European 
money'.  25  Moreover,  with  the  Cold  War  over,  balancing  independent  EU  foreign 
186 policy  action  against  harmonious  relations  with  the  USA  became  less  imperative. 
Inside  the  Community,  renewed  interest  in  political  integration,  inspired  by  the 
Delors  Commission  and  the  Franco-German  alliance,  generated  political 
momentum  behind  the  creation  of  a  more  coherent  and  cohesive  common  foreign 
policy. 
The  extent  of  the  EU's  marginalisation  in  the  Middle  East  became  clear 
when  it  was  confined  to  the  role  of  observer  as  the  USA  and  Russia  co-sponsored 
the  launch  of  the  bilateral  track  (Israeli-Palestinian)  of  the  Peace  Process  in 
Madrid  in  November  1991.26  The  bilateral  negotiations  covered  the  vital  political 
issues  in  the  Peace  Process:  territorial  control,  sovereignty,  borders,  security 
arrangements  and  the  rights  of  the  Palestinians.  European  leaders  played  down  the 
Union's  exclusion  from  the  toP  table.  French  Foreign  Office  Minister  Roland 
Dumas,  for  instance,  claimed  that  his  government  had  actively  contributed  to  the 
preparation  of  the  Madrid  conference,  and  that  US  leadership  was  essential  to 
keep  Israel  at  the  negotiating  table.  27 
Nevertheless,  it  was  evident  that  Israel  and  the  USA  had  little  appetite  for 
the  EU  to  play  a  significant  political  role  in  the  Peace  Process.  What  they 
required  was  its  money.  Faced  with  a  huge  budget  deficit  and  deep  economic 
recession,  the  USA's  aid  budget  in  the  early  1990s  came  under  severe  pressure  in 
Congress.  Since  there  was  no  question  of  reducing  its  fmancial  assistance  to  Israel 
and  Egypt,  an  alternative  source  of  funds  had  to  be  found  for  the  Palestinians,  and 
that  source  was  the  European  Union. 
Instead,  the  Union  had  to  settle  for  a  leading  role  in  the  Multilateral 
Working  Groups  set  up  to  channel  international  financial  aid  to  the  region  and 
coordinate  projects  in  the  economic,  infrastructural,  social  and  environmental 
spheres  . 
28  The  EU  acted  as  co-organiser  of  the  Environment,  Refugee  and  Water 
187 working  groups.  29  More  significantly,  it  was  made  'gavel  holder'  of  the  Regional 
Economic  Development  Working  Group  (REDWG),  which  allowed  it  to  direct 
30  international  financial  assistance  to  the  Palestinian  territories.  Work  in  the 
REDWG  was  divided  into  10  areas,  with  'shepherd'  states  responsible  for 
coordinating  projects  in  each  area: 
Figure  6.1  EU  Member  States'  Roles  in  the  REDWG 
In  addition  to  its  responsibilities  for  individual  project  areas,  the  Community  also 
provided  crucial  logistical  support.  A  secretariat  and  executive  secretary  for  the 
monitoring  committee  set  up  to  oversee  the  projects  were  funded  by  the  Union. 
The  Union  also  became  an  active  contributor  to  the  Arms  Control  and 
Regional  Security  working  group  (ACRS),  another  rolling  multilateral  forum 
established  by  the  Madrid  conference.  Again,  Community  Member  States  were 
entrusted  with  leading  discussions  in  certain  areas.  The  Netherlands,  for  instance, 
chaired  talks  on  a  regional  crisis  communication  network.  As  far  as  a  specific  EU 
6role'  was  concerned,  its  participation  in  the  ACRS  was  significant  in  two 
respects.  First,  it  allowed  a  Community  input  into  the  negotiation  of  issues  such 
as  arms  control  and  non-proliferation,  confidence-building  measures  and  regional 
security  structures.  It  was  thus  a  'back  door'  into  the  politico-security  aspects  of 
the  Peace  Process.  Second,  it  gave  the  Community  first  hand  experience  of  the 
security  problems  that  would  arise  as  the  Washington  agreement  was 
implemented.  This  experience  proved  valuable  in  the  Barcelona  process,  and 
influenced  the  wording  of  the  Barcelona  Declaration. 
188 As  Peters  argues,,  the  multilateral  track  was  based  on  a  'functionalist- 
liberalist  conception  of  cooperation"  where  the  enmeshing  of  the  region's  states 
through  multi-sectoral  cooperation  would  enable  them  to  set  aside  their  political 
differenceS.  31  The  initiation  of  this  functionalist-inspired  multilateral  track  was 
ideally  suited  to  the  Union  external  policy  strengths,  and  to  its  own  experience 
with  regional  economic  and  political  integration.  With  the  Union's  failure  to 
substantially  improve  its  capacity  for  politico-security  policy-making  at 
Maastricht,  pillar  one  assumed  even  greater  significance.  However,  the 
circumstances  in  which  the  Union  found  itself  were  clearly  favourable.  The 
multilateral  working  groups  provided  a  mutually  reinforcing  institutional  link 
between  its  emergent  Mediterranean  partnership  strategy  and  the  Peace  Process. 
The  Commission  was  quick  to  recognise  the  opportunity,  arguing  that: 
On  the  economic  front  the  time  is  now  right  for  the  EC,  together  with  the 
international  community  and  especially  the  Gulf  countries,  to  embark  on  an 
ambitious  cooperation  programme  which  would  embrace  the  economic 
development  of  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza,  bearing  in  mind  the  need  also  for 
international  efforts  in  favour  of  the  region  as  a  whole.  32 
The  economic  development  of  the  occupied  territories,  and  support  for  the 
economic  integration  between  the  Arab  countries,  became  the  guiding  principles 
of  the  EU's  contribution  to  the  Peace  Process. 
3.  Between  Banker  and  Broker:  How  Influence  Was  Won 
The  signature  of  the  Oslo  Declaration  of  Principles  and  Washington  Agreements 
in  September  and  October  1993  was  a  major  breakthrough  in  the  Peace  Process, 
and  injected  new  dynamism  into  the  flagging  Israeli-Palestinian  negotiations. 
Even  the  USA  had  proved  powerless  to  bring  the  dovish  Rabin  government  and 
Arafat's  beleaguered  and  conciliatory  PLO  together.  It  was  left  to  Norway,  not  an 
189 EU  member,  to  act  as  a  secret  intermediary  and  restart  the  talks.  Between  March 
and  September  1993,  a  series  of  discussions,  initially  between  academics  and 
researchers,  led  to  the  historic  mutual  recognition  agreement  by  the  Palestinian 
and  Israeli  authorities  and  set  a  clear  timetable  for  the  withdrawal  of  Israeli  forces 
from  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza. 
Immediately  after  the  Washington  meeting,  the  REDWG  was  convened  in 
order  to  discuss  a  World  Bank  report,  co-financed  by  the  EC,,  US  and  Norway, 
about  economic  rebuilding  in  the  region.  As  one  commentary  put  it,  'the  Israel- 
PLO  agreement  will  only  survive  if  it  results  in  a  quick  and  sustainable 
hnprovement  in  the  standard  of  living  of  the  people  of  the  occupied  territories.  33 
At  the  Washington  Donors'  Conference  (I  October  1993),  the  EU  heads  of 
government  pledged  500  million  ECUs  from  the  Community  budget  to  be 
channelled  to  the  region  from  1994-98  through  the  Commission  (50  million  ECUs 
per  annum  in  grants)  and  the  European  Investment  Bank  (250  million  ECUs  per 
annum  in  loans),  the  largest  single  pledge.  34  A  new  body  -  the  Ad  Hoc  Liaison 
Committee  (AHLC)  -  chaired  by  Norway,  was  mandated  to  coordinate  and 
promote  aid  from  individual  donors  to  the  Palestinian  people.  Much  of  the  real 
work  of  this  group  was  done  in  advance  of  informal  meetings  of  the  major 
participants,  with  the  EU,  United  States  and  World  Bank  (as  well  as  the 
Palestinian  Authority  and  Israel)  taking  the  key  decisions  among  themselves. 
190 Table  6.1  Donor  Pledges  October  1993-  November  1996  (Million  ECUs) 
Donor  Grants  Loans  Total 
European  Union 
(Budget+EIB) 
250  250  500 
USA  315  105  420 
Japan  215  0  215 
Saudi  Arabia  168  0  168 
Norway  126  -  0  126 
Netherlands  101  0  101 
Germany  78  0  78 
Italy  67  0  67 
Sweden  58  0  58 
France  54  0  54 
Deru-nark  43  0  43 
Spain  43  0  43 
Canada  28  0  28 
World 
Bank/IDA 
0  176  176 
Israel  21  42  63 
Other  donors  297  239  537 
Total  1864  858  2667 
Source:  Data  extrapolated  from  various  sources. 
By  1996,  the  EU  had  firmly  established  itself  as  the  biggest  contributor  to 
the  Palestinian  state-in-waiting,  a  fact  that  not  only  made  it  indispensable  to  the 
economic  track  of  the  Peace  Process,  but  provided  the  Union,  and  the  West,  with 
an  instrument  capable  of  influencing  the  behaviour  of  the  both  the  Arabs  and  the 
Israelis.  35  As  the  MEDA  financial  package  for  the  Mediterranean  came  on  stream, 
the  Union  had  an  impressive  array  of  financial  incentives  at  its  disposal.  That 
said,  political  influence  was  not  a  logical  corollary  of  aid.  That  depended  on  the 
multiplier  effect  of  aid,  including  anticipated  dividends  such  as  increased  inward 
investment,  the  stabilisation  of  the  business  environment  and  the  normalisation  of 
relations  at  both  the  governmental  and  societal  levels.  36 
191 For  many  inside  the  Union,  though,  this  improved  economic  leverage  did 
not  go  far  enough.  In  an  exchange  with  the  Belgian  Council  Presidency,  one  MEP 
complained  that: 
you  have  not  explained  what  the  European  Community  or  European  Union 
specifically  intends  to  do  to  encourage  the  .... 
I  have  the  impression  that 
Norway  has  done  a  great  deal  more  in  real  terms  that  the  European  Union 
and  I  am  rather  sad  about  that.  37 
In  a  similar  vein,  a  French  official  argued  that: 
the  Community  should  have  a  position  reflecting  its  economic  dynamism. 
It  should  not  just  serve  as  a  cash  register  for  policies  decided  elsewhere.  38 
Just  as  the  Middle  East  had  been  a  priority  for  EPC,  so  it  seemed  that  its 
successor,  the  CFSP,,  would  devote  an  equally  large  percentage  of  the  EU's 
diplomatic  resources  to  the  region.  At  the  Brussels  European  Council  of 
December  1993,  the  first  after  the  ratification  of  the  Maastricht  Treaty,  a  list  of 
possible  initiatives  was  set  out  by  the  Heads  of  Govenunent  identifying  priority 
areas  for  EU  initiatives.  The  principal  themes  of  the  framework  were  as  follows: 
Figure  6.2  Proposed  EU  Initiatives  in  the  Peace  Process 
1)  Participation  in  international  supporting  arrangements. 
2)  Strengthening  the  democratic  process  through,  inter  alia,  assisting  with  the 
ion  and  monitoring  of  elections  in  the  Palestinian  territories. 
)  Building  regional  cooperation,  chiefly  through  participation  in  the  REDWG 
Arms  Control  and  Regional  Security  Working  Group. 
1)  Support  for  Palestinian  institution  building  through  the  mobilisation  and 
mplementation  of  EU  aid  progranunes  for  the  occupied  territories. 
Providing  bilateral  aid  to  other  parties  to  the  bilateral  negotiations. 
Assuring  follow-up  to  action  underway  on  confidence-building  measures 
bmitted  to  the  regional  parties. 
Using  the  EU's  influence  to  encourage  ftill  support  on  all  sides  for  the  . 
39 
192 The  Commission  was  instructed  to  prepared  the  grounds  for  joint  actions, 
an  indication  that  the  Member  governments'  action  in  pillar  one  was  the  key 
element  in  the  Union"  s  long-term  contribution  to  the  Peace  Process.  A 
Commission  Communication  had  already  set  out  the  broad  parameters  for  EU 
policy  post-Washington.  Consistent  with  Europe's  call  for  a  global  settlement,  the 
Communication  emphasised  the  Union's  specific  role  in  promoting  regional 
cooperation  and  stressed  the  need  to  involve  Israel  in  'a  balanced  triangular 
relationship'  with  Europe  and  the  Mashreq  countries.  40 
Implementation  of  the  Oslo  process  soon  reached  an  impasse,  ostensibly 
over  the  speed  and  scale  of  the  hand-over  of  the  occupied  territories.  However, 
the  stalemate  was  symptomatic  of  a  more  serious  problem:  the  irreconcilable 
Israeli  policies  of  withdrawing  troops  while  simultaneously  expanding  Jewish 
settlements.  The  massacre  in  January  1994  of  dozens  of  Palestinians  in  a  Mosque 
in  Hebron  by  an  Israeli  settler  exposed  the  fragility  of  the  process  and  called  into 
question  the  ability  of  the  two  sides  to  guarantee  the  security  of  their  resPective 
populations.  The  EU's  reaction  to  events  in  Hebron  was  confined  to  a  short 
statement  by  the  Council  condemning  the  massacre,  and  calling  for  'the  authorities 
[Israeli]  to  take  full  responsibility  for  protecting  the  inhabitants  of  the  occupied 
territories  9.41 
Eventually,  the  CFSP  was  used  for  positive  action  by  the  Union.  A  joint 
action  (94/276)  on  the  Peace  Process,  based  on  Article  J3  of  the  Maastricht  Treaty, 
was  adopted  by  the  Council  on  19  April  1994.  The  political  element  of  the  joint 
action  took  the  form  of  funding  (10  million  ECUs)  for  the  establishment  of  the 
Palestinian  police  force,  and  a  programme  of  assistance  for  elections  in  the 
occupied  territories,  including  the  provision  of  electoral  observers.  The  precise 
details  of  the  latter  were  left  to  the  Council  to  decide.  As  Esther  Barbe  and 
193 Fernando  Izqueirdo  argue,  the  ambit  of  the  joint  action  confirmed  the  low  key 
approach  adopted  by  the  Union.  42  A  vague  promise  to  issue  dimarches  to  the 
Arab  states  over  their  economic  boycott  of  Israel,  and  to  the  Israelis  over  their 
settlement  policy  was  indicative  of  the  EU's  nervousness  about  making  overtly 
political  interventions. 
It  was  at  this  stage  that  divergencies  among  the  Member  States  began  to 
surface  over  how  to  respond  to  developments  in  the  region.  The  election  of 
Jacques  Chirac  as  President  in  May  1995  heralded  a  new  interventionism  in 
French  foreign  policy.  From  the  outset,  Chirac  demanded  a  greater  say  for 
Europe,  and  also  for  France,  in  the  Peace  Process  commensurate  with  their 
respective  financial  contributions.  France's  status  as  the  biggest  individual  donor 
to  the  Palestinian  authority  lent  Chirac's  vision  some  legitimacy.  But  the  new 
President's  European  vocation  masked  an  even  stronger  desire  to  reassert  France's 
6special'  status  in  the  region.  Chirac  used  the  final  days  of  the  French  Council 
Presidency  to  arrange  a  series  of  high  profile  meetings  with  Middle  Eastern 
leaders,  including  Arafat.  In  a  press  interview  following  a  diplomatic  visit  to 
Cairo,  Foreign  Minister  Herve  de  Charette,  asked  about  France's  role  in  the 
Middle  East,  replied  that  'the  situation  in  the  region  requires  that  Europe  in 
general,  and  France  in  particular,  take  account  of  their  traditional  links  and 
historical  interests',  promising  'a  bigger  French  presence'.  43 
French  activism  was  taken  a  step  further  April  when  Foreign  Minister 
Herve  de  Charette  travelled  in  quick  su-.  1cession  to  Beirut,  Jerusalem  and 
Damascus  to  negotiate  a  cease-fire  after  the  Israeli  shelling  of  Southern  Lebanon. 
France's  part  in  securing  the  ceasefire  won  it  a  seat  as  co-chair  of  the  monitoring 
committee  alongside  the  USA.  In  contrast  to  Chirac's  diplomatic  efforts,  the 
collective  response  of  the  EU  to  the  Lebanon  crisis  could  best  be  described  as 
194 tardy.  The  Troika,  led  by  Council  President  Susanna  Agnelli,  arrived  in  the  region 
behind  the  French  team.  One  of  the  major  shortcomings  of  EU  foreign  policy  -  its 
inability  to  speak  with  one  voice  -  and  the  obvious  tension  between  the  two 
European  delegations  attracted  widespread  media  coverage. 
A  more  revealing  indication  of  the  CFSP's  weakness  was  the  Union's 
lengthy  silence  on  the  election  of  Benjamin  Netanyahu's  Likud  coalition  in  May 
1996.  Despite  the  obvious  implications  for  the  Peace  Process  and  political 
relations  with  Israel,  no  statement  was  issued  on  what  the  Union  expected  from 
the  new  government  vis-a-vis  the  Oslo  process.  44  Only  after  a  summer  of  violence 
precipitated  by  Israel's  failure  to  adhere  to  the  Oslo  accords  and  the  USA's 
reluctance  to  put  pressure  on  Netanyahu  did  the  EU  finally  grind  into  gear, 
launching  a  thinly  veiled  attack  on  Israel  in  a  CFSP  statement  and  despatching 
Irish  Foreign  Minister  Dick  Spring  to  the  Middle  East  for  talks  with  Netanyahu 
45 
and  Arafat.  In  a  sudden  flurry  of  diplomatic  activity,  the  Troika  also  held  talks 
with  Arafat  and  Israeli  Foreign  Minister  David  Levy,  but  were  able  to  offer  little 
more  than  consoling  words  to  the  Palestinians,  and  were  rebuffed  by  the  Israelis. 
The  Union's  efforts  were  met  with  an  extraordinary  warning  from  US  Secretary  of 
State  Warren  Christopher.  In  a  letter  to  each  of  the  15  member  governments, 
Christopher  exhorted  the  Union  to  refrain  from  interfering  in  the  Peace  Process  at 
such  a  'delicate  moment'. 
46 
The  Union's  tentative  diplomacy,  and  the  US  warning  was  followed  by  a 
high  profile  diplomatic  foray  by  Chirac  who  controversially  grabbed  centre  stage 
with  his  own  tour  of  the  region.  The  Sharm  al  Shaykh  (Egypt)  anti-terrorism 
conference  heard  Chirac  argue  for  more  attention  to  be  paid  to  the  needs  of  Syria 
and  Lebanon,  a  move  calculated  to  win  France  greater  influence  among  the  Arab 
countries.  47  On  a  visit  to  Cairo,  the  French  President  argued  that  the  EU  deserved 
195 to  become  a  co-sponsor  of  the  Peace  Process,  suggesting  a  series  of  principles  on 
48 
which  a  European  political  initiative  might  be  based 
.  At  a  highly  sensitive  time 
in  the  peace  negotiations,  Chirac's  renewed  calls  for  the  establishment  of  a 
Palestinian  state  and  the  withdrawal  of  Israeli  occupying  forces  from  the  Golan 
Heights  and  Lebanon  were  guaranteed  to  raise  hackles.  Not  surprisingly,  the  visit, 
and  the  rhetoric,  were  welcomed  by  Arab  governments,  particularly  by  the 
Lebanese  government  with  which  France  was  reestablishing  a  close  working 
relationship.  The  President's  standing  was  further  boosted  by  a  televised  scuffle 
with  Israeli  security  guards  during  a  tour  of  Jerusalem. 
On  the  negative  side,  the  visit  was  a  serious  set  back  for  Euro-Israeli 
relations.  The  other  'leading  European  voice'  in  the  Middle  East  -  the  UK  -  took  a 
particularly  dim  view  of  Chirac's  unilateral  excursion.  Foreign  Secretary  Malcom 
Rifkind  undertook  his  own  diplomatic  offensive  in  the  region,  meeting  both  the 
Israeli  and  Palestinian  sides  to  show  that  Britain  took  a  more  neutral  view  of  the 
Peace  Process.  Rifldnd  went  on  to  argue  for  an  Organisation  for  Security  and 
Cooperation  in  the  Middle  East,  based  on  the  OSCE,,  a  proposal  that  was  an 
indirect  swipe  at  Chirac. 
The  outcome  of  the  Union's  experience  during  this  tense  period  was  the 
decision  to  appoint  a  special  envoy,  Miguel  Moratinos,  to  represent  the  EU  in  the 
Peace  Process.  The  appointment  of  Moratinos  was  a  shrewd  move  by  the  EU.  A 
former  Spanish  Ambassador  to  Israel,  the  special  envoy  had  considerable  inside 
49 
knowledge  of  regional  politics,  and  the  respect  of  the  parties  concerned  . 
Furthermore,  Moratinos  had  been  instrumental  in  preparing  the  Barcelona 
Conference  as  part  of  Spanish  Prime  Minister  Felipe  Gonzalez'  diplomatic  team, 
so  was  aware  of  the  limits  of  EU  diplomacy  in  a  multilateral  context  . 
50  Another 
factor  in  Moratinos'  favour  was  his  nationality.  Spanish  governments  had  always 
196 treated  the  Middle  East  and  North  Africa  as  a  special  concern,  and  the  relative 
even-handedness  of  their  policies  contrasted  with  the  high  profile  partisan 
approach  of  France.  A  Spanish  foreign  office  official  noted  that  'we  played  our 
cards  well  on  the  Middle  East,  we  are  respected  there  ....  we  know  our  limits'. 
51  it 
is  difficult  to  see  how  a  diplomat  from  one  of  the  big  three  Member  States  - 
France,  Gennany  and  the  UK  -  would  have  been  tolerated  by  either  side.  52 
Moratinos'  appointment  and  mandate,  the  subject  of  a  CFSP  joint  action, 
were  confinned  in  only  one  hour  by  Foreign  Ministers  in  October  1996  in  an 
indication  of  the  strength  of  support  for  the  initiative  among  the  Member  States.  53 
Having  scored  a  minor  diplomatic  success  with  Carl  Bildt  as  EU  special  envoy  to 
the  Yugoslavian  conflict,  the  lessons  learned  from  that  experience  were  applied  to 
Moratinos'  instructions.  54  His  mandate  contained  the  following  objectives: 
Figure  6.3  Special  Envoy's  Mandate 
To  establish  and  maintain  contacts  with  all  the  parties  involved. 
To  observe  the  negotiations,  offer  the  EU's  advice  and  its  'good  offices'. 
"  Contribute  to  implementing  international  agreements  and  'engage  with  them 
diplomatically'  in  the  event  of  non-compliance. 
"  To  promote,  by  engaging  with  signatories,  compliance  with  norms  of  human 
rights,  democracy  and  the  rule  of  law. 
"  To  report  to  Council  bodies  about  the  best  way  of  pursuing  EU  initiatives  and 
ongoing  Peace  Process-related  business. 
To  monitor  actions  which  might  affect  permanent  status  negotiations  (ie 
55 
actions  in  the  occupied  territories)  . 
Moratinos'  remit  appeared  carefully  judged  and  realistic:  to  project  the  political 
presence  of  the  EU  by  offering  its  good  offices  rather  than  by  attempting  major 
diplomatic  offensives.  The  fact  that  he  was  a  civil  servant  rather  than  a  politician 
also  smoothed  the  way  for  his  appointment.  Those  Member  States  who  remained 
wary  about  a  higher  profile  EU  presence  in  the  region  could  not  have  accepted  a 
197 political  figure.:  "'  Similarly,  the  Israeli  government  would  have  been  less  likely  to 
work  with  an  obviously  political  figure. 
The  early  signs  for  the  special  envoy  were  good.  Moratinos  worked 
effectively  behind  the  scenes  as  a  facilitator  for  dialogue  between  the  Israelis, 
Palestinians  and  other  Arab  countries.  One  of  his  most  significant  early 
achievements  was  to  bring  Arafat  and  Levy  together  in  Brussels  for  a  relaunch  of 
the  peace  talks  after  the  crisis  over  new  Israeli  settlements  in  East  Jerusalem.  He 
was  also  instrumental  in  brokering  the  deal  over  Hebron,  securing  the 
commitment  of  the  Palestinians  to  the  deal  while  the  USA  took  care  of  Israel.  57 
Why  should  Moratinos  have  brought  the  EU  greater  credibility?  A  clue  lies 
in  his  own  perceptions  about  his  role: 
My  role  is  complementary  to  the  US.  It  has  to  be  so.  My  role  is  not  about 
competing  for  influence  but  in  striving  to  help  the  Middle  East  Peace 
Process.  58 
Moratinos'  experience  as  Spanish  ambassador  in  Israel  also  made  him  acutely 
aware  of  Israeli  sensitivities.  Any  kind  of  direct  European  pressure  on  Netanyahu 
would  have  further  weakened  EU  mediation.  59  At  first,  the  Israeli  government 
had  been  sceptical,  with  David  Levy  arguing  that  'the  [Israeli-Palestinian] 
negotiations  must  be  direct  and  without  any  external  pressure'.  60  But  Moratinos 
patient,  neutral  approach  gradually  won  him  the  approval  of  Netanyahu's 
government  and  the  US  administration. 
For  the  Palestinians,  and  the  Arab  side  in  general,  the  special  envoy's  role 
was  less  satisfactory.  One  Arab  official  lamented  that: 
Moratinos  would  have  been  more  effective  if  there  was  an  effective 
mandate,  an  effective  initiative.  He  needed  something  to  offer  in  the 
framework  of  an  initiative.  It  is  a  good  thing  for  the  Arabs  to  underline  the 
importance  attached  to  a  European  role,  but  Moratinos  must  have  a  clear 
position.  He  must  be  able  to  use  all  the  resources  at  Europe's  disposal.  61 
Another  Arab  diplomat  expressed  similar  sentiments,  arguing  that: 
198 A  clearer  mandate  is  necessary.  At  the  moment,  his  role  is  presenting  the 
European  Union's  position  and  going  back  to  Brussels.  62 
The  point  here  is  that  Moratinos  was  more  important  to  the  Palestinians  than  the 
Israelis.  The  Arab  states  expected  the  special  envoy  to  back  the  Palestinians  in  the 
same  way  that  the  US  government  backed  Israel. 
By  the  latter  half  of  1997,  Moratinos  and  the  EU  had  accumulated 
sufficient  political  capital  to  enable  them  to  present  a  'code  of  conduct'  to  the 
Israelis  and  Palestinians.  The  document  was  presented  by  the  special  envoy  to  the 
two  sides  during  October  1997.63  True  to  form,  Moratinos  went  to  great  lengths 
to  clear  the  code  with  both  parties  before  its  fonnal  launch.  The  code  incorporated 
a  number  of  confidence  building  measures  drawn  in  a  large  part  from  the 
Barcelona  process.  Its  key  principles  were  firstly,  that  the  Israeli  government 
should  respect  the  commitments  made  by  its  predecessor.  Secondly,  the  code 
called  for  the  Palestinians  to  do  more  to  combat  terrorism.  64  Significantly,  it 
received  a  cautious  welcome  by  the  Israeli  government,  who  had  praised  the  envoy 
'for  establishing  excellent  relations  with  both  sides'.  65  Moratinos  thus  became  the 
conduit  for  a  more  substantive  political  input  from  the  Union. 
However,  regardless  of  Moratinos'  presence,  the  Union  could  only  stand 
by  and  watch  as  the  situation  in  the  Middle  East  deteriorated.  The  growing 
frustration  of  the  Union  was  also  expressed  by  the  Member  States  in  a  terse  attack 
on  Israeli  policy.  Meeting  on  24  November  1997,  EU  foreign  ministers  castigated 
Netanyahu,  with  Luxembourg  Foreign  Minister  Jacques  Poos  stating: 
Our  basic  approach  is  that  of  land  for  peace.  The  policy  of  Prime  Minister 
Netanyahu  does  not  enjoy  our  support.  It  is  a  narrow  minded  policy.  66 
In  what  amounted  to  an  admission  that  it  still  lacked  truly  effective  political 
influence,  the  Union  quickly  backtracked,  accepting  that  the  only  realistic  means 
to  prod  the  two  sides  back  to  the  negotiating  table  was  for  it  to  act  in  tandem  with 
199 the  USA.  At  the  EU-US  summit  on  December  3,  the  Union  unambiguously 
emphasised  its  support  for  US-led  mediation.  67 
European  diplomacy  in  the  Peace  Process  took  a  new  twist  in  March  1998 
with  the  visit  of  UK  Foreign  Minister  and  President  of  the  Council,  Robin  Cook, 
to  Egypt,  Israel  and  Jordan.  In  advance  of  the  trip,  EU  Foreign  Ministers  made  it 
clear  that  Israeli  settlement  policy  was  their  main  concern.  It  was  also  a  subject  on 
which  Cook  had  resolved  to  push  Netanyahu  as  far  possible,  a  task  he 
spectacularly  accomplished.  Cook  chose  to  ignore  Israeli  warnings  and  met 
Palestinians  at  the  disputed  Har  Homa/Jabal  Abu  Ghneim  settlement  in  East 
Jerusalem,  a  visit  that  provoked  violent  demonstrations  by  right  wing  Israeli 
settlers.  68  On  the  same  visit,  the  Foreign  Secretary  used  a  meeting  with  Netanyahu 
to  ask  for  an  explanation  of  Israel's  continued  refusal  to  open  the  airport  in  Gaza, 
whose  construction  was  funded  by  the  Union.  Cook's  actions  signalled  the  EU's 
displeasure  with  Netanyahu's  policies  and  earned  much  needed  political  capital 
from  Arab  states.  It  also  heightened  the  sense  that  the  Union  had  become  the  key 
western  ally  of  the  Palestinians. 
The  latitude  enjoyed  by  the  British  Foreign  Secretary  bore  testament  to  the 
growing  cohesiveness  of  the  Member  States  on  the  EU's  involvement  in  the  Peace 
Process.  Before  his  trip,  Cook  was  careful  to  draw  attention  to  the  backing  he  had 
69 
received  from  all  the  EU  foreign  ministers  at  an  informal  meeting  in  Edinburgh  . 
As  French  Foreign  Minister  Hubert  Vedrine  commented: 
It  is  one  of  the  things  that  has  struck  me  since  I  took  on  this  position. 
Coherence  in  the  analysis,  the  diagnosis  of  the  objectives  is  stronger  and 
stronger  within  the  European  Union.  70 
That  the  Member  States'  nerve  held  bore  testament  to  the  Union's  slow 
maturation  as  an  international  actor. 
200 4.  THE  EMP  AND  THE  MIDDLE  EAST  PEACE  PROCESS 
The  Barcelona  Process 
From  the  outset,  the  EU  made  a  determined  effort  to  keep  clear  blue  water 
between  the  Barcelona  process  and  the  Middle  East.  In  ajoint  report  on  the 
implementation  of  the  EMP,  the  Commission  and  Council  presidency  claimed 
that: 
strong  efforts  have  been  made  ....  to  ensure  respect  for  the  principle  that, 
while  the  Barcelona  Process  can  exert  a  positive  influence  on  the  Middle 
East  Peace  Process,  it  should  not  replace  other  activities  and  initiatives 
undertaken  in  the  interest  of  peace,  stability  and  prosperity  of  the  region.  71 
Officially,  the  primary  function  of  the  EMP  was  to  provide  the  institutional  basis 
for  low-key,  functional  cooperation  between  Arabs  and  Israelis.  The  Barcelona 
process  would  'step  in'  if  and  when  peace  finally  broke  out  in  the  region.  72 
Admittedly,  however,  some  within  the  EU  also  saw  Barcelona  as  a  response  to  its 
exclusion  from  the  political  track  of  the  Peace  Process.  73  According  to  Eberhard 
Rhein,  a  Commission  Director  General  responsible  for  Mediterranean  policy: 
the  Euro-Med  partnership  should  be  seen  as  a  catalytic  factor  helping  to 
inter  alia  allow  Israelis  and  Arabs  to  work  together  in  a  wider  context,  with 
Europe  as  a  sort  of  "chaperone"  between  the  two.  74 
But  there  was  never  any  serious  suggestion  that  the  Barcelona  process  could  or 
should  emulate  the  Oslo  process. 
When  the  Peace  Process  began  to  falter  early  in  1996,  the  Barcelona 
process  initially  appeared  to  withstand  the  rising  tension  between  the  Arab 
participants  and  Israel.  The  functional  method  appeared  to  be  bearing  fruit, 
particularly  at  the  administrative  level  where  diplomats  involved  in  the  two 
follow-up  committees  continued  to  attend  meetings,  while  the  programme  of 
201 sectoral  conferences,  meetings  and  seminars  proceeded  with  little  obvious 
disruption.  Most  notably,  a  meeting  of  the  senior  officials  committee  went  ahead 
in  July  1996  despite  the  Israeli  shelling  of  southern  Lebanon.  Commissioner 
MarM'  was  not  alone  in  proclaiming  the  durability  of  the  process  to  be  a  major 
75 
achievement  in  its  own  right.  Reflecting  on  the  turmoil  of  1996,  a  Swedish 
official  stated: 
We  should  be  happy  that  we  still  have  the  Barcelona  process  running  after 
this  year.  Just  being  able  to  meet  is  a  confidence  building  measure  in  its 
oWn  right. 
76 
Behind  the  scenes,  though,  cracks  were  appearing  in  the  fagade.  First,  the 
Israeli,  Lebanese  and  Syrian  representatives  on  the  two  steering  committees 
refused  to  address  each  other  directly  at  meetings,  opting  instead  to  read  out 
prepared  statements  on  the  situation  in  the  Middle  East.  77  Meetings  frequently 
started  with  condemnation  of  one  side  by  the  other  and  their  productiveness  was 
inevitably  adversely  affected.  Second,  at  a  meeting  of  the  Arab  League  in 
September  1996,  foreign  ministers  from  the  Arab  partner  countries  discussed  a 
proposal  to  withdraw  from  the  Barcelona  framework  if  the  Israelis  reneged  on  the 
Oslo  agreements.  "  That  they  eventually  decided  not  to  owed  more  to  the  lack  of 
79 
altematives  than  to  any  optimism  about  the  prospects  for  the  EMP.  Third, 
progress  in  the  political  and  security  basket,  effectively  a  barometer  for  the 
Barcelona  process,  virtually  ground  to  a  halt,  with  the  senior  officials  committee 
able  to  make  only  minimal  headway  on  the  list  of  Confidence  Building  Measures, 
and  the  suspension  of  the  stability  pact  initiative. 
Arguably  the  defining  moment  for  the  Barcelona  process  arrived  with 
Israel's  decision  to  go  ahead  with  the  construction  of  Israeli  settlements  in  East 
Jerusalem,  a  decision  which  effectively  halted  the  bilateral  track  of  the  Peace 
Process.  80  The  ensuing  row  occurred  only  weeks  before  the  second  ministerial 
202 conference  in  Malta,  meant  to  in  ect  new  momentum  into  the  EMP.  Dutch  i 
Foreign  Minister  Hans  Van  Mierlo  was  forced  to  embark  on  an  exhaustive  tour  of 
A-  - 
Lne  Middle  East  simply  to  persuade  the  Arab  and  Israeli  foreign  ministers  to 
attend.  "  Work  on  a  Conference  Declaration  had  to  be  put  to  one  side  as  Van 
Mierlo's  team  searched  for  a  form  of  words  acceptable  to  both  sides.  The  Arab 
governments  pressed  for  a  passage  condemning  the  settlements  to  be  included  in 
A.  1-  - 
die  final  declaration,  while  the  Israeli  govemment  flatly  rejected  any  references  to 
the  issue  and  to  the  Middle  East  in  general.  82  It  took  a  meeting  between  Israeli 
Foreign  Minister  David  Levy  and  Palestinian  leader  Yasser  Arafat,  brokered  by 
Dutch  Foreign  Minister  Hans  van  Mierlo,  to  prevent  an  acrimonious  break-up  of 
the  gathering.  83  Nevertheless,  the  participants  still  left  Malta  without  an 
agreement  on  where  the  Barcelona  process  was  heading,  and  it  required  several 
more  weeks  of  discussions  to  produce  a  sterile,  mutually  acceptable  text  which  did 
little  more  than  summarise  progress  and  identify  future  priorities. 
The  Malta  debacle  put  an  end  to  any  pretence  that  the  Barcelona  process 
could  be  insulated  from  the  Peace  Process.  As  Commissioner  Manuel  Manin 
admitted: 
The  fundamental  aim  of  peace  and  stability  in  the  Mediterranean  cannot  be 
achieved  without  a  permanent  and  just  solution  to  the  Middle  East  conflict. 
Although  the  Peace  Process  and  the  Euro-Mediterranean  partnership  are  two 
distinct  and  separate  processes.  Eventually  the  latter  cannot  fully  succeed 
without  the  success  of  the  former.  84 
For  many  of  the  participants,  the  very  essence  of  the  'Barcelona  spirit'  was  the 
novelty  of  having  Israel,  Lebanon  and  Syria  engaged  together  in  dialogue  in  a 
multilateral  forum,  something  neither  the  multilateral  track  of  the  Peace  Process 
nor  the  MENA  summits  had  achieved.  The  health  of  the  EMP  was  therefore 
203 always  bound  to  be  inextricably  linked  to  the  state  of  the  Peace  Process.  An  Arab 
diplomat  was  unequivocal  about  this  linkage: 
There  is  no  way  that  this  process  will  succeed  without  progress  on  the  Peace 
Process  .... 
How  can  we  talk  about  economic  cooperation  while  we  have  a 
government  [in  Israel]  that  is  reneging  on  all  its  previous  international 
commitments?  85 
The  Arab  partner  countries  perceived  the  Barcelona  process  as  a  means  to  draw 
the  EU  further  into  the  Peace  Process  and  as  a  potential  counter-weight  to  US-led 
diplomacy.  86  Their  enthusiasm  was  inevitably  dampened  when  it  became  clear 
that  the  EU  did  not  share  the  same  vision  of  the  process. 
From  the  outset,  Israel's  lukewarm  attitude  towards  the  Barcelona  process 
reflected  its  traditional  suspicion  of  European  interference  in  the  Middle  East. 
Indeed,  after  the  Likud  coalition's  election  victory  in  May  1996,  the  Israelis 
became  distinctly  more  critical  of  EU  initiatives.  Netanyahu's  government 
continued  to  regard  the  USA  as  the  only  acceptable  external  mediator,  perceiving 
the  Union  to  be  overtly  supportive  of  Palestinian  demands  and  generally  'pro- 
Arab.  47  An  Israeli  diplomat  summed  up  his  govemment"s  position  thus: 
The  Barcelona  process  is  not  going  to  replace  the  Middle  East  Peace  Process. 
Barcelona  is  for  the  future.....  Strategically,  the  US  is  much  more  "present"  than 
any  of  the  European  countries.  88 
Israel  had  another  reason  to  play  down  the  significance  of  Barcelona.  The  non- 
implementation  of  the  Oslo  accords  and  the  economic  blockade  on  the  Palestinian 
territories  could  be  argued  to  represent  a  violation  of  both  the  spirit  and  letter  of 
the  Barcelona  Declaration  . 
89  The  Israeli  government  was  therefore  keen  to 
prevent  the  process  becoming  another  platform  from  which  the  Arab  states  could 
mount  attacks  on  its  policies. 
204 By  mid-  1997,  the  negative  spillover  from  developments  in  the  Middle  East 
was  penetrating  throughout  the  Barcelona  process.  The  Arab  group  began 
selectively  refusing  to  meet  Israeli  representatives  on  Arab  soil,  effectively  ending 
the  diplomatically  important  practice  of  holding  meetings  in  all  the  countries 
participating  in  the  Barcelona  process.  90  Under  pressure  from  the  other  Arab 
governments,  the  Moroccan  government  decided  to  cancel  a  high  profile 
Conference  of  Industry  Ministers  due  to  be  held  in  Marrakesh,  blaming  Israel's 
'continued  obstruction  of  the  . 
'91  An  ad-hoc  foreign  ministers'  meeting, 
scheduled  to  be  held  in  an  Arab  country  in  June  1998,  had  to  be  switched  to 
Palermo  by  the  UK  Presidency.  Ironically,  the  point  of  the  meeting  was  for  the 
participants  to  make  a  political  statement  about  the  necessity  of  keeping  the 
Barcelona  process  separate  from  the  Peace  Process.  92  However,  Syria's  demands 
that  the  meeting  specifically  address  Israel's  policies  threatened  to  turn  Palermo 
into  a  repeat  of  Malta,  an  embarrassing  outcome  both  the  new  UK  government  and 
the  Italian  hosts  desperately  wanted  to  avoid.  93  In  the  end,,  the  Palermo  meeting 
did  the  minimum  necessary  to  ensure  the  survival  of  the  Barcelona  process, 
avoiding  further  controversy  over  the  Peace  Process  and  focusing  instead  on  the 
94 
commercial  and  financial  priorities  for  the  EMP. 
There  are  several  conclusions  to  be  drawn  from  the  way  the  relationship 
between  the  Barcelona  process  and  the  Peace  Process  evolved.  First,  the 
multilateral  strand  of  the  EMP  turned  out  to  be  contingent  upon  the  situation  in 
the  Middle  East  rather  than  complementary  to  it.  Incremental  confidence  building 
and  functional  economic  cooperation  had  little  more  than  symbolic  value  without 
forward  movement  in  the  Peace  Process.  95  Second,  the  EU  found  itself  unable  to 
keep  politics  out  the  process.  Part  of  the  blarne  lay  at  the  Union's  own  feet,  since 
it  devoted  too  much  attention  to  the  first  basket  where  the  specific  measures  on  the 
205 table  were  clearly  highly  sensitive.  But  the  problem  also  stemmed  from  the  inter- 
governmental  nature  of  the  process,  relying  on  agreements  among  parties  with 
such  demonstrably  conflicting  attitudes  and  interests.  Third,  the  inseparability  of 
the  two  arenas  called  into  question  the  wisdom  of  the  EUs  decision  to  apply  the 
partnership  concept  to  the  Mediterranean  region  as  a  whole.  The  all-pervasive 
influence  of  the  Middle  East  meant  conflict  resolution  and  regional  integration  in 
other  sub-regional  strategic  arenas  (Cyprus,  Greece-Turkey,  the  Maghreb)  was 
neglected,  prompting  calls  for  regional  sub-groups  (Western  Mediterranean,  South 
East  Europe)  to  be  created  within  the  Barcelona  frainework.  96  It  is  difficult  to 
avoid  the  conclusion  that  the  Barcelona  process  was  a  creature  of  the  uniquely 
favourable  political  conditions  at  the  end  of  1995.  Once  the  Peace  Process  broke 
down,  Barcelona  was  left  floundering. 
The  Euro-Mediterranean  Agreements 
In  contrast  to  the  ailing  Barcelona  process,  the  bilateral  strand  of  the  EMP  proved 
to  be  a  quietly  fruitful  channel  for  EU  to  strengthen  its  role  in  the  Middle  East. 
The  starting  point  was  the  conclusion  of  a  Euro-Mediterranean  agreement  with  the 
Palestinian  Authority,  a  natural  complement  to  the  Union"  s  substantial  financial 
investment  in  the  nascent  Palestinian  state.  Although  the  accord  merely 
formalised  existing  trade  concessions,  containing  none  of  the  political  and  social 
provisions  of  the  other  Euro-Mediterranean  agreements,  it  nevertheless 
represented  another  important  step  towards  the  recognition  of  Palestinian 
aspirations  to  statehood.  A  measure  of  the  agreement's  political  significance  came 
from  Israel's  reaction  to  it:  Netanyahu's  government  described  it  as  'almost  a 
barrier  to  the  Peace  Process'.  97 
206 However,  agreements  signed  in  Brussels  were  one  thing,  following  them 
through  in  the  disputed  territories  was  another.  Increasingly  frequent  border 
closures  and  restrictions  on  the  movement  of  Palestinian  people  and  goods  by  the 
Israeli  authorities  nullified  the  trade  creation  potential  of  the  accord,  delayed  the 
construction  of  donor-funded  projects,  and  impeded  the  operation  of  completed 
projects.  98  Imports  of  EU-funded  infrastructural  equipment  destined  for  Gaza  were 
routinely  held  in  Israeli  depots  for  'security  reasons',  after  which  the  Palestinians 
were  presented  with  large  bills  for  storage  costs.  99  Agricultural  goods  frequently 
sat  rotting  in  customs  warehouses  for  months,  with  Union  representatives  unable 
to  intervene.  '  00  As  an  Arab  League  official  put  it,  'the  EU  ought  to  be  asking  ask 
how  much  it  lose[s]  in  Palestine  from  the  money  it  provided  because  of  the  Israeli 
blockade.  "Ol 
The  Commission's  exasperation  with  the  situation  in  the  Palestinian 
territories  was  palpable.  In  a  blunt  statement  to  the  European  Parliament,  the 
Desk  Officer  for  Palestine  argued  that: 
Unless  there  is  safe  passage  between  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza,  an  open  port 
and  airport,  customs  controls  and  free  movement  ....  we  may  as  well  not  have 
signed  the  agreement.  102 
But  the  options  open  to  the  EU  were  limited,  constrained  both  by  the  terms  of  the 
1994  Interim  Agreement  and  its  inability  to  put  effective  political  pressure  on  the 
Israel  to  lift  the  physical  barriers  to  the  movement  of  goods  and  people.  103 
It  was  undoubtedly  this  combination  of  frustration  and  impotence  that 
prompted  a  shift  in  the  Union's  policy  towards  the  end  of  1997.  The  'demand'  for 
EU  action  was  clearly  expressed  by  Yasser  Arafat: 
Seventy  per  cent  of  the  economy  of  Israel  is  with  European  countries  and 
this  card  has  not  been  used  until  now.  Why  not?  You  only  have  to  wave 
this  economic  card  and  they  will  listen  to  you  directly.  At  least  wave  it.  104 
207 Seizing  the  opportunity  presented  by  Moratinos'  careful  groundwork  and  the 
hardening  of  the  Member  States'  attitudes  towards  the  Netanyahu  government,  the 
Commission  chose  to  raise  the  political  stakes  through  the  Euro-Mediterranean 
agreements.  105  The  decision  to  focus  on  trade  formed  part  of  an  EU  strategy  that 
targetted  three  specific  issues: 
a)  Improving  Palestinian  access  to  external  markets. 
b)  Unblocking  the  Israeli  restrictions  on  free-movement,  particularly  access  to  the 
airport  and  port. 
106  c)  Promoting  and  funding  new  projects  such  as  border-based  industrial  zones. 
The  pursuit  of  this  strategy  relied  on  a  division  of  labour  between  Moratinos  as  the 
Union's  political  envoy  to  the  Peace  Process,  and  the  Commission  as  coordinator 
of  the  Union's  economic  and  financial  input.  It  also  represented 
acknowledgement  on  the  Union's  part  that  its  political  objectives  for  the  Peace 
Process  had  to  be  more  effectively  harnessed  to  Community  policy  instruments. 
The  first  sign  of  the  Union  toughening  its  approach  towards  Israel  came 
with  a  dispute  over  orange  juice  imports  in  October  1997.107  The  dispute 
centred  on  claims  that  Israel  had  been  re-exporting  Brazilian  orange  juice  to  the 
Community  under  its  own  duty  free  quota.  '  08  Despite  a  blunt  written  warning 
from  Commissioner  Manuel  Marin  to  Israeli  Foreign  Minister  David  Levy,  the 
Israeli  government  failed  to  address  many  of  the  Commission's  concerns.  109 
Consistent  with  standard  procedures,  it  was  eannarked  by  DG  IB  as  a 
'technical'  issue  and  passed  to  the  Commission's  trade  policy  and  legal  experts. 
The  Israeli  authorities  were  subsequently  given  an  official  admonishment 
detailing  the  nature  of  the  complaint  and  threatening  EU  importers  of  the 
product  with  fines.  '  10  The  dispute  was  resolved  at  a  special  meeting  of  the 
EU-Israel  Cooperation  Committee  on  November  28  when  Israeli  customs 
officials  gave  an  undertaking  to  tighten  controls  on  orange  juice  traders.  "' 
208 But  the  official  warning  provoked  accusations  from  Israel  that  the  Union  was 
using  the  case  to  make  a  political  point  about  the  situation  in  Israel.  112 
Certainly,  the  dispute  -  ostensibly  a  technical-legal  one  -  was  politicised  to  an 
extent  not  previously  seen  in  EU-Israeli  trade  relations.  A  Scandinavian 
official  claimed  that: 
this  would  have  been  repressed  politically  15  years  ago  ....  Israel  is  being 
dealt  with  as  a  nonnal  state  and  political  considerations  will  no  longer 
disguise  misbehaviour.  Political  rules  now  apply.  '  13 
The  orange  juice  case  was  only  the  first  in  an  increasingly  bitter  war  of 
words  over  Israel's  application  of  the  rules  of  origin  clauses  in  its  Euro- 
Mediterranean  Agreement  with  the  EU.  The  Commission's  patience  with  Israel 
was  pushed  to  the  limit  as  instances  of  products  from  the  Occupied  Territories 
being  exported  to  the  EU  under  the  Israeli  flag  came  to  light.  Finally,  in  May 
1998,  the  Commission  officially  notified  Israel  that  the  terms  of  the  agreement 
were  being  violated,  and  that  products  originating  from  the  occupied  territories 
might  be  excluded  from  the  EU-Israel  free  trade  area,  a  threat  backed  by  the 
Council!  14  Manin  was  defiant:  'We  gave  peace  a  chance.  But  now  we  are 
acting.  "  15  Netanyahu's  retort  was  equally  confrontational: 
Be  careful  with  the  use  of  ultimatums  and  dictates  of  any  kind.  That  is  the 
one  thing  that  doesn't  go  well  in  Israel  and  with  me.  116 
It  was  a  measure  of  the  EU's  new-found  assertiveness  that,  in  spite  of 
Netanyahu's  attempt  to  play  the  'anti-Israel'  card,  Israeli  officials  were  forced  to 
sit  down  with  the  Commission  discuss  ways  of  lifting  the  restrictions  on 
Palestinian  trade.  "'  An  economic  policy  had  been  used  to  send  a  firm  political 
message:  that  it  was  unacceptable  to  regard  the  Palestinian  territories  as  part  of 
Israel.  By  the  end  of  1998,  it  accounted  for  53  per  cent  of  total  fmancial  assistance 
209 to  the  Palestinians,  and  was  on  the  point  of  pledging  another  1.5  billion  ECUs  in 
aid.  118  The  Union  was  not  prepared  to  sit  back  and  watch  its  massive  investment 
in  Palestine's  future  wasted. 
Conclusions 
It  is  evident  that  the  EU  has  settled  for  modest  influence  in  the  Peace  Process 
rather  than  outright  power.  Regardless  of  its  more  successful  initiatives,  the 
continued  presence  of  the  USA  has  made  the  Peace  Process  tick.  It  was  difficult 
to  conceive  of  jLny  Israeli  government  turning  to  the  EU  for  solutions.  There  is 
still  an  obvious,  deep-seated  mistrust  of  Europe  arising  from  its  history  of 
mistreating  its  Jewish  communities,  and  of  its  motives  for  seeking  to  increase  its 
influence  in  the  region.  Suspicions  on  both  the  Arab  and  Israeli  sides  suggest  that 
the  Union  views  the  region  as  an  untapped  market  which  it  is  in  the  best  position 
to  exploit.  Whereas  a  US  presence  remains  essential  to  progress  in  the  Peace 
Process,  the  EU  does  not  yet  possess  sufficient  leverage  with  the  Palestinians  to  be 
regarded  as  indispensable. 
What  does  it  mean  to  be  influential  in  the  Peace  Process?  In  practical 
terms,  exerting  influence  on  the  peace  talks  has  meant  bringing  the  Israelis  and 
Palestinians  together  to  the  same  table.  The  importance  of  this  seemingly  modest 
achievement  should  not  be  underestimated  since  convincing  Netanyahu's 
government  to  talk  to  the  Palestinians  has  vexed  everyone  involved  in  the  Peace 
Process.  European  diplomats  of  the  1970s  and  1980s  were  unable  to  consistently 
play  the  role  of  broker,  relying  instead  on  exchanges  with  individual  governments 
and  painstakingly  negotiated  dimarches.  Multilateral  fonnns  such  as  the  Euro- 
Arab  dialogue  could  hardly  be  described  as  effective  substitutes.  The  Europeans 
of  the  1990s,  however,  have  manoeuvred  themselves  into  a  position  where  their 
210 diplomacy  has  become  a  useful  supplement  and,  at  times,  a  foil,  to  that  of  the 
USA. 
The  distinction  between  influence  and  power  made  above  rests  on  the 
ability  of  the  EU  to  effect  changes  in  the  behaviour  of  the  Arabs  and  Israelis. 
Coercion,  sanctions  and  threats  are  the  traditional  tools  of  power  politics,  options 
to  which  the  EU  still  does  not  regularly  turn.  The  EU  has  proved  itself  much 
better  equipped  to  exercise  'soft  power,  using  economic  and  financial  instruments 
to  ensure  the  viability  of  the  nascent  Palestinian  economy  and  contribute  to  the 
stabilisation  of  the  Palestinian  Authority.  That  said,  the  recent  disputes  over  trade 
with  the  Israelis  suggest  an  increasing  willingness  on  the  Union's  part  to  flex  its 
economic  muscles  in  order  to  send  out  strong  political  signals. 
A  complex  mix  of  external  and  internal  factors  determined  the  EU's 
capacity  to  take  action.  Comments  about  the  major  external  factors  -  the  attitudes 
of  the  influenced  -  have  been  made  above.  Internally,  the  defects  of  the  CFSP  in 
forcing  the  Member  States  to  coalesce  around  a  single  position  were  clear  and 
recognised  as  serious  barriers  to  the  Union's  ability  to  project  itself  as  a  political 
force  in  the  region.  119  As  the  Palestinian  Delegate  General  to  the  EU  put  it: 
The  EU's  role  is  to  balance  the  role  of  the  USA  which  in  our  opinion  is 
dictated  by  the  powerful  Israeli  lobby.  Until  now,  the  American's  have  not 
put  enough  pressure  on  the  Israelis  who  have  not  respected  the  Oslo  accords. 
Unfortunately,  an  EU  role  is  not  yet  possible,  not  just  because  the  US  and 
Israel  don't  want  it,  but  because  there  is  no  CFSP.  120 
Joint  actions  to  send  electoral  observers  to  the  Occupied  Territories  and  to  support 
121 
the  Palestinian  police  force  did  not  amount  to  decisive  political  interventions. 
The  appointment  of  a  special  envoy  might  have  raised  the  Union's  profile,  but  it 
was  consistent  with  the  propensity  of  the  Member  States  to  appoint  representatives 
in  the  absence  of  agreement  on  collective  strategies. 
211 However,  an  alternative  interpretation  is  that  the  joint  actions  at  least 
showed  an  increased  willingness  to  utilise  pillar  one  Policy  instruments  to 
implement  inter-governmental  decisions,  a  trend  that  could  only  improve 
appearance  of  coherence  and  strategic  consistency  in  EU  external  policies. 
Moreover,  there  was  a  strong  strategic  thread  running  through  much  of  what  the 
EU  did  in  relation  to  the  Middle  East  after  the  Madrid  Conference.  Building 
outwards  from  the  Euro-Mediterranean  partnership,  the  Union  linked  together  its 
Mediterranean  policy,  its  role  as  the  key  financial  donor  to  the  Peace  Process  and 
the  new  generation  of  association  agreements  to  make  itself  economically 
indispensable  to  the  long-term  future  of  the  Peace  Process. 
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219 Chapter  7 
THE  EU  AND  THE  ALGERIAN  CRISIS 
'We  don't  know  what  is  going  on  and  we're  not  sure  the  state  even  knows.  It  is 
not  clear  who  is  being  targeted  and  why'.  European  Diplomat.  ' 
'Whoeverfails  to  export  stability  to  Algeria  today  will  import  instability  in  the 
form  of  big  movements  of  refugees  tomorrow.  '  Klaus  Kinkel,  German  Foreign 
Minister.  2 
The  response  of  the  EU  and  its  Member  States  to  the  violent  breakdown  of  order 
in  Algeria  during  the  1990s  might  best  be  described  as  j  anus  faced.  The  Union 
failed  to  censure  the  military  for  halting  the  electoral  process  in  1992  and  made 
little  subsequent  attempt  to  press  for  negotiations  between  the  regime  and  the 
opposition  parties.  Moreover,  the  EU  welcomed  Algeria  into  the  Barcelona 
process,  despite  the  fact  that  the  annulment  of  the  Algerian  elections  in  1992 
violated  fundamental  principles  of  both  the  Barcelona  Declaration  and  the  EU's 
own  treaties.  The  same  period  saw  a  substantial  increase  in  European  economic 
aid  to  Algeria.  European  companies,  with  financial  backing  from  national 
governments  and  support  from  the  EU  budget,  also  significantly  expanded  their 
investments  in  Algeria's  lucrative  natural  gas  sector.  Yet  the  deals  were  signed 
with  a  regime  that  stood  accused  of  complicity  in  the  murder  of  citizens  it  was 
supposed  to  be  protecting.  The  EU's  performance  over  the  Algerian  crisis  was 
220 both  an  indictment  of  its  feeble  collective  diplomacy  and  another  example  of  the 
political  weaknesses  of  the  Euro-Mediterranean  partnership. 
Franco-Algerian  relations  played  a  crucial  part  in  detennining  the  EU's 
position  on  the  Algerian  crisis.  As  Zoubir  and  Bouandel  argue: 
France  has  the  most  complex  interests  in  the  region;  it  also  hosts  the  largest 
immigrant  community  from  the  Maghreb.  Therefore,  France's  policy  has  to 
be  studied  separately.  3 
This  claim  is  an  analytically  simplistic,  as  there  is  clearly  a  strong  correlation 
between  French  and  EU  policy.  Once  part  of  Metropolitan  France,  Algeria  is  as 
much  a  domestic  as  a  foreign  policy  issue  for  French  governments.  The  presence 
of  I  million  immigrants  of  Algerian  origin,  and  over  3  million  Muslims,  on 
French  soil,  coupled  with  the  intertwined  recent  histories  of  the  two  states,  set 
France  apart  from  its  partners  in  the  Union.  4  Respect  among  the  other  Member 
States  for  the  notion  that  Algeria  remains  a  French  chasse  gardie  has  certainly 
constrained,  and  perhaps  even  defined  EU-Algerian  relations  during  the  1990s. 
In  short,  as  Roberts  contends,  in  detennining  EU  policy,  'power  lies  with 
France.  '  5 
The  first  section  of  this  chapter  analyses  the  origin  of  the  Algerian  crisis 
and  the  Community's  irresolute  response  to  it.  Section  two  considers  the  EU's 
collective  reaction,  and  the  reaction  of  individual  member  governments,  to  the 
cancellation  of  the  Algerian  national  elections,  an  action  that  triggered  the  civil 
war.  Section  three  examines  EU  action  as  the  situation  in  Algeria  degenerated 
into  a  defacto  civil  war,  one  which  spilled  over  onto  European  soil.  The  fourth 
section  looks  at  Algeria's  negotiation  of  a  Euro-Mediterranean  agreement  with 
the  EU  and  its  participation  in  the  Barcelona  process. 
221 1.  Algeria's  Breakdown  and  the  EU1s  Initial  Response 
The  breakdown  of  order  in  Algeria  began  with  the  mass  demonstrations  and  riots 
6 
of  1988.  A  series  of  strikes  orchestrated  by  the  Union  Generale  de  Travailleurs 
Algeriens  (UGTA),  a  banned  socialist  party  and  left  wing  elements  of  the  ruling 
FLN,  marked  the  limit  of  the  patience  of  the  Algerian  people  with  President 
Benjedid  Chadli's  programme  of  accelerated  economic  liberalisation.  7  In 
September  1988,  the  state  became  almost  bankrupt  after  several  years  of 
declining  oil  revenues  following  the  1985/6  price  crash.  Debt  servicing  to 
foreign  creditors  accounted  for  97%  of  export  earnings,  while  80%  of  state 
owned  companies,  Algeria's  biggest  employers,  were  in  the  red.  8  Rising 
unemployment,  swingeing  cuts  in  welfare  spending  and  a  sudden  hike  in  the  price 
of  basic  foodstuff  sparked  violent  demonstrations  in  October  1988.9  As  many  as 
500  people  were  killed  as  the  army and  police  brutally  crushed  the  protests, 
effectively  forcing  the  army  to  withdraw  from  the  front  line  of  Algerian  politics.  '  0 
The  riots  released  years  of  pent-up  frustration  with  one-party  domination  by  the 
FLN  and  with  a  socio-economic  structure  in  which,  according  to  the  Islamic 
opposition  group,  5  per  cent  of  the  population  earned  45  per  cent  of  Algeria's 
national  income.  "  Significantly,  the  aftermath  of  'Black  October'  also  saw  the 
emergence  of  the  Front  Islamique  A  Salut  as  a  political  force.  12 
The  European  Community's  reaction  to  the  1988  riots  was  low  key.  No 
statement  was  issued  by  the  Member  States  in  EPC-  Speaking  for  the  Member 
States,  the  Spanish  Council  Presidency  told  MEPs  that: 
The  Twelve  have  been  following  closely  the  recent  developments  in 
Algeria.  Individual  partners  have  expressed  their  opinion  publicly  or  to  the 
Algerian  authorities.  '  3 
222 Existing  EC-Algeria  cooperation  programmes  -  attached  to  the  Cooperation 
Agreement  and  financial  protocols  -  continued  uninterrupted.  Moreover,  the 
Commission  granted  the  Algerian  government  emergency  economic  assistance  in 
the  form  of  food  aid  worth  10.7  million  ECUs.  14  Overall,  though,  the 
Community  was  content  to  sit  back  and  watch  the  situation  develop.  The 
announcement  by  President  Chadli  of  an  ambitious  range  of  constitutional 
changes,  further  economic  reforms  and  moves  towards  political  pluralism  soon 
after  the  riots  seemed  to  vindicate  this  'wait  and  see'  approach.  It  was  left  to  the 
European  Parliament  to  act  as  the  democratic  conscience  of  the  Union.  It 
condemned  the  Algerian  government's  repression  of  the  protesters,  although  it 
too  commended  Chadli's  proposals  for  reform.  15 
The  Member  States'  individual  political  responses  were  similarly  low- 
key,  but  there  were  substantial  increases  in  bilateral  financial  assistance  to 
Algeria,  particularly  from  the  Mediterranean  group.  Jean-Jacques  Queyranne, 
spokesman  of  the  French  Parti  Socialiste,  argued  that  any  solution  should  come 
'from  within  the  Algerian  government'.  16  At  the  same  time,  the  PS  pushed  for 
extra  economic  aid  to  the  Algerian  government.  Chadli's  refonns,  which 
responded  to  the  increased  use  of  political  conditionality  by  the  French 
government,  were  welcomed  by  President  Mitterrand.  By  November  1988,  the 
French  government  had  agreed  to  boost  the  annual  level  of  financial  credits  to 
Algeria  from  231  million  ECUs  to  960  million  ECUs.  17  In  January  1989, 
Spain's  Ministry  of  Trade  announced  a  mixed  trade  credit  package  worth  of  970 
million  ECUs  to  boost  trade  and  allow  the  purchase  of  much  needed  industrial 
and  capital  goods  by  the  Algerian  government.  Similarly,  Italy  offered  Algeria  a 
3  year  export  credit  and  aid  package  worth  196  million  ECUs.  The  point  is  that 
the  level  of  assistance  granted  by  the  Member  States  dwarfed  direct  aid  from  the 
223 Community.  Bilateral  (Member  State-Algeria)  relations  were  to  remain  the 
dominant  level  at  which  Europe  dealt  with  the  regime  throughout  the  1990s. 
There  were  powerful  ulterior  motives  for  the  Community  to  throw  its 
weight  behind  Chadli:  fear  of  the  Islarnisation  of  Algeria  and  its  impact  on 
immigration  to  Europe.  As  a  leading  article  in  Le  Monde  argued: 
To  help  Algeria  on  the  road  to  democracy  and  prosperity  (which  in  the 
long  term  will  hardly  mean  more  than  providing  enough  food,  at  least  for 
the  masses)  will  be  expensive.  To  let  the  Algerians  sink  into  chaos  and 
fundamentalism  will  cost  more.  18 
Islam  rose  to  prominence  after  the  1988  riots  as  the  voice  of  disaffected  youth 
and  the  poorest  segment  of  Algerian  society.  19  The  harsh  climate  of  economic 
austerity  provided  fertile  ground  for  a  movement  whose  greatest  appeal  was  to 
the  country's  burgeoning  population  of  young,  unemployed  people.  Leaders  of 
the  Islamic  movement  accused  Chadli's  government  of  trying  to  pacify  the 
population  by  trying  to  fill  shelves  in  shops  rather  than  addressing  Algeria's  deep 
social  cleavages.  20  But  financial  aid  from  Western  Europe,  usually  targeted  at 
the  energy  sector  and  other  big  businesses,  did  not  attack  at  the  roots  of  the 
problems.  Indeed,  Algeria's  external  debt  continued  to  rise,  pushing  the 
government  inexorably  towards  a  potentially  unpopular  rescheduling  agreement 
with  the  IMF. 
21 
The  Algerian  economy  was  highly  dependent  on  trade  with  the 
Community,  with  the  latter  absorbing  around  70  per  cent  of  Algeria's  exports  and 
supplying  around  63  per  cent  of  its  imports.  Access  to  European  markets  was 
essential  for  Algerian  exporters  and  to  the  government's  attempt  to  diversify 
away  from  the  hydrocarbon  sector.  Table  7.1  (below)  shows  the  evolution  of 
trade  between  Algeria  and  the  Conununity  during  the  1980s.  Algeria  was  the 
only  country  in  the  southern  and  eastern  Mediterranean  with  which  the 
224 Community  ran  a  trade  deficit.  However,  when  account  is  taken  of  the  fact  that 
oil  and  natural  gas  provided  95%  per  cent  of  Algeria's  Community-derived 
export  revenues,  the  asymmetry  of  the  commercial  relationship  becomes 
apparent.  22  Moreover,  Algeria  accounted  for  only  0.3  per  cent  of  the 
Community's  external  trade,  making  it  relatively  unimportant  in  the  overall 
commercial  context  (outside  the  hydrocarbon  sector). 
Table  7.1  Trade  between  the  EC  and  Algeria  (Million  ECUs) 
1980  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988 
Imports  4028  8246  7732  9309  10289  6875  5383  4793 
Exports_  4754  5334  6147  7032  7145  5257  3884  3693* 
Balance  726  -2912  -1585  -2277  -3144  -1618  -1499  -1100-... 
*  The  dramatic  fall  in  EC  exports  to  Algeria  after  1985  was  one  outcome  of  the  government's 
decision  to  curb  imports  as  part  of  its  strategy  to  deal  with  the  deepening  economic  crisis. 
Source:  European  Commission  (1989)  'EEC-Algeria  Cooperation  Council',  Rapid  Database, 
Memo  89/33,  <<http:  //europa.  eu.  int/rapid)). 
When  the  dominance  of  the  energy  sector  is  taken  into  account,  it 
becomes  clear  that  the  Community's  quiet  response  to  Black  October  was  also 
laced  with  a  heavy  dose  of  economic  self-interest.  Algerian  gas  was  taking  a 
rapidly  growing  portion  of  the  European  market,  especially  in  France,  Italy  and 
Spain.  23  At  the  end  of  the  1980s,  it  accounted  for  nearly  a  third  of  the  French 
market  and  was  projected  to  capture  over  50  per  cent  of  the  Italian  market  and  70 
per  cent  of  the  Spanish  market  by  the  mid  1990s.  Much  of  it  was  to  be  supplied 
through  a  trarisnational  pipeline  running  from  Algeria  through  Morocco  into 
Spain.  24  Given  the  vulnerability  of  the  pipeline  and  past  experiences  with  the 
renationalisation  of  western  energy  companies  operating  in  Algeria,  political 
stability  was  seen  as  an  essential  prerequisite  of  guaranteed  supplies.  25  Revenues 
had  sharply  contracted  after  1986  as  world  market  prices  fell  and  the  dollar's 
225 value  appreciated,  driving  Sonatrach  to  seek  new  partners  and  new  markets.  26 
As  Chadli's  economic  liberalisation  project  subsumed  Sonatrach,  new  gas  supply 
contracts  were  signed  with  European,  Japanese  and  US  companies,  and  existing 
contracts  were  renegotiated  and  upgraded.  The  political  significance  of  these 
deals  was  clear.  The  French  government,  for  instance,  linked  its  credit  package 
to  the  resolution  of  a  long-standing  dispute  over  prices  for  the  supply  of  gas.  27 
Similarly,  both  Spain  and  Italy  negotiated  new  price  and  supply  deals  with 
Sonatrach  shortly  after  concluding  their  new  financial  agreements  with  Algeria.  28 
The  Community  had  another  motive  for  treating  Algiers  with  kid  gloves, 
one  related  to  its  Mediterranean  strategy.  In  1989,  the  Arab  Maghreb  Union 
regional  integration  project  was  launched  with  much  fanfare,  a  development  that 
the  EC  saw  as  a  means  to  underpin  economic  and  political  stability  in  North 
Africa.  The  idea  was  to  transform  intra-regional  political  and  economic  relations 
by  creating  a  regional  trading  bloc  modelled  on  the  Community.  Intra-Maghreb 
trade  would  be  made  easier  if  the  AMU  achieved  its  objectives  of  hannonising 
trade  regulations  and  introducing  free  movement  of  goods  and  services  between 
the  five  signatories.  Chadli's  rapprochement  with  the  Moroccan  government  was 
essential  to  the  success  of  the  AMU. 
Chadli's  'fast  track  to  democracy'  gathered  momentum  with  the 
introduction  of  a  new  constitution  in  November  198  9.29  In  contrast  to  the  more 
cautious  reforins  underway  in  the  other  Maghreb  countries,  the  new  pluralist 
constitution  promised  to  open  up  politics  to  the  full  spectrum  of  parties  and 
ideologies,  including  the  nascent  Islamic  movement.  By  way  of  encouragement, 
Community  and  national  leaders  made  a  number  of  official  visits  to  Algeria 
during  1989.  Commenting  on  a  visit  by  President  Franýois  Mitterrand,  a  leading 
article  in  Le  Monde  claimed  that: 
226 The  French  authorities  believe  that  Chadli  is  the  best  placed  to  be  able  to 
change  Algerian  society  and  that  he  has  the  best  chance  of  attaining  it  if  he 
is  able  to  steer  through  political  reforms  and  relaunch  the  economy.  " 
The  European  Commission  shared  this  view,  sending  Commissioner  Matutes  to 
Algeria  to  agree  a  schedule  for  the  distribution  of  Community  aid.  Four 
agreements  were  subsequently  signed  under  the  third  financial  protocol,  giving 
Algeria  26  million  ECUs  for  food  management,  energy  and  management  training 
proj  ects. 
Ultimately,  however,  the  reform  process  could  not  mask  continuing 
discontent  with  the  pace  and  direction  of  reforms.  For  many  of  the  new 
opposition  parties,  the  reforms  did  not  go  far  enough.  The  separation  of  the 
presidential  from  the  executive  and  legislative  branch  of  government  gave  Chadli 
-  who  had  been  reelected  in  December  1988  -  nominal  neutrality,  but  he  used  his 
role  as  'arbiter'  to  try  and  ensure  the  survival  of  the  FLN  regime.  With  the  floor 
open  for  opposition  politicians  to  exploit  the  govenu-nent's  poor  performance,  the 
old  order  quickly  came  under  sustained  attack  over  its  record  on  corruption, 
public  morality,  secularism  and  the  continued  influence  of  France  in  Algeria.  31 
The  big  winner  in  this  febrile  political  environment  was  the  Islamic  movement 
which  proved  highly  adept  at  mobilising  popular  support,  particularly  by  offering 
itself  as  an  altemative  provider  of  social  services  and  a  radical  alternative  to  the 
FLN-state.  As  Hugh  Roberts  argues,  Thadli  actually  facilitated  the  development 
of  the  FIS',  the  party  whose  electoral  appeal  was  to  prove  his  undoing.  32 
2.  Europe's  Silence:  The  End  of  the  Democratic  Experiment 
Chadli's  grip  on  power  in  Algeria  continued  to  loosen  during  1990  and  1991  as 
the  FIS  and  other  opposition  movements  capitalised  on  continuing  discontent 
with  the  country's  socio-economic  situation  and  the  opportunity  to  publicly 
227 criticise  the  FLN.  Notice  was  served  of  the  FIS'electoral  strength  in  the 
communal  elections  of  June  1990  when  the  FIS  secured  a  54  per  cent  share  of  the 
vote.  Despite  changes  to  the  electoral  system,  postponements  of  polls  and 
widespread  gerrymandering,  Chadli's  government  was  unable  to  counter  the 
momentum  building  behind  the  FIS  as  national  elections  approached.  33  In  the 
first  round  (December  199  1),  the  FIS  won  47.3  per  cent  of  the  vote  and  43.7  per 
cent  of  the  parliamentary  seats.  34  Overall,  Islamic  parties  took  a  55  per  cent 
share  and  secured  a  resounding  endorsement  for  their  anti-establishment 
platforms. 
35 
In  France,  the  results  were  greeted  by  a  mixture  of  alarm  and  quiet 
resignation.  Many  politicians  took  an  apocalyptic  view  of  the  crisis,  warning  of 
the  potential  for  mass  immigration  if  Algerians  sought  to  escape  the 
fundamentalist  state  that  was  expected  to  replace  the  old  order.  36  But  former 
Foreign  Minister  Roland  Dumas  appeared  less  perturbed,  arguing  that  there  was 
6no  more  to  fear  now  than  before  or  in  future',  and  that  Islam  was  'a  reality'  in 
the  region.  The  official  line  was  that  the  choice  of  the  Algerian  people  should  be 
respected.  Behind  the  scenes,  though,  France  and  the  rest  of  the  EU  had 
misjudged  the  strength  of  the  FIS  at  national  level  and  Chadli's  ability  to  bargain 
with  its  leaders.  37  This  uncertainty  was  exemplified  by  the  taciturn  attitudes  of 
Mitterrand  and  the  French  Foreign  Ministry  in  the  run  up  to  the  second  ballot.  38 
The  situation  took  a  dramatic  and  decisive  turn  when,  in  January  1992, 
the  army  removed  Chadli  and  cancelled  the  elections  . 
39  Chadli  had  offered  to 
share  power  in  secret  negotiations  with  the  FIS,  but  hard-line  elements  in  the 
army  were  totally  opposed  to  any  concessions  to  the  Islamists.  40  In  effect,  a 
military  coup  ended  the  democratic  experiment  and  left  a  politically  unstable 
state  facing  the  EU  across  the  Mediterranean.  Again,  opinion  in  France  wavered 
228 between  the  hawkish  pronouncements  of  the  right  and  the  pragmatism  of  the  left. 
The  Gaullist  Charles  Pasqua,  argued  that  French  cooperation  with  Algeria  should 
be  reviewed  and  even  abrogated.  A  number  of  Socialists,  including  President 
Mitterrand,  expressed  disquiet  at  the  cessation  of  the  democratic  process  and 
urged  its  resumption.  41 
It  was  at  this  stage  that  the  EU  settled  on  what  amounted  to  a  'non- 
decision'  on  Algeria.  The  EU  Member  States  made  a  vaguely  worded  call  for  a 
return  to  'nonnal  institutional  life'  and  'dialogue'  between  the  regime  and 
opposition,  but  avoided  aligning  the  Union  with  either  CaMp.  42  The  notion  of  a 
4non-decision'  does  not  imply  that  the  crisis  was  ignored.  Rather,  as  Michael 
Clarke  argues,  'it  describes  a  failure  to  confront  a  choice,  or even  to  recognise 
that  one  exists.  '  43  That  the  Union  initially  decided  to  do  nothing  owed  much  to 
France's  'relational'  power  over  its  European  partners  vis-a-vis  Algeria.  44  From 
the  outset,  the  French  government,  like  the  regime  itself,  ruled  out  external 
intervention  by  the  Union.  In  the  words  of  a  French  official:  'We  just  didn't  see 
the  possibility  for  the  EU  to  enter  with  credibility.  45  Unwilling  (or  unable)  to 
challenge  this  position,  the  other  member  governments  were  forced  to  follow  the 
French  lead.  As  a  UK  diplomat  put  it:  'French  policy  was  effectively  endorsed 
by  the  rest  of  the  EU.  No  thought  was  given  to  this  decision.  46 
However,  by  February  1992,  the  Union's  position  had  subtly  shifted, 
though  it  still  stopped  short  of  a  political  decision  on  the  coup.  A  statement, 
issued  in  the  EPC  framework  put  the  ball  in  the  regime's  court: 
The  Community  and  its  Member  States  strongly  urge  the  Algerian 
authorities  to  pursue  their  publicly  announced  commitments,  namely,  the 
social  and  economic  reforms,  the  restructuring  of  public  administration  and 
the  protection  of  fundamental  freedoms 
..... 
The  Community  and  its  Member 
States  are  willing  to  cooperate  with  the  Algerian  authorities  in  the  economic 
recovery  of  their  country,  bearing  in  mind  that  compliance  with  the 
229 aforementioned  principles  will  be  important  in  the  context  of  bilateral 
relations.  47 
Essentially,  the  Union  gave  the  regime  time  to  bed  itself  in  by  promising  that 
48  financial  aid  to  Algeria  would  not  be  disrupted.  This  non-decision  (not  to 
consider  suspending  aid)  was  not  without  logic.  The  Islamists'  campaign  of 
violence  alienated  the  FIS  from  many  of  its  supporters,  greatly  reducing  the 
likelihood  that  a  re-run  of  the  elections  would  produce  a  similar  result.  49 
Yet  the  Union  made  little  effort  to  justify  its  silence  on  Algeria.  Nor  did 
it  give  the  regime  a  time  limit  for  the  resumption  of  the  democratic  process.  In 
evading  firm  decisions,  the  Union  may  have  missed  the  best  opportunity  to  set  a 
precedent  for  international  peace-making  initiatives.  As  Barbara  Smith  argues: 
There  were  still  some  possible  courses  of  action  outsiders  could  recommend 
to  the  Algerian  govenu-nent.  And,  at  the  time,  the  regime  was  so  divided 
over  what  policy  to  adopt  toward  dissident  Islamic  political  groups  that  it  is 
at  least  possible  that  some  of  Algeria's  leaders  could  have  been  persuaded  to 
listen.  50 
It  is  easy  to  criticise  the  EU's  inaction  as  the  crisis  unfolded.  It  is  rather 
more  difficult,  even  with  the  benefit  of  hindsight,  to  suggest  what  policy  options 
were  available  and  credible.  Three  factors  mitigated  against  external 
involvement.  First,  the  political  situation  was  extremely  fluid.  It  was  neither 
clear  what  form  of  government  the  FIS  intended  to  purse,  nor  whether  the 
Algerian  public  would  accept  the  imposition  of  Islamic  order.  As  Claire  Spencer 
argues: 
At  no  stage  had  a  clear  and  unequivocal  statement  been  made  by  the  FIS 
leadership  that  it  would  respect  the  form  of  democracy  laid  down  in  the 
1989  Constitution'.  A  victory  for  the  FIS  would  possibly  have  created  an 
Islamic  state  governed  by  some  variant  of  the  Charia  code  on  the 
Community's  doorstep,  a  development  it  was  anxious  to  prevent.  51 
Second,  the  Haut  Comitj  dEtat,  installed  by  the  military  as  a  quasi 
civilian  government  after  the  coup,  was  quick  to  ward  off  external  interference  in 
230 what  it  viewed  as  an  purely  internal  problem.  Indeed,  it  drew  attention  to  the  fact 
that  the  FIS  leadership  itself  had  approved  of  France's  choice  not  to  intervene. 
Given  the  reservations  about  a  FIS  victory,  this  message  gave  the  Union  a 
convenient  excuse  to  stand  back.  Third,  European  investments  in  the  gas  sector 
may  well  have  been  j  eopardised  if  the  FIS  had  come  to  power.  While  the  FIS 
would  have  found  it  hard  to  maintain  high  levels  of  public  spending  without 
hydrocarbon  revenues,  the  investment  climate  for  foreign  capital  would  certainly 
have  been  judged  to  be  less  stable.  Abdelkader  Hachani,  provisional  leader  of 
the  FIS,  described  the  regime's  new  legislation  on  foreign  investments  in  the 
sector  'a  transaction  of  shame.  ' 
52 
Given  the  constraints  outlined  above,  the  Union's  'non-decision'  was  not 
surprising.  Yet  the  Union's  political  impotence  markedly  contrasted  with  the 
apparent  regularity  of  decisions  being  taken  on  the  economic  front.  In  line  with 
the  overall  increase  in  financial  resources  for  the  Mediterranean  non-member 
states,  Algeria  had  seen  its  allocation  of  financial  aid  rise  under  the  fourth 
financial  protocol. 
Table  7.2  EC-Algeria  Financial  Protocols  (Million  ECUs) 
Financial 
Protocol 
Duration  EIB  Loans  Budget  Total 
01  1976-1981  70  44  114 
02  1981-1986  107  44  151 
03  1986-1991  183  56  239 
*04  1992-1996  280  **70  350 
*  Among  the  8  Mediterranean  non-member  countries  benefiting  from  the  fourth  financial 
protocol,  Algeria's  share  of  resources  amounted  to  17  per  cent. 
**  Amount  includes  18  million  ECUs  in  venture  capital. 
No  direct  connection  was  made  by  the  Community  between  the  disbursement  of 
resources  and  the  annulment  of  the  elections.  Indeed,  the  Commission  reportedly 
231 expressed  surprise  at  rumours  that  financial  aid  might  be  frozen.  53  In  1991,  the 
Member  States  had  agreed  to  set  aside  300  million  ECUs  to  support  structural 
adjustment  programmes  in  the  Mediterranean  non-member  countries,  including 
Algeria.  As  a  supplement  to  this  programme  of  macro-economic  aid,  the 
Community  had  also  offered  Chadli's  government  a  medium-term  loan  of  400 
million  ECUs  prior  to  the  cancellation  of  the  elections.  Even  after  the  events  of 
January  1992,  the  only  new  conditions  attached  to  the  loan  related  to  the 
negotiation  of  a  reform  programme  between  Algeria  and  the  IMF,  not  to  the 
resumption  of  the  democratisation  process.  54 
This  decoupling  of  the  Community's  economic  relations  with  Algeria 
from  the  political  crisis  reveals  much  about  EU  external  policy-making.  First,  it 
lends  further  weight  to  the  argument  that  pillar  I  is  what  really  matters  in  EU 
foreign  policy.  A  collective  political  initiative  from  the  EU  might  have  been 
desirable  in  the  context  of  its  foreign  policy  ambitions,  but  would  have  had  little 
effect  on  a  regime  that  had  already  warned  off  the  international  community  from 
attempting  to  intervene  in  the  Algerian  crisis.  However,  there  can  be  no  doubt 
about  the  highly  politicised  nature  of  EU  and  bilateral  aid  from  the  Member 
States  and  its  importance  to  the  regime's  survival.  With  an  external  debt  of  24 
billion  ECUs  in  1992,  the  goodwill  of  western  creditors  and  their  willingness  to 
underpin  the  regime's  faltering  macro-economic  reform  programme  was  crucial 
to  the  financial  liquidity  of  the  Algerian  state.  55 
Second,  an  approach  centred  on  economic  support  and  technical 
cooperation  was  in  line  with  the  Union's  strategy  of  dealing  with  functional 
issues  rather  than  the  big  political  questions.  Cooperation  in  the  energy  field  was 
a  particularly  salient  example.  As  Janne  Haaland  Matlary  argues,  'energy  is  a 
prime  instrument  for  such  linkage  politics.  '  56  After  talks  between 
232 Commissioners  Abel  Matutes  (DGI),  Carlos  Cardoso  e  Cunha  (DG17  energy) 
and  the  Algerian  energy  minister  in  March  1992,  the  Union  agreed  to  look  at 
Algeria's  proposals  in  the  context  of  the  budgetary  allocation  for  regional 
cooperation  in  the  Mediterranean.  57  Of  even  greater  financial  significance  were 
the  new  contracts  being  signed  by  Sonatrach  with  multinational  oil  companies. 
The  Community's  assistance  was  sought  in  establishing  a  conducive  climate  for 
investment,  but  the  rest  was  left  to  private  capital. 
Third,  the  Union's  decision  to  offer  economic  support  without  political 
interference  represented  another  instance  of  a  position  defined  by  the  lowest 
common  denominator.  The  French  government's  assumption  that  'Islam  would 
be  "soluble"  in  the  face  of  economic  progress'  effectively  became  the  Union's 
strategy.  58  As  a  'mediator'  between  Algeria  and  the  Community,  the  French 
goverranent  clearly  exerted  pressure  on  its  partners  within  the  EU  institutions  to 
meet  the  regime's  financial  needs.  59  The  decision  to  provide  increased  balance  of 
payments  assistance  at  the  Luxembourg  European  Council  in  199  1,  for  instance, 
was  a  French  initiative.  60  As  a  Dutch  diplomat  put  it: 
They  [the  French]  are  quite  pushy  in  the  case  of  Algeria,  but  they  have 
reasons  for  that.  It's  always  a  question  if  you  can  stop  Moslems  by  pumping 
in  money,  because  where  the  money  goes  we  don't  know,  but  you  can't  deny 
the  French  for  trying.  61 
Only  as  the  crisis  worsened  did  divisions  within  the  EU  begin  to  surface  and  its 
political  position  come  under  fire. 
3.  The  Descent  into  Violence  and  the  EU's  First  Initiative 
The  assassination  of  President  Mohamed  Boudiaf  in  June  1992  seemed  to  harden 
the  resolve  of  the  EU  to  take  an  'arms  length  approach.  '  Commission  President 
Jacques  Delors  stated  that: 
23  33 The  Commission  is  sure  that  the  Algerian  people  and  the  nation's  leaders 
will  survive  this  new  crisis  with  reason  and  determination.  In  these  tragic 
hours,  it  plans  to  remind  them  of  its  solidarity  and  expresses  the  hope  that 
Algeria  will  return  to  a  period  of  peace  in  which  democratic  freedoms  and 
pluralism  are  respected.  62 
President  Mitterrand  expressed  the  hope  that  'Algeria  [would]  be  able  to 
overcome  this  severe  test',  and  pledged  that  the  Algerian  people  could  'count  on 
the  friendship  of  France'.  63  The  resort  to  violence  by  armed  elements  of  the 
Islamic  opposition,  principally  the  Groupe  Islarnique  Arme  (GIA),  may  have 
made  it  easier  for  the  EU  to  exonerate  its  position,  as  an  identifiable  'enemy'  of 
the  state  and  ordinary  people  was  emerging.  Furthermore,  the  decision  by  the 
regime  (May  1993)  to  break  diplomatic  relations  with  Iran  signalled  the 
military's  desire  to  be  at  the  forefront  of  the  struggle  against  radical  Islam, 
underlining  its  self-proclaimed  status  as  a  bulwark  against  fundamentalism.  As  it 
became  ever  more  difficult  to  identify  the  perpetrators  of  violence,  an  'arms 
length'  approach  increasingly  appeared  to  be  the  safest  option. 
The  civil  war  entered  a  new  and  more  dangerous  phase  late  in  1993,  when 
armed  Islamic  groups  began  to  target  foreign  residents  in  Algeria.  In  September, 
two  French  surveyors  were  kidnapped  and  murdered  by  Islamists,  the  first  such 
attack  on  foreigners  inside  Algeria.  Until  then,  the  safety  of  European  citizens 
working  in  Algeria  had  not  given  undue  cause  for  concern.  In  October,  the 
audacious  kidnapping  of  three  employees  of  the  French  Consulat  General  in 
Algiers  galvanised.  the  EU  into  another  EPC  statement  urging  the  Algerian 
authorities  to  'take  every  possible  measure  for  a  rapid  return  to  a  climate  that  will 
ensure  their  safety.  '  64 
French  citizens  working  in  Algeria  were  inevitably  prime  targets  for  the 
armed  Islamists.  65  When  the  kidnappers  eventually  released  the  French  consulate 
staff,  they  issued  a  warning  giving  French  expatriates  one  month  to  leave  Algeria. 
234 Other  foreign  nationals  were  also  warned  to  leave.  Foreign  minister  Alain  Juppe 
responded  by  offering  his  government's  assistance  to  the  regime  in  the  fight 
against  the  FIS  and  fundamentalism  in  general.  66  Nevertheless  by  the  end  of 
1994,  only  2000  French  citizens  were  left  in  the  country.  67  Other  Member  States 
paid  more  heed  to  the  warnings,  however,  and  advised  their  citizens  not  to  travel 
to  Algeria  unless  for  exceptional  reasons. 
The  deliberate  targetting  of  French  citizens  in  Algeria  stiffened  the  new 
Balladur  government's  resolve  and  temporarily  put  the  hawks  in  the  ascendancy. 
Alain  Juppe,  questioned  about  how  France  intended  to  help  Algeria  combat 
fundamentalism,  set  out  three  objectives: 
1)  To  halt  'terrorist  activities'  on  French  soil. 
2)  To  prevent  the  production  of  'hostile'  literature,  essentially  pro-FISIGIA 
literature. 
3)  To  increase  France's  bilateral  financial  aid  to  Algeria  to  around  960  million 
ECUs,  a  level  that  has  been  sustained  ever  since.  68 
Implementation  of  this  harder  line  was  swift.  In  a  sweeping  police  operation,  88 
Islamic  activists  were  arrested  and  Islamic  propaganda  seized.  This  action  drew 
an  angry  response  from  both  sides  in  Algeria.  Prime  Minister  Rheda  Malek 
insisted  that  the  rights  of  Algerians  living  on  European  soil  be  respected  . 
69  Raba 
Kebir,  a  leading  figure  in  the  FIS,  demanded  the  release  of  those  arrested  and 
called  on  France  to  cease  its  backing  for  'lepouvoir'.  70 
A  key  player  in  defining  the  Balladur  administration's  policy  on  Algeria 
was  Interior  Minister  Charles  Pasqua.  As  Spencer  observes,  'in  contrast  to  the 
policies  of  its  less  engaged  neighbours,  France's  reactions  to  events  in  Algeria 
[were]  led  as  much  by  the  Interior  as  the  Foreign  and  Defence  Ministries.  '  71 
Pasqua's  name  appeared  atop  a  restrictive  and  much  criticised  1993  law  on 
235 immigration,  and  it  was  largely  his  decision  to  clamp  down  on  the  activities  of 
Islamists  within  France.  Relations  with  the  Algerian/Moslem  communities  in 
France  were  seriously  damaged  by  the  new  measures.  72  Part  of  the  rationale  for 
the  so-called  loi  Pasqua  was  an  emotive  appeal  for  the  'preservation  of  the 
essential  values  of  French  society',  a  thinly  veiled  reference  to  a  perceived 
Islamic  threat  to  the  secular  basis  of  the  French  state  . 
73  Algeria's  generals 
formed  an  unspoken  alliance  with  Pasqua,  who  became  associated  with  the 
eradicateur  faction  in  the  regime.  74  The  GIA  viewed  France's  actions  as  a 
declaration  of  war,  and  responded  by  stepping  up  their  campaign  of  violence.  75 
Positive  action  by  the  Balladur  goverment  took  the  fonn  of  pressure  on  the 
London  and  Paris  international  creditors  club  to  obtain  a  debt  rescheduling 
agreement  for  Algeria.  It  successfully  secured  increased  aid  from  the  World 
Bank  and  western  governments,  though  the  Algerian  regime  continued  to  reject 
another  debt  rescheduling  agreement  with  the  IMF. 
While  many  of  France's  EU  partners  shared  its  concern  about  an  Islamic 
'domino  effect'  in  North  Africa,  they  were  averse  to  restricting  the  activities  of 
the  exiled  Algerian  opposition  on  their  own  territories.  The  presence  and 
freedom  of  speech  of  opposition  activists  was  regarded  as  a  civil  liberties  matter 
on  which  the  host  states  were  reluctant  to  compromise.  Germany  and  the  UK,  for 
instance,  both  came  in  for  criticism  from  the  Algerian  and  French  governments 
for  allowing  FIS  leaders  to  operate  on  their  territory.  Both  governments  also  kept 
S76 
an  open  mind  about  dialogue  with  the  FI, 
. 
Divisions  among  the  member 
governments  undoubtedly  prolonged  the  tendency  for  'non-decisions'.  Since  no 
consensus  could  be  reached  on  a  political  line,  the  subject  of  Algeria  was  rarely 
broached. 
236 The  hijacking  of  an  Air  France  airbus  in  Algiers  during  Christmas  1994 
brought  the  Algerian  crisis  onto  French  soil,  into  the  media  spotlight  and 
subsequently  into  the  Presidential  election  campaign.  The  hijackers  -  who 
described  themselves  as  FIS  representatives  rather  than  GIA  activists  -  timed  their 
action  and  chose  their  target  to  achieve  the  maximum  effect.  Air  France  aircraft 
were  among  the  last  symbols  of  France's  presence  in  Algeria.  Despite  a  much 
lauded  rescue  operation  by  France's  Groupe  dIntervention  de  la  Gendarmerie 
Nationale,  the  episode  highlighted  the  vulnerability  of  French  citizens  both  in 
Algeria  and  in  France,  leading  Balladur  and  Pasqua  to  clamp  down  even  harder 
on  the  activities  of  Islamic  groups.  The  hijacking  also  opened  a  rift  between  the 
French  government  and  the  regime,  which  was  criticised  by  Balladur  for  having 
delayed  giving  permission  for  the  aircraft  to  leave  Algiers.  77 
In  the  absence  of  governmental  action,  it  was  left  to  NGOs  to  maintain  a 
critical  watch  on  the  deteriorating  human  rights  situation  in  Algeria.  Human 
rights  organisations,  particularly  Amnesty  International,  continually  reproached 
the  regime  and  armed  Islamic  groups,  and  berated  the  international  community 
for  failing  to  deal  with  the  crisis.  The  most  promising  peace-making  initiative 
stemmed  was  brokered  by  a  small,  Christian  NGO  based  in  Rome,  the 
Sant'Egido  Community.  In  the  so-called  'Rome  platform'  of  early  1995,  the  vast 
majority  of  Algeria's  opposition  parties,  including  the  FIS,  agreed  on  a  set  of 
principles  and  mutual  guarantees  designed  to  allow  the  democratic  process  to  be 
resumed.  Critcally,  though,  neither  Zeroual's  representatives  nor  representatives 
of  the  GIA  attended.  Moreover,  the  document  explicitly  ruled  out  external 
intervention,  stating  that  the  parties  were  'opposed  to  any  interference  in  the 
internal  affairs  of  Algeria'.  78  As  Dominque  Moisi  argued,  'if  the  army  doesn't 
237 feel  the  need  to  compromise,  then  what  happened  in  Rome  will  be  just  talk.  179 
The  regime  immediately  rejected  the  Rome  Platform 
Italy  was  the  first  Member  State  to  publicly  break  rank  over  EU  policy  on 
the  Algerian  crisis.  80  As  Rich  and  Joseph  argue,  'the  Italian  government  [was] 
torn  between  its  need  to  safeguard  hydrocarbon  imports  and  concern  over  the 
potential  security  risks  posed  by  further  deterioration  of  the  conflict.  81  In  January 
1997,  an  under-secretary  in  the  Italian  Foreign  Ministry,  Pierre  Fassino,  hinted 
that  Italy  was  about  to  launch  a  peace  initiative,  calling  for  the  EU's  backing. 
Foreign  Minister  Lamberto  Dini  quickly  disavowed  Fassino's  proposal,  ruling 
out  any  independent  mediating  role  for  Italy.  82  But  he  too  called  for  the  EU  to 
pursue  a  negotiated  settlement,  arguing  that  the  Union  should  'emerge  from  a 
condition  of  passivity  and  lack  of  interest  and  help  Algeria,  though  without 
interfering,  to  overcome  the  current  crisis.  '  83  However,  in  a  trilateral  meeting 
with  the  French  and  Spanish  governments  shortly  after,  the  Italians  were 
persuaded  by  France  to  put  their  proposal  on  ice.  84 
At  the  end  of  1997,  the  EU  finally  started  to  take  a  tougher  line  with  the 
regime.  When  Foreign  Minister  Ahmed  Attaf  came  to  Luxembourg  in  November 
and  accused  Belgium,  France,  Germany,  Italy  and  the  UK  of  harbouring  terrorists 
and  of  giving  them  logistical  support  on  the  pretext  of  their  being  asylum  seekers, 
he  received  a  rebuke  from  Luxembourg's  Foreign  Minister  Jacques  Poos.  Poos 
defended  the  Union's  right  to  consider  exiled  members  of  the  Islamic  opposition 
as  asylum  seekers  and  warned  the  Algerian  government  that  it  should  not  just 
treat  the  crisis  as  an  issue  of  terrorism,  but  should  do  more  to  protect  its  own 
citizens.  85  At  the  same  time,  Poos  called  for  greater  openness  on  the  part  of  the 
regime  about  the  conflict  in  Algeria  and  for  restrictions  on  the  media  to  be  lifted. 
238 In  the  end,  the  Europeans  were  forced  to  act  by  the  sheer  scale  of  the 
violence.  An  upsurge  in  violence  during  the  winter  of  1997-8  to  unprecedented 
levels  -  1500  deaths  during  Ramadan  alone  -  received  sustained  coverage  in  the 
West  European  press.  A  new  EU  initiative,  launched  by  UK  Foreign  Minister 
Robin  Cook  after  strong  pressure  from  German  Foreign  Minister  Klaus  Kinkel, 
was  a  first  test  for  the  Labour  government's  new  'ethical'  foreign  PoliCY. 
86  A 
succession  of  extended  press  reports  in  the  UK  and  a  direct  appeal  to  the 
European  Parliament  by  the  FIS  convinced  the  Foreign  Office  that  something  had 
to  be  done.  87  After  discussing  an  initiative  with  its  partners  in  Brussels,  the  UK 
announced  that  the  EU  would  send  a  team  to  Algeria. 
Initially,  a  delegation  comprising  of  regional  directors  from  the  foreign 
ministries  of  the  UK,  Luxembourg  and  Austria  was  rejected  by  Foreign  Minister 
Attaf  as  'inappropriate.  '  88  The  fact  that  the  EU  had  to  concede  on  both  the 
composition  of  the  delegation  and  the  subjects  it  would  be  permitted  to  discuss 
was  indicative  of  both  the  regime's  sensitivity  on  external  intervention  and  of  the 
EU's  own  failure  to  define  the  purpose  of  its  mission.  Attaf  argued  that  the 
delegation  should  primarily  focus  on  the  fight  against  terrorism.  The  EU, 
however,  aimed  to  raise  the  issue  of  human  rights  with  the  regime,  calling  for  a 
UN  rapporteur  to  be  allowed  to  investigate  the  situation.  It  was  another  example 
of  a  superficially  activist,  but  reliably  hesitant  EU  passing  the  buck. 
Following  prickly  negotiations  with  the  regime,  the  EU  was  forced  to 
upgrade  the  status  of  its  delegation  to  junior  ministerial  level.  Meetings  were 
held  with  both  Ministers  and  representatives  of  the  opposition  and  press,  and 
were  a  limited  success  for  the  Union  in  raising  its  diplomatic  profile.  But  in 
substantive  terms  the  mission  merely  underlined  the  regime's  intransigence  in  the 
face  of  extemal  pressure.  Attaf  was  persuaded  to  accept  the  idea  of  an  ad  hoc 
239 political  'dialogue'  with  the  EU,  but  it  in  practice  meant  nothing  more  than 
periodic  meetings  where  the  Union  could  maintain  the  impression  that  it  was 
taking  action.  It  was,  as  the  UK  Minister  involved  put  it,  'a  tactical  fig  leaf  in 
the  short  term.  89  The  mission  failed  to  make  much  headway  on  the  subject  of 
mediation,  although  an  invitation  was  extended  to  Attaf  to  meet  with  Robin  Cook 
in  London  at  the  end  of  the  year.  90  The  regime  refused  outright  a  request  to  allow 
the  UN  to  conduct  an  inquiry  into  human  rights  in  the  country.  A  fatal  bus  bomb 
in  Algiers  while  the  meetings  were  taking  place  was  a  tragically  poignant 
counterpoint  to  the  mission. 
The  reaction  of  the  FIS  leadership  to  the  Troika's  visit  revealed  a  shift 
away  from  outright  rejection  of  external  intervention.  In  a  letter  to  Robin  Cook, 
Anwar  Haddam,  President  of  the  exiled  FIS  members,  made  a  number  of 
demands  of  the  EU: 
It  is  our  hope,  at  a  time  where  there  is  a  lack  of  political  freedom  in  Algeria, 
to  see  the  European  Union,  under  the  leadership  of  the  government  of  Her 
Majesty,  open  the  doors  of  its  countries  to  FIS  representatives  to  freely 
express  the  suffering  and  the  aspirations  of  the  Algerian  people.  It  is  our 
deep  hope  and  strong  request  to  the  European  countries  to  immediately  put 
an  end  to  the  activities  of  those  who  had  claimed  responsibility  for  these 
horrible  massacres  and  crimes  committed  against  civilians  in  Algeria,  and  to 
bring  them  to  justice.  It  is  also  our  hope  to  see  the  EU  monitor  different 
Algerian  embassies  and  their  suspicious  activities.  Finally,  we  hope  to  see  an 
end  to  any  military  or  financial  aid  to  the  regime  in  place.  91 
For  his  part,  Attaf  defended  the  regime's  refusal  to  allow  an  international 
committee  of  inquiry  on  a  number  of  grounds.  First,  he  made  an  emotive  defence 
of  Algerian  independence.  He  claimed,  with  some  justification,  that  all  the 
political  parties  in  Algeria  would  reject  outside  intervention.  His  claim  that  the 
Algerian  people  cared  deeply  about  their  independence  was  less  easy  to  justify. 
Second,  and  far  less  convincingly,  Attaf  questioned  the  focus  of  the  nquiry 
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light  the  covert  activities  of  the  military. 
In  a  partial  volteface,  however,  the  Algerian's  finally  agreed  to  allow  a 
UN  team  into  the  country  in  July  to  undertake  an  'information  gathering' 
mission.  92  The  so-called  'eminent  persons'  committee,  led  by  Fon-ner  Portuguese 
President  Mario  Soares,  was  requested  not  to  meet  the  FIS,  and  was  only  allowed 
entry  on  condition  that  their  report  would  not  produce  binding  conclusions  on  the 
UN.  93  Its  report  balanced  encouragement  for  political  liberalisation  with 
criticism  of  both  sides  for  a  campaign  of  violence  which  had  claimed  an 
estimated  120,000  lives  by  1999.94  However,  the  committee  was  short  on 
recommendations  for  the  international  community.  It  made  only  vague  calls  for 
the  west  to  offer  'cooperation  and  support'  for  political,  economic  and  social 
reforms,  and  the  fight  against  terrorism.  95  In  the  final  analysis,  simply  keeping 
diplomatic  channels  to  the  regime  open  was  all  the  outside  world  could 
realistically  achieve. 
4.  Algeria  and  the  Euro-Mediterranean  Partnership 
The  linking  of  the  EU's  economic  policy  instruments  to  its  political  objectives, 
employed  with  some  success  in  the  Middle  East  Peace  Process,  was  conspicuous 
by  its  absence  when  it  came  to  Algeria.  Neither  of  the  two  main  conduits  of  the 
Union's  Mediterranean  strategy  -  the  Euro-Mediterranean  Agreements  and  the 
Barcelona  Process  -  were  utilised  to  try  and  bring  the  regime  and  the  opposition 
forces  to  the  negotiating  table.  Any  attempt  to  attach  strong  political  conditions 
to  the  opening  of  negotiations  on  a  Euro-Mediterranean  agreement  may  well  have 
been  futile  given  the  low-level  of  non-hydrocarbon  trade  between  the  EU  and 
Algeria.  The  regime  did  not  'need'  a  trade  liberalisation  agreement  to  anywhere 
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with  the  EU  presented  'no  special  difficulties'  for  Algerian  producers,  accounting 
for  only  I  per  cent  of  export  revenues,  while  oil  and  gas  products  were  totally 
excluded  from  the  agreement.  96  The  Barcelona  process  deliberately  kept  clear  of 
domestic  politics  and  human  rights  issues,  such  was  their  sensitivity  for  most  of 
the  partner  countries.  Despite  the  near  civil  war  going  on  in  the  country,  Algeria 
was  a  6normal'  participant  in  the  Euro-Mediterranean  Partnership. 
One  of  the  major  problems  for  the  EU  was  the  withdrawal  of  all  but  a 
handful  of  its  diplomats  from  Algeria  during  1995  and  1996.  Many  EU-financed 
projects  had  to  be  cancelled  or  frozen  as  consultants  and  the  Commission's 
representative  staff  in  Algiers  left  the  country.  97  Responsibility  for  analysing  the 
economic  situation  in  Algeria  and  for  overseeing  the  structural  adjustment 
programme  was  effectively  handed  to  the  World  Bank,  although  the  Commission 
did  maintain  close  contact  with  World  Bank  personnel  through  frequent  meetings 
in  Brussels.  An  unintended  effect  of  this  delegation  of  responsibility  to  the 
World  Bank  was  to  reinforce  the  sense  that  the  EU  was  simply  following  the 
IMF/World  Bank  neo-liberal  orthodoxy  in  its  policy  on  Algeria. 
Exploratory  discussions  on  Algeria's  Euro  -Mediterranean  agreement 
began  in  began  in  March  1997,  several  years  behind  schedule.  The  delay  was  a 
deliberate  move  by  the  Commission,  which  chose  to  wait  until  the  election  of 
President  Liamine  Zeroual  in  1995  and  parliamentary  elections  in  1997  had 
taken  place  in  order  to  give  some  semblance  of  legitmacy  to  its  negotiations  with 
the  regime.  The  Commission  was  also  concerned  that  securing  the  passage  of  the 
agreement  through  the  European  Parliament  might  be  difficult  before  the 
Algerian  people  had  been  given  a  chance  to  pass  judgement  on  the  regime.  98 
242 When  the  polls  were  approved,  with  some  reservations,  by  international 
observers,  the  Commission  began  to  negotiate. 
The  Troika  mission  to  Algeria  clearly  complicated  the  Commission's  task 
by  hardening  the  regime's  resolve  in  its  negotiations  with  the  Union.  Issues 
already  flagged  by  Algerian  negotiators  prior  to  the  EU  mission  -  the  negative 
impact  of  free  trade  on  the  industrial  and  agricultural  sectors,  and  the  question  of 
provisions  on  the  free  movement  of  people  -  became  major  sticking  points.  99  The 
Algerian  government  argued  that  the  dismantling  of  tariff  barriers  and  the 
removal  of  duties  on  the  scale  required  by  the  EU  would  cause  substantial 
damage  to  an  economy  that  heavily  relied  on  subsidies  and  other  forms  of 
protection  from  the  state.  100  The  Algerians  also  argued  that  the  idea  of 
4partnership'  was  meaningless  without  allowing  for  the  free  movement  of  people 
and  better  protection  for  Algerian  immigrants  in  EU  countries.  Visa  restrictions 
in  particular  were  making  it  difficult  for  Algerian  citizens  to  enter  Western 
Europe.  However,  as  a  British  diplomat  put  it,  'there  isn't  anyone  in  the  EU  who 
supports  the  idea  that  Algeria  has  genuine  problems  with  the  agreement.  '  101  The 
Member  States  viewed  Algeria's  insistence  on  a  stronger  'third  pillar'  component 
in  the  agreement  as  a  thinly  disguised  attempt  to  improve  cooperation  on  counter- 
terrorism. 
It  remains  to  be  seen  what  will  happen  when  the  final  Agreement  is  put 
before  national  parliaments  of  the  EU  Members.  Member  States  which 
traditionally  emphasise  human  rights,  such  as  Sweden  and  Finland,  might  call 
into  question  elements  of  the  agreement  and  its  lack  of  conditionality  upon  the 
demands  made  by  the  EU.  102  On  balance,  however,  it  seems  more  likely  that 
ratification  will  proceed  without  difficulty.  Given  that  national  parliaments  and 
the  EP  were  so  circumspect  about  withholding  ratification  of  the  EU-Israel 
243 agreement  when  the  latter  was  in  clear  violation  of  UN  resolutions  and  the  Oslo 
agreements,  it  seems  unlikely  that  they  will  be  any  more  decisive  about  what  is 
an  extremely  complex  domestic  political  crisis.  Furthermore,  concern  about 
Europe's  commercial  interests  in  Algeria  means  that  Member  States  continue  to 
be  reluctant  to  push  the  regime  too  far. 
The  Barcelona  process  has  deliberately  steered  clear  of  the  Algerian 
question,  despite  attempts  by  the  regime  to  influence  the  agenda.  Foreign 
Minister  Ahmed  Attaf,  for  instance,  criticised  the  refusal  of  the  EU  to  put 
terrorism  on  the  agenda  of  meetings  of  the  senior  officials  dealing  with  political 
and  security  questions.  103  Later,  the  Algerians  presented  their  own  version  of  a 
Mediterranean  stability  pact,  again  with  a  heavy  emphasis  on  counter- 
terrorism.  104  Algeria  even  emerged  as  the  defacto  leader  of  the  Arab  group 
within  the  Barcelona  process.  '  05  Working  alongside  British  diplomats  in  the  run- 
up  to  the  Palermo  Foreign  Ministers'  meeting,  Algerian  diplomats  were 
instrumental  in  persuading  the  Lebanese  and  Syrian  governments  to  attend. 
The  basic  problem  was  that  the  Algerians  and  the  EU  defined  the  crisis  in 
different  ways.  Attaf  drew  on  references  in  the  Barcelona  Declaration  to  the 
terrorism  and  argued  that  the  Mediterranean  partners  should  assist  in  the  fight 
against  it,  a  thinly  veiled  way  of  criticising  those  EU  Member  States  that  played 
host  to  the  exiled  opposition.  The  EU,  by  contrast,  always  insisted  that  the 
Barcelona  process  was  not  intended  to  interfere  in  domestic  politics.  Yet  the 
Algerian  regime  has  undoubtedly  violated  several  of  the  human  rights  and 
democratic  clauses  of  the  Barcelona  text.  A  potentially  dangerous  precedent  has 
been  set  in  which  governments  under  fire  over  their  human  rights  record  can 
continue  to  participate  in  a  multilateral  process  that  is  supposed  to  improve  the 
lives  of  ordinary  people  around  the  Mediterranean. 
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The  civil  war  in  Algeria  has  thrown  the  limitations  of  the  EU  as  a  political  actor 
into  sharp  relief.  Faced  with  a  highly  unstable  neighbour  and  a  civil  conflict 
which  clearly  has  a  negative  impact  on  the  Europe,  the  EU's  neglect  of  Algeria  is 
a  serious  threat  to  the  credibility  of  its  Mediterranean  policy.  Instead  of  leading 
by  example,  the  Union  has  stood  by  and  watched  human  rights  abuses  occur  on  a 
breathtaking  scale.  When  European  governments  did  finally  launch  a  diplomatic 
initiative,  the  mission  manifestly  lacked  purpose.  It  is  difficult  to  avoid 
concluding  that  the  Union  is  simply  not  suited  to  dealing  with  the  kind  of 
complex  civil  conflict  that  has  beset  Algeria. 
Three  problems  in  particular  stand  out.  First,  the  EU's  relations  with 
Algeria  during  the  1990s  have  continued  to  be  determined  by  French  policy. 
Indeed,  it  is  France's  analysis  of  the  source  of  the  conflict  (Islam  versus 
democracy)  and  the  most  appropriate  means  to  resolve  it  (to  back  the  regime, 
with  qualified  support  for  elections  and  a  return  to  a  tenuous  form  of  political 
pluralism)  that  has  prevailed  in  Brussels.  As  an  Algerian  human  rights  lawyer 
argues: 
The  EU  has  failed  by  giving  a  free  rein  to  France  in  leading  EU  policy  on 
Algeria.  The  flagrant  failure  of  the  French  approach  and  that  of  the  regime 
which  they  support  has  been  amply  demonstrated  over  the  last  three  years.  It 
does  EU  credibility  in  North  Africa  and  the  Arab  world  no  good  for  the  EU 
to  continue  to  allow  the  French  a  virtual  monopoly  in  EU  foreign  policy  on 
this  matter.  106 
This  capture  of  a  policy  issue  by  a  single  Member  State  exemplifies  the  weakness 
of  the  Union's  foreign  policy-making  process.  Where  intergovernmentalism 
prevails,  the  interests,  perceptions  and  positions  of  one  state  can  define  the  EU's 
position  or  exclude  the  possibility  of  a  political  position  altogether.  Since  the 
245 CFSP  operates  on  the  basis  of  unanimity,  it  was  inevitable  that  no  common 
position  or  joint  action  on  Algeria  was  ever  adopted  by  the  Union. 
Second,  the  opposition  of  the  regime  and  Algerian  political  parties  to 
external  interference  in  the  conflict  provided  the  Union  with  a  convenient,  but 
poor,  excuse  for  its  non-decision.  107  The  1990s  have  seen  the  Union  devote  an 
increasing  amount  of  resources  to  so-called  'good  governance'  -  respect  for 
universal  human  rights,  fundamental  freedoms  and  the  democratic  process. 
Justifying  its  silence  on  the  grounds  that  the  conflict  is  Algeria's  problem  calls 
into  question  the  Union's  commitment  to  stick  to  these  principles.  Similarly,  the 
Euro-Mediterranean  Partnership,  which  was  also  intended  to  encourage  'good 
governance'  in  all  the  Mediterranean  partner  countries,  has  proved  impotent 
when  conflicts  have  arisen  either  between  or  within  partner  countries. 
Third,  pillar  I  policy  instruments  have  proved  equally  ineffective  as  a 
means  to  influence  the  behaviour  of  the  Algerian  regime.  The  Euro- 
Mediterranean  Agreement  has  little  economic  value  to  Algeria,  the  key  to  using 
trade  policy  as  a  tool  of  suasion.  Nor  have  serious  questions  yet  been  raised 
nl-ý about  the  continued  provision  of  financial  assistance  from  the  MEDA  budget 
which,  in  any  case,  is  greatly  exceeded  by  bilateral  aid  and  trade  credits  from  the 
Member  States.  Indeed,  almost  the  reverse  applies,  with  the  regime  seeking  to 
use  the  Agreement  for  its  own  ends. 
Yet  the  Union  cannot  continue  to  take  'non-decisions'  on  Algeria.  The 
'election'  of  regime  representatives  is  certainly  no  substitute  for  genuinely 
competitive  elections.  As  population  growth  continues  to  outstrip  the  capacity  of 
the  Algerian  economy  to  provide  a  sufficient  number  of  new  jobs,  the  likelihood 
of  a  social  explosion  increases.  The  most  optimistic  forecasts  predict  annual 
GDP  growth  of  4  per  cent  into  the  early  part  of  the  next  millennium.  World  Bank 
246 estimates  suggest  5  per  cent  growth  outside  the  hydrocarbon  sector  would  be 
needed  simply  to  keep  up  with  the  flow  of  young  people  entering  the  job 
market.  108  Trade  credits,  macro-economic  restructuring  and  IMF  austerity 
programmes  mean  little  to  the  burgeoning  number  of  jobless,  disenfranchised 
people  of  Algeria.  As  Pierre  Sane,  Secretary  General  of  Amnesty  International 
argues: 
The  international  community  has  turned  its  back  on  the  Algerian  human 
rights  tragedy.  Such  indifference  in  the  face  of  so  much  horror  is  an 
abdication  of  their  responsibility  towards  the  Algerian  people.  '  09 
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252 Chapter  8 
CONCLUSIONS 
The  Euro-Mediterranean  Partnership  represented  the  first  credible  attempt  at 
strategic  action  by  the  EU  in  the  Mediterranean.  The  EU  developed  a  strong  sense 
of  purpose  in  the  its  relationships  with  Mediterranean  non-member  countries,  and 
projected  an  impression  of  coherence  between  the  Union's  stated  policy  objectives 
and  the  measures  associated  with  them.  However,  a  positive  assessment  of  the 
strategy  must  be  tempered  by  a  rather  more  negative  assessment  of  the  EMP's 
actual  record  to  date.  A  gap  quickly  appeared  between  rhetoric  and  reality  as  the 
Union's  protective  external  trade  regime  and  the  chronic  problem  of  Arab-Israeli 
relations  seriously  impeded  the  implementation  of  the  Euro-Mediterranean 
strategy.  More  significantly,  perhaps,  analysts  are  increasingly  calling  into 
question  the  degree  to  which  the  EMP  can  actually  change  the  underlying  structure 
of  what  is  in  many  respects  an  exercise  in  managing  North-South  relations  is 
certainly  questionable.  I 
This  chapter  moves  towards  a  final  analysis  of  the  current  genesis  of  EU 
Mediterranean  policy,  both  in  terms  of  the  EMP  strategy  and  its  wider 
implications  for  the  EU  as  an  global  actor.  The  first  section  considers  what  the 
development  of  the  EMP  tells  us  about  the  kind  of  strategic  action  that  the  EU 
produces  and  how  the  pillar  I  is  used  as  the  basis  for  this  strategic  action.  Section 
two  assesses  how  far  the  EMP  has  bridged  the  divide  between  pillar  I-  the 
Union's  foreign  economic  policy  -  and  pillar  11  -  the  CFSP.  This  blurring 
between  the  two  pillars  was  not  deliberately  and  systematically  pursued  by  the 
Union,  but  was  driven  by  the  nature  of  a  strategy  which  demanded  a  more 
253 effective  harnessing  of  foreign  economic  policy  instruments  to  political  objectives. 
The  third  section  revisits  the  'civilian  power5  concept  which  attracted  renewed 
attention  at  the  start  of  the  1990s  as  a  potential  role  for  the  Union  to  play  in  the 
post-Cold  War  world.  The  EMP  incorporates  many  of  the  basic  tenets  of  the 
civilian  power  concept.  The  final  section  employs  Christopher  Hill's  seminal 
'capabilities-expectations  gap'  thesis  as  an  analytical  tool  to  assess  whether  the 
EMP  has  changed  the  EU's  status  as  an  international  actor.  2 
Strategic  Action:  The  EU  as  Framework,  EC  as  Agent 
The  word  'strategy'  appears  throughout  the  policy  documents  that  set  out  the 
Union's  proposals  for  a  new  Mediterranean  policy.  The  Commission  clearly  saw 
a  need  to  sell  its  ideas  to  the  Member  States  and  the  partner  countries  as  a  long- 
tenn  action  plan,  justifying  the  allocation  of  additional  financial  resources  to  the 
region  and  trade  concessions  on  the  grounds  that  the  Mediterranean  region  would 
be  made  more  secure.  In  that  sense,  strategic  action  also  served  a  legitimating 
function  for  the  further  Europeanisation  of  national  Mediterranean  policies. 
However,  the  Union's  claim  that  the  EMP  is  a  'strategy  '  does  not  make  it  one, 
nor  can  we  assess  its  effectiveness  without  considering  precisely  what  constitutes 
a4  strategy'. 
The  notion  of  EU  strategic  action  assumes  both  an  autonomous  capacity  to 
pursue  policy  strategies  that  are  distinctly  'European'  and  some  form  of  'effective 
international  agency'.  3  Taking  the  assumption  that  the  EU  can  act  strategically 
first,  the  EMP  arose  out  of  the  political  commitment  of  the  Member  States  to  task 
the  Union  with  the  formulation  of  a  new  Mediterranean  policy.  Perceptions 
converged  around  the  view  that  European  states  had  to  carry  a  bigger  share  of  the 
burden  of  post-Cold  War  security  in  the  Mediterranean,  and  the  Union  was 
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prescribed  policy  measures  after  experimentation  with  the  CSCE,  5+5  dialogue 
and  other  sub-regional  forums.  Previous  incarnations  of  Mediterranean  policy 
had  lacked  a  well-defined  set  of  objectives.  The  label  'policy'  was  merely  a 
convenient  disguise  for  a  disparate  collection  of  agreements  with  Mediterranean 
third  countries,  which  were  more  a  product  of  the  'logic  of  externalisation'  than 
the  result  of  any  coherent,  long-tenn  planning.  4  By  contrast,  the  purposes  of  the 
EMP  were  thoroughly  examined  and  debated  from  the  end  of  the  1980s  onwards 
in  the  context  of  the  wider  debate  about  'new'  or  'soft'  security.  A  considerable 
volume  of  analysis  and  research  pointed  to  the  need  for  policy  change. 
So  the  1990s  saw  the  EU  lay  down  the  foundations  for  purposeful  strategic 
action  in  the  Mediterranean.  What  were  its  principal  objectives,  and  how 
'European'  were  they?  The  fundamental  aim  of  the  EMP  project  was  to  foster 
'security  and  stability'  in  the  Mediterranean  by  increasing  the  prosperity  of  the 
partner  states  and  by  enhancing  cooperation  at  the  governmental  and  societal 
levels.  There  was  a  strong  sense  of  unity  among  the  Member  States  and  EU 
institutions  about  the  importance  of  Mediterranean  security  to  European  security. 
Northern  Member  States  were  persuaded  that  the  negative  impact  of  instability  in 
the  Mediterranean  region  could  spread  throughout  Western  Europe  in  the  fonn  of 
dramatically  increased  immigration,  deleterious  consequences  for  Europe's 
Islamic  communities  and  threats  to  European  economic  interests  in  the  partner 
countries.  Meanwhile,  the  southern  Member  States  had  manifestly  vital  economic 
and  political  interests  in  a  stable  Mediterranean  region  and  increasingly  took  the 
view  that  the  challenge  could  best  be  met  by  shifting  national  bilateral  policies  to 
the  EU  level.  The  Commission's  proposals  for  the  EMP  therefore  found  a 
receptive  audience,  giving  the  project  a  strong  European  flavour  from  the  outset. 
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the  'securitisation'  of  the  discourse  surrounding  Western  Europe's  relationships 
with  its  Mediterranean  neighbours  at  the  end  of  the  1980s,  the  Commission's 
proposals  were  based  on  a  series  of  inter-connected  arguments.  Together,  they 
added  up  to  a  compelling  case  for  the  practical  application  of  'soft  security'  to  EU 
Mediterranean  policy.  Their  ideological  grounding  combined  the  classic 
functionalist  approach  to  cooperative  international  relations  with  orthodox  neo- 
liberal  economic  thinking.  A  clear  link  was  identified  between  economic 
development,  political  and  social  stability  and  regional  security.  By  extension,  as 
the  major  trading  partner  of  all  the  partner  countries  and  the  biggest  provider  of 
financial  aid,  the  EU  and  its  Member  States  had  a  special  responsibility  to  take  the 
lead  in  building  a  new,  socio-economically  oriented  framework  for  regional 
security. 
Behind  this  'logic  of  assistance',  however,  was  a  less  progressive  agenda, 
one  centred  on  the  domestic  interests  of  the  Member  States.  For  the  Southern 
Member  States  in  particular,  the  possibility  of  destabilised  states  and  Islamic 
regimes  in  North  Africa  raised  the  spectre  of  mass  immigration,  the  spread  of 
terrorism  and  even  the  possibility  of  military  challenges.  The  Barcelona 
Declaration  contains  references  to  combating  terrorism  and  organised  crime  in 
both  the  first  and  third  chapters.  Crudely  speaking,  one  of  the  priorities  of  the  new 
Mediterranean  policy  for  the  Member  States  was  to  'combat  fundamentalism' 
which  in  practice  meant  preserving  the  political  status  quo  in  many  partner 
countries.  The  EU's  'non-decisions'  on  Algeria  clearly  revealed  this  unspoken 
rationale  for  the  EMP.  While  the  Union  carefully  avoided  associating  the  EMP 
with  a  'threat'  from  the  south,  fears  of  an  Islamic  'domino  effect'  were  widely 
expressed  in  European  capitals. 
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overlooked  in  an  explanation  of  the  EMP.  Despite  the  comparatively  low  volume 
of  trade  between  the  EU  and  the  Mediterranean  partner  countries  (when  compared 
to  the  EU's  trade  with  other  states  and  regional  groupings),  there  were  sectors  in 
which  the  Union  had  a  fundamental  interest  in  safeguarding  its  external  economic 
interests.  The  hydrocarbon  sector  -a  highly  strategic  sector  in  its  own  right  -  was 
excluded  from  the  Euro-Mediterranean  agreements,  but  occupied  a  prominent 
position  in  the  follow-up  programme  of  the  Barcelona  process.  Moreover,  the 
European  private  sector  was  always  going  to  be  biggest  beneficiary  of 
liberalisation  within  the  partner  countries.  The  EMP  contained  both  financial 
incentives  and  the  promise  of  significant  improvements  in  the  partner  countries' 
investment  regimes,  leaving  European  businesses  in  a  powerful  position  to  exploit 
their  overwhelming  comparative  advantages  in  terms  of  capital,  distribution 
infrastructures,  production  capacities  and  technology.  5  The  point  here  is  that  the 
EU  will  be  a  net  economic  beneficiary  of  the  EMP  for  a  long  time  to  come.  6 
While  the  propose  strategy  was  original  and  far  sighted,  the  early  stages 
of  the  implementation  phase  highlighted  its  shortcomings.  First,  the  scope  of  the 
task  that  the  EU  set  itself  -  economic  'transition'  in  the  Mediterranean  -  was  not 
backed  by  a  commensurate  level  of  financial  assistance.  Even  allowing  for  the 
substantial  increase  in  EU  aid  for  the  region  provided  by  MEDA,  the  partner 
countries  still  lagged  far  behind  the  Central  and  Eastern  European  countries.  In 
1997  EU  aid  to  the  Mediterranean  partners  amounted  to  just  over  3  ECU  per 
capita,  while  the  Central  and  Eastern  European  countries  received  around  II  ECU 
per  capita.  7  The  Union  was  faced  by  the  familiar  problem  of  demand  for  its 
limited  budgetary  resources  outstripping  SUPPlY.  8  This  resource  problem  was 
highly  political,  pitting  the  northern  'Calvinist'  liberalising  tendency  in  the  EU 
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approximating  parity  in  the  division  of  EU  funds  between  the  East  and  South. 
The  final  financial  agreement  -  like  many  EU  package  deals  -  left  neither  side 
satisfied. 
9 
Second,  the  free-trade  objective  obliged  the  EU  to  open  up  its  markets  in 
the  very  sectors  that  were  internally  the  most  highly  politicised:  Mediterranean 
agricultural  products  and  textiles.  10  For  Michael  Smith,  politicisation  is  the 
driving  force  behind  the  development  of  the  core  of  EU  foreign  policy  in  pillar 
I.  "  What  the  EMP  surely  shows  is  that  politicisation  often  limits  the  ability  of  the 
EU  to  undertake  strategic  action,  since  the  projected  long-term  benefits  of  such 
action  are  invariably  set  aside  for  short  term  political  expediency.  In  EU 
Mediterranean  policy,  political  expediency  demanded  the  protection  of  domestic 
producers  by  member  governments,  calling  into  question  the  credibility  of  the 
Union's  commitment  to  free-trade.  As  Peter  Petri  argues,  'by  themselves,  free 
trade  agreements  with  Europe  will  yield  limited  results,  since  no  major  market 
access  concessions  seem  to  be  on  the  table.  '  12  Recent  World  Bank  statistics 
suggest  that  the  Middle  East  suffered  the  biggest  decline  in  exports  of  any  region 
during  1998,  and  underline  both  the  weakness  of  exporters  in  the  partner  countries 
and  the  need  for  the  Union  to  soften  the  blow  of  liberalisation.  13  But  all  the  EU 
can  offer  is  a  transitional  period  of  12-15  years,  modest  financial  aid  and  its 
technical  expertise.  The  rest  is  left  to  market  forces.  The  perception  of  the 
partner  countries  is  that  the  EU  remains  stubbornly  protectionist  on  many  of  the 
products  that  matter  most  to  them.  14  As  an  Egyptian  diplomat  put  it,  'It  is  out  of 
self-interest  that  Europe  exploits  the  Mediterranean.  The  EU  has  to  realise  there  is 
always  a  price  to  pay.  "  5 
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rails  when  the  breakdown  of  the  Middle  East  Peace  Process  widens  the  diplomatic 
gulf  between  the  Arab  and  Israeli  participants.  Face-saving  diplomacy  at  the 
Malta  and  Palen-no  conferences  could  not  hide  the  fact  that,  by  1999,  the  wind  had 
gone  out  of  Barcelona's  sails.  The  stalling  of  the  Barcelona  process  raised 
questions  about  the  wisdom  of  investing  so  much  political  capital  in  a  multilateral 
forum  with  such  a  broad,  diverse  and  frankly  antagonistic  membership.  With  sub- 
regional  options  available  (Euro-Maghreb,  Euro-Mashreq),  expanding  the 
partnership  concept  to  the  whole  Mediterranean  region  may  ultimately  prove  to 
have  been  a  serious  strategic  miscalculation. 
Turning  now  to  the  agency  argument,  Michael  Smith's  contention  that  the 
EC  is  the  primary  agent  for  EU  strategic  action  is  clearly  borne  out  by  the  content 
and  institutional  form  of  the  Euro-Mediterranean  Partnership.  '  6  The  free-trade 
area  is  almost  entirely  dependent  on  the  results  of  the  Community's  negotiations 
with  individual  partner  countries,  led  by  the  Commission  as  chief  negotiator.  The 
MEDA  aid  package  is  also  exclusively  a  Community  instrument,  administered  by 
the  Commission  under  the  watchful  eye  of  the  Member  States,  the  European 
Parliament  and  the  EU's  Court  of  Auditors.  In  more  general  terms,  the  functional, 
integrative  dimension  of  the  EMP  has  built  on  the  Community's  own  internal 
integration  process.  Cooperative  programmes  launched  by  the  Barcelona  process, 
in  sectors  such  as  energy,  the  environment,  industry,  small  businesses  and 
telecommunications,  have  all  been  based  on  the  Community's  organisational 
resources  and  experience  in  these  policy  areas. 
However,  the  EMP  also  exposes  the  inherent  limitations  of  EC  agency, 
some  of  which  arise  from  the  unique  complexity  of  the  EU  policy  process,  others 
which  result  from  the  inter-govenimental  basis  of  the  Barcelona  process.  The 
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Mediterranean  agreements  and  administers  the  Community's  budget  for  the 
Mediterranean.  But  the  Member  States  retain  the  final  say  over  decisive  issues, 
and  are  heavily  influenced  by  domestic  political  interests.  The  repeated  blockages 
over  agricultural  trade  concessions  in  the  Council  are  the  best  illustration  of  the 
Member  States'  capacity  to  restrict  the  scope  for  substantive  policy  change.  The 
results  of  negotiations,  more  often  than  not,  are  trade  deals  that  barely  exceed  the 
status  quo.  '  7 
Governmental  prerogative  dominates  the  Barcelona  process  to  an  even 
greater  extent.  Measures  can  only  be  adopted  with  the  approval  of  all  27 
participating  governments.  The  direction,  pace  and  progress  of  the  follow-up 
process  are  dictated  by  inter-governmental  diplomacy.  When  governments  refuse 
to  meet,  there  is  little  the  EU  can  do  about  it.  Here,  pillar  I  is  merely  a  tool  for 
implementing  measures  adopted  by  governments,  providing  funding  for  the 
various  sectoral  and  expert  networks.  The  Commission  might  enjoy  a  powerful 
role  as  coordinator  of  the  process,  but  it  cannot  propose  measures  that  will  not 
receive  the  unanimous  endorsement  of  the  twenty  seven.  The  result  has  been  a 
cautious,  low  key  approach  to  the  follow-up  process,  with  ideas  being  tentatively 
mooted  rather  than  vigorously  pursued.  As  a  senior  Commission  official 
observed,  'We  are  unlikely  to  be  in  a  situation  where  we  would  want  to  go  against 
the  wishes  of  the  states.  ' 
18 
What  kind  of  picture  is  emerging  as  the  EMP  strategy  begins  to  take 
effect?  The  most  obvious  point  is  that  the  EU  has  clearly  reinforced  its 
'leadership'  role  in  the  region,  extending  its  reach  deeper  into  the  economies, 
political  systems  and  societies  of  the  partner  countries.  In  Central  and  Eastern 
Europe,  the  EU  was  'catapulted  into  leadership'  after  1989,  and  was  forced  to  find 
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the  fold.  19  In  the  Mediterranean,  by  contrast,  the  EU  progressively  built  on  its 
already  dominant  economic  position  to  the  point  where  formal  agreements  with  it 
became  an  essential  element  of  third  countries'  foreign  policies.  There  are  no 
signs  that  the  partners'  dependence  on  exports  to  the  EU  -  between  60  and  70  per 
cent  of  their  total  exports  -  will  contract  in  future.  In  short,  by  the  1990s  the  EU 
had  made  itself  indispensable  to  the  partner  countries,  if  not  politically,  then 
certainly  economically. 
The  EMP  also  accelerated  the  unidirectional  process  of  extending  selected 
parts  of  the  EU's  order  to  the  Mediterranean  partner  countries.  Again,  the 
principa  conduits  for  this  process  were  pillar  I  policy  instruments.  The 
Commission  was  unequivocal  about  this  facet  of  the  EMP:  the  partners  were 
expected  to  implement  a  watered  down  version  of  the  Union's  own  single  market 
programme.  20  Signatories  of  the  Euro-Mediterranean  agreements  would  be 
obliged  to  bring  their  customs,  tariff  and  taxation  regimes  into  line  with  those  of 
the  EU.  Stricter  enforcement  of  the  Union's  rules  of  origin,  alignment  of  public 
procurement  procedures  and  the  adoption  of  EU  product  standards  meant  that 
governments  would  be  forced  to  adapt  their  administrative  and  regulatory  systems 
to  the  EU  model,  requirements  that  in  most  cases  had  significant  financial 
implications.  21  If  the  Commission,  and  organisations  such  as  the  OECD,  IMF  and 
World  Bank  are  to  be  believed,  the  spin  off  for  the  partners  will  be  a  steady 
increase  in  trade  amongst  themselves,  integration  into  the  global  economic  order 
and  higher  economic  growth.  Most  partner  governments  have  bought  this 
argument,  having  no  realistic  alternatives. 
However,  there  are  good  reasons  to  question  both  the  manner  in  which  the 
Union  is  imposing  an  order  on  the  Mediterranean  partners,  and  the 
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underdeveloped  economies,  bureaucracies  and  political  systems.  The  EMP  falls 
short  of  the  all-embracing  governance  framework  currently  being  extended  to  the 
Central  and  Eastern  European  accession  candidates.  Upon  their  accession,  the 
CEECs  stand  to  benefit  from  substantial  compensation  for  the  negative  socio- 
economic  effects  of  compliance  with  and  integration  into  the  EU  order.  The 
Mediterranean  non-member  countries,  by  contrast,  continue  to  rely  heavily  on 
outside  financial  and  technical  assistance  both  to  carry  out  the  prescribed  reforms 
and  alleviate  the  negative  effects  of  austerity.  Much  depends  on  the  ability  of  the 
partners  to  attract  significantly  higher  levels  of  inward  investment  and  on  the 
development  of  an  as  yet  nascent  private  sector.  The  EMP  may  well  help 
establish  the  conditions  for  a  flourishing  private  sector,  but  the  onus  is  on  self- 
reliance  and  the  unpredictable  behaviour  of  Private  capital. 
The  EMP  has  institutional  architecture  for  the  EU's  long-term 
Mediterranean  strategy  is  now  in  largely  in  place.  22  At  the  multilateral  level,  the 
Barcelona  process  is  spawning  networks  of  sectoral  cooperation  involving 
governments,  businesses  and  other  non-governmental  actors  coordinated  by 
national  ministers  and  the  European  Commission.  In  a  sense,  though,  it  is  a 
structure-in-waiting,  since  it  will  become  fully  activated  only  if  all  the  Arab 
partner  states  and  the  Israelis  can  normalise  their  diplomatic  relations. 
Many  analysts  of  EU  foreign  policy,  as  well  as  practitioners,  remain 
sceptical  about  its  capacity  for  strategic  action  in  the  continued  absence  of  a 
Common  Foreign  and  Security  Policy  that  equips  the  Union  with  a  'hard  security' 
capability.  23  The  argument  is  that  its  strategies  will  always  be  somehow  complete 
without  the  option  of  military  action.  Pro-active  CFSP  actions,  such  as  the  EU's 
funding  of  the  Palestinian  elections,  are  still  the  exception  rather  than  the  rule. 
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'hard  security'  capability  to  back  it  up,  the  Union  cannot  become  a  self-reliant 
foreign  policy  actor.  24  As  Helene  Sjursen  argues,  'by  the  late  1990s  it  looked 
likely  that  the  emergence  of  a  security  and  defence  policy  for  the  EU  was 
politically  and  practically  unrealistic  although  legally  possible  and  permissible.  )25 
NATO  has  reasserted  its  claim  to  be  the  only  institution  capable  of  dealing  with  a 
direct  military  challenge  from  the  southern  shore.  Confidence  building  measures, 
dialogue  on  politico-security  issues  and  stability  pacts/charters  are  undeniably 
laudable  and  useful  starting  points,  but  are  unlikely  to  be  of  much  utility  if  the 
pessimistic  predictions  of  mass  immigration,  regime  collapse  and  weapons 
proliferation  are  realised. 
2.  Bridging  the  Divide:  The  Pillarisation  Problem 
The  problem  of  consistency  between  pillars  I  and  II(and,  increasingly,  pillar  III) 
remains  largely  unresolved.  Wrangling  between  the  Member  States,  Commission 
and  European  Parliament  over  competencies  has  become  a  stock  feature  of  the 
EU's  foreign  policy-making  process.  Such  disputes  are  symptomatic  of  the 
continuing  sensitivity  of  national  governments  to  what  might  be  termed 
supranational.  creep  in  the  foreign  policy  sphere.  The  EMP  did  not  entirely  escape 
the  competency  problem,  as  exemplified  by  the  marginalisation  of  the 
Commission  in  the  negotiation  of  the  Barcelona  Declaration,  by  stalemate  in  the 
Council  over  British  objections  to  the  use  of  qualified  majority  voting  on  the 
suspension  of  MEDA  aid,  and  by  the  different  institutional  formulae  used  for  EU 
representation  in  the  two  Barcelona  coordination  committees.  However,  the 
pillarisation  issue  had  only  a  peripheral  effect  on  the  actual  functioning  of  the 
EMP.  Although  the  three  chapters  of  the  Barcelona  Declaration  resembled  the 
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Barcelona  was  explicitly  designed  to  have  its  own  dynamic,  outside  the  direct 
control  of  the  EU. 
The  sui  generis  nature  of  the  Barcelona  process  mitigated  against  the 
categorisation  of  issues  pillar  I/pillar  11  issues.  Uncertainty  about  the  how  the 
provisions  of  the  Declaration  would  be  classified  was  exacerbated  by  the  text 
itself  For  instance,  issues  with  a  strong  cultural  dimension  -  including  religious 
freedoms,  freedom  of  expression  and  anti-racism  -  were  all  included  in  the 
political  and  security  partnership  rather  than  in  the  third  chapter.  In  the  initial 
stages  of  the  follow-up  process,  there  were  several  arguments  among  the 
participants  over  the  appropriate  chapter  for  confidence  building  measures.  26 
Where  intenneshing  of  pillars  one  and  two  is  occurring,  it  is  driven  by  the 
nature  of  the  strategy,  by  ad  hoc  procedural  creativity,  and,  as  a  Commission 
official  put  it,  'for  the  sake  of  convenience.  '  27  No  formal  decision  was  ever  taken 
in  the  EMP  to  actively  and  systematically  bridge  the  divide  between  the  EC  pillar 
and  the  CFSP,  despite  calls  from  the  European  Parliament  to  generate  CFSP  joint 
actions  for  security  measures  adopted  in  the  Barcelona  process.  However,  the 
inclusion  of  the  political/security  chapter  and  the  social,  cultural  and  human 
chapter  in  the  Barcelona  Declaration  made  coherence  essential,  since  all  three 
chapters  were  directed  at  the  broader  goal  of  enhancing  regional  security.  When 
internal  divisions  within  the  Union  did  surface  -  as  was  the  case  over  the  Stability 
Pact/Charter  -  the  partner  countries  clearly  viewed  it  as  a  sign  of  weakness.  28 
The  EMP  put  the  Commission,  which  was  entrusted  with  the  overall 
coordination  of  the  Barcelona  process,  in  a  strong  position  as  far  as  bridging  the 
pillar  1-11  gap  was  concerned.  As  the  common  institutional  link  between  the  three 
chapters,  the  Commission  was  in  a  good  position  to  put  a  pillar  I  label  on  the  work 
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propose  measures  funded  by  the  Community  budget,  which  it  was  quick  to  exploit 
in  the  first  chapter.  The  possibility  of  military  involvement  in  a  disaster  relief 
mechanism  funded  by  EC  money  illustrated  how  practical  considerations  could 
override  the  kind  of  governmental  sensitivity  that  would  ordinarily  subject  such  a 
proposal  to  lengthy,  dogmatic  debates  in  the  Council.  Paradoxically,  the 
Commission's  task  was  made  easier  by  the  weakness  of  the  CFSP,  since  measures 
could  only  be  funded  from  the  CFSP  budget  if  formal  joint  actions  were  agreed,  a 
possibility  apparently  ruled  out  before  the  Barcelona  process  began. 
That  said,  the  significance  of  this  use  of  the  EC  budget  to  fund  politico- 
security  measures  should  not  be  overstated.  The  approval  of  the  Member  States 
owed  more  to  practicality  and  downright  common  sense  than  to  any  deliberate 
transfer  of  power  to  the  Commission.  The  measures  on  the  table,  such  as 
financing  for  a  network  of  defence  institutes,  were  part  of  the  low  profile 
confidence  building  programme  and  therefore  lacked  the  kind  of  overtly  political 
content  that  might  have  drawn  objections  from  the  less  communitarian  Member 
29  States.  In  some  cases,  it  was  unclear  under  which  chapter  a  measure  should  fall 
under.  30  That  the  Barcelona  Declaration  was  a  political  rather  than  a  legal 
document  also  contributed  to  the  de-sensitisation  of  the  measures.  It  remains  to  be 
seen  whether  more  politically  sensitive  measures,  in  particular  the  Stability 
Charter,,  will  be  subject  to  similarly  expeditious  decisions,  or  whether  the  CFSP 
will  eventually  have  to  be  activated  as  the  basis  for  the  EU's  decisions  about 
Mediterranean  security. 
One  of  the  more  interesting  outcomes  of  the  EMP,  and  of  the  EU's 
activities  in  the  mediterranean  in  general,  is  the  increased  deployment  of 
economic  policy  instruments  to  achieve  manifestly  political  objectives.  The  most 
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more  combative  stance  in  its  quest  for  political  relevance.  As  well  as  becoming 
paymaster  of  the  post-Madrid  Palestinian  territories,  it  showed  a  growing 
willingness  to  rattle  its  commercial  sabre  over  the  Israeli  government's  failure  to 
adhere  to  the  Oslo  principles.  The  signs  are  that  the  Union's  economic  weight  is 
beginning  to  pay  dividends  in  terms  both  of  its  profile  in  the  region  and  its  status 
as  an  4ally'  of  the  Palestinians. 
In  a  less  high  profile  way,  the  EMP  also  saw  the  introduction  of  stronger 
political  conditionality  attached  to  the  MEDA  budget  and  to  the  Euro- 
Mediterranean  agreements.  Both  instruments  included  clauses  for  suspension, 
based  on  a  Commission  proposal,  in  the  event  of  human  rights  abuses,  provisions 
which  promised  to  subject  the  partner  governments  to  closer  scrutiny  of  their 
behaviour  at  home.  The  power  of  the  European  Parliament  (and  national 
parliaments)  to  withhold  its  assent  to  the  agreements  and  to  refuse  to  authorise  the 
MEDA  budget  line  added  to  the  potential  for  these  economic  instruments  to  be 
used  as  political  weapons.  Although  Turkey  was  the  only  partner  country  to  have 
its  MEDA  funding  blocked,  for  reasons  related  as  much  to  its  relationshiP  with 
Greece  as  to  human  rights  concerns,  the  Union's  willingness  to  flex  its  muscles 
was  nevertheless  established  early  on  in  the  EMP. 
It  appears  that  this  type  of  ad  hoc  linkage  between  economic  policy 
instruments  and  political  objectives  will  continue  to  be  the  norm.  It  reflects  the 
general  trend  in  EU  foreign  policy  for  finding  pragmatic  solutions  when  existing 
procedures  fail  to  generate  effective  collective  action,  as  is  routinely  the  case.  The 
practice  of  nominating  Special  Envoys,  for  instance,  initially  a  product  of  the 
Union's  inability  to  agree  on  how  to  deal  with  the  crisis  in  the  former  Yugoslavia, 
has  become  a  firmly  established  feature  of  the  Union's  diplomatic  repertoire. 
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jeopardise  the  already  dwindling  output  of  measures  by  engaging  protracted 
debates  about  the  proper  legal  bases  for  action.  With  eastern  enlargement 
impending,  flexibility  may  be  essential  to  the  credibility  of  EU  foreign  policy. 
3.  Revisiting  the  Civilian  Power  Concept 
Both  literally  and  normatively,  the  'civilian  power'  concept  is  deeply  embedded  in 
the  Euro-Mediterranean  Partnership.  31  By  definition,  'soft  security'  demands  a 
shift  of  emphasis  in  away  from  traditional  power  politics  and  politico-military 
security  towards  a  more  idealistic,  visionary  approach  to  international  relations. 
Along  with  the  'economics  first'  approach,  a  whole  chapter  of  the  Barcelona 
process  was  devoted  to  'civilian'  issues  spanning  culture,  religion  and  the 
controversial  idea  of  encouraging  the  development  and  participation  of  'civil 
society'.  The  inclusion  of  a  human  face  to  the  EMP  was  in  keeping  with  the 
Union's  use  of  what  Hill  calls  'moral  suasion'  as  a  policy  instrument.  32  The 
implication  was  that  Western  Europe's  approach  to  democracy,  human  rights  and 
governmental-societal  relations  should  be  the  standard  for  members  of  the  Euro- 
Mediterranean  Partnership. 
But  the  civilian  power  concept  also  implies  passivity  on  traditional 
politico-security  issues,  something  that  does  not  square  with  the  agenda  of  the 
EMP.  The  first  chapter  of  the  Barcelona  Declaration  makes  direct  references  to, 
inter  alia,  sovereignty,  weapons  proliferation  and  even  the  need  to  refrain  from 
developing  military  capacities  beyond  legitimate  defence  requirements.  Reading 
between  the  lines,  the  first  chapter  anticipates  future  political  crises  in  the  region, 
whether  domestic  or  international.  France's  push  for  a  stability  pact/charter, 
despite  the  attempt  to  sell  it  as  a  'political  statement,  is  evidence  of  an  active 
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security'  strategy  fails. 
The  real  relevance  of  civilian  power  Europe  in  the  EMP  context  is  to  be 
found  in  the  perceptions  and  expectations  of  the  partner  countries.  With  most 
Mediterranean  states  having  been  dragged  into  the  superpowers'  battle  for 
dominance,  the  European  Union  always  (symbolically)  represented  a  less 
threatening  presence  in  the  international  system.  In  the  power  vacuum  left  by  the 
end  of  Cold  War,  Mediterranean  non-member  countries  were  centripetally 
attracted  to  the  EU  by  the  'magnetic  force  of  economics.  '  33  They  joined  a  growing 
queue  of  third  countries  knocking  on  the  EU's  door  for  membership,  upgraded 
association  agreements  and  increased  economic  support.  Among  the 
Mediterranean  partners,  Cyprus  and  Malta  stand  on  the  verge  of  accession,  Turkey 
sits  in  a  seemingly  perpetual  waiting  room  and  Morocco  has  had  formal  and 
informal  applications  for  membership  rejected.  All  the  partners  expect  the  EU  to 
meet  its  obligations  as  a  benevolent  dispenser  of  resources  from  north  to  south  and 
as  the  keyholder  of  access  to  the  lucrative  single  European  market.  In  that  sense, 
the  civilian  power  concept  has  a  tangible  product  to  offer.  Whether  or  not  it  is 
34 
enough  for  the  EU  to  replace  the  state  is  another  matter. 
There  is  also  demand  for  Europe  as  a  civilian  political  power.  For  the 
Arab  Mediterranean  group  in  particular,  the  EU's  presence  is  sought  after  as  an 
effective  counterweight  to  the  USA  in  the  Middle  East  Peace  Process.  Indeed, 
Arab  governments  reproached  the  Union  for  being  insufficiently  forceful  with  the 
Benjamin  Netanyahu's  government,  and  for  appointing  a  diplomat  -  Miguel 
Moratinos  -  rather  than  a  politician  as  its  special  envoy  to  the  peace  process.  35 
More  generally,  the  EU  is  widely  regarded  a  model  for  peaceful 
international  relations  between  states  with  a  history  of  bloody  conflict.  The 
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organisation  to  capitalise  on  peace  in  the  Middle  East  both  foresaw  political 
integration  along  the  lines  of  the  European  integration  experience. 
However,  mistrust  persists  about  the  EU's  motives  for  devoting  what  is 
seen  as  excessive  attention  to  the  political  and  security  dimension  of  the 
Barcelona  process.  To  illustrate  the  point,  at  the  same  time  that  the  Union  was 
talking  about  peace,  prosperity  and  stability  in  the  region,  its  southern  Member 
States  were  discussing,  among  other  things,  the  creation  of  EuroMarFor, 
Euroforce  by  France,  Italy  and  Spain.  36  Not  surprisingly,  these  initiatives  were 
regarded  with  deep  suspicion  by  the  Maghreb  states.  37  As  a  Moroccan  diplomat 
argued: 
The  security  issue  is  a  very  real  and  deep  one,  and  we  do  understand  the 
concerns  in  Europe,  some  of  which  are  genuine.  But  some  are  the  result  of 
scaremongering,  some  are  a  result  of  stereotypes  and  prejudices  which  we 
don't  like.  As  far  as  we  are  concerned,  there  hasn't  been,  at  any  time,  any 
need  for  Europe  to  have  any  military  concerns.  38 
The  Union  has  had  to  be  ultra-cautious  on  following  up  the  democratisation  and 
human  rights  elements  of  the  EMP.  It  is  perhaps  no  coincidence  that  uptake  of  the 
MEDA  Democracy  budget,  which  was  set  up  to  promote  the  activities  of  non- 
goverm-nental  organisations  in  the  partner  countries,  was  initially  slow.  39  There  is 
a  fine  line  between  nudging  the  partners  in  its  preferred  direction  and  outright 
political  interference. 
The  question  remains:  can  the  EU's  Mediterranean  strategy  succeed 
without  an  independent  hard  security  dimension?  Although  it  is  still  hardly 
transformative,  the  EMP  at  least  aims  to  tackle  the  root  socio-economic  causes  of 
instability,  with  the  Union  acting  as  a  bridge  between  the  rich  North  and  poor 
South.  Given  time,,  and  the  benefit  of  several  years  of  closer  cooperation  between 
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appears  to  be  a  realistic  prospect.  In  this  respect,  a  militarily  empowered  EU 
implementing  its  own  defence  policy  in  the  Mediterranean  might  prove  to  be 
counter-productive.  As  Karen  Smith  argues: 
The  end  of  the  civilian  power  image  would  entail  giving  up  far  too  much 
for  far  too  little.  An  EU  intervention  capability  could  be  seen  by  outsiders 
as  a  step  towards  the  creation  of  a  superpower  that  uses  military  instruments 
to  pursue  its  own  interests.  40 
Alternatively,  the  increasing  international  trend  towards  using  military  means 
for  selective  humanitarian  interventions  may  well  see  pressure  grow  on  the  EU 
to  equip  itself  with  a  genuine  politico-security  capability  .41 
The  crisis  in 
Kosovo  during  1999  once  again  exposed  the  EU's  powerlessness  to  intervene 
even  where  it  has  a  strong  interest  in  doing  so.  Civilian  power  Europe, 
however  laudable,  may  be  redundant. 
4.  Closing  the  Cap  abilities-Expectation  s  Gap? 
In  important  respects,  the  EMP  has  clearly  narrowed  the  capabilities  expectations 
gap  in  EU  Mediterranean  policy.  On  the  capabilities  side,  the  EMP  delivered  two 
main  improvements.  First,  the  Union  displayed  a  significant  (and  arguably 
surprising)  degree  of  internal  cohesiveness  over  the  new  Mediterranean  strategy. 
The  Commission's  proposals  passed  through  the  Council  largely  unscathed,  a 
measure  of  the  convergence  among  the  Member  States  on  the  need  for  policy 
change.  Critically,  the  southern  Member  States  secured  the  endorsement  of  the 
northern  group  to  the  MEDA  budget.  The  exception  was  the  Euro  -Mediterranean 
agreements  where  the  liberalising  ambitions  of  the  northern  group  were  repeatedly 
frustrated  by  the  defensive  attitude  of  the  southern  group.  42 
270 The  Member  States'  relative  cohesion  on  the  EMP  contrasted  with  their 
disunity  on  the  Union's  eastern  enlargement  strategy.  Internal  disputes  over  the 
candidates,  the  timing  of  enlargement  and  how  the  costs  of  widening  were  to  be 
distributed  have  left  an  air  of  uncertainty  hanging  over  EU-CEEC  relations.  43 
Accession,  unlike  the  EMP,  is  a  high  risk,  high  cost  game  requiring  both  reform  of 
the  Union's  own  internal  order  and  a  massive  re-distribution  of  resources  to  the 
east. 
Moreover,  the  EMP  equipped  the  Union  with  an  array  of  new  and 
modified  policy  instruments  that  have  significantly  expanded  the  policy  choices 
available  to  it.  The  coupling  of  the  Euro-Mediterranean  agreements  to  MEDA  and 
the  Barcelona  process  has  brought  new-found  coherence  to  EU  Mediterranean 
policy.  Arguably  the  most  significant  development  is  the  multi  I  ateralisation  of 
policy  which  offers  a  clear  pathway  to  regional  integration.  If  the  Union  is  to 
exercise  decisive  influence  over  future  development  in  the  Mediterranean  and 
benefit  from  the  extension  of  its  own  sphere  of  influence  in  the  region,  then  the 
Barcelona  process  is  undoubtedly  a  step  in  the  right  direction. 
Such  is  the  economic  and  political  diversity  of  the  partner  countries  that  it 
is difficult  to  generalise  about  their  expectations  of  the  EU  as  a  whole.  There  are 
clearly  realistic  expectations  about  what  the  EU  can  achieve  as  a  political  actor, 
and  the  limitations  of  the  CFSP  are  widely  acknowledged.  The  Arab  partner 
countries  certainly  look  to  the  EU  to  take  a  lead  on  their  behalf  in  the  Middle  East 
Peace  Process  and  act  as  a  far  more  effective  counterweight  to  the  close 
relationship  between  the  USA  and  Israel.  In  this  respect,  the  Barcelona  process 
has  so  far  failed  to  live  up  to  their  expectations,  with  the  EU  more  concerned  to 
keep  all  the  Participants  satisfied  than  to  use  the  process  as  a  means  to  influence 
Israel's  policy  on  the  Palestinian  territories.  The  Union's  brief  trade  skirmish  with 
271 Israel  in  1998  was  welcomed  as  a  sign  that  the  Europeans  are  no  longer  as 
prepared  to  tolerate  Israel's  stranglehold  on  the  nascent  Palestinian  state. 
On  the  economic  front,  the  highest  possible  level  of  financial  assistance 
and  the  maximum  level  of  market  access  are  priorities  for  all.  Here,  the 
Mediterranean  partners  join  a  long  line  of  developing  countries  looking  to  deepen 
their  links  to  an  altruistic  EU,  which  is  still  regarded  as  a  'bridge'  between  rich 
and  poor.  Yet  the  1990s  have  seen  warning  signs  that  the  EU  may  be  'losing 
interest'  in  development  policy,  appearing  preoccupied  with  its  own  budgetary 
problems  and  the  massive  transfer  of  resources  that  will  accompany  eastern 
enlargement.  Few  of  the  partner  countries  can  hope  to  accede  to  the  Union,  and 
failure  to  achieve  the  kind  of  economic  growth  required  to  provide  employment 
for  rapidly  expanding  populations  is  likely  to  leave  them  largely  helpless  if  the 
most  apocalyptic  forecasts  of  social  explosions  are  borne  out 
The  Euro-Mediterranean  agreements  have  unequivocally  failed  to  meet  the 
partners'  expectations,  however  optimistic  they  may  have  been.  Having 
experienced  three  decades  of  largely  unfulfilled  promises  on  access  to  the  EU's 
agricultural  markets,  they  reasonably  expected  a  considerable  improvement  in  the 
terms  of  trade  in  this  sector.  Once  again,  however,  negotiators  came  up  against 
the  inherent  conservatism  of  the  CAP  and  the  protectionist  instincts  of  the 
Member  States.  As  Likke  Friis  concludes  in  a  study  of  EU-CEEC  relations,  the 
EU  is  "highly  efficient  in  defending  its  own  'domestic  interest"  in  external 
negotiations,  but  more  inefficient  in  playing  a  truly  constructive  role  for  its 
surroundings.  '  44  The  comparative  importance  of  agricultural  trade  to  the  EU  and 
the  partner  countries  throws  the  EU's  miserliness  in  this  sector  into  even  sharper 
relief.  As  is  the  case  with  financial  resources,  however,  there  appears  to  be  little 
prospect  of  improvement  in  the  prevailing  terms  of  trade. 
272 The  EMP  balance  sheet  shows  a  boost  for  the  Union's  capacity  to  control 
its  relationships  with  the  Mediterranean  partner  countries,  but  a  persistent, 
substantive  failure  to  meet  their  expectations.  The  bottom  line  is  that  the  EU  may 
be  spreading  itself  too  thinly  in  the  external  relations  sphere,  creating  expectations 
that  it  simply  cannot  meet  either  economically  or  politically.  Progressive  force  in 
the  international  order  or  not,  the  EU's  first  priority  is  to  serve  European  interests, 
a  fact  inevitably  reflected  in  the  structure  of  its  relationships  with  third  countries. 
Strategic  actions  like  the  EMP  are  undeniably  a  sign  of  progress  in 
European  integration,  and  of  a  European  Union  that  is  gradually  acquiring  the 
capacity  to  order  the  world  around  it  in  a  more  systematic  and  coherent  way.  But 
the  acid  test  of  successful  strategic  action  is  surely  the  attainment  of  long-term 
objectives  and  a  genuinely  transformative  impact.  In  a  region  whose  fragile 
stability  will  become  increasingly  vital  to  the  EU,  partnership  is  unlikely  to  be 
enough. 
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276 APPENDIX  1 
EU  FINANCIAL  AID  TO  THE  MEDITERRANEAN  PARTNERS 
First  Second  Third  Fourth 
Partner  Protocol  Protocol  Protocol  Protocol 
Country  1978-81  1981-6  1986-91  1991-6 
Algeria  44  44  56  70  EC  Budget  Grants 
70  107  183  280  EIB  loans 
114  151  239  350  Total 
Cyprus  10  16  18  24 
20  28  44  50 
30  44  62  74 
Egypt  77  126  200  258 
93  150  249  310 
170  276  449  568 
Israel  -  -  - 
30  40  63  82 
30  40  63  82 
Jordan  22  26  37  46 
18  37  63  80 
40  63  100  126 
Lebanon  10  16  20  24 
20  34  53  45 
30  50  73  69 
Morocco  74  109  173  218 
56  90  151  220 
130  199  324  438 
Syria  26  33  36  43 
34  64  110  115 
60  97  146  158 
Tunisia  54  61  93  116 
71  78  131  168 
95  139  224  224 
TOTAL  699-  1059 
. 
1680 
_2089 
Sources:  European  Commission  (1994)  The  European  Union's  Relations  with  the  Mediterranen, 
MEMO  (94)  74,  Rapid  Database,  <(http:  //europa.  eu.  int/rapid/cgi>). 
European  Commission  (1996)  Commission  Report  on  the  Implementation  offinancial  and  Technical 
Cooperation  with  Mediterranean  Non-Member  Countries,  COM  (96)  151  Final,  May. 
277 APPENDIX  2 
Sample  Calendar  of  the  Barcelona  Process 
[Date  IlEvent  -1 
126  February  19  [EurýMediterranean  Committee  for  the  Barcelona  proces 
E28! 
_yay 
1998  i[Euro-Mediterranean  Committee  for  the  Barcelona  proces 
sI 
s  Jýl 
M  rULffICAL  AND  SECURrrY  PARTNERSE[IP 
JDate  [Event  [LE: 
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nfi; 
ýýon 
session  for  diplomas 
111997  1 
Malta 
1  1 
JE25 
Februar  1998 
l  Semor  Officials  meeting  on  Political  and  Security  i  -  EB 
I  y 
questions  nLmm  s 
27  M  1998 
II  Senior  Officials  meeting  on  Political  and  Security  l 
l 
1 
ay 
questions 
1 
Brusse  s 
1 
Seminar  of  persons  with  politico-military  2nd  Semester 
1997  ibilities  on  the  use  of  military  forces  for  responsi  Rome 
J 
kumanitarian  wks  (to  be  confirmed) 
To  be  determined] 
I  Meeting  of  the  Steering  Committee  of  the  project  on  To  be  de 
prevention  of  natural  and  human 
ITo  be  confirmed  JIMeeting  of  Institutes  of  Defence  Studies  J  [Paris 
, 
JTo  be  confirmed  JEWýoýýo  for  diplomats  on  cultural  dialogue  ý  [Cairo 
ECONObHC  AND  FINANCUL  PARTNERSHIP 
JDate  I 
26-27  November 
1997 
27-28  November 
1997 
1 
[E-vent  ----1 
Preparatory  Meeting  for  the  Ministerial  Conference 
on  Environment 
Meeting  of  NGOs  on  Environment 
11 
FL--oc-a  tion 
Helsinki 
Helsinki 
1 
128  November  19  I  IMinisterial  Conference  on  Environment  H-elsinki F 
Meeting  of  Directors  General  of  Water  on  the 
9-  10  December  1997 
I 
Euro-Mediterranean  Information  System  on  Naples 
_  know-how  in  the  field  of  water  (SENME) 
Follow-up  to  the  meeting  of  Industry  Ministers: 
December  1997  (to  be 
confirmed) 
Working  Group  "Legal  and  administrative 
" 
To  be 
determined 
fi-amework 
Workshop  for  the  gradual  establishment  of  a  network 
Mid-February  1998  of  technology  innovation  poles  in  the  Brindisi 
Euro-Mediterranean  region 
r4-7  March  I  Seminar  on  the  use  of  Internet  ý  [Cyprus 
h  1998  J  26-27  M  jEuro-Mediterranean  Conference  on  c8Pital  markets  ILondon 
ý  III  May  1998  -ý  JEuro-Mediteffanean  Conference  of  Energy  Ministers  J  jBrussels 
278 Research  Notes 
Much  of  the  primary  research  for  this  thesis  was  interview-driven.  The  chief 
purpose  of  the  interviews  was  to  obtain  knowledge  of  diplomatic  activity  'behind 
the  scenes'.  Interviewees  were  encouraged  to  offer  assessments  and  opinions  on 
all  aspects  of  EU  Mediterranean  policy.  Given  the  general  low  profile  of  the 
Barcelona  process,  there  has  been  relatively  little  in-depth  debate  or  analysis  of 
EU  Mediterranean  policy  in  either  the  media  or  the  academic  literature.  Although 
the  chapters  on  Algeria  and  the  Middle  East  Peace  Process  deal  with  higher  profile 
issues,  interviews  were  also  necessary  to  elaborate  upon  and  verify  infonnation 
obtained  from  secondary  sources. 
A  total  of  62  interviews  were  conducted  between  April  1996  and  October 
1998  (see  accompanying  list).  Five  research  trips  were  made  to  Brussels  and  to 
national  capitals,  including  London,  Madrid,  Paris  and  Valletta.  The  majority 
were  diplomats  responsible  for  Mediterranean  policy  based  in  national 
representations  and  embassies  in  Brussels.  In  all,  representatives  of  23 
governments  were  interviewed.  Interviews  with  a  Minister  of  State  at  the  Foreign 
Office  in  London,  a  Deputy  Political  Director  in  Madrid,  and  a  former  Maltese 
Foreign  Minister  proved  especially  valuable.  A  wide  range  of  interviews  were 
also  carried  out  in  the  main  EU  institutions  -  the  Commission,  Council  and 
European  Parliament  -  with  Heads  of  Unit,  Desk  Officers  and  other  officials. 
Towards  the  end  of  the  research  period,  interviews  were  conducted  with 
representatives  of  management  consultants  involved  in  implementing  MEDA 
projects  and  members  of  a  parliamentary  lobby  group. 
The  selection  of  interviewees  was  driven  by  the  need  to  speak  to  as  broad  a 
range  of  representatives  as  possible.  Once  a  first  meeting  had  taking  place,  most 
279 interviewees  were  approached  for  a  second  and  third  time  in  order  to  take 
advantage  of  familiarity  with  the  research  and  its  objectives.  One  official  in  the 
Council  Secretariat  and  the  Commission's  desk  officer  for  the  Barcelona  process 
proved  to  be  good  'gatekeepers',  suggesting  potential  interviewees  and  even 
affanging  meetings  themselves. 
Rather  disappointingly,  despite  numerous  approaches,  it  proved  impossible 
to  meet  with  Members  of  the  European  Parliament  involved  in  a  variety  of 
Mediterranean-related  Committees.  Many  failed  to  respond  to  letters,  while 
others  contacted  during  visits  to  Brussels  were  unable  to  find  space  for  a  meeting 
in  their  schedules.  Similarly,  it  proved  impossible  to  arrange  meetings  with  Irish, 
Lebanese,  Luxembourgeois  or  Tunisian  diplomats.  In  the  case  of  the  Ireland  and 
Luxembourg,  visits  to  Brussels  coincided  with  their  respective  Presidencies  of  the 
Council.  Attempts  to  meet  with  the  Ambassadors  'parachuted'  in  by  Council 
Presidents  to  coordinate  their  preparations  for  the  Barcelona  process  were  also 
problematic.  IA  French  Ambassador  died  shortly  after  the  Barcelona  process 
began,  while  most  returned  to  their  postings  after  the  end  of  their  government's 
tenure  of  the  Council  Presidency. 
For  the  most  part,  visits  were  timed  to  take  place  either  just  before  or 
immediately  after  important  meetings,  though  the  uncertain  atmosphere 
surrounding  the  Barcelona  process,  and  the  sheer  volume  of  meetings,  made 
scheduling  something  of  a  lottery.  Arranging  meetings  in  advance  of  research 
trips  proved  to  be  problematic,  as  interviewees  often  re-scheduled  at  the  last 
minute.  On  several  occasions,  particularly  at  the  Commission,  officials  terminated 
the  interview  in  order  to  attend  meetings  elsewhere. 
1  It  was  common  practice  for  the  Member  States  to  bring  in  an  Ambassador,  frequently  based  in 
one  of  the  Mediterranean  partner  countries,  to  organise  the  numerous  meetings  that  took  place 
during  each  Council  Presidency. 
280 All  interviews  were  conducted  in  person,  and  contact  was  maintained  with 
a  number  of  interviewees  via  telephone  and  email  when  further  clarification  was 
required  about  specific  points.  Initially,  interviews  were  conducted  using  a 
dictaphone,  from  which  material  was  then  transcribed.  It  became  clear  early  on 
that  interviewees  were  sensitive  to  the  presence  of  the  dictaphone.  Some  objected 
to  its  use  altogether,  while  others  would  only  'open  up'  when  the  machine  was 
turned  off.  The  decision  to  cease  using  the  dictaphone  led  to  some  difficulties 
minor  with  transcription.  However,  the  advantages  more  than  outweighed  the 
disadvantages.  This  move  encouraged  open  and  often  frank  discussion  of  the 
subject,  and  often  allowed  the  interview  to  proceed  in  an  informal,  conversational 
style. 
In  the  ideal,  extensive  preparation  was  made  for  each  interview,  including 
research  into  national  positions  on  specific  issues  and  the  state  of  play  in 
negotiations.  Interviews  were  based  on  the  semi-structured  method,  with  each 
interviewee  being  asked  a  number  of  identical  questions  in  addition  to  specific 
questions  relating  to  their  government's  position  or role  in  the  policy  process. 
Lists  of  questions,  or  at  least  a  guide  to  the  issues  to  be  covered,  were  initially 
provided  wherever  possible  in  advance  of  interviews.  However,  in  the  case  of 
hastily  arranged  meetings,  interviewees  were  unaware  and  therefore  unprepared 
for  questions  beforehand.  On  the  plus  side,  this  approach  also  allowed  interviews 
to  freely  flow. 
The  problem  of  attribution  was  solved  by  making  it  clear  at  the  outset  that 
comments  would  not  be  directly  attributed  to  the  interviewee  in  the  text.  Several 
interviewees  expressly  requested  that  they  should  not  be  named  anywhere  in  the 
thesis.  Others,  though,  stated  that  they  had  no  objections  to  being  quoted 
verbatim. 
281 Between  February  I  and  April  30  1997,  research  was  also  carried  out 
during  a  stage  at  in  the  European  Parliament's  Directorate  for  Research  (DGIV)  in 
Brussels.  The  main  benefit  of  this  extended  stay  came  from  my  access  to  the  EP's 
Foreign  Affairs  and  External  Economic  Relations  Committees,  to  the  numerous 
meetings  of  the  EP's  various  Delegations,  and  to  my  attendance  at  EP  plenary 
sessions.  Committee  meetings  were  frequently  attended  by  Commissioners,  by 
Commission  officials  and  by  Ambassadors  of  the  partner  countries.  In  particular, 
meetings  of  the  EP's  Delegations  for  Relations  with  Israel  and  the  Palestinian 
Territories,  which  usually  met  on  the  same  afternoon,  offered  lively,  provocative 
debate  and  brought  home  to  this  researcher  the  seriousness  of  the  breakdown  in 
the  Middle  East  Peace  Process. 
The  downside  of  the  stage  was  that  my  work  for  the  EP's  External 
Economic  Relations,  which  entailed  preparing  a  series  of  'Country  Reports'  on  the 
economic  situation  in  associates  of  the  EU,  only  indirectly  covered  the  Euro- 
Mediterranean  Partnership.  Material  was  often  obtained  in  the  course  of  work  on 
other  issues  and  during  periods  of  free  time.  The  heavy  workload  of  the  EP's 
Research  Directorate  limited  the  amount  of  time  available  to  carry  out  interviews. 
Research  was  also  hijacked  by  problems  surrounding  the  Malta  Conference  in 
April  1996.  Most  officials  were  unavailable  through  the  whole  of  April  as  they 
worked  overtime  to  produce  a  Declaration. 
The  manner  in  which  the  interviews  were  conducted  presented  a  number  of 
problems  when  it  came  to  processing  the  data.  Text  from  the  first  set  of 
interviews  was  inputted  into  QSR-NUD*IST4.  This  qualitative  research  tool  is 
designed  for  the  management  and  analysis  of  unstructured  data,  a  high  tech  form 
of  discourse  analysis.  By  coding  and  indexing  textual  material,  the  researcher  is 
able  to  systematically  search  out  common  themes,  test  theories  about  data  and 
282 generate  statistical  or  graphical  representations  of  the  data.  A  small  sample  -  five 
interviews  -  were  coded  initially  using  15  categories  and  an  eclectic  range  of  sub- 
categories.  These  included  the  role  of  the  interviewee,  nationalities  and  the 
specific  issue  about  which  the  interview  spoke  (  Euro-Mediterranean  Agreements, 
Barcelona  Conference  etc). 
Even  during  the  coding  process,  it  was  clear  that  the  variation  between  the 
texts  was  too  great  to  allow  searches  on  a  sufficiently  extensive  range  of  themes. 
Furthermore,  the  fact  that  some  interviews  were  not  transcribed  verbatim  made  it 
impossible,  even  with  the  flexibility  of  the  package,  to  put  issues  in  their  proper 
context.  Given  that  the  text  rarely  exceeded  five  pages,  further  use  of  QSR- 
NUD*IST  4  was  limited  to  searching  for  text  in  individual  cases. 
Official  documents  on  both  the  Euro-Mediterranean  agreements  and  the 
Barcelona  process  were  rather  thin  on  the  ground.  Naturally  enough,  the 
Commission,  Member  States  and  the  partner  countries  were  reluctant  to  release 
details  of  the  figures  on  the  table  in  the  negotiations  before  deals  were  concluded. 
Despite  numerous  requests,  none  of  the  Commission's  negotiating  mandates  for 
the  Euro-Mediterranean  Agreements  were  made  available,  and  the  information 
included  in  the  body  of  the  thesis  was  supplied  by  interviewees.  Two  contacts  - 
one  in  the  Commission,  one  in  the  Council  Secretariat  -  did  supply  a  handftil  of 
internal  briefing  papers  on  the  preparation  of  the  Barcelona  Declaration,  though 
these  had  to  be  matched  to  official  reports  to  discover  how  and  why  the  text  was 
modified  during  the  course  of  1995.  Again,  interviews  proved  a  far  more  effective 
source  of  infortnation. 
Obtaining  other  secondary  sources  -  newspapers  and  periodicals  -  was  a 
reminder  how  far  Glasgow  is  from  the  Mediterranean.  A  very  limited  range  of 
relevant  material  was  accessible  in  Scotland,  and  frequent  trips  to  London  and 
283 further  afield  were  necessary  to  find  specialised  periodicals  and  foreign 
newspapers.  Visits  to  the  libraries  of  the  ULB  in  Brussels,  Louvain-la-Neuve 
University  and  the  Institut  du  Monde  Arabe  in  Paris  were  especially  helpful 
though  costly.  A  list  of  the  periodicals  and  newspapers  consulted  follows. 
Actualites  Frangaises 
Agence  France  Presse 
Al-Ahram  Weekly 
Arabies 
Agence  Europe 
Bulletin  of  the  European  Union 
Cahiers  de  I'Orient 
Defense  Nationale 
Economist  Intelligence  Unit  Country  Reports 
El  Pals 
El  Watan. 
European  Report 
European  Voice 
International  Herald  Tribune 
Jeune  Afrique 
Le  Canard  Enchaine 
Le  Monde 
Le  Monde  Diplornatique 
Le  Soir 
La  Vie  Econornique 
Marches  Tropicaux  et  Mediterraneens 
Middle  East  Business  Weekly 
Middle  East  Economic  Digest 
Monde  Arabe:  Maghreb/Machrek 
Official  Journal  of  the  National  Assembly  of  France 
Reuters 
The  Guardian 
The  Independent 
The  Jerusalem  Post 
The  New  York  Review  of  Books 
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